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The potential for satellite technology to make an essential contribution to socio-
economic development has been recognised by the international community 
since the onset of space adventure in the late 1950s. Due to its complexity and 
the resources required, satellite technology development has always been the 
reserve of major powers. However, a new trend emerged in the 1990s towards 
developing smaller and cheaper satellites. It is driven by the spectacular 
development in information and communication technologies, advances in 
technology miniaturisation, rising performance of off-the-shelf components, and 
space sector globalisation. This trend has lowered barriers to entry for small 
developing countries. They have used the new mechanism of small satellite 
collaborative projects in order to transfer Earth observation small satellite 
technology from developed countries. 
Like other developing countries, Algeria has leveraged this trend and engaged 
successively in three Earth observation small satellite collaborative projects with 
foreign companies in order to build small satellite capability. The purpose of this 
study is, thus, to evaluate whether Algeria has skilfully combined the technology 
acquired from abroad with local efforts to build effective and sustainable local 
small satellite capability.  
Technological capability-building through technology transfer usually refers to 
the ability to reconcile two categories of factors: i) exogenous factors, external 
to the country’s socio-economic environment, that condition the transfer of 
technology from abroad - these factors are traditionally gathered under the body 
of knowledge called ‘technology transfer’; and ii) endogenous factors, relating to 
the local effort to effectively acquire and indigenise the transferred technology – 
these factors are traditionally gathered under the body of knowledge called 
‘technological capability-building’. Technological capability-building through 
technology transfer is also viewed as a learning process where knowledge is 
transferred from abroad and locally diffused.  
The evaluation approach adopted in this study examines the small satellite 
capability-building programme from a knowledge-oriented perspective. Algeria’s 
ii 
context is appraised by using the Innovation System analytical approach. The 
programme planning is evaluated by using the ‘strategic planning’ analytical 
approach. The programme implementation is evaluated by placing technological 
learning at the heart of the study. Two systemic models for the evaluation of 
knowledge flow from the transferor to the transferee, and then to its local 
environment, have been devised and tested. The knowledge-oriented 
perspective has been triangulated with perspectives stemming from the two 
traditional bodies of knowledge: technology transfer and technological 
capability-building. The evaluation has been comprehensive by taking into 
account factors across different levels of analysis: individual and team (micro 
level); organisation or firm (meso level); and national, sectoral and international 
(macro level). The evaluation has been performed through a mixed method 
research design.  
The research findings indicate that the process of building small satellite 
technological capability in Algeria has provided mixed results, and the most 
concerning are at the macro level. Algeria has failed to establish a strong 
foothold between the nascent satellite development activities and a local supply 
chain. Moreover, at the meso level, Algeria has not established an effective 
learning organisation that can lead, synergistically and coherently, satellite 
development activities. Finally, at the micro level, Algeria has failed to align 
technology transfer mechanisms with satellite development objectives.  
Based on these findings, the study highlights the need for clear strategies with 
prioritised objectives. It recommends elevating management capability-building 
as an absolute priority, and suggests the adoption of appropriate technology 
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1 Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Making the case for the study 
Technology transfer from developed to developing countries is seen as a 
catalyst for accelerating the technological capabilities of developing countries. 
Satellite technology, traditionally the reserve of major powers, was not so much 
concerned with this debate. However, a new international dynamic has 
emerged over the last two decades; namely, the rise of a new international 
industrial transfer mechanism called satellite collaborative projects, allowing 
small countries with a relatively constrained budget to access small satellite 
technology and start building up their own small satellite capabilities.  
Since the early 2000s, Algeria has used this mechanism in order to build up its 
small satellite capabilities. The question that currently arises is whether Algeria 
has skilfully combined the technology acquired from abroad with local efforts so 
as to build effective and sustainable local small satellite capabilities.  
The following sections of this opening chapter shed light on space technology 
potential, providing an overview of its evolution and the international context 
fostering its adoption. It will be seen that the new trend towards small satellites 
lowers barriers to entry for small developing countries. First, the mechanism 
used by the latter to acquire technology is briefly presented. Then, foundational 
considerations underpinning the evaluation of small satellite capability-building 
in Algeria are explained. This leads to the formulation of the study aim, and an 
articulation of the study’s contribution to knowledge. A conceptual model is then 
provided illustrating the building blocks of this study. Finally, the structure of the 
thesis is presented. 
1.2 Space technology potential and its adoption in developing 
countries 
Mankind has always gazed at space with fascination. Curiosity, along with the 
desire to push forth the boundaries of the known world has led to the 
progressive conquest of space. The latter was formally begun in 1957 with the 
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launch of the first Earth-orbiting satellite. Since then many important 
achievements have been realised that use space for the well-being of humanity 
and its development. None of these achievements would have been possible 
without the outstanding development of space technologies or, indeed, 
‘terrestrial’ technologies that were upgraded and adapted to meet the 
requirements of space. This raises the question as to the contribution these 
technologies have made, and whether they have fostered progress, particularly 
in developing countries. 
1.2.1 Technology: a key driving force in development 
The importance of technology in supporting and sustaining socio-economic 
development, in both developed and developing countries, is recognised and 
has been extensively documented.1 Technology is held to be the main lever for 
economic development. Scholarly works reveal that technological progress is a 
dominant factor in long-term economic growth2 and the most important factor 
affecting economic growth rate.3 Several studies stress the role of technology in 
sustaining more than 50 percent of long-term economic growth in industrial 
countries.4 Research on the East Asian countries shows that productivity 
growth, which is the best proxy for technology progress, accounts for as much 
as 30 percent of gross domestic product growth.5  
Technology also plays a prevailing role in human development in the current 
era. Its strengths lie in information, knowledge and ICT development.6 Indeed, 
this development has led to a revolutionary technological progress that has 
brought major changes in education, work patterns, employment and job 
markets, as well as quality of life, through social behaviour change, including 
increased personal empowerment, self-reliance and freedom.7 
Regarding the role of technology in achieving sustainable development, it is 
worth recalling that environmental impact is affected by three factors: population 
growth, consumption, and technology used to transform resources into 
consumable products.8 Governments are currently unable to reduce population 
growth and face difficulties in changing consumption models. Consequently, 
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technology is left as the major factor to reckon with in order to achieve 
sustainable development.9  
Recognising the vital role of technology, developing countries have continuously 
engaged over roughly the last sixty years (mainly after WWII) in a quest to build 
technological capability and move from poverty to prosperity. There are three 
non-mutually exclusive options these countries face in developing technological 
capability:10 (i) acquiring technology from abroad, (ii) improving the locally 
existing technology, and (iii) starting from scratch by using R&D and production 
experience to develop new indigenous technology. However, in the context of 
the early developmental stage of these countries, technology acquired or 
transferred from overseas is likely to be the major source of technology.11 This 
is particularly fostered by the openness in international technology transfer 
relationships during recent decades. Fredland12 points out that since 1989, 
international technology transfer has been “intentional… apolitical or moderately 
political, global economy compatible, integrated and supported through global 
economy”.13 On the other hand, he recalls that it was “intentional… political or 
highly political”14 from 1945 to 1989, and “inadvertent, incidental… nonpolitical 
or apolitical”15 during the 19th century through to 1945. 
A noteworthy range of technologies that contribute significantly in building 
developed country capabilities is already available in the international market or 
public domain. However, these technologies are not easily accessible because 
of their cost or the lack of appropriate knowledge for their acquisition.16 In 
addition, technology is a kind of knowledge and is thus a cross-cutting concept 
and not a product. Acquiring it is therefore difficult.17  
Moreover, transferring technology to developing countries goes beyond its mere 
acquisition from abroad. It aims to build nation’s local technological 
capabilities.18 This dual objective refers to the ability to reconcile exogenous 
factors, external to the country’s socio-economic environment, with endogenous 
and local factors.  
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Indeed, a review of developing country experiences makes it clear that for a 
successful and sustainable building of technological capabilities, the acquisition 
of technology from abroad should be accompanied by an indigenous 
assimilation effort.19  In general, the latter is oriented towards fully utilising 
imported technologies, and then, through indigenous adaptation and 
improvement, a new technology is developed.20  
From a knowledge-based stance,21 the whole process can be looked at as a 
technological learning phenomenon in which technology (as knowledge) flows 
from foreign to local actors (Figure 1-1). Knowledge is conveyed across borders 
through an international transfer effort, involving factors exogenous to the 
country. It is then locally disseminated through a local technological capability-
building effort, involving endogenous factors.  




Acquisition and progressive mastering of technology is considered to be one of 
the key driving forces underpinning the spectacular economic take-off and 
development of the so-called "first tier" Asian Newly Industrialised Countries.22 
However, technology mastering and indigenisation has not always been 
successful. Several developing countries have engaged in this quest but with 
limited impact on their local capabilities.23 The fact remains that success (or 
failure) stories of technological development vary from one country to another, 
depending on industrial (or sectoral), technological and market conditions. 
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1.2.2 Space technology potential  
Following the launch of the first Earth-orbiting satellites in the late 1950s, the 
potential for space technology24 along with its applications to make essential 
contributions to economic and social development was quickly recognised by 
the international community. Space activities expanded quickly in the following 
decades and demonstrated their usefulness in everyday life. Space activities 
have significantly impacted the human condition, environmental protection, 
economic progress, institutions and policy.25 Space investment also 
demonstrates tremendous potential for deeper impact in the future. Wood & 
Weigel26 synthesise the three ways where space contributes to global society: 
space provides infrastructure, information and inspiration. 
Infrastructure refers to local, regional and global infrastructures (e.g. satellites, 
ground segment, and user terminals) that support human activity. Space also 
provides information that reduces uncertainty,27 creating tangible benefits for 
individuals, governments and businesses. Moreover, “the unique environment 
of space often inspires creative engineering approaches and innovative 
solutions”.28   
In the context of developing countries, the contribution of space technology in 
multi-sectoral development is undeniable.29 Better still, beyond the physical and 
tangible sense of fulfilling developmental needs, space promotes “the sense of 
national pride and confidence amongst [developing countries’] citizens”.30 
Indeed, the vast majority of developing countries emerging from colonialism 
face a pessimistic perception of themselves.31 Promoting space-related 
technological challenges creates a sense of national pride and instils 
confidence amongst developing country populations. Space has the ability to 
capture the imagination of the public. Any space achievement will spread 
confidence amongst citizens, foster a spirit of national unity, and promote a 
desire to take up further challenges.32 Two outstanding examples of changing 
national self-perception through challenging space programmes are offered by 
China and India. Both countries have achieved exceptional development in 
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space technology within the past five decades and have demonstrated that, 
even within a challenging developing country context, perceptions and a 
community’s confidence in its own abilities can change.  
Many developing countries33 have entered into space activities facing various 
circumstances, harbouring differing ambitions, and achieving different results. 
However, they have all pursued similar motivations: socio-economic 
development along with political, security and sovereignty objectives. 
Regardless of circumstances and motivations, foreign space technology and 
international cooperation are catalysts for building local capability. 
Space technology programmes development and categorisation 
Space activities are often divided into two major categories: i) space 
applications, including remote sensing (or Earth observation) systems, satellite 
communications and navigation, satellite meteorology and atmospheric 
sciences, and ii) basic space science, including astronomy and astrophysics, 
solar-terrestrial interactions, planetary and atmospheric studies and exobiology. 
Both categories are based on space technology utilisation.  
The most common and significant contribution to development lies in space 
applications stemming from services provided by satellites.34 Most of these 
services are categorised according to the satellite mission, such as: i) remote 
sensing (or Earth observation) satellites used for collecting information about 
the Earth and objects on it, ii) communication satellites that enable radio, 
television and telephone transmissions, and (iii) positioning satellites that 
determine object positioning on the ground and in space surrounding the Earth.  
Dupas35 explains that space development occurred in three waves (Figure 1-2). 
The first was mainly led by developments in science exploration and manned 
space flight in the 1960s. It resulted from the space race between the United 
States and the former Soviet Union. Space activities during this period were 
almost exclusively funded by governments. The second wave in the 1970s was 
led by developments in military space programmes. This period is characterised 
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by the use of space for defence and security purposes. Governments were still 
the main financier of space activities during this period. However, the private 
sector developed expertise particularly in communication satellites.  
The third wave was led by the 1990’s development in information space 
programmes, and is still ongoing. This wave has had a considerable effect on 
space development. It is driven by the revolution in Information and 
Communication Technologies. It is also driven by the tendency towards a 
globalised space sector, characterised by international collaboration and the 
growing role of private sector (or commercial) activities.36  
Figure 1-2: Waves of space development 
 
Source: adapted from Dupas, A., 1995. In Search of Waves of Space Development. Presentation to 
Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, USA. Second reference in: Waswa, P.M.B, 
Juma, C., 2012. Establishing a space sector for sustainable development in Kenya. International 
Journal of Technology and Globalisation 6(1-2), pp.152-169. 
 
The third wave is characterised by the growth of satellite activities, or services 
provided by satellites (e.g. satellite TV, broadband, communications, and Earth 
observation services).37 The upstream segment (i.e. satellite manufacturing, 
ground equipment and launch industry) still participates in this growth. For this 
reason, the space industry is defined as “the economic sector providing goods 
and services related to space”.38  
Looked at differently, the space industry encompasses two major components: 
the satellite and non-satellite industries.39 Because it is difficult to identify what 
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the non-satellite industry comprises, there is a blanket focus on satellite-related 
activities when it comes to the space sector. Consequently, the common 
practice is to focus on the satellite industry and to use interchangeably the 
terms satellite industry and space industry.40   
Technological advances in terms of miniaturisation and performance of off-the-
shelf components have significantly contributed to the emergence of a trend 
towards building smaller and cheaper spacecraft. This trend brought a 
concomitant reduction in domestic space budgets and gave rise to a new ‘small’ 
satellite business model. Consequently, there is growing interest in space on 
the part of budget-limited developing countries. The trend has opened up the 
exclusive ranks of spacefaring nations to new entrant states (e.g. Algeria, 
Egypt, Nigeria, Turkey, Chile, Peru, Venezuela, United Arab Emirates, 
Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam), which have engaged in building satellite 
technology capability through acquisition of small satellites via technology 
transfer programmes. 
1.2.3 Space technology capability-building  
Capability-building has often been explained through a set of achievements 
spread out over a space technology sophistication continuum. Building space 
capability corresponds to progressing from one step to another. The steps are 
ranked according to technical complexity, cost and managerial autonomy. They 
also reflect the historical strategies of developed and developing countries 
engaged in space technology. Two major frameworks illustrate this hierarchical 
order: firstly, Leloglu & Kocaoglan’s41 one-dimensional pyramidal structure, and, 
secondly, Wood & Weigel’s42 space technology ladder. 
In the first framework (Figure 1-3), countries can be hierarchically grouped 
according to their level of mastery of space technology. For example, the base 
of the pyramid is large because all countries are ‘users’ of space technology. 
The apex of the pyramid is narrow, and limited to countries that have 




Figure 1-3: The space technology pyramid 
 
Source: Leloglu, U.M., Kocaoglan, E., 2008. Establishing space industry in developing countries: 
Opportunities and difficulties. Advances in Space Research 42, 1879–1886 
 
In the second framework (Table 1-1), countries are ranked according to space 
technological complexity and managerial autonomy. Thus, in addition to the 
organisational aspect represented mainly by the first step ‘establishing a 
national space agency’, the ladder framework is built by using additional major 
steps and is more detailed in terms of technological achievement. The second 
step consists of owning and operating a satellite in low Earth orbit, 
corresponding generally to a remote sensing satellite (or Earth observation). 
The next step is that of owning and operating a satellite in geostationary orbit 
corresponding generally to a communication satellite. The capacity to launch 
satellites is the ultimate step. 
Table 1-1: The space technology ladder 
Categories Sub-categories or Milestones 
Launching satellites 
13 Satellite to GEO (Geostationary Earth Orbit) 
12 Satellite to LEO (Low Earth orbit) 
Owning and operating a satellite in 
geostationary orbit 
11 Build Locally 
10 Build through Mutual International Collaboration 
9 Build Locally with Outside Assistance 
8 Procure 
Owning and operating a satellite in 
low Earth orbit 
7 Build Locally 
6 Build Through Mutual International Collaboration 
5 Build Locally with Outside Assistance 
4 Build with Support in Partner’s Facility 
3 Procure with Training Services 
Establishing national Space Agency 
2 Establish Current Agency 
1 Establish First National Space Office 
 
Source: Wood, D., Weigel, A., 2012. Charting the evolution of satellite programs in developing countries – 
The space Technology Ladder. Space Policy 28, 15-24. 
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The above two frameworks reflect the general debate on space capability-
building in both developed and developing countries. They identify major space 
technology development milestones at country level, whether they be 
developed or developing. This hierarchy of ‘macro’ steps informs on the major 
milestones for building small satellite capability. However, the level of 
aggregation remains insufficient and inadequate for capturing the finer 
granularity and peculiarities of small satellite capability-building, particularly in 
the specific context of developing countries, such as technological autonomy. 
Moreover, the frameworks are unclear as to the share of technological 
acquisition from abroad (imports) and the degree of technological indigenisation 
(technology locally generated).     
The same ‘macro’ perspective is reflective of the commonly adopted approach 
when evaluating space technology capability-building. Evaluation is based on 
‘instrumental’ use of ‘macro’ outcomes and achievements, and says little about 
the finer details of the phenomenon.  
1.3 New dynamic of small satellite technology transfer to 
developing countries  
As mentioned earlier, small satellite technology transfer has been facilitated by 
a wave of information and communication technologies, technological advances 
in terms of miniaturisation, and performance of the off-the-shelf components. 
This wave is inherently ‘Global’, and has been boosted by extensive 
international collaboration, with greater involvement of ‘small’ developing 
countries.  
This dynamic, or the new way of manufacturing small satellites, was largely 
popularised by a University of Surrey-owned spin-off company, Surrey Satellite 
Technology Limited (SSTL).43 As a pioneer in small satellite technology, SSTL 
exploited the opportunities arising from the profound transformation of the 
space industry. It developed a business model in the 1990s based on a unique 
Know-How Transfer and Training (KHTT) programme, along with Earth 
observation satellite manufacture.44 Within this programme, a combination of 
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academic and hands-on technical training was provided to engineers and 
scientists from countries wishing to take the first steps into space on an 
affordable budget. By working together as a team with SSTL engineers to build 
a satellite, developing states were able to start working on complex 
technological systems, generating the diverse skills required to design, build, 
launch and operate a satellite once in orbit.45 
SSTL’s business model, called the collaborative satellite project, has 
subsequently been adopted by numerous companies and space agencies 
throughout the world. After more than two decades of small satellite 
development and commercialisation, collaborative small satellite projects are 
perceived as the most common mechanism of international satellite technology 
transfer directed towards small developing countries. These countries typically 
have limited budgets and little or no experience in space technology. 
Sophisticated forms or variants of this mechanism have been adopted by 
developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, with the common aim of 
achieving a higher level of independence in satellite capability.  
1.4 Developing small satellite capability in Algeria 
Algeria’s development effectively started in the late 1960s following a trial and 
maturation period that began in 1962 just after Independence. Algeria first 
adopted a planned economy model from the late 1960s to the late 1980s.46 The 
model was heavily oil-dependent and failed in producing the desired results. A 
market economy was then adopted in the late 1980s.47 Since then, ineffective 
measures have been taken to promote transition towards a new economic 
model. Algerian development trajectory has been characterised by incorrect 
choices, inconsistencies, interruptions, and short-sighted perspectives. 
Consequently, Algeria is still thought of as being in economic transition, and 
continues to be heavily oil-dependent.48  
Within the 1990’s transitional phase, the idea of building small satellite 
capabilities in Algeria emerged. The strategic value of space technology, and its 
applications, has progressively increased. The need for developing national 
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space activities coincided with an international context favourable to technology 
transfer. 
Algeria seized the opportunity and engaged successively in three Earth 
observation small satellite collaborative projects with foreign companies. The 
first was the Alsat-1 project with SSTL/UK in 2001.49 The second was the Alsat-
2 project with Airbus Defence and Space (previously EADS-Astrium)/France in 
2005. This project comprised the development of two identical satellites: Alsat-
2A in 2005 and Alsat-2B in 2012.50 The third was the Alsat-1B project with 
SSTL/UK in 2014.51   
Given Algeria’s limited experience in satellite technology, these collaborative 
projects were used to take the first steps into satellite manufacturing through 
technology transfer.52 They were also used as the backbone for devising a 
broader national space programme, covering both space technology (or satellite 
industry) and space applications, with the aim of achieving a higher level of 
independence.53    
This undertaking has not always been viewed favourably in Algeria, and even in 
other ‘small’ developing countries. Some analysts54 consider that due to their 
limited capabilities, developing countries would benefit more from a focused 
effort on space applications rather than venturing into satellite technology 
capability-building (or manufacturing).  
Multiple studies55 relating to other industries in developing countries show that 
achieving higher levels of technological independence through international 
technological transfer is a complex task. It depends upon diverse factors, 
notably the host country’s technological capability. 
Despite the popularity of small satellite collaborative projects, there is a lack of 
hindsight and objectivity as to their effectiveness in building sustainable satellite 
technological capability in developing countries. This argues for a cautious 
stance when using collaborative projects as a technology transfer mechanism, 
and, accordingly, requires a deeper evaluation.  
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Technological capability-building through technology transfer has a literature 
base that is widely influenced by a mono-dimensional economic perspective. 
Emphasis is usually placed on economic goals such as the transferred 
technology’s impact on productivity, or on the cost-benefit of production.56 This 
perspective is restrictive when dealing with Earth observation small satellite 
technology, because the direct and immediate economic potential is not proven 
(as discussed in chapter 3).  
An exclusive economic perspective is also inappropriate for studying technology 
transfer in the Algerian context. Algeria is currently stuck in a long-lasting 
transitional period in which economic choices are uncertain (as discussed in 
chapter 6). However, the body of knowledge on technology transfer stems 
essentially from market economy environments. Analyses conducted on the 
basis of this solely economically oriented body of knowledge might be biased 
when it comes to Algeria’s economic environment. The uncertainty makes it 
difficult to build a foothold between the studied satellite capability-building 
programme and its economic environment. 
For these reasons, a knowledge-oriented perspective is central to this study.57 
This perspective reflects the “engineering” point of view, not least because the 
author is an engineer. Importantly, engineers consider technology transfer as 
knowledge transfer.58  
For the purpose of formulating the study aim, these introductory comments 
have sought to make the case for an evaluation of small satellite capability-
building in Algeria. The evaluation is knowledge-centred, grounded in today’s 
context of knowledge-based societies and knowledge-intensive industries (e.g. 
satellite technology). 
1.5 Study Aim 




1.5.1 Enabling objectives 
1. Review of the foundational concepts of technological learning, 
technological capability-building, technology transfer and innovation 
systems in developing countries. 
2. Analysis of small satellite technology: its peculiarities and the process of 
acquisition in developing countries. 
3. Definition of the evaluation metrics. 
4. Appraisal of Algeria’s developmental and technological context. 
5. Appraisal of small satellite capability-building programme planning. 
6. Empirical analysis of small satellite technological learning in Algeria. 
7. Empirical analysis of small satellite technology transfer in Algeria through 
collaborative projects.  
8. Empirical analysis of indigenous development of Algerian small satellite 
capability.  
1.6  Study Value 
This thesis contributes to the established but still relevant debate on managing 
technology in developing countries. To paraphrase Drucker, “there are no 
‘underdeveloped’ countries, there are only ‘undermanaged’ ones”.59 This is 
reflective of how essential it is to study managerial questions in developing 
countries. Like other sectors in Algeria, the space sector is truly representative 
of the challenges such countries face. Management of space technology within 
Algeria has never been studied, despite the multiple “technical” endeavours 
undertaken by the space leading organisation over the last two decades. 
Therefore, the present study attempts to provide knowledge that enriches the 
literature on space technology management in Algeria and developing countries 
in general. This is particularly relevant, given the growing international interest 
in space.60 
The first principal contribution of this research derives from empirical evaluation 
and deep insights into small satellite capability-building in Algeria’s nascent 
space programme. One of the strategic objectives of the latter is the 
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development of industrial capabilities. Therefore, Algerian policymakers will gain 
appreciation on whether their developmental model is promoting effective 
industrialisation through generation of local value. Moreover, the Algerian space 
programme covers a planning period of 15 years (2006-2020), so it is timely to 
explore the programme’s progress.  
The second principal contribution of this research lies in understanding better 
the relatively new phenomenon of building small satellite capability through the 
mechanism of collaborative projects. It relates more to the nature of 
relationships between developing and developed countries regarding 
technology transfer. Indeed, the satellite industry is a knowledge-intensive 
industry.61 Developing countries intend to build, eventually, local technological 
capabilities from the technology transferred through collaborative projects. On 
the other hand, developed countries, as suppliers of technology, recognise that 
in a globalising world, their knowledge base provides the major comparative 
advantage. However, maintaining it requires protectionism. Reconciling those 
two goals is challenging. This research can aid in understanding some aspects 
of the contemporary knowledge-intensive relationships between developed and 
developing countries. 
The third contribution of the study lies in its evaluation framework. In 
technological capability-building through technology transfer, knowledge flows 
from the transferor to the transferee, and then to its local environment      
(Figure 1-1). In order to evaluate the knowledge flow for the particular case of 
small satellite technology in Algeria, two systemic models, called ‘knowledge 
flow model’ and ‘experiential learning model’, have been devised and tested. 
These two models show conceptual potential for adaptation to knowledge flow 
(or learning) evaluation in further studies involving other industries with similar 
contexts.  
1.7  Conceptual model 
A conceptual model is a construct representing the “concepts, assumptions, 
expectations, beliefs, and theories that support and inform [the] research”.62 It 
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“explains, either graphically or in narrative form, the main things to be studied— 
the key factors, concepts, or variables—and the presumed relationships among 
them”.63 The conceptual model assists the researcher in conducting the 
research and adds clarity for the reader.64 It provides an overview of the 
intended research. Ideally, it connects all aspects, including the research aim, 
literature review, research methodology and analysis.65 The model stems 
essentially from the literature review, where theories and concepts underpinning 
the study are identified.66   
The rationale behind the conceptual model for this study (Figure 1-5) derives 
firstly from the meaning of the programme evaluation. The evaluation refers to 
“the systemic collection of information about the activities, characteristics and 
outcomes of programs to make judgments about the program, improve program 
effectiveness, and/or inform decisions about future programming”.67 The 
evaluation aims to provide insights into the programme’s major phases: 
planning and implementation.68 
Planning evaluation aims at examining whether the plan clearly connects the 
‘mission’ to the ‘vision’.69 The evaluation assesses whether the plan is 
complete, realistic, integrated (elements mutually supported) and balanced 
(resources, objectives).70 The evaluation of Algeria’s small satellite capability-
building programme is conducted from a ‘strategic planning’ perspective.71 The 
latter offers a comprehensive approach which addresses relationships between 
strategic, intermediate, and operational levels, and encompasses numerous 
frameworks and models enabling the evaluation.72 
Implementation evaluation determines whether programme activities have been 
properly implemented and producing the intended effect.73 As illustrated in 
Figure 1-4 and detailed in chapter 2, the process of technological capability-
building through technology transfer can be looked at, and then evaluated, from 
a triple perspective: (i) evaluation of the international transfer by focusing on the 
exogenous factors (technology transfer in Figure 1-4); (ii) evaluation of the 
locally-built capability by focusing on the endogenous factors (technological 
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capability-building in Figure 1-4); and (iii) evaluation of the knowledge that flows 
from the transferor to transferee, and is then locally diffused (technological 
learning in Figure 1-4).  
Figure 1-4: Triple perspective approach 
 
Source: Author  
 
The literature reviewed in this thesis (chapters 2 and 3) reveals that 
technological capability-building through technology transfer involves a 
multitude of factors that can be categorised at individual and team level (micro 
level), organisation level (meso level), and sectoral, national and international 
level (macro level). Accordingly, any attempt at a comprehensive evaluation 
should be performed at all levels (micro, meso, and macro).  
In addition, comprehensively evaluating a programme is not only about 
understanding its immediate activities, characteristics, and outcomes; it is also 
concerned with the comprehension of the setting in which it is undertaken as 
well as the wider environment (macro considerations). The programme is both 
affected by its context and attempts to influence this context. The embedment of 
the programme into its environment needs to be appraised if a comprehensive 
evaluation is to be achieved. However, the literature in chapters 2 and 3 reveals 
that the macro level is not sufficiently covered by the above-mentioned 
analytical perspective (or bodies of knowledge). Thus, the Innovation System 
approach is adopted for further analysis of the macro-environment.  
Accordingly, the conceptual model in Figure 1-5 illustrates the building blocks of 
Algeria’s small satellite capability-building evaluation. The starting point is the 
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appraisal of Algeria’s developmental and technological context, highlighting the 
macro considerations surrounding the small satellite capability-building 
programme. In a second stage, the study evaluates the planning from a 
strategic planning perspective. Finally, the study collates and analyses 
measurements across the implementation process.  
Figure 1-5: Conceptual model: evaluation building blocks 
 
Source: Author  
 
1.8  Study structure 
Beyond this introductory chapter, the study comprises seven further chapters. 
Chapter 2 provides a critical review of the literature on technological capability-
building through international technology transfer in developing countries. 
Discussion is conducted from a knowledge-oriented perspective, where the 
literature on technological learning is reviewed. The latter perspective is 
enriched (triangulated) by perspectives from the traditional literature on 
technological capability-building and technology transfer in developing 
countries.74 A knowledge-oriented perspective is also adopted to review 
literature on the environment by using the Innovation System analytical 
approach. Chapter 2 reveals the complexity of designing ‘standard’ 
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measurements, and therefore underlines the need for a one-off approach that 
suits small satellite capability-building.  
Chapter 3 reviews small satellite peculiarities and small satellite technology 
adoption in developing countries. It provides insights into the philosophy 
underpinning the complexity of small satellite development. The discussion 
identifies managerial factors required for successful development and 
categorises those factors according to levels of analysis (macro, meso and 
micro). This chapter reviews the mechanism of collaborative projects used for 
small satellite technology transfer. It also provides insights on selected relevant 
experiences (South Korea and India) in developing satellite capabilities.  
Chapter 4 draws on the literature discussed in the previous two chapters and 
proposes the evaluation framework to be used in this study. A global framework 
is formed by three categories of evaluation metrics, covering three levels of 
analysis (macro, meso and micro). The knowledge perspective is at the heart of 
this study, and chapter 4 presents two systemic evaluation models as part of 
the global framework. They both encompass metrics related to knowledge flow, 
from knowledge conveyance (transferor to transferee) to its local diffusion (in 
developing countries).  
Implementation of the evaluation framework requires empirical data. Chapter 5 
positions the research and delineates the hierarchy of philosophical and 
methodological choices that led to the mixed design used in the study. 
Research quality considerations are highlighted throughout the chapter.  
The analysis and findings from the evaluation of Algeria’s small satellite 
capability-building programme are synthesised across chapters 6 and 7. 
Chapter 6 appraises the contextual backdrop of Algeria’s technological 
development from an Innovation System perspective, and then traces and 
evaluates the planning of the small satellite capability-building programme from 
a strategic planning perspective. Chapter 7 deepens the evaluation by 
examining, systemically, the capability-building implementation process at 
macro, meso, and micro levels. It critically analyses the process according to 
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three categories of evaluation metrics (technological learning, locally built 
technological capabilities, and the transferred technology). 
Finally, chapter 8 concludes that, at the macro level, Algeria has failed in 
establishing a strong foothold between satellite development activities and the 
national environment. Actions at the meso level (organisations) are inconsistent, 
fragmented, and unbalanced. Actions at the micro level are not aligned with the 
defined objectives. Accordingly, a set of recommendations is offered towards 
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2 Chapter 2: Technology adoption in developing countries 
Algeria uses foreign technology transfer as a catalyst towards building its own 
small satellite capabilities. Evaluating such an endeavour requires reviewing the 
literature on the general phenomenon of technology adoption in developing 
countries. In particular, the literature on how technological capabilities are built 
through international technology transfer. 
As illustrated in Figure 2-1, the present chapter starts by recalling the role of 
technology in development (section 2.1), highlighting two concepts that are 
fundamental to understanding technology adoption in developing countries. The 
first is that technological development in developing countries involves 
exogenous factors linked to technology transferred from abroad, as well as 
endogenous factors associated with local technological capabilities.  
The second fundamental concept is that technology is knowledge which is 
conveyed across borders (international technology transfer) and disseminated 
internally (local technological capability-building). Hence the centrality of the 
knowledge-oriented perspective in this thesis (section 2.3).  
Three bodies of knowledge are then reviewed. The literature on technological 
learning, which is at the heart of the present thesis, is covered in section 2.4. 
The approach is ‘triangulated’1 by a review of the relevant literature on 
technological capability-building and technology transfer (sections 2.5 and 2.6). 
This review reveals that learning technology (or building technological-
capabilities through technology transfer) is affected by a multitude of factors. 
These factors can be categorised as being operative at individual and team 
levels (micro level), organisational and firm levels (meso level), and within the 
national, sectoral and international environment (macro level).  
The review also reveals that the macro level is not addressed sufficiently well by 
the three above-mentioned bodies of knowledge. Thus, a knowledge-oriented 
perspective is adopted for further analysis of the macro-environment. The 
Innovation System analytical approach is then reviewed in section 2.7. 
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Finally, a critical appraisal of the literature in section 2.8 sheds light on the gaps 
that need to be filled in order to develop an appropriate approach for evaluating 
satellite capability-building in Algeria.  





2.1 Development: a multifaceted concept 
Development is defined as “the gradual growth of something so that it becomes 
more advanced, stronger…”.2 It usually means improvement. National 
development is a multi-dimensional concept as it refers to the development of a 
highly complex system, often referred to as socio-economic system, i.e. a 
nation or a country. The literature usually addresses national development 
either as a whole system composed of several interacting elements (referred to 
as subsystems) or from a focused subsystem perspective (e.g. economic 
development, human development, sustainable development, territorial 
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development, technological development, industrial development and 
agricultural development) (Figure 2-2).  
Figure 2-2: National development components 
 
Source: Author. 
Due to a nation’s system complexity, national development “can occur in 
different parts or ways, at different speeds, and driven by different forces”.3 
Therefore, mixing successfully too many entangled subsystems with diverse 
objectives within a multitude of contexts (national and international) is clearly an 
enormous challenge. Thus, defining national development might be more a 
matter of understanding the relationships dynamics among the system’s 
components and their relative significance in the changing nation’s system of 
values over time.  
The appropriate way to address national development is to adopt a holistic 
perspective, gathering all socio-economic components. However, the 
complexity of such a perspective has led scholars to adopt more practical 
approaches towards policy making and managing development. These 
approaches emphasise development system components. Component 
identification occurs progressively over the long-run in the light of intellectual 




2.1.1 Economic development 
The most traditional component or dimension of national development is 
economic. Indeed, economic development is a process that generates growth. 
Scholars identify three major reasons that explain economic growth. The first is 
provided by Solow,4 who argues that the accumulation of capital or increasing 
the capital per unit of labour increases productivity and economic growth in per 
capita terms. The problem is that continuous increases of capital progressively 
diminish marginal productivity. Beyond a certain point, any increase in capital 
would have no impact on productivity per unit of labour. A more adroit solution 
would be to have capital and labour increase in tandem.5  
In the context of developing countries the capital/labour ratio is low. Solow’s 
argument essentially means that by investing in capital, developing countries 
will have more returns than developed countries as the latter enjoy higher 
capital/labour ratios. Ultimately both developing and developed economies 
would converge (capital/labour ratios would converge) – a questionable 
assumption which points up the limitations of this line of argument.  
The second reason proffered to explain economic growth is known as 
Schumpeterian growth. Schumpeter6 suggests that long-term economic growth 
is generated to a large extent by innovation. Economic agents or entrepreneurs 
introduce innovations, including new technology, to their businesses in order to 
improve them and destroy the results of earlier innovations. This continuous 
innovation introduction/destruction cycle is the key driver of long-term growth.  
The third reason explaining economic growth is specified by North.7 He remarks 
on the relationship between institutional change and economic growth. 
Institutions are defined as “humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interactions”.8 Put differently, institutions are the formal 
and informal rules used by society to ensure market order and safety. As it is 
often risky to operate in a market, rules reduce this risk and underpin market 
development and expansion.  
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Stiglitz9 points out the prevalence of market failure in developing countries and 
the institutional role for government intervention. He emphasises that 
knowledge and information are associated with “commodities” that are most 
often linked to market failure. Thus, knowledge becomes central to economic 
development. Economic development is then defined as “a process of moving 
from a set of assets based on primary products, exploited by unskilled labour, to 
a set of assets based on knowledge, exploited by skilled labour”.10 
2.1.2 Human development 
Economic development is not an end per se, but should enable human 
development.11 The latter refers to another important development dimension. 
The United Nations Development Programme suggests capturing human 
development through the aggregation of three basic measurements: length of 
life and health, knowledge, and living standards.12 Thus the notion of knowledge 
becomes central to human development. It empowers people, expands their 
opportunities, promotes creativity and personal freedom.  
Economic development and human development are mutually reinforcing. 
Soubbotina reveals that “during 1960-1992, not a single country succeeded in 
moving from lopsided development with slow human development and rapid 
growth to a virtuous circle in which human development and growth can 
become mutually reinforcing”.13 Mankiw et al.14 and Grossman & Helpman15 
highlight the significant impact of appropriate and motivated human capital on 
economic growth.  
2.1.3 Sustainable development 
Both economic and human development should not be achieved at the expense 
of the environment or future generations or by jeopardising the well-being of 
people living elsewhere. These concerns have led to the emergence of the 
concept of sustainable development, which was first defined by Brundtland.16 
She considers development as sustainable if it “…meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
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needs”.17 According to Elkington,18 the triple bottom line of sustainable 
development consists of economic, social and ecological components. They are 
all critical to human development – in terms of ensuring economic prosperity, 
social equity and environmental quality.  
Indeed, sustainable development ties in closely with socio-economic 
development. Ashfors & Caldart19 illustrate the multitude of non-market- and 
market-based decisions, and beyond that the economic and competition 
regulations that comply with environmental issues (e.g. protection, control and 
exploitation) and maintain the economic value of environmental resources and 
amenities. They argue that sustainable development also has a social 
sustainability dimension that manifests itself through sustainable life quality, 
sustainable health, sustainable employment and knowledge. Munsasinghe & 
Lutz20 discuss the ecological component of sustainable development and 
emphasise the need to maintain the resilience and robustness of biological and 
physical systems. 
In addition to the above national development components, several other 
components are identified such as industrial development, technological 
development, agricultural development and territorial development (Figure 2-2). 
They often have diverse but overlapping objectives and balancing them is 
challenging for any country. Cross-linkages among the nation’s development 
components are complex and difficult to untangle. For this reason, the focus in 
the following section is on the technological dimension of development, 
particularly in the context of developing countries, as it underpins the present 
thesis’ purpose.  
Due to the fact that development is often informed by theories and ideas 
generated in developed countries,21 the implementation of those theories and 
ideas has proven difficult because of developing countries’ peculiarities and 
context.  
Another difficulty is that of defining and characterising developing countries. 
According to the contemporary literature on development, developing countries 
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are defined as states trying to catch up with developed countries along multiple 
dimensions: economic, human, sustainable, technological, territorial, and so 
forth. Several indices22 are currently used by international organisations to rank 
countries’ development. However, none of them is thought of as comprehensive 
of emerging global development issues.  
Due to this operational uncertainty as regards country development levels, the 
World Bank classification, one of the oldest and most conventionally accepted, 
is adopted for the purpose of this study. The World Bank classifies countries 
against four categories based on Gross National Income (GNI) per capita: Low 
Income, Lower Middle Income, Upper Middle Income and High Income. Low 
and Middle Income are conventionally referred to as developing countries. 
Based on this classification, Algeria falls under the category of developing 
countries with Upper Middle Income.23 
2.2 Technology and development 
Technological progress can either be seen as a component of national 
development per se or as an agent contributing to the development of other 
components such as economic, human and sustainable development      
(Figure 2-3). This section proposes to explore the relationships from the latter 
perspective. 
Figure 2-3: Technology as a development agent 
 
Source: Author.  
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2.2.1 Technology: ‘the’ lever for economic development  
Malecki24 considers technology as an evolving multi-dimensional concept 
referring to the “capabilities of human society to transform nature into useful 
products for human consumption”.25  Storper & Walker26 state that technological 
evolution occurs through a multitude of dimensions that technology 
encompasses.27 Solow28 studies the impact of technological evolution on 
American living standards between 1909 and 1949. He finds that much of the 
improvement stems from technological progress. He then infers that 
technological progress is the dominant factor in long-term economic growth. 
Building on this idea, Mansfield29 argues that the rate of technological change is 
the most dominant factor affecting the rate of economic growth.  
Kim30 stresses the role of technology in supporting long-term economic growth 
in industrial countries. He recalls some studies that showcase the role of 
technology in improving productivity and enabling new products, processes and 
industrial development. The World Development Report31 makes clear that 
improvement in productivity as a consequence of technological progress is a 
significant factor explaining the rapid growth of East Asian GDP. Kondo32 
considers technology progress as a key element in international 
competitiveness and economic growth. He illustrates the technological impact 
on productivity through the production function, highlighting the fact that 
technological progress is the only input that increases wealth without increasing 
capital or labour.33 
Endogenous vs exogenous technological progress 
The previous debate leads to the fundamental question as to whether economic 
growth is based on endogenous or exogenous technological progress. 
Supporters of the exogenous thesis led by Rostow34 claim that long term 
economic growth is primarily induced by external factors. The exogenous 
growth model draws on the assumption that technology is generated outside the 
socio-economic system and is ‘easily’ transferrable into that system. In the 
context of developing countries, this means that economic growth can be 
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enjoyed merely through transferring technology from abroad, which is clearly 
too ‘simplistic’.  
Noting the weakness of the exogenous growth theory, Romer,35 supported by 
other scholars,36 propose an endogenous growth theory. They argue that 
internal investment in education, R&D, innovation and knowledge will bring 
about technological change, the engine for economic growth. For the spill-over 
effect to be significant, emphasis has to be placed on indigenous effort, such as 
policies supporting R&D, education, human capital and incentives for 
innovation. The institutions’ role, as defined by North,37 is vital in promoting 
endogenous technology progress. At country level, this role includes, for 
instance, government measures to encourage innovation, knowledge, and 
enforce property rights, traded off against taxation that may hinder progress, as 
explained by Barro.38 
A major question is raised regarding the appropriateness of endogenous growth 
theory in business start-ups and during early stages of development. Bellu39 
points out that the spill-over effects of investment in technological learning, on 
which this theory is based, are built on the assumption that businesses have 
already started and processes are ongoing. 
Here many scholars push for exogenous growth theory by using external factors 
such as foreign investment and technology transfer that can be used to start up 
activities. Once the required accumulation level is reached in terms of capital 
and technological knowledge, an endogenous growth model or a mix 
(exogenous-endogenous) can take over. This approach seems to be relevant to 
developing countries.  
However, sounding a note of caution, Bellu raised the inherent difficulties of 
shifting from an exogenous to an endogenous growth model since “extraneous 
production modalities, retained or disguised information on know-how by 
investors, associated with missed control on capital accumulation processes by 
local actors, for instance, due to stealth expatriation of profits, may hamper the 
accumulation of capital”.40 The difficulties “may also affect the endogenous 
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generation of innovations by blocking learning-by-doing dynamics, hampering 
the empowerment of local actors and jeopardizing the appropriate use of local 
endowments”.41 
2.2.2 Technology and human development  
As regards the relationship of technological progress to human development, 
the UN Human Development report emphasises the necessity to use 
technological progress and wealth for the benefit of people.42 On this topic, it is 
worth mentioning that technology is considered as particular kind of 
knowledge43 and that the centrality of the latter to human development is 
acknowledged,44 not least through the increasing impact “technological” 
knowledge has on quality of life, education, employment and work patterns.45 
The impact is arguably fostered by the phenomenal development of information 
and communication technologies.46  
2.2.3 Technology and sustainable development  
Sustainable development is typically affected by current consumption models 
adopted by societies around the world, as well as by population growth and 
technological development.47  Governmental margins of manoeuvre are very 
tight when it comes to reducing the impact on the environment by changing 
consumption models or limiting population growth. This demonstrates the vital 
role technology (or environmentally friendly technology) has as a lever for 
sustainable development.      
A number of studies argue that a noteworthy range of technologies that can 
contribute significantly to sustainable development is already available in the 
public domain. However, these technologies are not easily accessible because 
of their cost or the lack of appropriate knowledge for their acquisition.48   
Technology is knowledge: a cross-cutting concept that can be considered a 
public good.49 Stiglitz50 emphasises the responsibility of the international 
community to disseminate knowledge, as its importance goes beyond national 
or regional boundaries. Knowledge dissemination or transfer can then occur 
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internally or across borders. However, the bulk of knowledge is generated in a 
very limited number of developed countries. Consequently, accessing it in the 
context of developing countries is a matter of transfer from abroad. It is also a 
matter of internal endeavour to absorb this knowledge. This combination 
parallels the exogenous-endogenous mixed growth model discussed earlier.  
Other considerations should be taken into account, including that the 
transferred technology is not always up-to-date, enabling sustainable 
development to occur. For that reason, the technological progress dynamic 
should be considered in the development model design, as suggested by 
Ashford & Caldart.51 It is essential to note that the debate in this realm remains 
dominated by market perspectives, and nourished by the economic literature.  
Having discussed national development dimensions and the role technology is 
playing, the following sections discuss issues that are germane to technological 
capability-building through technology transfer, focusing on developing 
countries. 
2.3 Technology transfer and technological capability-building: a 
knowledge acquisition process 
Prior to getting into a more detailed discussion on technology transfer and 
technological capability-building, the concept of technology should be defined. 
There has been a proliferation of different technology definitions over time. 
These definitions stem from multiple perspectives in accordance with the 
transformations that human societies have experienced.  
Toffler52 explains that development in societies has occurred in three waves. 
The first wave was agricultural society dominated by labour and natural 
resources (land). Industrial society was the second and it was capital-intensive. 
The third wave is the service/information society, and it is knowledge-intensive. 
Drucker53 qualifies the transformation that took place immediately after World 
War II as transition towards a post-capitalist or knowledge society. The 
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‘knowledge’ qualification comes from the fact that the main production factor in 
the new society is knowledge and not capital, labour or land.  
From this standpoint, Mokyr54 defines technology as a particular kind of 
knowledge which “in its basic form, consists of instructions or recipes on how to 
make things or supply a service. But these instructions are based on 
background knowledge of natural phenomena and the regularities that can be 
exploited to yield these instructions. As people learn more about nature and the 
physical world, they can write better instructions and enjoy better ways to 
manipulate nature; that is, to produce”.55  
Storper & Walker56 identify elements involved in technology which can be 
classified into products (goods: equipment and products), processes 
(production techniques), and knowledge (social knowledge and skills).57 The 
concept of knowledge, then, is central when discussing matters related to 
technology transfer and technological capability-building.  
Technology transfer refers to knowledge transfer. This is why Chen58 argues 
that defining the concept of technology transfer is difficult – because technology 
is knowledge and not a product. He explains that transferring technology goes 
beyond its mere acquisition from abroad, principally because it also aims to 
build national technological capabilities.59 Odedra60 and Gohen61 highlight the 
confusing, complex and multi-dimensional aspects of technology transfer, which 
gives rise to the multitude of definitions used in the literature.  
For the purpose of this study, technology transfer refers to knowledge acquired 
by an organisation situated in a country different from that in which the 
knowledge was generated, with the acquirer’s intention to use it indigenously, to 
adapt, modify, improve, and even innovate from it.62 On the other hand, 
technological capability-building refers to the acquirer’s “ability to make effective 
use of technological knowledge in efforts to assimilate, use, adapt and change 
existing technologies. It also enables one to create new technologies and to 




Put differently, technology transfer reflects a system involving exogenous 
factors, while technological capability-building involves endogenous factors 
(Figure 2-4). However, both technology transfer and technological capability-
building are concepts that revolve around knowledge acquisition or 
technological learning. A caveat here should be added: the linear representation 
of the knowledge flow (Figure 2-4) from the technology transferor to the 
transferee and then to the local diffusion should not overshadow interactions 
and knowledge that flows in the opposite direction.  




2.4 Technological learning 
The following discussion is in line with the resource-based view of the 
organisation.64 This school of thought views knowledge as a resource at the 
core of developing and assembling other resources within the organisation.65 
The ability to acquire, appropriate, and diffuse knowledge (i.e. learning) is 
crucial for the organisation. This section reviews some knowledge and learning 





2.4.1 Tacit vs explicit knowledge 
Knowledge is a heterogeneous resource that can take an explicit or a tacit form. 
According to Sanchez,66 knowledge is explicit when it is declarative, factual and 
can be codified (either verbally or in writing). Nonaka & Takeuchi67 and 
Nonaka68 define tacit knowledge as subjective, personal and created within a 
specific context. Polanyi69 distinguishes tacit from explicit knowledge by its 
latent nature. He offers the example of a person’s ability to recognise human 
faces without the ability to fully explain how. Unlike explicit knowledge, tacit 
knowledge cannot be conveyed through codified form. It is accumulated through 
practice and experience.70  
In the technological and industrial context, knowledge is very often thought of as 
a resource that includes two complementary (tacit and explicit) components, 
and seldom one without the other.71 For effective learning in the technological 
milieu, there is a need to coalesce explicit (codified) knowledge and implicit 
(tacit) knowledge.72  
However, the difficulty in conveying implicit knowledge lies mainly in the fact 
that it resides in individuals and cannot easily be shared. The challenge then is 
to first diffuse it through the organisation, as it may be lost or transferred 
elsewhere if individuals leave the organisation.73  
Moreover, conveying implicit knowledge in a technology transfer context is 
difficult even if face-to-face communication is used between the transferor and 
transferee. This is due to the difficulty of codifying such knowledge. And, even 
when knowledge is codified, interpreting it may be difficult due to cultural and 
communication reasons, such as differences in languages and codification 
practices used. Cowan et al.74 argue that the difficulties grow more acute in 
person-to-person learning because of the idiosyncratic and particular 
personality of each person. 
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2.4.2 Learning levels: individual, group, organisation and inter-
organisation 
The literature on learning conventionally identifies several learning levels: 
individual, group, organisation and inter-organisation.75 The individual level is 
foundational, in the sense that effects at that level can be enriched and 
converted through interactions into group opportunities and then embedded and 
amplified into the context of an organisation or inter-organisation. 
Gill76 argues that individual learning depends both upon individuals and the 
organisation. The former have the responsibility to seek their own development; 
the latter has the responsibility to offer an environment conducive to learning. 
By learning, individuals should attempt to build capacity to achieve the 
organisation’s goals and not simply seek their own personal interest.  
Group learning occurs when knowledge is held by the group as a whole and not 
by any single individual.77 It results from individuals who share group values and 
contribute to achieving the group’s goals. According to Russ-Eft et al.,78 
knowledge resulting from group learning is a continuous accumulative process 
of knowledge about the organisation, the group and the individuals. When 
dealing with group learning, Kim79 suggests considering the group both as a 
mini-organisation and as an extended individuals. In the former case, 
individuals have their own shared values and can even provide a parallel 
learning structure within the organisation. In the latter, individual groups are 
influenced by organisational management and structures. 
Organisational learning does not stem from mere aggregation of individual 
learning, but hinges upon further factors. Dasgupta80 identified seven variables 
that may impact organisational learning: (i) individual learning, refers to the 
individual’s ‘separate’ role in the organisational learning process; (ii) process 
and systems, refer to the individual learning processes gathered within the 
organisation as a learning system; (iii) culture and metaphor, required to shape 
values that guide personnel behaviours; (iv) organisation memory, involves 
recorded experience structures and processes for retrieving this experience; (v) 
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knowledge management, refers to a multi-disciplined approach that aims to 
manage organisational knowledge81 resulting out of organisational learning – 
this approach involves processes for creating, capturing, developing, sharing 
and effectively using organisational knowledge;82 (vi) continuous improvement, 
refers to continuous organisational learning processes adopted by the 
organisation; and (vii) creativity and innovation, refers to the organisational 
mechanism used to convert continuous learning into incremental innovation.  
Nonaka’s model of organisational knowledge creation 
Nonaka83 argues that learning results from a combination of two dimensions. 
The interplay between individual and organisation learning, and the interplay 
between tacit and explicit knowledge. Knowledge can then be conveyed during 
learning through four modes. The first, called “socialisation”, refers to the 
conversion of tacit knowledge held by an individual(s) into another form of tacit 
knowledge held by another/other individual(s) (e.g. through on-job-training). The 
second, called “combination”, refers to the situation where an individual(s) 
receive(s) pieces of explicit knowledge from another/other individual(s) and 
creates from them new explicit knowledge (e.g. knowledge reconfiguration and 
recontextualisation). The third process is referred to as “externalisation”. It 
occurs when tacit knowledge is converted to explicit knowledge. The fourth 
process is called “internalisation”. It occurs when explicit knowledge is 
converted to tacit knowledge.   
Nonaka’s four modes of knowledge creation are represented through a model 
(Figure 2-5) that shows the spiral dynamic of knowledge creation. Nonaka 
argues that organisational knowledge will exist separately from individual 
knowledge when the four knowledge creation modes exist and are managed 
simultaneously. For instance, he points out that a team (or field) setting can 
trigger socialisation. Meaningful dialogue between actors (successive rounds) 
can trigger externalisation. Organisational units and team member coordination 
along with existing knowledge use (e.g. data, documentation) can trigger 
combination. Learning by doing (or the process of trial-and-error) builds 
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experiences that can trigger internalisation. Noteworthy is that the upward spiral 
process starts from an individual and moves towards collective levels (group, 
organisation, inter-organisation) and illustrates knowledge creation 
amplification.  
Figure 2-5: Nonaka’s model of organisational knowledge creation 
 
Source: adapted from Nonaka, I., 1994. A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation. 
Organization Science 5, 14–37. 
 
Experiential learning at individual, group, organisation and inter-
organisation levels 
Experience has been emphasised by many scholars84 as a major catalyst in the 
learning process at individual level. Kolb’s Experiential Learning Theory (ELT),85 
particularly its cyclical model, has had a dramatic impact on learning literature at 
this level. Beyond the individual level, past experiences have a role in shaping 
the learning dynamic at other levels of analysis (group, organisation and inter-
organisation).  
The present subsection examines Kolb’s ELT and its extensions beyond the 
individual (which was Kolb’s original focal level of analysis) to other levels of 
analysis (group, organisation and inter-organisation). This is to show how Kolb’s 
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ELT is adapted to learning programmes which lend themselves to multi-level 
analysis.  
a) Kolb’s Experiential Learning Theory: a framework for individual 
learning 
Kolb defines learning as “the process whereby knowledge is created through 
the transformation of experience”.86 He claims that “knowledge results from the 
combination of grasping experience and transforming it”. 87 He dissected this 
vision into a model of a four-stage learning cycle (Figure 2-6) and argues that 
learning is effective when it is holistic and combines experience, perception, 
cognition and behaviour (referred to as concrete experience, reflective 
observation, abstract conceptualisation and active experimentation).  
Figure 2-6: Experiential Learning Cycle and basic learning styles 
 
Source: Adapted from Kolb, D.A., 1984. Experiential learning: Experience as the source of learning and 
development, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey. 
 
Kolb emphasises that learning is effective when it is holistic. Fundamentally, this 
happens when both dimensions, reflection and action, are combined during the 
learning process. However, Kolb recognises the conflict between these two 
dimensions of learning whereby the learner “moves in varying degrees from 
actor to observer, and from specific involvement to general analytic 
detachment”.88 These opposing tensions are constantly at play and require 
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individuals to combine reflective abilities (theoretical) and action (concrete and 
practical).  
Kolb explains that combining conflicting abilities is not always a natural task. He 
explains that individuals thrive from their own experience, based on their own 
set of learning abilities which they use comfortably. Put another way, individuals 
develop their particular learning styles throughout their lives. Four learning 
styles are therefore identified (Figure 2-6): diverging, assimilating, converging 
and accommodating.89 Each individual tends to enter the learning cycle from the 
point that corresponds to his strongest abilities (or preferred style), and the 
whole cycle then needs to be completed for learning to be effective.  
b) Experiential Learning Theory expanded to group learning 
There is a need to continuously develop individual skills for teamwork. Mills90 
describes this dynamic as involving successive and increasingly sophisticated 
levels of abilities for a team which faces increasingly sophisticated purposes. 
Kayes et al.91 regard these purpose orders as team developmental stages. 
They argue that Kolb’s ELT can be used as a framework whereby a team 
moves from lower to higher stages. They bring to light two fundamental aspects 
of team experiential learning. Firstly, the incidence of a conversation space for 
the team where members talk about their experience, reflect on actions and 
consequences, and share the desire to grow together. Secondly, the ability of 
team members to evolve from individual roles to shared responsibilities and 
team roles.  
For these conditions to be met, Kayes et al.92 argue that teams should enter the 
experiential learning cycle and “must have members who can be involved and 
committed to the team and its purpose (concrete experience), who can engage 
in reflection and conversation about the team’s experiences (reflective 
observation), who can engage in critical thinking about the team’s work 
(abstract conceptualisation), and who can make decisions and take action 
(active experimentation)”.93 Put another way, teams must be composed of 
members with diverse learning styles (Figure 2-6).  
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c) Organisational learning cycle and Kolb’s Experiential Learning Theory 
An early indication of the relevance of the Kolb ELT for an organisation is 
provided by Swieringa & Wierdsma.94 They explain that organisations learn 
effectively when they combine reflection and action. They argue that “while 
[Kolb’s cycle] is true for individual learning, it is even more so for a collective 
learning process, a process of organizational learning”.95  
Dixon96 addresses the connection between organisational learning and Kolb’s 
experiential learning cycle by suggesting that the phases of learning which take 
place at individual level bear relation to the collective context.97 She offers a 
four-phase model inspired by Kolb’s learning cycle and fitting the organisational 
context (Figure 2-7). 
Figure 2-7: Organisational learning cycle and Kolb’s experiential learning cycle 
  
Source: adapted from Dixon, N. 1999. The organizational learning cycle: How we can learn collectively. 
Gower Publishing, Ltd, p.65. 
 
The initial step of the cycle deals with ‘concrete experience’. In this phase and 
in order to better deal with complexity, organisations need to diversify and 
broaden their sources of information (generating information). Subsequently 
comes a phase of integration of information corresponding to Kolb’s ‘reflective 
observation’. The next step is the collective interpretation of information relating 
to ‘abstract conceptualisation’ in the Kolb model. The final step is action and 
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corresponds to ‘active experimentation’. The actions taken will serve as sources 
of new information. 
d) Inter-organisational learning cycle and Kolb’s Experiential Learning 
Theory 
Hargadon98 highlights the importance of inter-organisational experience for 
learning. Experience is built over time through dense and continuous 
interactions between organisations. Beeby & Booth99 reject the assumption that 
inter-organisational relations are inherently competitive. They put forward the 
need for complementarity and integration between organisations, similar to that 
needed between departments of the same organisation. They then draw 
connections between Kolb’s cycle and inter-organisational learning. Their 
proposal is based on Coghlan’s100 inter-departmental framework, where 
learning at inter-departmental level is modelled according to a Kolb-like cycle 
(Experiencing-Processing-Interpreting-Taking action).  
e) Interplay between learning levels  
The previous discussion purports that learners, whether they are individuals, 
groups, organisations or inter-organisations, might be more effective when 
completing Kolb-like cycles. It suggests that experience-based learning models 
can contribute to the study of knowledge transfer at separate levels of 
aggregation. However, there is a need to recognise that learning is a more 
complex phenomenon insofar as processes occurring at separate levels are in 
fact interrelated.101 A number of authors suggest that successful learning leads 
to a systemic phenomenon where the interplay involves all levels of 
aggregation, from individuals to inter-organisations.102 
It is important to recall that the idea of discussing the potential of Kolb-inspired 
experiential theory and models in technology transfer comes from the need for 
evaluation of comprehensive technological learning based on experience. 
However, in the context of developing countries, achieving a tension-filled 
process combining action (practical aspects) and reflection (theoretical aspects) 
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is challenging. Many developing countries have had limited exposure to full 
learning cycles combining action and reflection.103  The following situations 
reveal the absence of established practices in holistic learning. The 
development strategy of numerous developing countries relies on knowledge 
acquired from abroad combined with knowledge generated endogenously. In 
the former case, studies revealed that this strategy often overemphasises the 
action and practical aspects of learning (e.g. through industrial programmes, 
consulting) and overlooked the theoretical basis underlying the transferred 
knowledge.104 With regard to the latter, it is acknowledged that when the 
strategy is based on endogenous development, the role of local education is 
crucial.105 However, because of limited local financial and managerial 
resources, indigenous education (or human skills development) systems in 
many developing countries marginalise practical work and experimentation and 
limit education to some theoretical aspects.106 In both strategies, the learning 
cycle is interrupted; consequently, many developing countries have not enough 
exposure to effective learning processes where action and reflection were 
successfully combined.  
2.4.3 Knowledge velocity vs knowledge viscosity 
Davenport & Prusak107 introduce two concepts that are essential when 
discussing issues of knowledge transfer effectiveness: “velocity” and “viscosity” 
of transfer. Velocity refers to the “speed with which knowledge moves through 
an organisation. How quickly and widely is it disseminated? How quickly do the 
people who need the knowledge become aware of it and get access to it?”108 
On the other hand, they consider that viscosity represents the “richness (or 
thickness) of the knowledge transferred. How much of what we try to 
communicate is actually absorbed and used? To what extent does the original 
knowledge get pared down? Does what was absorbed bear little resemblance 
to what we tried to transmit and retain little of its original value?”109 
Davenport & Prusak110 consider also that ICT (e.g. computers, networks) 
contribute strongly to enhancing knowledge velocity, whereas factors such as 
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the transfer mode influence viscosity. For instance, the mode that fosters the 
long process of apprenticeship or mentoring relationship contributes more to 
enhancing knowledge depth or viscosity through subtle knowledge and many 
details conveyed during the process. Viscosity, according to Schwartz et al.,111 
will be much thinner if knowledge is made accessible only through scientific 
journals or on-line database.  
Davenport & Prusak112 stress, along with Lall,113 that absorption of new 
knowledge is a slow, sometimes long and laborious process. Davenport & 
Prusak114 also argue that successful knowledge transfer is usually achieved 
through a delicate balance between velocity and viscosity. They argue that the 
relationship between velocity and viscosity is indirectly proportional, as often the 
factors that lead to high velocity are those leading to thin viscosity and vice-
versa. Schwartz et al.115 support that argument and contend that in general the 
transfer mode adopted is a compromise between high velocity and acceptable 
viscosity.  
Failure to reach the right velocity-viscosity compromise is reminiscent of the 
multiple technology transfer failure stories. Indeed, Matthews116 reveals that 
India’s foreign collaboration in machine tool manufacture during the 1970s 
proved to have little impact on local capability-building. Felker117 points out that 
the FDI policies adopted by Malaysia in the 1990s lead in some industrial 
sectors (e.g. electronic and automobile industries) to a shallow form of 
industrialisation. For the same country, Balakrishnan118 notices the limited depth 
of foreign technology transfer into the defence industry during the 1990s-2000s. 
Furthermore, Yan119 observes the limited depth of foreign collaboration in the 
aerospace industry in the 2000s. 
2.4.4 Component vs architectural knowledge 
Henderson & Clark120 argue that successfully developing a technological 
product requires two types of knowledge: component knowledge that relates to 
the core design concepts for each component of the product, and architectural 
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knowledge that relates to the way that components are put together to form the 
system (or the product).  
In technology-oriented industries, Tallman et al.121 contend that component 
knowledge is “relatively coherent and definable, and is usually acontextual”.122 
Henderson & Clark123 claims that it remains subject to incremental changes and 
is managed explicitly. Consequently, component knowledge has the potential to 
be transferred to informed learners.124 However, the flow remains dependent on 
the degree of knowledge explicitness: on whether it is simple vs complex, 
independent vs systemic, and on whether it is tangible vs intangible.125 Matusik 
& Hill126 describe component knowledge as related to subroutines or parts of 
the organisation’s operations, rather than the whole. Both individuals and 
groups within the organisation can hold this type of knowledge. 
Architectural knowledge, on the other hand, refers to “organisation-wide 
routines and schemas for coordinating the various components of the 
organisation and putting them to productive use”. 127 Architectural knowledge is 
built collectively over time, shaped by the organisation’s idiosyncratic events 
and its evolutionary path.128 It is built by encouraging interactions. This 
knowledge is typically complex, intangible, tacit, and organisation-specific, 
which makes it difficult to transfer.129 Henderson & Clarck130 claim that once a 
technological system’s dominant design is accepted, architectural knowledge 
becomes stable and implicitly embedded in the organisation.  
Baldwin131 suggests that architectural knowledge includes “knowledge about 
how the system performs its functions (the function-to-component mapping)”,132 
the knowledge about “how the components are linked together (i.e. the 
interfaces)”,133 and the knowledge about how the system performs or behaves 
in both planned and unplanned situations and in different environments.  
Henderson & Clark134 claim that the architectural knowledge already rooted in 
the organisation makes it hard for the organisation to build new architectural 
knowledge. It needs to switch to a new mode of organisational learning that 
fosters architectural changes. This new learning mode should be explicitly 
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recognised, managed, and might require new organisational structure and new 
skills more appropriate to architectural knowledge (e.g. systems engineering).  
Henderson & Clark135 point out therefore that an “organisation that is structured 
to learn quickly and effectively about new components technology may be 
ineffective in learning about changes in product architecture”.136 Hence the 
need for a more open organisational environment and cross-functional or multi-
disciplinary teams. This is also a challenge for organisations: to avoid the 
situation where architectural knowledge leads them to a comfortable feeling that 
may encourage competitors (mainly new entrants) to take advantage of major 
component or architectural changes. 
Moreover, building a strategy on the preservation of a stable architecture (i.e. 
same architectural knowledge) is generally possible by modularising 
technological systems and intervening only on modules that need to be 
changed while keeping the remaining modules unchanged.137 Such a strategy is 
limited as modularising is acceptable only to a certain level beyond which the 
complexity cost becomes unbearable.138  
For acquiring technology, the literature on strategy and innovation suggests that 
organisations with limited resources, such as those in developing countries, 
need to make a trade-off between architectural and component knowledge. 
Indeed, under the inherent complexity of a technological system, the 
organisation (or learner) may be so focused on building integrative capabilities 
(architectural knowledge) that component knowledge is neglected, and vice-
versa.  
Based on transaction cost economics, Teece139 argues that small firms are 
more suited to generating autonomous innovation. Such innovation relates to 
the development of a new component, which enables it to fit comfortably into 
the existing system. Conversely, large firms are more suited to generating 
systemic innovation. The latter relates to the development of new architecture, 
leading consequently to further coordination problems. 
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In the same vein, Jacobides & Winter140 show that the optimal choice for firms 
with financial constraints is to narrow the initial scope.  Baldwin141 recognises 
the difficulty of striking the right balance and proposes a strategy that resource-
limited firms can adopt. She suggests that firms narrow their initial scope by 
focusing on learning internally about particular components (i.e. crucial 
components, sometimes called ‘bottleneck’ components) and outsourcing the 
non-bottleneck components.  
From a system engineering perspective, a system with n components      
(Figure 2-8) may require n² interfaces that need to be integrated and tested.142 
Thus, if the number of components increases (which can be considered as an 
increase in component knowledge), coordination problems increase (which can 
be considered as a decrease in architectural or integrative knowledge). 




Consequently, and similarly to the delicate balance sought between velocity and 
viscosity to achieve successful knowledge transfer, the literature acknowledges 
the inversely proportional relationship between the number of components (or 
component knowledge) and the architecture (or integrative knowledge) when it 
comes to resource-limited firms. 
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2.4.5 The triad: learning by doing, learning by searching and 
learning by interacting 
This typology is one of the most prominent in technological learning. It identifies 
three types of learning: learning by doing, learning by searching and learning by 
interacting.  
Learning by doing 
Arrow143 recalls that learning results from experience or what is referred to as 
learning by doing. Knowledge is accumulated progressively by repeating 
production activities and attempting to solve problems faced. Bell144 argues that 
learning by doing takes place as a by-product of production.  
At an organisational level, Argote & Epple145 explain that depreciation in 
learning by doing may be caused by factors such as organisational forgetting 
(e.g. interruption in production, non-employment of knowledge, employee 
turnover, losses in knowledge transferred from other products or organisations, 
as well as growing use of economies of scale that may mask a decrease in 
learning rate. UNIDO146 stresses the importance of routine management in the 
process of learning by doing. Teece147 explains that learning by doing is not as 
automatic as is considered and requires explicit efforts.  
Learning by searching and learning by playing 
Bell148 recognises that besides learning by doing that aims to increase 
production using the same technological capability, further learning types exist. 
It is required to, first, improve the existing technological capability and, second, 
to move to another and new kind of technological capability. Dosi149 refers 
respectively to these two options as continuous change along the same 
technological trajectory, and discontinuous change associated with the 
emergence of new technology (discontinuities in technological innovation). Both 




As with learning by doing, learning-by-searching knowledge accumulation is 
path-dependent, as it builds on prior knowledge.150 Searching involves 
experimentation and simulation to understand phenomena. Nelson & Winter151 
and Malerba152 explain that R&D activities are a significant enabler of learning 
by searching whether they are endogenously conducted through formal R&D, or 
exogenously by carrying out a technology watch (e.g. scientific and 
technological publications, seminars, patents analysis).  
It is expedient at this stage to stress the analogy between learning by searching 
and learning by playing. De Geus153 argues that the best way to make learning 
effective and to accelerate its pace is to make skilful use of ‘playing’, as “the 
essence of learning is discovery through play”.154 Playing here refers to the 
situation where learners can experiment, or play with, an object that they hold in 
their hands. This object may range from a basic technological product to a 
complex technological system such as a satellite.  
Winnicott155  emphasises that the idea of playing with objects enables learners 
to move from one stage to another. Moreover, de Geus156 explains that the 
more in-depth the game or the experiment is, the more learners’ imagination is 
triggered and the more knowledge is acquired. Eilertsen & London157 stress the 
importance of protecting learners from reprisal when they are experimenting, or 
playing, with objects, because they may make mistakes. 
Arrow158 and Nelson159 point out the fact that learning by searching is not 
encouraged in firms because of the likely rapid dissemination or leakage of 
knowledge that might be created. This is why there is a need to entrust this task 
to government-sponsored organisations.160 The enforcement of intellectual 
property rights helps promote learning by searching within the private sector,161 
and encourages firms to engage in continuous learning-innovative activities to 





Learning by interacting 
Malerba163 considers that interaction enables knowledge acquisition from 
external sources. Upstream and downstream (e.g. suppliers and customers) 
interactions are referred to as vertical or value chain interactions. Horizontal 
interactions refer to cooperation with horizontal organisations such as firms in 
the same industry that may belong to the same supply chain, as well as 
research organisations.  
Horizontal cooperation is more likely to produce a discontinuous change 
(technological innovation) than vertical interaction.164 The latter leads to more 
continuous change along the same technological trajectory (i.e. incremental 
innovation). However, in today’s ever-changing environment, knowledge 
created through vertical interaction does not necessarily accumulate and is not 
necessarily path-dependent.165 Kenney166 provides the example of highly 
knowledge-intensive industries such as electronics and computer networking 
where the pace of new knowledge creation may destroy the recently created 
knowledge value. He therefore suggests examining the impact of such a 
dynamic on the firm and whether its core competencies are built on more static 
knowledge components that may shield the firm against the threat of knowledge 
obsolescence. 
Complementarity between learning by doing, learning by searching and 
learning by interacting 
When learning by doing, by searching and by interacting are combined 
together, the learner’s ability to effectively take action increases significantly. 
Kim167 illustrates this ability through the example of a carpenter’s limited 
effectiveness if he masters woodworking skills (i.e. knowledge stemming from 
learning by doing) without mastering knowledge about house structures and 
architecture (i.e. knowledge stemming from learning by searching) and vice-
versa. In the same vein, the present author argues that a carpenter’s abilities 
will be limited if he does not interact (learning by interacting) enough with his 
environment (e.g. suppliers, customers, other carpenters) to, for instance, find 
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out about techniques used elsewhere, customers’ needs and appropriate 
timber.  
2.4.6 Absorptive capacity: a key component of learning 
Having discussed the principal concepts relevant to technological learning, the 
present subsection discusses the importance of learner absorptive capacity for 
effective learning.  
Zahra & George168 and Zahra et al.169 explain that absorptive capacity is a 
concept that relates to two sets of capabilities: knowledge acquisition and 
assimilation capabilities, and knowledge transformation and exploitation 
capabilities. Cohen & Levinthal170 argue that acquiring new knowledge hinges 
largely on the level of prior related knowledge. The latter allows the recognition 
of new knowledge value and facilitates this knowledge assimilation and 
utilisation. Cohen & Levinthal171 call abilities enabled by prior knowledge 
“absorptive capacity”. Prior knowledge ranges from basic skills to the latest 
advanced knowledge in the area.  
Two major components of absorptive capacity are identified at the 
organisational level: the existing knowledge base (i.e. prior knowledge or 
knowledge accumulation) and the intensity of effort. Existing knowledge 
accumulates over time. It helps develop the ability to recognise new knowledge 
value, assimilate and then use it. The existing knowledge base grows through 
continuous learning occurring under normal circumstances.  
Intensity of effort refers to the level of effort invested by the organisation to 
assimilate and utilise new knowledge. It relates more to the discontinuous 
learning that occurs under abnormal circumstances, i.e. a crisis.172 According to 
Meyers,173 a crisis can be unintentional, stemming, for instance, from the threat 
of market competition, where the organisation has to acquire new knowledge to 
negotiate the crisis. On the other hand, a crisis can be intentionally created by 
the organisation’s management or by institutions (e.g. government policy such 
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as import substitution or export promotion) through setting high performance 
targets or very ambitious goals.174 
 
2.5 Technological capability-building 
2.5.1 Capability-building, moving along a complexity continuum  
As mentioned earlier, national development is heavily dependent on 
technological change that stems from technological accumulation over time. 
Relevant literature on technological capability addresses this idea from various 
standpoints. Kim175 considers technological capability as a concept indicating 
the level of organisational capability stemming from the dynamic process of 
technological learning. He emphasises the need to go beyond the mere 
possession of knowledge in building technological capability, and instead to use 
it in investment and production activities, as well as in generating new 
knowledge. According to him, technological capability and absorptive capacity, 
as defined by Cohen & Levinthal,176 can be used interchangeably.  
Westphal et al.177 identify three elements of technological capability: production, 
investment and innovation. Production refers to the capabilities of operating and 
maintaining existing technology and improving within the original design. 
Investment refers to capabilities that expand existing production capacity and 
duplicate it through new facilities. Innovation refers to capabilities that create 
new technology and also its implementation.  
Lall178 argues that when addressing technological capability one should 
consider factors that are firm-specific (i.e. firm-level technological capability), 
and others that are more general or country-specific (i.e. national technological 
capability). He then breaks down firm-level technological capability into 
functions and degrees of complexity. The major functions identified are 
categorised into investment, production and linkage capabilities.  
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Investment capabilities refer to skills required for pre-investment studies, 
facilities installation and commissioning. Production capabilities involve skills 
required for operational tasks (e.g. production, control, maintenance, 
adaptation, improvement, R&D, design, innovation). Linkage capabilities are 
those required to interact with the firm’s external environment (e.g. suppliers, 
subcontractors, R&D institutions).  
Functions evolve greater complexity in stages: from basic to higher; from skills 
required for simple tasks to skills required for complex tasks. It is worth 
mentioning that Lall’s functions are neither exhaustive nor have to be performed 
internally by the firm.  
With regard to national technological capability, Lall179 suggests a broad 
framework that involves capabilities, literally encompassing physical investment, 
human capital and technological effort. In addition, he considers capability 
interactions with incentives that arise from market forces, institutional 
functioning and government policies. He includes the institutional framework 
(i.e. market and non-market institutions) as well, drawing on the idea that 
developing country backwardness is particularly due to an inappropriate 
institutional framework.  
Variants of Lall’s firm-level technological capability framework have been used 
as dictated by the research focus. Figueiredo,180 for instance, uses a 
disaggregated framework made up of five technological functions and seven 
levels of capability (or complexity). Teece’s181 emphasis is on firm dynamic 
capability, arguing that learning is translated into continuous improvements 
through insertion of minor innovations, leading to new product development. He 
considers that a firm’s ability to subscribe to such a dynamic depends 
essentially upon its organisational process (and some other factors, such as 
paths and markets). 
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2.5.2 The market perspective in building technological capability 
Several factors impact on firms and tie them to the external environment. These 
factors are common, sometimes country-specific, and relate more to macro 
considerations. Lall182 puts forward a framework that presents these ties from 
two perspectives: the demand and the supply perspective for building a firm’s 
technological capability.  
The demand perspective refers, first, to the inherent need for new knowledge in 
order to introduce new technology into firms. Second, it refers to how conducive 
the macroeconomic environment is (e.g. favourable trade regimes183) to firms 
investing in new technological capabilities. Third, it refers to technological 
change occurring in developed countries. This change incentivises or drives 
firms in developing countries to upgrade, sooner or later, their technological 
capabilities in order to resist competition, particularly firms that are highly 
exposed.  
With regard to the supply perspective, several supply-oriented factors drive 
firms to build technological capabilities. Firm size fosters this need (e.g. large-
scale production relying on complex technologies and skilled personnel).184 
Skilled labour market accessibility, knowledge market accessibility, and firms’ 
organisational and managerial capabilities are other significant factors.185 
The market perspective is also used for explaining technology policy at country-
level. Kim & Dahlman186 identify three sets of market measures: (i) policies 
intended to create and foster market needs for the technology in question, 
known as demand side strengthening; (ii) policies intended to support science 
and technology capabilities, known as supply side strengthening; and (iii) 
policies intended to effectively link both the demand and supply sides.  
This perspective highlights the limited benefits of policies intended to shore up 
the supply side without a competitive market, and the drag this places on 
investments in science and technology capabilities (deterrent effect on 
investment). For this reason, science and technology policies should be 
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combined with industrial policies that structure the markets. It also underlines 
the limited benefits of policies intended to support the demand side (i.e. markets 
calling for more technology) when the supplier does not have the required 
capabilities to deliver the technology, which seems to be typical of developing 
countries. It accordingly highlights the importance of policies intended to 
effectively link demand to supply.  
2.5.3 Technological change in developing countries 
Technological capability in developing countries is very often built upon 
transferred technology. Kim187 studies the phenomenon in rapidly industrialising 
countries, such as Korea. He explains that before generating their own 
technology (i.e. the innovation stage), firms in developing countries pass 
through three stages: acquisition, assimilation, and improvement (Figure 2-9), 
and orient their learning efforts accordingly (i.e. the learning effort can be 
oriented at country level through national or sectoral policy).  
 
Figure 2-9: Kim’s model of technological change in developing countries 
 
Source: adapted from Linsu Kim, “Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea's Technological 
Learning”, Harvard Business School Press, 1997, page 88-91. 
 
Kim argues that firms start building their technological capabilities by acquiring 
technology in the form of ‘packages’ from abroad. He emphasises the way of 
using this technology (via processes) to produce undifferentiated products, fairly 
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similar to those produced elsewhere. From a technical perspective, an 
engineering effort is mainly required during this stage.  
Experience during this initial implementation stage leads to some indigenous 
development activities aiming to produce differentiated products in order to 
resist market pressure. The pressure results from technology diffusion 
throughout the country, which brings new entrants and competition. This second 
stage is called ‘assimilation’, because through the assimilation of imported 
technology, indigenous firms could develop new products by directing 
engineering and development efforts, such as imitative reverse engineering 
(and other non-research efforts), to achieve ‘duplicative imitation’.  
The following stage of this model is called ‘improvement’ as further assimilation 
efforts associated with increasing market pressure lead to technology 
‘improvement’. For this to work, indigenous scientists and engineers should 
have the capacity to engineer, develop, and then research, in order to achieve 
‘creative imitation’. 
In explaining this model, Kim188 stresses that firms in developed countries build 
their technological capability according to the following sequence: research, 
development, engineering. He then points out that unlike developed countries’, 
developing countries’ firms evolve according to the opposite sequence: 
engineering, development, research.  
It is apt to note here that lines between engineering and development and 
between development and research are not clearly drawn in the literature. 
Therefore, in the context of the present thesis, engineering, development and 
research efforts are thought of as the required sequence to move along the 




2.6 Technology transfer 
As mentioned earlier, technology transfer involves exogenous factors. The 
present section positions the discussion at the nexus between transferor and 
transferee.  
Technologies transferred can be old (mature), established, or sophisticated (the 
latest or new).190 Generally, reasons behind transferring technology are viewed 
differently by the suppliers (developed countries) and the acquirers (developing 
countries). Developing countries import technology because it is a less risky 
option, technically and financially, having already been used elsewhere, and 
since little R&D investment is required to quickly exploit it locally.   
Developed countries, on the other hand, export technology because they seek 
to increase returns on R&D investment, or they consider that the transferred 
technology has been exploited up to its limits and can be transferred without 
any risk (e.g. fuelling future competition, security considerations), or the 
acquirer’s capabilities are deemed to be not sufficiently advanced to make use 
of the relatively advanced technology transferred.191 
2.6.1 Embodiment forms of transferred technology  
The literature traditionally considers that technology transfer is likely to occur in 
embodied form.192 Sharif193 and Haines & Sharif194 identify four components 
when considering technology transfer. Technoware (i.e. object-embodied 
technology) refers to the core elements of transferred technology (e.g. 
equipment, machinery, tools, and physical facilities). Humanware (i.e. person-
embodied technology) refers to transferred personnel abilities to achieve 
transformation operations (e.g. skills, experience, wisdom). Infoware (i.e. 
document-embodied technology) refers to documentation transferred and used 
by individuals for learning (e.g. process specifications, procedures, theories, 
observations). Finally, Orgaware (i.e. institution-embodied technology) refers to 
managerial aspects (e.g. planning, organising, motivating) required for the 
integration of Technoware, Humanware and Infoware.  
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Minimum conditions are required to make effective use of these four 
components. Technoware needs operators; Humanware needs motivation; 
Infoware needs updating; and Orgaware needs evolution.195 These four 
components interact dynamically and are required to manage simultaneously 
the transfer process. Indeed, Technoware is developed, installed, and operated 
by Humanware. Humanware is guided by Infoware. Infoware is enriched and 
updated by Humanware and Orgaware. Technoware, Humanware, and 
Infoware are brought together through Orgaware.  
2.6.2 Technology transfer mechanisms/typologies 
The objective of technology transfer is to serve the purpose of local 
technological capability-building, described in the literature as ‘local’ diffusion of 
technology. In order to achieve successful technology transfer in developing 
countries, a combination of mechanisms is used (e.g. licensing, sub-contracting, 
equipment and material supply, and consultancy).  
Technology transfer can also be regarded as a three-element process 
comprised of transferor, transferee and linkages.196 Linkages can be direct, 
such as licensing, personnel training abroad, and hiring of experts and 
contractors. They can also be indirect, such as equipment and material 
purchases, participation in international meetings and exhibitions, and 
publications (e.g. books, journals).  
The UN Centre on Transnational Corporations197 has put forward another 
technology transfer typology, commercial (e.g. foreign direct investment – FDI, 
joint ventures, licensing) and non-commercial (e.g. publications, foreign 
students, training). The use of FDI as a mechanism prevails in developing 
countries.198 
Newly industrialised countries (NIC) have made use of unconventional 
mechanisms in acquiring high technology (e.g. electronics and computer 
industry). Countries like Japan, South Korea and Brazil used reverse 
engineering and product imitation to acquire technology. Taiwan, China and 
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South Korea, for instance, adopted the mechanism known as ‘reverse brain 
drain’ by attracting experienced expatriates from abroad and putting them in 
appropriate institutions or industries.  
It is important to mention that whatever the mechanism used, technology 
transfer is greatly affected by industry-specific factors (e.g. products, facilities), 
region-specific factors (e.g. cultural considerations), country-specific factors 
(e.g. political and economic system), and organisation-specific factors (e.g. 
existing knowledge, management).199  
The complexity that arises from the association of those factors with the 
available mechanisms makes clear that there is no one-size-fits-all solution for 
developing countries. Each country has to seek its own solution to technology 
transfer.200  
2.6.3 Transferor-transferee relationships  
Successful transfer is highly dependent on the strength of the linkages between 
the transferor and transferee. Indeed, building sound linkages is underpinned by 
the depth of the mutual understanding of the transferor and transferee’s 
interests, and the coordination between them. Transferor motives are often 
economic (business-oriented), possibly alloyed with some political 
considerations. Transferee motives, on the other hand, might be economic or 
non-economic, but often aim at building local capabilities for national 
developmental objectives. Mutual understanding may explain, for instance, why 
multinational corporations’ strategies are often in line with local economic firms’ 
objectives, but virtually always different from national developmental 
objectives.201  
Mutual understanding is also a matter of negotiation balance and bargaining 
power. In general, developing countries have low bargaining power compared 
to developed countries because of several factors such as prior knowledge 
limitations, immature international experience, and imbalanced market 
structures (e.g. supplier markets).  
65 
 
In order to establish sound transferor-transferee linkages, Lee et al.202 point out 
the need for the transferee to adapt technology transfer strategies in 
accordance with the technological development stage reached. Adaptation 
occurs by choosing suitable transfer mechanisms. These mechanisms depend 
on the transferee’s technological capabilities and the technology life cycle. They 
in turn depend on the transferor’s willingness to adhere to them, considering 
criteria such as technological novelty, the strategic importance of transferor 
activities, and further considerations like intellectual property protection.  
Abernathy & Utterback203 and Utterback204 put forward a technology trajectory 
model illustrating the technology life cycle in developed countries             
(Figure 2-10a). It explains that technological change rate or innovation, for both 
products and processes, occurs over three main phases. The fluid phase 
represents the fluid pattern of innovation. During this formative period, the 
radical product innovation rate is higher than the incremental innovation rate, 
and firms are experimenting with new products and attempting to place them on 
the market. In the fluid stage, both products and markets are rapidly changing. 
Consequently, a firm’s structure needs to remain flexible. Because of the high 
product innovation rate, less attention is paid to process innovation during this 
period. The fluid phase is followed by a transitional phase where product 
varieties converge towards a dominant design that may result from an 
increasing or dominant market share or regulation. As a consequence, firms 
direct their efforts towards improving the process of product manufacturing (e.g. 
procedures, cost); a high process innovation rate is then observed. The third 
phase is ‘specific’ as only some industries enter it. During this phase, products, 
processes, and markets mature, and firms focus on cost, volume and capacity. 
Innovation for both product and process occurs at a small incremental rate.  
Kim205 connects technological trajectories in developed (Figure 2-10a) and 
developing countries (Figure 2-10b). The idea is that the transferee who 
successfully acquires mature technology and assimilates it may shift to 
acquisition and then assimilation of more sophisticated (high) technology. The 
transfer process continues even when the transferee reaches the level of 
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generating their own technology. Kim also argues that linkages are possible at 
several stages. Technology can then be transferred at the mature, transitional 
or fluid stage.  
Figure 2-10: Kim’s model of technology trajectory linkages 
 
 
Source: adapted from Linsu Kim, “Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea's Technological 
Learning”, Harvard Business School Press, 1997, page 89. 
 
Transfer success predominantly depends on the absorptive capacity of 
learners. Kim206 argues that the intensity of organisational effort has a 
preponderant influence as compared to the influence of prior knowledge, 
particularly on long-term learning. This intensity is translated through actions of 
both continuous and discontinuous learning.  
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This is particularly true in today’s ever-changing environment where knowledge 
does not necessarily accumulate and is not necessarily path-dependent.207 For 
instance, Chen & Li-Hua208 argue that when technology is at the embryonic 
stage in developed countries, firms in developing countries can seize the 
opportunity for leapfrogging (discontinuous change) through in-house R&D. 
Success depends on the availability of funds, talent, and government support. It 
also depends on self-innovation culture and abilities which require considerable 
time to build, without which leapfrogging opportunities are very hard to seize. As 
a result, some NICs have used other mechanisms, such as exercising a 
measure of control over host firms in developed countries (e.g. holding shares, 
market access) for, inter-alia, expediting self-innovation abilities. 
Therefore, in addition to the knowledge-accumulation perspective, the 
knowledge non-accumulation perspective is relevant for understanding the 
transfer of high technology systems, such as satellites. A caveat here should be 
added: the above model is not applicable in all situations.209 However, it is 
deemed useful in understanding the dynamics of satellite technology transfer 
and the appropriate strategy.  
2.6.4 Cultural differences in technology transfer  
Cultural difference is another potential impediment to sound linkages and 
mutual understanding between transferor and transferee. Culture is a collective 
phenomenon.210 This concept is rarely monolithic and can only be characterised 
by certain heterogeneity.211 Its nature can differ according to the level of 
aggregation (e.g. nations, organisations, or other collectives) and the particular 
cultural dimension.  
In a technology transfer context, these factors are interwoven with others 
involved in the transfer process, such as knowledge types, absorptive capacity, 
language, geographical proximity and international experience.212 
In view of this complexity, the present study is limited to examining 
management practices at an organisational level that shape a learning culture 
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facilitating technology transfer. Some of the most influential practices are quality 
practice, training, management commitment, sharing/understanding (inter-
personal social interaction) and team-based work.213 Moreover, organisations 
which delegate responsibilities, tolerate creative mistakes, and provide slack 
time to work on new ideas, foster a learning culture. 214 Cross-cultural training 
programmes are another lever for overcoming cultural obstacles.215  
2.7 Macro-environment: the technological innovation system 
approach 
As discussed earlier, building technological capability through technology 
transfer is affected by a combination of factors at individual and team levels 
(micro level) as well as at organisational and firm levels (meso level) within the 
national, sectoral and international environment (macro level). The emphasis in 
this section is on the macro environment that can be explained from the 
literature using innovation system frameworks.  
The concept of ‘innovation system’ was introduced by Lundvall.216 It builds on 
evolutionary theory217 and other theoretical considerations related to learning by 
interacting and institutional economics.218 It refers to a system of actors and 
institutions whose interactions largely explain learning effectiveness and 
innovation. The idea is that in building capabilities, organisations or firms are 
not acting alone; they are linked to other actors and operating within contexts 
that influence their activities.  
The analytical importance of the innovation system approach stems from the 
growing importance of knowledge in technological development, the growing 
number of actors and institutions generating this knowledge, and the growing 
adoption of systemic approaches in technological development.219 Adopting this 




2.7.1 Concept versatility 
The innovation system approach has been applied at national level. It refers to 
the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies.220 
Malerba & Nelson221 study the process of catching up for different sectoral 
systems in several countries. They claim that industries differ in both their 
catching up process and in the conditions surrounding this process. They point 
out the need to focus more on the dynamics of a sectoral innovation system 
rather than the national innovation system. Malerba & Nelson222 argue that 
“While analyses of sectoral and national innovation systems share a 
perspective that multiple actors are involved, the national innovation system 
concept is more aggregative and is particularly oriented to broad national 
characteristics. In contrast, the sectoral innovation system concept is 
particularly concerned with highlighting sector-specific characteristics within the 
environment where development takes place”.223 
As with sectoral systems, the unit of analysis for the innovation system may be 
a particular technology. This context is referred to as a technological innovation 
system. Carlsson & Stankiewicz224 define it as “a network of agents interacting 
in a specific economic/industrial area under a particular institutional 
infrastructure or set of infrastructures and involved in the generation, diffusion 
and utilisation of technology”. 225 Technological innovation system boundaries 
may differ from national boundaries. They can coincide with local or regional 
areas. They can even be international or global according to agents’ locations, 
capabilities and the relationships between them. Unlike national innovation 
systems, technological system frameworks are applied in less aggregative form, 
focusing on fewer macro considerations.226 
2.7.2 Technological innovation system components  
The building blocks of a technological system framework are actors, networks 
and institutions. Actors refer to organisations that can be gathered into four 
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categories: suppliers and users (vertical linkages), universities and public 
research centres, financial organisations, government and related public 
policies. Actors create knowledge, influence institutions, as well as shape the 
perception of this technology.227 Jacobsson et al.228 call the most technically, 
financially, or politically powerful actors ‘prime movers’ or ‘system builders’, as 
they can strongly influence system development.  
Actors are linked in synergistic “networks and clusters of innovation, production 
and distribution that integrate complementarities in knowledge, capabilities, and 
specialisation”.229 Interactions between actors can occur within market networks 
or non-market networks, locally or globally. In general, developing countries are 
deficient in terms of local networking (e.g. university-industry and research-
industry linkages).230 They are also disconnected from international actors (e.g. 
R&D, suppliers, and customers).231 
The third technological system component that shapes networks and 
interactions between actors are institutions. They refer to laws, rules, standards, 
norms and practices governing interactions. They range from the most binding 
to the less binding, and from formal to informal. They can have a national effect 
or an effect on a specific sector or technology.232 Institutional barriers faced by 
developing countries when transferring technology are often reflected through a 
lack of flexibility, cumbersome procedures,233 and shortage in addressing 
intellectual property rights. 234  
In addition to the three traditional elements of a technological system, Malerba 
& Nelson235 mention the ‘knowledge base’ as a fourth element. This is relevant 
as each sector has its own knowledge base. For instance, knowledge can be 
general (public), sector-specific and even firm-idiosyncratic. Knowledge can 
also be ‘easily’ transferable and difficult to diffuse. 
2.7.3 Concept applicability in developing countries 
In practical terms, this approach suggests the mapping of knowledge flows 
between actors, and evaluating channels and identifying bottlenecks in order to 
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act appropriately. The mapping directs decision-maker attention to systemic 
failures rather than separate failures, such as market failures or lack of R&D 
funds. However, the proper application of this approach in developing countries 
may be hindered by a lack of mature data to compile statistical indicators of 
knowledge flow. Even when flow measurements exist, this approach presents 
significant challenges to translating them into performance indicators.236 
In addition, multiple views exist of the appropriate analysis level (e.g. national, 
sectoral, regional, or local). This makes it difficult to adopt comparable 
approaches across units of analysis (e.g. countries, sectors, or regions). The 
dynamic interplay between levels of analysis increases difficulties. When it 
comes to applying the innovation system approach at country (or national) level, 
it is important to note that scholarly work reveal that national innovation systems 
in developing countries are not well developed.237 They lack resources and 
capabilities to effectively collaborate and play a key role in the production of 
innovation. 
2.8 Research Gap 
The critical evaluation of the literature conducted in this chapter has covered 
major aspects of technological learning, technological capability-building, and 
technology transfer in developing countries.  
A knowledge-based perspective has been adopted throughout the analysis and 
reveals that the literature remains highly influenced by a mono-dimensional 
economic perspective, backed up by technology-policy literature that also ties in 
closely with an economic perspective. Indeed, much of the literature builds on 
cases where the transferor’s economic (i.e. business-oriented) motives are in 
line with transferee economic motives. For instance, multinational corporations 
seeking economic opportunities (e.g. new markets, preferential production 
conditions) in developing countries through local firms that are also driven by 
economic objectives.  
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A challenge facing the author is to investigate the phenomenon where: (i) the 
transferor might not have engaged in as much international trade as larger firms 
(e.g. small companies and university spin-offs); and (ii) the transferee, unlike 
the transferor, is driven by non-economic and developmental goals such as 
those posed by government agencies (i.e. transferor and transferee objectives 
are not aligned).  
Also, much of the evidence provided by the literature stems from studies related 
to mass-produced goods (e.g. assembly lines, steel mills, automobiles, 
electronics, and computers). The production process in the latter is key in the 
transfer, and the transferred knowledge is mainly explicit and relatively easy to 
analyse. However, the present thesis emphasises knowledge-intensive, 
complex, and one-off products, namely satellites. Design, systems engineering, 
and integration are crucial phases for their production. Tacit and integrative 
knowledge also have a vital role to play. Transfer is then relatively difficult to 
analyse. In this respect, even when the literature hints that complex 
technological activities are covered, detail on how the complexity is handled is 
not always provided and appropriately explained. A trend to “confuse apples 
with oranges” has been noted (i.e. simple and complex technologies analysed 
together).  
Moreover, the literature focuses mainly on knowledge transfer evaluation either 
at the firm or national levels. It explains that causes of knowledge transfer 
failures can mostly be attributed to: (i) the lack of understanding that the 
process is slow, long and laborious; and to (ii) the inability to identify appropriate 
capabilities and ways to develop them. This raises the question as to whether 
conducting analysis at a more aggregative level, such as that of a firm or nation, 
captures change that occurs slowly, and furthermore, within a nascent and 
complex technological sector. Therefore, the present study includes less 




Two further “grey areas” have been noted from the critique of the literature. The 
first is the tendency towards focusing on exogenous factor evaluation 
(knowledge transferred from abroad) at the expense of endogenous factors 
(locally-built knowledge) required to effectively absorb foreign knowledge. In this 
respect, the present thesis pays more attention to the dynamics of transferee 
local effort and local learning. This is particularly relevant when the transferee is 
a government agency, motivated mainly by non-financial incentives (i.e. 
learning and local capability-building).  
The second is the lack of clarity with regard to translating theories underpinning 
technological learning, technology transfer, technological capability-building, 
and innovation systems, into practical evaluation approaches. This indicates 
that there is no one-size-fits-all methodology. Therefore, the present thesis 
proposes a one-off approach that suits satellite capability-building in the context 
of developing countries. For this to happen, there is a need to review the sector-
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3 Chapter 3: Satellite technology in developing countries 
The previous chapter analysed relevant foundational theories and concepts 
dealing with technological capability-building in developing countries. Devising 
an analytical framework to evaluate satellite technological capability-building 
requires further analysis of satellite technology peculiarities in developing 
countries. This chapter sheds light on the satellite industry with an emphasis on 
Earth observation small satellites (section 3.1). The architecture of the latter is 
depicted and the philosophy underpinning small satellite development is 
discussed in section 3.2. Project life cycle and management structure are 
discussed in section 3.3. Given that one of the main barriers to entry into the 
satellite industry is technology complexity, matters related to satellite complexity 
are addressed in section 3.4. 
Based on the above, section 3.5 identifies key success factors for developing 
small satellites. It categorises them into managerial challenges at individual, 
team, organisational, and inter-organisational (or external environment) levels. 
Section 3.6 analyses the few studies to be found in the literature about small 
satellite capability-building in developing countries. As the mechanism of 
collaborative small satellite projects is the most common form of technology 
transfer to developing countries (including Algeria), particular attention is paid to 
its analysis. Learning opportunities offered through such mechanisms to the 
transferee in developing countries are also addressed. 
Finally, due to the immaturity of experiences related to collaborative projects 
carried out hitherto, section 3.7 provides insights into the South Korean model, 
the only experience that has gained in maturity. In addition, the early Indian 
satellite development path is also explored. Many lessons can be learnt from 
the latter, particularly with regard to the unfavourable conditions under which 
the satellite programme was launched, the centrality of the vision and the 
implementation strategies pursued.  
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3.1 Satellite industry  
According to the Satellite Industry Association, the global space industry’s 
revenues in 2015 were $325 billion and the satellite industry’s share in the 
space industry represented 64% ($208 billion).1 The satellite industry 
encompasses four major components, two of them are viewed as non-core 
components: satellite services and ground equipment. In 2015, they 
respectively represented 61.16% ($127.4 billion) and 28.27% ($58.8 billion) of 
the global satellite industry’s revenues.2 The two other components considered 
as being at the core of the space industrial base are satellite manufacturing (i.e. 
spacecraft and their subsystems) and the launch industry (i.e. launch vehicle 
manufacturing, launch subsystems, and launch services). In 2015, the former 
represented 7.96% ($16.6 billion) of the global satellite industry’s revenues, 
while the latter represented 2.59% ($5.4 billion).3 
Earth observation services revenues accounted for only 1.6% of global satellite 
services in 2015 ($127.4 billion) whereas the rest related to communication 
services.4 The number of operational Earth observation satellites represents 
14% of the total operational satellites (1381 satellites in orbit by the end of 
2015), with 51% of the total operational satellites dedicated to communications, 
and 37% to commercial applications.5 
With respect to satellite manufacturing, among the 202 spacecraft launched in 
2015, 54% were for Earth observation missions.6 However, they represent only 
8% in terms of total revenues generated against 36% for communication 
satellites.7 The bulk of these Earth observation satellites are very small and 
cheap (called CubeSats and representing less than 1% of the total value).8 
These figures clearly support the argument that Earth observation satellites are 
not the most commercially driven segment in the satellite industry. 
3.1.1 Earth observation small satellite industry 
Euroconsult predicts that over 400 Earth observation satellites (civil and 
commercial, excluding very small satellites whose weight is less than 50kg) are 
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expected to be manufactured between 2014 and 2024.9 Expected 
manufacturing revenues are about $39 billion over the coming decade.10 Over 
40 countries are expected to order, build, and/or launch Earth observation 
satellites.11 
Currently, Earth observation systems generate modest profits and are 
predominately funded by government. However, whilst most of these systems 
are expected to be small and “cheap”,12 the expected growth justifies today’s 
presence of manufacturers in this market.13  
This small satellite dynamic is of concern to traditional market players. The 
market is dominated by large firms (oligopolistic). Their concentration has 
discouraged competition (because of the highly risk-averse nature of the 
satellite industry) and affected the rate of innovation in the satellite industry. The 
latter has been much slower than in comparable high-tech industries (e.g. 
mobile devices, computers, and consumer electronics).14     
Petroni & Santini15 argue that large firms have perceived the emergence of 
small firms manufacturing small satellites as both a threat and an opportunity. In 
addressing the threat, they have started buying out the small firms. They view 
small firm-specific knowledge and innovative capability as an asset that can 
better position them to assume control over this growing market.  
Other trends in this market are also plausible. Meurer & Seah16 argue that a 
tendency towards resource diminution is leading manufacturers to devise new 
approaches to doing business. Competitors are joining forces throughout the 
value chain segments (e.g. sharing their hardware manufacturing facilities, 
satellite image distribution channels). Petroni & Santini17 explain that, in 
addition, manufacturers generally tap other opportunities in “close-by” market 
segments, seeking to diversify their activities and strengthen their position in the 
small satellite market.18 
Such approaches are lowering barriers to entry for new actors, particularly in 
the current climate of increasing geographical fragmentation of space activities 
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across the world and between actors. However, those actors need business 
agility and interactivity. 19  
3.1.2 Satellite industrial supply chain 
The broader space economy chain is composed of three main segments:20 the 
space/satellite manufacturing supply chain; services from satellite operators; 
and actors providing consumer services (downstream activities). Even though 
those actors are not always thought of as part of the space community, they still 
provide services based on space assets.21 In general, well-established 
downstream activities reflect developed space manufacturing activities.22  
The space/satellite manufacturing supply chain is typically divided into five 
levels (primes, and four tiers) (Table 3-1). Primes refer to actors in charge of the 
design and assembly of the complete spacecraft system. The latter is then 
delivered to the users. In a technology transfer project with developing 
countries, the transferee usually deals essentially with the primes.  




Tiers 3 and 4 
Scientific and engineering consulting 
Material and components suppliers 
Tiers 1 and 2 Designer and manufacturer of space equipment and subsystems 
Primes Space systems Integrators/ full systems supplier 
Services from satellite 
operators 
Operators 
Space systems operators 
Ground system operators. 
Consumer services Downstream 
Devices and equipment supporting the consumer markets 
Space-related services and products for consumers 
 
Source: adapted from OECD, 2014. The Space Economy at a Glance 2014. OECD Report, p.21. 
“Tier 1” actors are those who participate in the design, assembly and 
manufacture of major subsystems such as the satellite platform structure, data-
handling subsystem, power subsystem, communication subsystem, etc. “Tier 2” 
refers to actors which manufacture equipment to be assembled in major 
subsystems. “Tiers 3 and 4” cover producers of components and sub-
assemblies. They usually specialise in the production of particular electronic, 
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electrical, or electromechanical components, or the production of particular 
materials such as cables and switches. “Tiers 3 and 4” also refer to scientific 
and engineering service providers, such as engineering firms, R&D 
organisations and universities. Scientific and engineering service providers can 
either be specialists or generalists. One should recognise that division between 
these levels is sometimes blurred because of task overlap.  
Traditional satellite manufacturers often share elements of their supply chain 
with the automotive, electronics, aeronautics and defence industry.23 With 
respect to the small satellite industry, the few small companies that have 
achieved a certain stability in this industry are highly vertically integrated.24    
The space sector is not a “business like others”.25 Everywhere in the world, the 
vitality of its value chain hinges heavily on government contributions. 
Government is the main financier of public R&D and the major customer of 
space products and services, because of the highly risk-averse nature of this 
industry.26 The dependence on government support seems greater in the Earth 
observation small satellite industry because its community is still closely tied to 
universities and R&D activities, and its market is not yet well developed.27 
In developed countries, private contribution is significant throughout all supply 
chain stages. In developing countries, however, the chain is dominated by 
government actors (e.g. the Indian Space Research Organisation - ISRO). In 
general, a well-established supply chain reflects the value produced by the 
space industry. Building a local space supply chain is largely down to 
interactions between actors (or organisations) involved in the chain. From a 
knowledge-oriented perspective, the intensity of inter-organisational learning is 
reflective of the vitality of the space value chain, or the space innovation 
system.28    
Satellite technology is thought of as a complex technology (see section 3.4). In 
this sense, the density and continuity of interactions have proved insufficient. 
Baldwin29 claims that the technical architecture of complex systems matters in 
shaping the strategy of the organisation and whether parts of the system are 
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insourced or outsourced. Based on modularity theory, 30 Baldwin claims that the 
knowledge flow between an organisation and its suppliers is influenced by the 
system architecture (architectural knowledge) and particularly by how loose (or 
strong) the coupling between its components (component knowledge) is. It is 
less complicated to outsource production when the coupling is loose, whereas 
production is often insourced when the coupling is strong. 
3.2 Small satellite: concept and philosophy 
In the context of the present thesis, small satellites are small Earth-orbiting 
artificial bodies operated remotely to collect information on the Earth; hence the 
name ‘Earth observation small satellite’ or ‘remote sensing small satellite’. 
What, then, is small? As illustrated in Figure 3-1, the smallness refers to a 
category of satellites weighting less that 1000Kg. They are usually less 
expensive and of lower performance than large satellites.  
Figure 3-1: Satellite categorisation 
 
Source: adapted from the International Academy of Astronautics categorisation, second 
reference in Sandau, R., 2010. Status and trends of small satellite missions for Earth 
observation. Acta Astronautica 66(1-2), 1-12. 
 
Sandau31 explains that small satellites usually refer to satellites of reduced 
complexity. The concept implies faster knowledge diffusion and greater industry 
involvement, particularly local and small-scale industry.32 With regard to Earth 
observation small satellites, Sandau summarises their mission through seven 
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categories (Table 3-2). The last three categories are particularly relevant to 
small countries as they aim to develop local expertise in satellite technology.  
Table 3-2: Earth observation small satellite missions 
Mission nature Mission objective 
Commercial A profit to be made from satellite data or 
services 
Scientific/Military New scientific/military data to be obtained 
New technology Developing or demonstrating a new level of 
technology 








Developing engineering competence using 
space as a motivation 
Education Personal growth of students via course 
projects or team project participation. 
 
Source: adapted from Sandau, Rainer., “Status and trends of small satellite missions for 
Earth observation”, Acta Astronautica, Jan-Feb, 2010, 66 1-2, p1-p12. 
 
3.2.1 Earth-observation small satellite architecture 
The typical small satellite architecture used in the present study derives from 
the literature on Earth observation small satellite architectures, including 
satellites developed for Algeria.33 In general, small satellite can be divided into a 
ground segment and space segment (Figure 3-2). The ground segment refers 
to the components used to operate the satellite once in orbit, and to receive and 
process data (satellite images). The space segment refers to the satellite itself. 
The satellite is made up of a platform which carries one or several payloads. 
The payload consists of optical instrumentation (e.g. camera) and related 
modules used to capture images (e.g. control and processing electronics).  
The platform provides services through the following subsystems: (i) data 
handling system or on-board computer (OBC), linked to the majority of satellite 
subsystems; the OBC has the capability to manage satellite operations to 
complete the objectives of the mission; (ii) attitude and orbit control system 
(AOCS), consisting of attitude (position and behaviour) modules allowing the 
attitude of the satellite to be determined and actively controlled; (iii) power 
system capable of generating, storing and managing the power needed for 
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mission operations; (iv) propulsion system used to move the satellite; and (v) 
communication system used to communicate with the ground station. 
In addition to the above-mentioned components, it is generally accepted that 
the ground support equipment is part of the space segment. This includes all 
electrical, mechanical and software items used to support assembly, integration 
and testing of the platform and payload. Typically, this includes a set of 
mechanical ground support equipment (MGSE) and electrical ground support 
equipment (EGSE) that is similar or identical to that of the actual ground 
segment used to test the satellite (e.g. communication system, power system 
and attitude control system).  






3.2.2 Small satellite philosophy 
The Department of Electric Power at the University of Surrey can be credited 
with the emergence of the small satellite concept through the development of 
the first successful small satellite in 1981.34 This initiative was then emulated by 
many research organisations in the USA. It has shaped the well-known Faster, 
Better, Cheaper (FBC) approach for project management adopted by NASA in 
the early 1990s.35 According to Fleeter,36 the international space community 
considers that FBC principles underpin small satellite development.  
FBC principles can be summarised as a new, innovative way of managing 
satellite projects. Effective innovative solutions (referred to as Better solutions) 
are developed and implemented in significantly shorter timelines (referred to as 
Faster) and with lower costs (referred to as Cheaper).37 Watzin38 explains that 
such approaches focus on “competence, empowerment with responsibility, 
freedom to innovate outside the established norms, and constant situational 
awareness”. 39  
Definition and acceptance of reasonable risk is another enabling principle of the 
FBC approach. Indeed, for a successful FBC mission, a trade-off between 
Faster, Better and Cheaper dimensions has to be found. Failure will primarily be 
the result of too much emphasis on cost and schedule reduction at the expense 
of appropriate risk management as risk reaches unacceptable levels.40 
Dornheim41 argues that failure in this approach is predictable, as missions that 
“crossed into an area of high complexity and low development time, inevitably 
failed”. 42 In addition to the negative consequences of too much cost and 
schedule pressure, Dornheim points out that “loss or impaired performance [of 
the mission] is often found to be the result of mismanagement or 
miscommunication”.43 
Dillon & Madsen44 reject the emphasis put on success versus failure when 
evaluating the FBC approach. They suggest that there is a need to consider the 
benefit in terms of learning even when failure occurs. Dillon & Madsen argue 
that this approach produces knowledge at a lower cost than have traditional 
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approaches – through setting stretch goals, or extreme goals. They claim that 
adopting extreme goals may have significant benefits in terms of learning (see 
chapter 2, section 2.4) even after the goals are abandoned. According to 
Ward,45 these hidden benefits can be measured by adopting another evaluation 
framework based on the idea that “success-per-dollar is a more meaningful 
measurement of achievement than success per-attempt … The important thing 
is not how much success we get out of 100 tries, but rather, how much success 
we get out of 100 dollars”.46  
The small satellite philosophy partly overlaps with the traditional way of 
developing satellites, where technological change is continuous (incremental 
innovation) (see chapter 2, subsections 2.5.3 and 2.6.3). Because of the highly 
risk-averse nature of this industry,47 technologies (or components) used in small 
satellite development may already have an established pedigree or heritage in 
space usage.48 Their adoption may result from conservative design. This is why 
technological change (rate of innovation) in this industry has been much slower 
than in comparable high-tech industries (e.g. mobile devices, computers, and 
consumer electronics). 
In sum, the small satellite philosophy is anchored in both the traditional 
approach, where technological change is continuous (incremental innovation), 
as well as the radical innovation approach, or discontinuous change (e.g. new 
technology, new management philosophy) (see chapter 2, subsections 2.5.3 
and 2.6.3). The approaches are combined with a view to managing the difficult 
balance between schedule, performance and cost. 
In order to understand the logic underpinning this balance, Wertz & Larson49 
explain that cost and performance traditionally evolve according to a logarithmic 
curve (Figure 3-3). At the lower part of the curve, small additional resources 
(cost) will significantly improve performance, whereas in the upper part, large 
additional resources will only impact modestly on performance. The minimum of 
acceptable performance is achieved with a ‘low cost’ level. ‘Design to cost’ 
allows flexibility in terms of performance according to the available budget. The 
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‘optimum’ level refers to the perfect match between required performance and 
budget. Elsewhere, performance prevails over cost. In ‘design to requirements’, 
a required performance should be reached. In the ‘high cost’ approach, 
performance sought should be the best available (state-of-the-art technology).  
 
Figure 3-3: Performance vs Cost relationships 
 
Source: adapted from Wertz, JR., Larson, WJ., (Eds.), 1999. Space Mission Analysis and 
Design. Space Technology Library 8. Third Edition, Microcosm Press, p.248. And from Wertz, 
JR., Larson, WL., (Eds.), 1996. Reducing Space Mission Cost. Space Technology Library 6. 
Microcosm Press. Second reference in Moody, JB., 2004. The importance of Complex 
Product Systems to space Industry in Australia: A small satellite case study. PhD Thesis, The 
Australian National University, p.122. 
 
3.3 Small satellite project management  
3.3.1 Project life cycle 
Satellite projects are conducted through a number of phases. Each phase has a 
prevailing activity, and the transition from one phase to another is marked by a 
review. The latter has to attest to the successful completion of the previous 
phase and the readiness to start the next phase (as part of risk management).  
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A satellite project life cycle is typically composed of the following phases  
(Figure 3-4):  phase 0: mission analysis/needs identification; phase A: feasibility; 
phase B: preliminary definition; phase C: detailed definition; phase D: 
manufacturing, assembly and testing; phase E: launch and operation of the 
system; and phase F: disposal (customer disposal).  
 
Figure 3-4: Typical project phases and reviews 
 
Source: adapted from ECSS, 2009. Space project management: Project planning and implementation. 
European Cooperation for Space Standardisation, ECSS-M-ST-10C Rev. 1, pp.19-20. 
 
Forsberg & Mooz50 illustrate the overall evolution of space system design and 
implementation (Figure 3-5) as a V-shaped process. The design is a top-down 
process, whereas the implementation is a bottom-up process. During the design 
(i.e. top-down) process, a large multi-disciplinary team of engineers creates 
satellite models using specialised tools and software. The process is based on 
intense dialogue between the prime constructor and both the customer and the 
suppliers – to refine needs and technical specifications. In general, small 
satellites are seen as one-off products. However, they are often designed 
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quickly (in approximately 1 to 3 years), as they rely on previous designs and 
components.  
During the implementation (i.e. bottom-up) process, a separate team of 
technicians implements the design produced by the engineering team. As the 
satellite will be employed in a harsh extra-terrestrial environment, it has to be 
rigorously tested (including its components) over months throughout the 
implementation phases. These tests are crucial, and some of them require 
specific and often expensive equipment and facilities (e.g. chambers for testing 
satellite behaviour under extreme space-like temperatures and pressures and 
vibration equipment for testing satellite structure). In general, for small satellite 
projects, approximately 50 to 100 people (involved in engineering, technical and 
managerial tasks) are required to complete a project, as opposed to hundreds 
of people for large satellite projects.  
 
Figure 3-5: The V-Process of satellite design and implementation 
 
Source: Author. The model is the author’s combination of models presented in: Forsberg, K., Mooz, H., 
1999. System Engineering for Faster, Cheaper, Better. INCOSE International Symposium 9(1), pp.924–
932. Aguirre, MA., 2013. Introduction to Space Systems: Design and Synthesis. Space Technology 
Library, Springer, p.12. ECSS, 2009. Space project management: Project planning and implementation. 
European Cooperation for Space Standardisation, ECSS-M-ST-10C Rev. 1, pp.19-20. 
 
Aguirre51 stresses that the upper part of the “Vee” relates more to the 
aggregated aspects of the system (i.e. system level in Figure 3-5) involving few 
engineers, while the lower part refers more to disaggregated aspects (i.e. detail 
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level in Figure 3-5) involving larger teams. According to ECSS,52 the top-down 
process starts from the Preliminary Requirements Review (PRR) to the 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR). The bottom-up process starts from the 
Critical Design Review (CDR) to the Acceptance Review (AR). The time 
between the PDR and the CDR is used for equipment procurement and 
development. Any procured (e.g. off-the-shelf) or manufactured item should 
undergo its own development cycle, starting from the requirements definition on 
to integration into an upper level (e.g. unit, subsystem, system).  
3.3.2 Project management structure 
A space system project is a combination of technical and support functions. 
Technical functions are those related to technical tasks during the design, 
development and testing of the space and ground segments, along with their 
components. The support functions refer to management, system engineering 
and product assurance tasks. The commonly accepted approach is to divide 
space projects into manageable work packages according to task nature, as 
illustrated in Figure 3-6. A Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) is used as a 
framework to identify the components of the space system, their relationship to 
one another, support functions and associated services (e.g. test facilities). 
Typically, each function represented in the WBS is reflected by an 
organisational entity (e.g. department) within the organisation. Systems 
engineering and programme management are often functions referring to 
groups coordinating satellite development. The WBS shown in Figure 3-6 
illustrates work packages performed at the system level. However, this 








Figure 3-6: Example of a satellite Work Breakdown Structure 
 
 
Source: adapted from ECSS, 2009. Space project management: Project planning and implementation. 
European Cooperation for Space Standardisation, ECSS-M-ST-10C Rev. 1, pp.17-18. Fox, B., 
Brancato, K., Alkire, B., 2008. Guidelines and Metrics for Assessing Space System Cost Estimates. 
Technical Report, RAND Project Air Force, pp.152,153, 189. Abramson, RL., Bearden, DA., Glackin, 
DL., 1995. Small Satellites: Cost Methodologies and Remote Sensing Issues. Proceedings SPIE 2583, 
Advanced and Next-Generation Satellites, 548-564.  
 
3.4 Satellite technology complexity  
Complexity is one of the main barriers to entering an advanced and high 
technology industry. Successful transfer of high technology requires the 
transferee to learn how to effectively manage this complexity; hence, the 
importance of this section. The Technology Atlas Team53 argues that interaction 
complexity between the four technology components proposed by Sharif54  
(Technoware, Humanware, Infoware, and Orgaware) increases in relation to 
technology sophistication (see chapter 2, subsection 2.6.1). The sophistication 
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may result from an increase in operational complexity (Technoware), advanced 
skills and experience (Humanware), documentation value (Infoware), or 
advanced managerial practices (Orgaware).  
The Technology Atlas Team cautions that unlike the Technoware component, 
which can be brought from abroad, the other components cannot be imported 
easily. They depend heavily on local or indigenous considerations. Humanware 
hinges on local technological learning effort. Foreign Orgaware needs a 
considerable adaptive effort, particularly in the local context of developing 
countries. Transferred Infoware very often does not go beyond basic 
documentation.55 Moreover, as technology transfer is a long and progressive 
process, transfer effectiveness also depends on the local assimilation rate of 
imported technology. The rate has to be rapid enough to set in place local 
capabilities that will assimilate the next ‘higher’ generation of imported 
technology.56 
Complexity is therefore seen as a socio-cultural phenomenon reflecting 
interactions between products, processes and organisations.57 From this 
standpoint, a group of scholars led by Hobday & Rush58 recognised the 
peculiarities of certain technological activities featured by complexity. They laid 
down a number of principles for a new holistic approach towards complex 
products or systems called Complex Product Systems (CoPS). It goes beyond a 
purely technical perception and includes managerial and political 
considerations. Hobday defines CoPS as ”high cost, engineering-intensive 
products, systems, networks and constructs”.59 He also explains that CoPS are 
often produced “in one-off projects (or small batches) and the emphasis of 
production is on design, project management, systems engineering and 
systems integration”.60 Complexity mainly stems from: (i) the number of 
components that are customised to fit in the products/systems; (ii) knowledge 
and skill diversity required for production; and (iii) new knowledge required for 
production. 61 Put differently, the complexity of any system derives from the 
complexity of knowledge required to build its components and the knowledge 
required to put together these components to form a system.  
102 
 
Davies62 and Hobday63 put forward categories of products that might fall into 
CoPS. They explain that stand-alone products, such as satellites, which refer to 
systems made up of interconnected components, can be considered as CoPS. 
Consequently, a CoPS framework has been used in analysing satellite projects. 
Moody & Dodgson64 draw heavily on the CoPS approach to analyse a small 
satellite collaborative project in Australia. Wood65 considers the managerial 
challenges related to a CoPS project in exploring technological capability-
building within satellite programmes in developing countries.  
In reality, product complexity spans a continuum that ranges from low 
complexity products, referred to as simpler mass-produced goods, to more 
complex products referred to as CoPS.66 Therefore, it is essential not to restrict 
the analysis of complex products by only using dedicated analytical tools. 
Conventional analytical tools, initially devised for mass-production analysis (e.g. 
Abernathy-Utterback’s model, see chapter 2, section 2.6.2), can also bring 
valuable insights.     
3.5  “Successful” management of small satellite development 
Small satellites can be seen as either CoPS or systems developed under the 
FBC philosophy. The present section explores both perspectives and identifies 
key success factors for developing small satellites.  
According to Hobday & Rush,67 managerial challenges to the successful 
development of small satellites can be categorised into: (i) challenges at 
individual and team level, dependent upon the control of the project (or the 
system integrator); (ii) challenges at organisational level, dependent on both the 
control of the project and the organisation; and (iii) managerial challenges that 
are outside the control of the project, dependent on the organisation and the 
external environment (i.e. relationships with partners and customers, the 
business environment).  
Hobday & Rush68 stress that priority should be given to fostering an ability to 
solve problems internally (within the project). Such an ability provides better 
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negotiating capacity in resolving problems, subject partly to control of the 
project, and consequently offers increased flexibility in managing external 
situations that are out of control. 
3.5.1 Managerial challenges at individual and team level 
Small satellite development projects rely heavily on team work rather than 
institutional or organisational processes. Successful FBC projects are those 
where the team leads the development and not the institution. Watzin describes 
this kind of development as “a team-driven process, not a process-driven 
team”.69 A successful team-driven process hinges upon self-motivated team 
members, their talents, technical competencies and communication skills. 
Continuous and strong interactions should connect the team-lead researcher (or 
principal investigator) to his team members so that trade-offs that need to be 
made do not endanger project outcomes and remain consistent with resource 
limitations.70 Co-location of team members naturally increases formal and 
informal communication. Teams insulated from day-to-day operations have 
proven to be more efficient.71 Peer reviews have always proved to be more 
valuable than formal reviews.72  
The project management function should be balanced and agile. It should focus 
more on motivating the team, providing guidance on the planning and business 
aspects of the project, encouraging and facilitating communication 
development, and coordinating it, rather than focusing on technical 
development. The latter is more a responsibility of the system engineering 
function, which remains a complementary function of management.73 
The system engineering function should be strong enough to lead effectively 
and in a timely manner the technical development and to make technical trade-
offs between subsystems (i.e. at the horizontal level) and amongst levels of 
decomposition/integration (i.e. at the vertical level). System engineering 
activities are carried out by an organisational entity within the project team and 
across the project life cycle.74  
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The system engineering approach should be systemic.75 Each subsystem lead 
engineer should develop a mission level perspective rather than a limited, 
personal subsystem vision. A subsystem lead engineer with a mission level 
perspective can easily be empowered to make decisions within their area of 
responsibility. Effective decision making distribution is enabled through a clear 
project structure, a jointly developed schedule, technical requirements and 
technical interfaces (e.g. standardised interfaces). Decisions should be taken, 
or driven, from the lowest possible level of the project structure.  
Besides lead engineer prerequisites, the principal investigator must have an 
effective sense of ‘the work at hand’ or practical knowledge or experience (e.g. 
subtle trades) required to integrate, assemble or build hardware. In this regard, 
‘pure’ theoreticians often lack a sense of practical appreciation.76  
Minimal documentation is another common practice in successful projects. It 
aims to document only when value is added and when the documentation is 
required for communication (e.g. system requirements, specifications, 
interfaces, implementation plans and procedures).77   
Project monitoring should be dynamically managed (i.e. with a real time system 
for monitoring). 78 Team members should be aware of the impact of any 
deviation or separate action on the overall project. Simple tools that are 
accepted by all members should be used for managing the project. In order to 
ensure dynamism and efficiency, experienced personnel, selected beforehand, 
are often appointed to key areas of the project. 79 
Managing risk is crucial in small satellite projects. Simplicity should be adopted 
as a design strategy.80 Indeed, system testing, cost and scheduling induced by 
additional engineering and testing effort usually rise exponentially when 
complexity increases.81 Small satellites also take advantage of modern 
technologies that are reasonably mature,82 as well as extensively tested off-the-
shelf technologies.83  
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Satellite team performance and productivity should strive for continuous 
improvement. This is enabled by effective group learning (see chapter 2, 
subsection 2.4.2). The latter is achieved through learning routines put in place 
and a learning culture encouraged. One of the enabling practices is to 
recognise the importance of tacit knowledge (see chapter 2, subsection 2.4.1), 
by identifying it, along with pinpointing individuals who hold it, and giving 
recognition to their work. Performance and experience should be rewarded. 
This is possible through incentivising experienced persons to share their 
knowledge with the less experienced (mentoring them so as to convey tacit 
knowledge particularly), and by incentivising the latter to learn from the more 
experienced.84  
Another practice that should be encouraged is to keep good records on project 
progress during the project, with the intention of reusing them on future projects. 
This can be implemented by recording the lessons learned at the end of each 
major task or milestone. 
3.5.2 Managerial challenges at organisational level 
The organisation should build organisation-team confidence that enables 
project team empowerment. Confidence is built progressively by supporting the 
team without micro-managing it. For effective and efficient support, the 
organisation should place a high priority on organisation-team communication. It 
should remain continuously attentive to team requirements. Good organisation 
responsiveness is possible through the a priori assembling of a reservoir of 
resources that the team may need. This is particularly relevant in the context of 
a technology transfer project where transferee exposure time to technology (or 
the transferor’s) is limited. Resources may be human, equipment, facilities, 
information or managerial knowledge.85 The team’s ability to call upon 
resources whenever needed rather than loading up with extra resources from 




A distinction should also be made between effective organisation-team 
communication and excessive reviewing that may lead to micromanagement. A 
hybrid communication approach appears to be the most appropriate way in this 
context.87  
The organisation should rely on structured formal reviews to get insights on 
project progress (e.g. schedule, cost and impediments).88 These reviews are at 
the same time self-evaluation landmarks for the project team. Unstructured 
reviews are also used.89 They are deliberately unstructured to allow anyone in 
the project team, or the organisation management, to raise whatever question 
or concern it is deemed necessary to consider during the project. This kind of 
interactive review gives the organisation deeper understanding of the nature of 
the project, the context, individual profiles, strengths and weaknesses, as well 
as a measure of previous management actions and guidance for future actions.  
Casual meetings and visits should also be encouraged.90 They allow discussion 
on issues that are not directly linked to the project’s sphere of influence, but 
may affect its conduct. They allow for progress monitoring and gauging the 
impact of decisions in situ, and all other aspects that are not addressed in other 
reviews. They reinforce confidence between an organisation’s management and 
the project team.  
Improving organisational learning (see chapter 2, subsection 2.4.2) by 
embedding best practices and new knowledge from project to project is another 
managerial capability that has to be developed. Learning difficulty derives 
mainly from the provisional nature of a project-based entity, which involves 
multiple actors often belonging to several functional and organisational 
structures. It is difficult for a provisional project-based entity to act as a 
knowledge “silo” like traditional organisational entities (e.g. departments). In the 
latter, people belong to the same entity and knowledge accumulates within it. 
Group and organisational learning can also be affected by some strategies that 
may cause staff reduction or re-organisation (experienced personnel quit the 
organisation or are posted to unrelated domains), all leading to loss in project 
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and organisational memory.91 Consequently, organic92 management systems 
should be implemented. They allow flexibility by continuously adjusting 
individual and group tasks during the project and improving interaction between 
groups in both vertical and lateral directions, irrespective of their specialisations 
and hierarchical positions.   
The organisation should build an open learning culture. It should recognise that 
learning is not “free”, and resources should be made available for that purpose 
(personnel, organisation, infrastructure, equipment, budget and time). It should 
understand that the benefits of learning are often perceptible in the medium- 
and long-term, but seldom in the short-term.93 
The organisation should encourage the use of new knowledge and view the 
associated risk (e.g. mistakes) as part of the learning process. Clear guidelines 
and simple tools of risk assessment should be defined and accessible for all 
parties. The organisation should adopt simple tools and systems for helping 
groups work together. The organisation should conduct post-project workshops 
that can diffuse knowledge and contribute in making it organisational.94 
In the particular context of governmental procurement in developing countries, 
there is a need for organisations to implement quality assurance approaches 
(e.g. continuous improvement). These relax or eliminate bureaucratic 
procedures, streamline acquisition contract execution, and allow more flexibility 
in the project.95  
3.5.3 Managerial challenges related to the external environment 
In the development of satellites, organisations are not acting alone, they are 
linked to other organisations and operating within contexts that influence their 
activities. Interactions with these organisations largely explain learning 
effectiveness and innovation.96 In a technology transfer context, learning 
effectiveness is reflected by the local value created, particularly, from a well-
established supply chain.97 Hobday98 explains that complex product production 
often requires the coordination of several producers (or suppliers) working 
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together. This joint-action effectiveness is built over time through dense and 
continuous interactions between organisations (i.e. inter-organisational learning) 
(see chapter 2, subsection 2.4.2).99  
Managerial challenges at this level are primarily the consequence of the 
requirement for combination of extraordinary skills and abilities along with, 
sometimes, a high ‘pace’ of technological change.100 They are also the 
consequence of problems such as the non-recognition of common practices 
between complex systems (e.g. practices are very sector-specific, few 
recognised learning curves).101   
The satellite developer (or prime constructor) should outsource with confidence. 
They should develop in-house ability to assess supplier deliverables (i.e. 
technical specifications, quality, cost and schedules). At the same time, the 
prime should develop their negotiation skills. The latter are necessary for 
resolving conflicts between different actors involved in the project. They are also 
useful for building partner-type relationships with suppliers. This is realised by 
involving them more and encouraging them to share goals, achievements and 
pressure.102  
However, in the context of complex technology, density and continuity of 
interactions are insufficient. The technical architecture of the product matters in 
shaping the strategy of the organisation and whether parts of the product are 
insourced or outsourced. 103  Indeed, knowledge flow between an organisation 
and its suppliers is influenced by the product architecture and particularly how 
loose (or strong) the coupling between its components is. It is less complicated 
to outsource production when the coupling is loose, whereas production is often 
insourced when the coupling is strong. Consequently, satellite developers 
should consider the technical architecture when devising their interactions with 
suppliers and partners.   
Satellite developer actions should be built on prior knowledge of the 
environment. This knowledge stems from an internal effort made by the 
organisation, fostered by a larger strategy adopted at higher level (e.g. sector, 
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country level). Any strategy should be preceded by an accurate tracking of who 
is doing what, through regular industry surveys, promoting relationships with 
industry associations and exploiting data available from government agencies 
(on firms and contracts).104 
Particular attention should be paid to strategies sustaining value-creating 
industries. There is a need to identify the ingredients of efficient innovation 
systems, such as education, skills development and long-term investment in 
R&D.105  
3.6 Small satellite capability-building in developing countries 
Small satellite capability-building in developing countries has rarely been 
addressed in the literature. The few works that have studied the issue offer a 
more general treatment, in that the emphasis was more on space technology 
than small satellite technology. They can be regarded as international 
comparative studies rather than country-specific studies.106 Their levels of 
aggregation do not capture enough of the peculiarities of small satellite 
technology. They also do not thoroughly cover considerations of technology 
transfer to developing countries.  
3.6.1 Mechanisms for small satellite technology transfer 
The dynamics that have emerged over the last twenty-five years in building 
small satellites have lowered barriers to entry for newly industrialised and 
developing countries (e.g. South Korea, Malaysia, Turkey, Algeria, Nigeria, and 
Chile).107 These countries have engaged in a process aimed at moving from 
passive status (i.e. user) to a more active status (i.e. operator and then 
manufacturer).  Wood & Weigel108 identify four models that have been used by 
these countries for implementing early satellite projects.  
Turnkey projects are used where the customer is only in charge of operating the 
satellite after its launch, and managing its applications. This model is generally 
used to procure high capability (i.e. performance and advanced technology) 
satellites. Local university projects are the model for local organisations 
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favouring training benefits over capabilities. In this model, much of the 
development effort is spearheaded by a local university (e.g. design, training, 
manufacturing and operation). Overseas education with local development is 
the third model. It refers to the situation where local organisations seek to use 
knowledge acquired abroad for developing satellites locally. This model is 
generally used when the local organisation wants to leverage foreign knowledge 
to facilitate and speed up local development. The fourth model is collaborative 
satellite development. It refers to projects where a combination of academic and 
hands-on technical training is provided to the customers’ engineers and 
scientists. It often involves countries seeking to take their first steps in satellite 
technology on an affordable budget. The customer’s engineers spend time and 
work together as a team with supplier engineers to build and launch the 
satellite. Then, the customer’s engineers solely operate the satellite. The 
mentoring provided by the supplier’s engineers enables the customer’s 
engineers to commence working on complex systems and honing the diverse 
set of skills required for satellite development. In this model, the supplier leads 
the process of satellite design and manufacture.  
The present research focuses on the use of the fourth model, as it is the 
mechanism used by Algeria for building small satellite capabilities. 
3.6.2 Collaborative project characteristics 
Wood & Weigel109 studied collaborative satellite development projects in four 
developing countries. They argue that at least three archetypal models of 
satellite projects are used: the politically-pushed project; the structured project; 
and the risk-taking project. Wood & Weigel’s study reveals that during the 
capability-building process, developing countries are likely to transition from the 
politically-pushed project to either the structured or risk-taking project. Decisions 
on models to initially adopt or transition to are strongly shaped by the national 
context and the leadership style of the host organisation.  
Wood & Weigel 110 point out the particular challenges that are faced during 
collaborative project implementation. Collaborative project models are chosen 
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according to the internal capabilities of the host organisation (e.g. absorptive 
capacity) and its ambition, balanced by the supplier’s willingness to transfer 
technology (see chapter 2, subsection 2.6.3). 
Three training types are generally provided during these projects: theoretical, 
practical and on-the-job.111 The first refers to learning from courses or 
documentation. It is usually assessed through a formal mentoring system and 
formal accountability (e.g. academic evaluation, tests, dissertations and 
presentations). The results of theoretical training are relatively easy to convey to 
the host organisation for control purposes.  
The second (practical training) refers to the application of skills learnt through 
practical work and on tasks that are not necessarily related to the manufactured 
satellite. This training is recommended when trainee skills are below those 
required for satellite manufacture. It is usually assessed through an informal 
mentoring system and “informal” accountability. It is relatively difficult to control 
by the host organisation.  
The third (on-the-job training) refers to practical tasks performed by the trainee, 
under the supervision of a mentor, towards building the actual satellite. These 
activities are suitable when trainee skills match the skills required for satellite 
manufacture. Trainee contribution is assessed like any other team member’s 
contribution. On-the-job activity is relatively difficult to control by the host 
organisation. 
Each archetypal model used in collaborative projects has its strengths and 
weaknesses in terms of learning opportunities offered to the transferee.      
Table 3-3 summarises these opportunities at individual and organisational 
levels. The common difficulty across all cases remains the monitoring and 
assessment of training by the host organisation.112 This difficulty increases if the 





Table 3-3: Learning opportunities according to the archetypal models of 
collaborative satellite projects 
 
Source: adapted from Wood, D.R., 2012. Building technological capability within satellite programs in 
developing countries. PhD Thesis, MIT, pp.160-191. And, Wood, D., Weigel, A., 2014. Architectures of 
small satellite programs in developing countries. Acta Astronautica 97, 109–121. 
 
3.7 Comparative experiences 
The mechanism of collaborative projects is popular and regarded as the most 
common for satellite technology transfer to developing countries. However, due 
to the immaturity of experiences and projects carried out hitherto, it is difficult to 
either support or reject the idea that this mechanism has been successfully 
used for building satellite technology capability in developing countries. South 
Korea remains the only state that has gained in maturity and provides enough 
lessons to be analysed. Additionally, some lessons can be learnt from the 
Indian satellite development path, which unfolded well before South Korea’s. 
The Indian experience started out with traditional satellites under very 
constricted conditions: an unfavourable national economic and technological 
situation, lack of confidence among the population, and a global environment 
fairly closed to international exchange in satellite technology.     
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3.7.1 South Korean satellite development experience 
In 1989, Korea commenced space technology development activities by 
creating the Korean Aerospace Research Institute (KARI), effectively acting as 
the national space agency.113 At the same time, the Koreans created the 
Satellite Technology Research Centre (SatReC), a university-based research 
centre for satellite technology and applications.114  
Satellite development in Korea was initiated through collaborative small satellite 
projects. SatReC partnered with the UK’s University of Surrey to build the first 
Korean satellite KITSAT-1 that was launched in 1992. The main objective of this 
programme was to acquire technology through training and education.115 A 
group of recent Koreans graduates in engineering was sent to the UK to work 
with the University of Surrey team on the satellite. They had just finished their 
undergraduate programmes in a premier technical university in South Korea 
and lacked any specific training in satellite engineering.  
At the same time, SatReC formed a second, complementary team that 
remained in South Korea. Once KITSAT-1 development was completed, Korea 
purchased the same components as had gone into KITSAT-1 from the UK. 
Back in Korea, both teams were put together to assemble KITSAT-2 
independently, an identical satellite to the first satellite.116 The main objective of 
KITSAT-2, launched in 1993, was to verify that the knowledge conveyed in the 
KITSAT-1 programme had been absorbed by the Koreans.117  
In 1994, building on the experience and knowledge acquired in the previous 
programmes, the same SatReC team attempted to design and build locally 
another small satellite: KITSAT-3. The main objective of this satellite, launched 
in 1999, was to mark Korea’s indigenisation of satellite manufacturing.118 The 
same year, SatRec Initiative (SI) was founded; a university spin-out company 
formed by the engineers involved in KITSAT-1, -2 and -3.119  
Since then, SI has improved its capabilities, moved to higher levels of 
complexity and diversified its products. It has successfully developed and 
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exported products covering the whole spectrum of remote sensing missions 
(e.g. satellites, platforms, electro-optical instruments, communication systems, 
ground systems and application software) as well as products for defence 
systems and nuclear safety. 
In parallel to the maturation of this university-level embryonic experience built 
through collaborative projects, the leadership of Korea’s satellite development 
shifted to KARI (Korea space agency).120  In 1996, a national space 
development plan was established covering the period 1996-2015, envisaging 
the development of capabilities across the entire spectrum of space technology 
(i.e. satellites, launch vehicles, applications and space science).121 
Mid-term objectives were specified. For instance, the plan aimed to 
independently develop a low Earth orbit (LEO) multi-purpose satellite by 2010. It 
aimed to acquire capability to launch micro-satellites by 2007, and to establish 
the technical basis for competing in the global space market.  
The long-term objectives were to develop independent core technological 
capabilities, to join the ranks of the top 10 countries in the global space industry, 
to improve quality of life, and to inspire Korean pride and achievement.122  
In order to achieve these objectives, a twin-track approach was adopted. Korea 
relied on foreign technology to develop and place space systems into orbit, as 
well as foster indigenous technology through international cooperation.123  
Impressive development in space capabilities, particularly satellite technology, 
has been achieved under the space development plan.124   
Increasing achievements, a steady move towards greater technical autonomy 
and complexity, and the growing national importance of space have been 
accompanied by elevating the government body responsible for space policy. In 
2005, the National Space Committee was established as the supreme 
government body for drafting space policy. It was placed under the control of 
the President, chaired by the Minister of Science and Technology, and 
composed of many members, including ministers.125  
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In South Korea, space technology development has mainly been a government 
business throughout the whole value chain, either via government research 
institutes or through international cooperation. Government planned space 
activities, implemented the policy, carried out research and development, and 
commercialised space systems and products. This government-centred 
industrial strategy led to major impediments to space industry growth. 126 It has 
limited private sector involvement and limited support from the government to 
private companies wishing to enter this market. This is reflected in the dearth of 
space systems manufacturing companies.127 Monopolisation into a few principal 
government research institutes has led to weak research-industry 
communication and limited technology transfer from research institutes to space 
companies.128  
To address these deficiencies, Lee & Chung129 argue that the principal 
government research institutes should expand their missions from a “research-
only laboratory to a manager and supporter of space development and 
industry”.130 This will be enabled by promoting a wider space industry, 
facilitating communication between companies, encouraging technology 
transfer to the private sector, and supporting private companies (e.g. sharing 
expensive equipment, facilities and information with them). There is also a need 
to increase the number of satellite development projects, along with their 
monetary value, so as to entice more Korean companies to get involved.131    
3.7.2 India’s satellite development experience 
India offers an outstanding example of changing perceptions by way of a 
challenging space programme. It demonstrates that even deep-rooted national 
and international negative perceptions towards a nation’s capabilities can 
change swiftly as the national community gains confidence. India’s space 
programme was brilliantly initiated and was shaped by a clear-cut vision: “be 
second to none in the development and application of space technology to the 
solution of real problems of man and society”.132  
116 
 
Central to this vision is the use of advanced technology like that for space for 
accelerating the national development process. The Indian strategy also 
emphasises self-reliance and “application through an understanding of basic 
technology”.133 The strategic vision also emphasises the importance of 
international cooperation in capability-building and for bridging gaps in 
development.134  
This strategic vision has evolved and has successively been adapted and 
enriched. It emphasises organisational culture and links with users, 
development of space-related industry, use of space as a tool for sustainable 
development, a holistic and diversified approach to growth, a planetary vision 
and, finally, space exploration.135 To implement this strategy, a planning 
approach has been adopted defining long-, medium- and short-term goals.  
As a result, the Indian space programme began in a modest way in 1962, 
however, five decades later, all segments of the space programme, namely 
satellite communications, meteorology, Earth observation system, and launch 
vehicles, are operational, commercialised and with industrial spin-offs. 
Moreover, India inaugurated a moon mission, is working on manned flight 
missions, and is now planning to venture into interplanetary space.136  
With regard to satellite technology in India, Baskaran137 analyses technological 
learning that occurred between the early 1970s and the late 1990s. He 
examines the judicious combination of active international cooperation along 
with strong local efforts throughout the various phases of satellite capability-
building. He divides the capability building process into two phases: the 
formative phase (1971-1985) and the accumulative phase (since 1986). 
Noteworthy is that “in the early 1970s, India’s capability in all aspects of satellite 
technology was nearly zero”.138  
In the formative phase, India started importing subsystems and assembling 
them into whole systems. Then, it imported most of the components (and 
developed some locally) and assembled them into subsystems. Finally, it 
manufactured most of the subsystems using mostly local components. The 
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foreign contribution in the formative phase was critical. India cleverly diversified 
its partners, which seems to have been a strategic choice to increase 
technology transfer opportunities and overcome possible setbacks.139 It relied 
on the Soviet Union for remote sensing satellites, and the USA, France and 
other European countries in communication satellites. Baskaran140 points out 
that, to all appearances, during this phase India could access almost all 
technologies without major obstacles. He stresses also the prevailing role of 
local effort during this phase.    
The accumulative phase is marked by the threshold that India attained in terms 
of capabilities for building satellites locally (e.g. design, fabrication, testing, 
integration, control, simulation, appropriate facilities, management and 
commercialisation). During this period, India’s dependence on foreign 
technology decreased in general. However, the steady move towards greater 
technical complexity made the dependency stronger in terms of complex 
components, especially under a stringent new export restriction regime. 
Consequently, India adopted a new strategy towards establishing indigenous 
research and development for the most critical components.  
In sum, India gradually built up sustainable capabilities and reduced 
dependence on foreign technology. It fostered linkages between ISRO’s141 
internal entities, local universities, R&D organisations and industry, including the 
public and private sectors. In parallel, and since the mid-1970s, it gradually 
enlarged the size of its space market by increasing the number of projects, 
diversifying themes, and encouraging the entry of new local suppliers across 
the value chain segments.  
The strategy was to foster supplier networks by means of a technology transfer 
programme from ISRO’s entities towards public and private companies. The 
strategy was also to support suppliers by training and sharing information and 
facilities, prototype development and applied R&D. Basic R&D was kept under 
ISRO or R&D entities. Development and engineering aspects were transferred 
to industrial firms (public and private) by involving them in R&D related to 
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production problems. Since the late 1990s, new strategies towards the 
international market have been devised and international collaboration remains 
key to their implementation. 
 
The literature reviewed in chapters 2 and 3 allowed the selection of a 
knowledge-oriented approach for the evaluation of small satellite technology 
transfer and capability-building in Algeria. Chapter 2 placed technological 
learning at the heart of the present thesis. The learning perspective has been 
substantiated by theoretical perspectives stemming from traditional bodies of 
knowledge: technology transfer (i.e. involving exogenous factors) and 
technological capability-building (i.e. involving endogenous factors). These 
factors are categorised at individual and team level (i.e. micro level), 
organisational level (i.e. meso level), and sectoral, national and international 
level (i.e. macro level). Macro considerations were further discussed using the 
Innovation System analytical approach. 
Chapter 3 has linked the considerations reviewed in chapter 2 underpinning 
technological learning, technology transfer, technological capability-building, 
and innovation systems, with the peculiarities of small satellite development in 
the context of developing countries. Managerial challenges related to small 
satellite technology development has been explored from the perspectives that 
small satellites are complex systems (CoPS) and systems developed under the 
FBC (Faster-Better-Cheaper) philosophy. The literature findings have guided 
the formulation of the evaluation framework detailed in the following chapter.  
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4 Chapter 4: Small satellite capability-building: an evaluation 
framework 
Drawing on the literature surveyed in previous chapters, two fundamental ideas 
arise for the evaluation of technological capability-building and technology 
transfer in the context of developing countries. The first is that technological 
capability-building is affected by a multitude of factors at individual and team 
level (i.e. micro level), as well as at organisational level (i.e. meso level), and 
also within the sectoral, national and international environment (i.e. macro 
level). Accordingly, any attempt at a comprehensive evaluation should be 
performed at all levels (micro, meso, and macro).  
The second idea stems from the analysis of technological change occurring in 
developing countries (see chapter 2, subsection 2.5.3), which reveals that 
technological capability in these countries is built according to the sequence: 
engineering, development, and research.1 Accordingly, the starting point for the 
evaluation in the context of the present thesis is the small satellite itself: its 
engineering, development work surrounding it, and related research activities. 
This sequence corresponds to a gradual evaluation from micro level, where 
individuals and teams engineer the satellite, up to meso and, ultimately, macro 
level, where the development and research environment has salience.  
The purpose of this chapter, then, is to present the evaluation framework used 
in the present study. Firstly, the Innovation System analytical approach 
(described in chapter 2, subsection 2.7.3) is used to examine the wider context 
(macro environment) through the analysis of Algeria’s satellite innovation 
system (actors, networks and institutions). Secondly, the planning of the small 
satellite capability-building programme is evaluated by using the ‘strategic 
planning’ analytical tools (e.g. PESTEL2 and SWOT3). 
Thirdly, the implementation of Algeria’s small satellite capability-building 
programme is evaluated by using the framework devised in this study and 
described below (section 4.1). The framework is formed of three categories of 
evaluation metrics: (i) metrics related to technological learning; (ii) metrics 
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related to locally built technological capabilities; and (iii) metrics related to 
transferred technology. These metrics are applied at micro, meso and macro 
levels. As the present evaluation lies essentially within the knowledge-based 
tradition,4 the approach examines primarily knowledge flow, or learning, where 
complex technology is transferred. Performance related to technological 
learning is therefore at the heart of this evaluation (section 4.2). To ensure a 
systemic evaluation of technological learning, two systemic models, 
encompassing various metrics, are devised and presented in sections 4.3     
and 4.4.  
4.1 Metric categories  
The multitude of factors which affect technological capability-building and 
technology transfer to developing countries are spread over different analytical 
levels. These factors, from which the evaluation metrics derive, form the 
analytical framework used for examining the implementation of the satellite 
capability-building programme. They are gathered according to three major 
categories illustrated in Table 4-1 : (i) metrics related to Technological Learning 
(M.T.L) for measuring the knowledge acquired during the transfer and locally 
diffused; (ii) metrics related to locally built Technological Capabilities (M.T.C) for 
measuring the level of organisational capabilities and their complexities; and (iii) 
metrics related to Transferred Technology (M.T.T) for measuring the factors that 
are at the nexus between transferor and transferee.  
Needless to mention, these categories overlap in certain respects. This is a 
deliberate choice so as to enhance the evaluation’s credibility through 
theoretical triangulation.5 The latter refers to the use of diverse theoretical 
perspectives stemming from multiple bodies of knowledge: technological 
learning, technological capability-building, and technology transfer.  
Evaluation of satellite technological learning is performed through six sub-
categories of metrics described in Table 4-1. In the same way, evaluation of the 
locally built satellite technological capabilities and the transferred satellite 
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technology is performed according to their particular sub-categories of metrics, 
respectively two and five sub-categories, as sketched out in Table 4-1. 








The velocity and viscosity of the knowledge handled and whether the 
velocity/viscosity balance is appropriate 
2 
The level of component and architectural knowledge acquired and whether the 
mix is appropriate. 
3 
The level of individual, group, organisational and inter-organisational learning 
and whether the interplay between them is effective. 
4 
The level of prior knowledge required to build satellite capabilities (as part of the 
absorptive capacity) 
5 
The level of learning by doing, learning by searching and learning by interacting, 
and whether these learning types are appropriately combined. 
6 
The level of explicit and implicit knowledge acquired and whether the mix is 
appropriate. 
Metrics related 





The level of organisational (or physical) capabilities that have been built, human 
capital, information, and their integration through appropriate management. 
8 
The degree of complexity of capabilities and the interplay with engineering, 






The nature and content of technology components that are transferred: 
Technoware, Humanware, Infoware, and Orgaware. 
10 
The maturity level of transferred technologies or the developmental stages 
which they are in in their countries of origin 
11 The strength of relationship between the transferor and transferee 
12 
The appropriateness of the mechanism used for technology transfer 
(collaborative projects). 
13 
The appropriateness of the transferee’s management practices (fostering 
learning culture within a technology transfer context).  
Source: Author (synthesised from the literature review in chapters 2 and 3). 
 
The above-identified sub-categories of metrics apply at different levels of 
analysis (micro, meso and macro) as illustrated at the end of this chapter 
(section 4.5, Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). For instance, when it comes to measuring 
the level of prior knowledge required to build satellite capabilities, at a micro 
level this refers to prior individual technical skills and team managerial skills. At 
a meso level, this refers to the transferee’s organisational knowledge that is 
already available to build a satellite. At a macro level, this refers to inter-
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organisational, or broad sectoral, knowledge (national and international) that is 
part of the satellite technological innovation system. Similar reasoning is applied 
to the rest of the metrics.  
4.2 Centrality of technological learning metrics in the evaluation 
One way of evaluating technology transfer and technological capability-building 
is to adopt what Cohen6 calls the ‘engineering perspective’. It posits that 
knowledge cannot be considered as transferred until it has been used or 
applied. This perspective fosters the use of evaluations having two purposes: 
judgment or improvement. Such evaluations prevail in technology transfer from 
developed to developing countries and have been re-adopted, inappropriately, 
by developing countries for certain complex and knowledge-intensive projects.  
These traditional evaluation approaches have inherent limitations that preclude 
a deeper understanding of the phenomenon in question. Indeed, learning (or 
knowledge transfer) is often a slow and laborious process.7 It rarely produces 
swift, tangible outputs, and does not necessarily lend itself to traditional ways of 
evaluation based on the ‘instrumental’ use of outcomes and results. For this 
reason, a move towards knowledge-generating evaluations might be highly 
valued, as suggested by Patton.8 
Accordingly, the present evaluation lies essentially within the knowledge-based 
tradition.9 It looks at knowledge flow, or learning, where satellite technology is 
transferred from developed to developing countries.  
Technological learning is the central element of this evaluation. Table 4-1 
sketches out six subcategories of interwoven learning metrics. Any separate or 
isolated measurement of these metrics during the evaluation is likely to weaken 
the systemic nature of the evaluation. Hence, two systemic models, 
encompassing the six subcategories of technological learning, are devised in 
the present thesis. These models are devised for evaluating the flow of 
knowledge from its first transfer at the transferor-transferee interface to its local 
diffusion (Figure 4-1). 
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Figure 4-1: Positioning of the proposed evaluation models 
 
Source: Author. 
The first model is called the ‘knowledge flow model’. It is devised to evaluate 
knowledge transfer at the departure point from transferor to transferee     
(Figure 4-1). It evaluates the transferred knowledge during collaborative satellite 
projects in which transferor and transferee teams were mixed.  This model is 
built by using the Davenport & Prusak10 concepts of knowledge ‘viscosity’ and 
‘velocity’ (subcategory 1 in Table 4-1), along with the Henderson & Clark11 
concepts of ‘architectural’ and ‘component’ knowledge (subcategory 2 in     
Table 4-1).  
The second model is called the ‘experiential learning model’. It is devised to 
evaluate post-project knowledge transfer. This model applies after the 
technology has been transferred from abroad via collaborative projects. It 
evaluates the locally transferred (or diffused) knowledge meant to build local 
capabilities (Figure 4-1). The model is built by combining the three types of 
technological learning: learning by doing, learning by searching, and learning by 
interacting (subcategory 5 in Table 4-1), occurring at various learning levels 
(individual, group, organisation and inter-organisation) (subcategory 3 in     
Table 4-1).  
Prior knowledge required for building a satellite (subcategory 4 in Table 4-1) 
and the form (tacit and explicit) of the acquired knowledge (subcategory 6 in 
Table 4-1) are measured across these two models. 
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4.3 Knowledge flow model 
4.3.1 Knowledge velocity vs viscosity and component vs 
architectural knowledge  
Knowledge flow in this model is addressed by combining the two knowledge 
typologies presented in chapter 2 (section 2.4). The first draws on the concepts 
of knowledge ‘velocity’ and ‘viscosity’ introduced by Davenport & Prusak12 
(chapter 2, subsection 2.4.3).  They argue that successful knowledge transfer is 
usually achieved through a delicate balance between velocity and viscosity. 
They explain that the relationship between velocity and viscosity is indirectly 
proportional, as often factors that lead to high velocity are those leading to thin 
viscosity and vice-versa. Schwartz et al.13 support the argument and contend 
that in general the transfer mode adopted is a compromise between high 
velocity and acceptable viscosity.  
The delicate velocity-viscosity balance for effective transfer is closely tied to the 
nature of the knowledge that circulates and the actors involved in the transfer. 
In the technological and industrial context, knowledge is very often thought of as 
a resource that includes two complementary components: tacit and explicit 
knowledge (chapter 2, subsection 2.4.1). In addition, acquiring new knowledge 
hinges on the absorptive capacity of the actors involved (chapter 2,    
subsection 2.4.6).  
The second knowledge typology refers to Henderson & Clark’s14 concepts of 
‘component’ and ‘architectural’ knowledge (chapter 2, subsection 2.4.4). For 
acquiring technology, the literature on strategy and innovation suggests that 
organisations with limited resources, such as those in developing countries, 
need to make a trade-off between architectural and component knowledge. 
Other literature (e.g. on transaction cost economics and system engineering) 
acknowledges the inversely proportional relationship between the number of 
components (or component knowledge) and the architecture (or integrative 
knowledge) when it comes to resource-limited firms. 
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4.3.2 Implications of complex technological systems  
As detailed in chapter 3 (section 3.4), three important aspects stand out from 
the complexity characteristics of a product. The first is the number of 
components we need to know about. It relates to the diversity (or breadth) of 
component knowledge that the system integrator requires. In this respect, we 
should not overlook the depth of knowledge that relates to each component; 
that is, the knowledge required to generate these components.15 Indeed, the 
components of complex systems are not ‘simple’ components; they are 
themselves architectures (e.g. modules, subsystems) connecting other 
components or, rather, subcomponents. Therefore, components, as knowledge-
gathering entities, can be seen as a microcosm of the larger system as they 
share common features with it.  
The second aspect of complexity refers to the level of proficiency (or depth) 
needed to manage the interdependencies between components. This is the 
concern of architectural knowledge.16  
The third aspect relates to knowledge novelty required for building a complex 
system. It concerns both component and architectural knowledge. Indeed, 
acquiring new knowledge hinges largely on the ‘absorptive capacity’ of learners. 
That can be broken down into the abilities enabled by prior knowledge 
(knowledge accumulation), and the intensity of learning effort. Kim17 argues that 
the intensity of organisational effort, through actions leading to both continuous 
and discontinuous learning, has a more prominent role than prior knowledge, 
particularly for long-term learning. 
4.3.3 Formulating the model   
Building on Henderson & Clark’s18 knowledge typology and complex technology 
characteristics, successful transfer of a technological system is akin to effective 
learning in respect of the system architecture and components. The technology 
acquirer should therefore acquire the knowledge that relates to the core design 
concepts of each component, as well as to the architectural (or integrative) 
knowledge required to put together these components to form a system.  
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However, in accordance with the system engineering view, a technological 
system is also perceived as a decomposition-integration process. The 
technological system is an architecture gathering together several components, 
and each component is further decomposed into several subcomponents. The 
decomposition continues down to the lowest level of decomposition (e.g. 
hardware, software). On the other hand, the lowest level entities are integrated 
together, validated and tested to form higher level entities, and the process 
flows up to the system level. The selection of the decomposition approach is 
often driven by the need to, for instance, integrate easily, to upgrade easily, to 
develop easily, as well as to simplify management accountability.19  
To ease understanding of the proposed model, the example of a product 
breakdown structure (PBS) in Figure 4-2 illustrates the decomposition-
integration process associated with the technological system transferred. In 
general, system complexity is reflected through multiple levels of decomposition 
and the number of components at each level. 







Let S denote the components of the technological system. At the highest level, 
S0 denotes the final integrated product (or the technological system). S1, S2, …, 
Sn denote the subcomponents of S0. At the second level, Si1, Si2, …, Sim denote 
the subcomponents of Si. At the third level, Sij1, Sij2, …, Siju denote the 
subcomponents of Sij, and so on until the lowest level of decomposition is 
reached.1 For instance, the INCOSE systems engineering handbook defines 
seven decomposition levels (system, segment, element, subsystem, assembly, 
subassembly and part).20  
Based on the Henderson & Clark’s21 knowledge typology, it can be posited that 
each component of the technological system relates to two types of knowledge: 
component knowledge C and integrative (or architectural) knowledge I. The pair 
(C0 , I0) refers to component and integrative knowledge related to component 
S0. (C1 , I1), (C2 , I2), …, (Cn , In) refer, respectively, to component and 
integrative knowledge related to components S1, S2, …, Sn.   
At the second level, (Ci1 , Ii1), (Ci2 , Ii2), …, (Cim , Iim) refer, respectively, to 
component and integrative knowledge related to components Si1, Si2, …, Sim.  
At the third level, (Cij1 , Iij1), (Cij2 , Iij2), …, (Ciju , Iiju) refer, respectively, to 
component and integrative knowledge related to components Sij1, Sij2, …, Siju.       
There is an assumption that component knowledge C of any component is the 
entire knowledge that is needed in order to build this component. This ‘whole’ 
knowledge is the combination of the knowledge of its composing elements 
(components) along with the knowledge required to integrate these elements. In 
other words, the knowledge that is needed to be acquired (or transferred) in 
order to build the component is simply its component knowledge. Let KT denote 
the knowledge acquired (or transferred), then for each component of the 
system:  
 
                                            
1 n, m, u refer to the numbers of components at each level of decomposition. 
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KT0 = C0 = C1 + C2 + …. + Cn + I0            (1), where C1, C2, ….,Cn refer to the 
components’ knowledge and I0 is 
the knowledge required to integrate 
these components.  
… 
KT2 = C2 = C21 + C22 + …. + C2m + I2          (2)  
… 
KT22 = C22 = C221 + C222 + …. + C22u + I22   (3) 
…. 
 
The proposed model serves to illustrate the interplay between component and 
integrative knowledge in technology transfer. The flow of knowledge from 
transferor to transferee can be viewed differently by borrowing Davenport & 
Prusak’s22 concepts of knowledge ‘viscosity’ and ‘velocity’, explained earlier. 
For the purposes of the model, viscosity refers to the flow, in terms of depth, of 
knowledge transferred, and it specifically provides indication as to the depth of 
integrative knowledge required to put components together. Let KVis denote the 
knowledge that flows as a result of viscosity, then:  
 
KVis0 = I0     (4) 
… 
KVis2 = I2    (5) 
… 




On the other hand, velocity refers to the speed with which knowledge moves 
during technology transfer project. Velocity provides an indication as to the 
number of topics (components) covered over the course of the project; that is, it 
provides an indication of the breadth of component knowledge transferred. This 
knowledge is reflected through the number and/or diversity of component 
knowledge transferred, and implicitly, the depth of knowledge associated with 
each component. Let KVel denote knowledge flow as a result of velocity, then: 
 
KVel0 = C1 + C2 + ….. + Cn   (7)  
… 
KVel2 = C21 + C22 + ….. + C2m   (8) 
… 
KVel22 = C221 + C222 + ….. + C22u  (9) 
…. 
 
The knowledge transferred is a combination of two inversely proportional 
factors: breadth and depth (or knowledge from velocity and knowledge from 
viscosity). Figure 4-3 shows this delicate balance. The author would argue that 
the knowledge acquired for any component varies along the curve labelled “set 
of combinations” featured in Figure 4-3. Consequently, the knowledge 
transferred (KT) for each component of the system is given by:  








Figure 4-3: Velocity vs Viscosity - Breadth vs Depth 
 
Source: Author. 
It is noteworthy that the velocity-viscosity balance is sought across all of the 
components of the technological system and at all levels of decomposition-
integration, as illustrated in Figure 4-4. The knowledge transferred through each 
component can be represented by an equation combining two variables KVis 
(viscosity) and KVel (velocity): 
KT0 = KVis0 + KVel0     (11) 
… 
KT2 = KVis2 + KVel2     (12) 
… 
KT22 = KVis22 + KVel22     (13) 
… 
The accumulation of balancing ‘games’, along with the reciprocal effect between 
components, reflects the difficulty of acquiring knowledge effectively. This is 
even truer in the context of technology transfer, where ‘balance’ choices are 
insufficiently well informed because of initial constraints on the knowledge 
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acquirer (i.e. developing countries), such as limitations of prior knowledge which 
can enlighten choices. 




Interplay between component and integrative knowledge  
To explain the interplay between component and integrative knowledge, the 
technology acquirer’s objective is assumed to be maximisation of the 
knowledge transferred. Thus, it is clear from (11) that an increase in knowledge 
transfer (KT0) (related to the technological system) requires an increase in 
either the depth of knowledge (KVis0) or breadth of knowledge (KVel0), as the 
two factors are inversely proportional.  
The first scenario is to increase the depth of knowledge, i.e. deepen 
integrative knowledge. This knowledge (KVis0) can increase up to a point, but 
cannot go beyond a certain threshold, because it is related to the components. 
Indeed, it offers a margin for progress, but remains limited because it cannot go 
beyond a certain level of integration unless more is known about the 
components. Paradoxically, in order to know more about the components, there 
is a need to explore the second scenario.  
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The second scenario is to increase the breadth of knowledge (KVel0), i.e. gain 
more knowledge about components. This knowledge is represented by KVel0. 
From (7), to increase KVel0, there is a need to increase C1, C2, …, or Cn. Firstly, 
the example of increasing knowledge about one of the components (C2) is 
examined.   
From (2), to increase knowledge about the component C2, there is a need to 
increase knowledge about its subcomponents C21, C22, …, C2m, which is 
equivalent to KVel2 (see (8)) or its integrative knowledge I2, which is equivalent 
to KVis2 (see (5)). KVis2 remains limited and cannot go beyond a certain 
threshold because it is related to the subcomponents. KVel2 and KVis2 are 
inversely proportional, and so as KVel2 increases, KVis2 decreases, and vice-
versa. Similarly, the example of increasing knowledge about one of C2’s 
subcomponents (C22) is examined.   
From (3), to increase knowledge about the subcomponent C22, there is a need 
to increase knowledge about its sub-subcomponents C221, C222, …, C22m, which 
is equivalent to KVel22 (see (9)) or its integrative knowledge I22, which is 
equivalent to KVis22 (see (6)). Likewise, KVis22 remains limited and cannot rise 
above a certain threshold, because it is related to the sub-subcomponents. 
KVel22 and KVis22 are inversely proportional. In order to increase knowledge, 
the same rationale can be applied down to the lowest level of decomposition.  
It is clear from the above that intra-level factors are interwoven. For instance, 
integrative knowledge at one level depends on the component knowledge of the 
same level. Likewise, inter-level factors are related to each other, as any 
attempt to increase knowledge about a single component requires a 
corresponding knowledge increase at lower levels (i.e. in subcomponents). The 
challenge is even greater when it comes to increasing knowledge about several 
components.  
Graphically, the range of ‘balance’ options offered to the technology acquirer is 
represented in Figure 4-3 by the curve labelled “set of combinations”. Explained 
differently, any technology acquirer making the trade-off to increase either depth 
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of knowledge (KVis0) or breadth of knowledge (KVel0) will likely have to move 
along the same curve represented by the “set of combinations” in Figure 4-3.  
Consequently, due to the difficulty of disentangling component knowledge from 
integrative knowledge, and vice-versa, a third scenario can be adopted in 
order to increase knowledge transferred KT0 (see (11)). It consists of increasing 
both depth of knowledge (KVis0) and breadth of knowledge (KVel0), or 
increasing one of them without decreasing the other.  
Because the two factors are inversely proportional, increasing both factors is 
only possible by achieving a shift like the one represented by the arrow in 
Figure 4-5. Such a shift is enacted through structural, multi-dimensional and 
systemic measures that should lead to the establishment of coherent sectoral 
and national innovation systems (e.g. creating an innovative environment, 
fostering collective work, improving absorptive capacity of learners) (see 
chapter 2, section 2.7). 




















4.4 Experiential learning model 
The experiential learning model proposed in this section applies subsequent to 
technology transfer from abroad having occurred via collaborative projects. It 
evaluates locally transferred (or diffused) knowledge in order to build local 
capabilities. It is a systemic model that evaluates learning processes occurring 
at and between various local learning levels: individual, group, organisation and 
inter-organisation (chapter 2, subsection 2.4.2). In a technological context, 
learning is effective when combining learning by doing, learning by searching, 
and learning by interacting (chapter 2, subsection 2.4.5). The experiential 
learning model evaluates the combination of these learning types, at various 
learning levels, by using Kolb’s Experiential Learning Theory23 and March’s 
concepts of ‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’.24 The selection of Kolb’s theory is 
motivated by the fact that this influential theory is grounded in experience and 
that learning is effective when it is holistic. Fundamentally, this happens when 
two dimensions, reflection and action, are combined during the learning 
process.  
4.4.1 Formulating the model   
Learning is a systemic phenomenon that can be dissected according to vertical 
and horizontal differentiation.25 Each learning level (individual, group, 
organisation or inter-organisation) can be modelled, horizontally, according to a 
Kolb-like learning cycle (chapter 2, subsection 2.4.2). The term horizontal refers 
to intra-level learning. 
On the other hand, vertical connections are made between the horizontal levels 
of aggregation by borrowing March’s concepts of ‘exploration’ and 
‘exploitation’.26  Vertical connections refer to the cross-level learning.  
The proposed systemic experiential learning model is the combination of 





Intra-level learning (horizontal differentiation)  
As discussed in chapter 2 (subsection 2.4.2), learners, whether they be 
individuals, groups, organisations, or inter-organisations, are more effective 
when completing Kolb-like cycles. The latter are tension-filled processes where 
action (i.e. practical aspects) is combined with reflection (i.e. theoretical 
aspects). 
On the other hand, the literature on technological learning identifies three types 
of learning: learning by doing, learning by searching and learning by interacting 
(chapter 2, subsection 2.4.5). In a technological context, learning is effective 
when it combines these three types of learning.  
The proposed model draws a parallel between the typology of technological 
learning (learning by doing, by searching and by interacting) and the 
combination of action and reflection. Learning by doing can refer to the practical 
aspects of learning, or what Kolb defines as ‘action’. Learning by searching can 
refer to the theoretical aspects, or what Kolb defines as ‘reflection’.  
Accordingly, combining learning by doing and learning by searching can be 
modelled as a Kolb-like cycle combining action with reflection. This intra-level or 
horizontal combination is enabled by interaction. The technological learning 
typology identifies the latter as ‘learning by interacting’.  
However, interactions occur also between learning levels (individual, group, 
organisation or inter-organisation). This is why the inter-level dimension is also 
considered in the proposed model.      
Inter-level learning (vertical differentiation)  
As mentioned above, learning is a systemic phenomenon where processes that 
occur at separate levels of aggregation interrelate with each other.27 In the 
context of knowledge transfer from developed to developing countries, learning 
is effective when knowledge is locally diffused and used to develop local 
capabilities in developing countries. Local diffusion results primarily from the 
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“diffusion of knowledge and/or skill from the individual to members of the 
collective, and expansion of the collective's capacity to take effective action”.28 It 
results also where processes at all levels evolve to mutually supportive 
relationships.29  This is very often reflected in the local value created. 
A number of authors suggest that successful diffusion leads to a systemic 
phenomenon where the interplay involves all levels of aggregation from 
individual to inter-organisation.30 Coghlan31 and Beeby & Booth32 illustrate the 
systemic nature of diffusion through a network-like model (Figure 4-6).  
Figure 4-6: Network interaction between all learning levels 
 
Source: adapted from Coghlan, D., 1997. Organizational learning as a dynamic interlevel 
process. Current topics in management 2, 27-44. And from Beeby, M., Booth, C., 2000. Networks 
and inter-organizational learning: a critical review. The learning organization 7(2), 75-88. 
 
In the proposed model, diffusion is vertical when it refers to cross-level learning 
or relationships and horizontal when it refers to learning cycles occurring at 
each level of aggregation. The current subsection seeks to highlight the 
elements that underlie the interplay between levels of aggregation (or cross-
level learning) as well as the complexity of such relationships.  
Indeed, as discussed above, each learning level can be modelled horizontally 
according to a Kolb-like learning cycle. The proposed approach then is to draw 
connections vertically between Kolb’s learning cycles at each level of 
aggregation. These connections are made by borrowing March’s33 concepts of 
‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’ and by juxtaposing them with Kolb’s learning 
cycles.  
Prior to drawing these connections, it is useful to recall that March’s concepts of 
‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’ are central to the study of adaptive processes. 
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March stresses that the survival of any adaptive system requires an appropriate 
trade-off between exploration and exploitation. He warns that “systems that 
engage in exploration to the exclusion of exploitation are likely to find that they 
suffer the costs of experimentation [i.e. trialling] without gaining many of its 
benefits ……[and] conversely, systems that engage in exploitation to the 
exclusion of exploration are likely to find themselves trapped in suboptimal 
stable equilibria”.34 
Building on the concepts of exploration and exploitation, Holmqvist35 examines 
the interplay between organisational and inter-organisational learning. He points 
to the duality in organisational learning, arguing that organisations engage in a 
process of exploration when they need to create variety in their experiences 
through experimentation (i.e. trialling) and taking risks, whereas, they engage in 
a process of exploitation when they need to create reliability in experience by 
focusing on and refining certain activities. A number of scholars underscore the 
cyclical relationship between exploration and exploitation and describe how 
exploration leads to exploitation and vice-versa.36 Holmqvist37 argues that the 
cyclical exploration-exploitation dynamic occurs at the organisational level as 
well as beyond it – at inter-organisational level, where it orchestrates the 
interplay between these two levels. He thus proposes a dynamic model of intra- 
and inter-organisational learning.  
Based on the foregoing, the present model draws connections between the two 
learning cycles: the exploration-exploitation cycle and Kolb’s cycle at four levels 
of aggregation (i.e. individual, group, organisation, and inter-organisation). It 
proposes a theoretical dynamic model that explains the interplay between levels 
of aggregation.  
For the purposes of this model, exploration refers to the process of a 
preliminary examination of a subject either in terms of experimentation (i.e. 
action; or learning by doing) or conceptualisation (i.e. reflection; or learning by 
searching). Exploitation refers to the process of making use of knowledge 
through ‘mature’ conceptualisation (i.e. reflection or learning by searching) or 
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through active experimentation (i.e. action or learning by doing). Therefore, the 
learning cycle at each level of aggregation can be viewed as a continuous 
exploration-exploitation cycle, and, when juxtaposed with Kolb’s cycle, it 
provides a four-step cycle (Figure 4-7): explorative action, explorative reflection, 
exploitative reflection, and then exploitative action.  
Figure 4-7: Exploration-exploitation cycle juxtaposed with Kolb’s cycle 
 
Source: Author 
Explorative action is where learners (e.g. individuals, groups, organisations and 
inter-organisations) are assigned a task which they then perform (or 
experience). At this stage the process is still explorative, because learners have 
not yet internalised what is behind the concrete experience. That is why they 
need to engage in an explorative reflection, where they step back from the task 
and reflect on what has been done and explore the experience. Exploration at 
this stage is carried out through formulating questions and attempting to answer 
them.  
Once reflection has matured (or been refined), learners conceptualise theories 
and models of what was experienced with the intention of exploiting them or 
putting them into practice. This stage is called exploitative reflection. Finally, 
learners attempt to plan how to test their models and theories, and how to enter 
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into a new experience. In general, learners usefully exploit the experience (or 
the ensuing theories and models) by placing it into a context that is relevant to 
them. This stage is called exploitative action.  
It is clear that any proposed model explaining the interplay between levels of 
aggregation should illustrate the systemic nature of the learning process.38 This 
systemic nature is primarily underpinned by the relationships between each pair 
of learning levels of aggregation. For Isaac,39 dialogue is of essence to 
collective thinking and learning. He defines dialogue as “a sustained collective 
inquiry into the processes, assumptions, and certainties that compose everyday 
experience”.40  
Based on this definition, the present model posits that learners, whether they be 
individuals, groups, organisations, or inter-organisations, trigger intra-level and 
cross-level dialogues during learning. The intra-level dialogue occurs at the 
same level of aggregation and is represented through learning cycles       
(Figure 4-7). The cross-level dialogue is triggered between levels of aggregation 
and is represented in Figure 4-8.  
The complexity of cross-level relationships is illustrated by the multitude of 
dialogue types or connections that any pair of learning levels can establish. In 
each pair, each level reciprocally affects the other (or internalises from the 
other). Both levels are tied together through the following simplified 
combinations: exploitative-exploitative, exploitative-explorative, explorative-
explorative, and explorative-exploitative (Figure 4-8a); or the full-length 
combinations: exploitative action-exploitative action, exploitative action-
exploitative reflection, …, explorative action-explorative action (Figure 4-8b). 
Table 4-2 lists all dialogue combinations identified by the proposed model, 






Figure 4-8: Interplay between each pair of learning levels 
                                                                                  
Source: Author 
Table 4-2: Inter-level dialogue combinations 
General combinations Detailed combinations 
Meaning in the context of technological 
learning 
Exploitative-Exploitative 
Exploitative action-Exploitative action Dialogue between 
learner who (regularly) performs practical 
tasks (e.g. manufacturing tasks) or matures 
conceptually the tasks (e.g. mature design) 
and 
learner who (regularly) performs practical 
tasks (e.g. manufacturing tasks) or matures 
conceptually the tasks (e.g. mature design) 
Exploitative action-Exploitative reflection 
Exploitative reflection-Exploitative action 
Exploitative reflection-Exploitative reflection 
Exploitative-Explorative 
Exploitative action-Explorative action Dialogue between 
learner who (regularly) performs practical 
tasks (e.g. manufacturing tasks) or matures 
conceptually the tasks (e.g. mature design) 
and 
learner who tests and explores practical tasks 
(e.g. laboratory experience) or conceptual 
ideas (e.g. research) 
Exploitative action-Explorative reflection 
Exploitative reflection –Explorative action  
Exploitative reflection-Explorative reflection 
Explorative-Explorative 
Explorative action-Explorative action Dialogue between 
learner who tests and explores practical tasks 
(e.g. laboratory experience) or conceptual 
ideas (e.g. research) 
and 
learner who tests and explores practical tasks 
(e.g. laboratory experience) or conceptual 
ideas (e.g. research) 
Explorative action-Explorative reflection 
Explorative reflection –Explorative action 
Explorative reflection-Explorative reflection 
Explorative-Exploitative 
Explorative action-Exploitative action Dialogue between 
learner who tests and explores practical tasks 
(e.g. laboratory experience) or conceptual 
ideas (e.g. research) 
and 
learner who (regularly) performs practical 
tasks (e.g. manufacturing tasks) or matures 
conceptually the tasks (e.g. mature design) 
Explorative action-Exploitative reflection 
Explorative reflection–Exploitative action 




The reciprocal effect between levels of learning also depends on their ability to 
interact. This ability can be explained by borrowing Hamel’s41 concepts of 
‘transparency’ and ‘receptivity’. In this model, ‘transparency’ refers to the 
openness of a learning level (individual, group, organisation, or inter-
organisation) to other levels by sharing experiences with them, and ‘receptivity’ 
refers to the ability to absorb knowledge that comes from other levels by 
internalising their experiences. Holmqvist42 employs these concepts to explain 
the relationship between organisational and inter-organisational levels. The 
present model advocates generalising the use of these concepts to explain 
relationships between all levels of aggregation (individual, group, organisation 
and inter-organisation). 
The reciprocal effect between levels of learning reflects the systemic nature of 
learning and shows that the phenomenon transcends learner boundaries, 
whether learners be individuals, groups, organisations or inter-organisations. 
However, illustrating learning’s systemic nature in the form of networks    
(Figure 4-6) with a broad variety of possible combinations between levels of 
learning (Figure 4-8) does not necessarily imply intense cross-level interactions. 
Indeed, network-like representation seems to neglect the significance of 
‘vertical’ barriers. These come about as a result of hierarchical relations43 
between organisational levels plus “the complexity with which a given system 
level is organized, the size in physical space of its constituent units, the physical 
proximity of these units, their characteristics, and the distinctive structures and 
processes characterizing these units”.44 Figure 4-9 illustrates the interplay 
between learning levels and depicts the hierarchical aspect. The shaded area in 







Figure 4-9: Interplay between hierarchical learning levels 
   
Source: Author 
Another argument in favour of choosing a hierarchical model to capture the 
systemic nature of learning is the presence of forms of authority (formal and 
informal) at the intra-organisational level (individual, group and organisation). 
Such forms of authority can hinder cross-level or ‘vertical’ learning. 
Paradoxically, according to experiential learning theory, in order to make 
learning intentional, there is a need for coordinating authorities at each level of 
learning. These authorities drive and orchestrate the ‘horizontal’ learning cycles 
and balance between action and reflection45 or between exploration and 
exploitation.46 The lack of such authorities at inter-organisational level is a major 
barrier to learning, as several studies have revealed.47  
Indeed, a great deal of the systemic learning lies in the paradoxical effect of 
these authorities (hindering vs driving). Through these authorities, conditions 
and behaviours are aligned within and across different levels of aggregation,48 
and learning curves can be shortened.49 Figure 4-10 illustrates the key 
components of the proposed model by representing horizontal and vertical 
differentiations (i.e. horizontal learning cycles and the vertical arrows connecting 
them through concepts of exploitation and exploration), along with 









4.5 Evaluation metrics at micro, meso and macro levels 
The categories of evaluation metrics described in section 4.1 (Table 4-1) are 
formed of metrics spread across different analysis levels: macro, meso and 






















Intensity of interactions between organisations involved in satellite 
development 
Degree of involvement of these organisations  
Number of system components outsourced  
Depth of development of outsourced components through the ratio: number 
of individuals involved / number of individuals required 
Absorptive capacity 
Level of inter-organisational prior knowledge (previous inter-organisational 
experience, preparatory inter-organisational activities) 
Intensity of inter-organisational effort (inter-organisational objectives, and 
degree of achievement) 
Inter-organisational 
learning  
Number, intensity and nature of activities between organisations  
Alignment of inter-organisational activities (and objectives) with 
organisational, team and individual activities 
Combination of learning 
by doing, learning by 
searching and learning 
by interacting 
Number and intensity of practical activities (engineering and development) 
between organisations  
Number and intensity of theoretical activities (research) between 
organisations 
Connections between practical and theoretical activities 
Explicit-implicit balance 
Intensity and nature of interactions between organisations  
Inter-organisational documentation and material produced and shared (inter-
organisational memory) 
Employment stability (personnel turnover) 
Metrics related 






Physical investment at inter-organisational level: equipment (heavy and 
shared between organisations), machinery, physical facilities 
Human capital  
Information (inter-organisational documentation) 
Management capabilities (inter-organisational coordination, communication, 
planning, incentives, risk, quality assurance) 
Sophistication level of 
inter-organisational 
capabilities 
Simple capabilities for exploitation activities (operations)  
Intermediate capabilities for engineering and development activities 
Advanced capabilities for research and innovation activities 








Object-embodied technology, inter-organisational level equipment, 
machinery, physical facilities 
Document-embodied technology (inter-organisational documentation) 
Maturity and 




Old, established, sophisticated 
Simple, intermediate or advanced  
Transferor-transferee 
relationship 
Interaction between organisations of the transferor’s supply chain with the 




Interaction between organisations of the transferor’s supply chain with the 
transferee or organisations of the transferee’s supply chain 
Management practices 
that foster learning 
culture 
Transferee strategies and entities in charge of learning promotion at inter-
organisational level 














Intensity of interactions between groups of the same organisation   
Degree of involvement of these groups  
Number of system components insourced 
Depth of internal development through the ratio: number of individuals 
involved / number of individuals required  
Absorptive capacity 
Level of organisational prior knowledge (previous organisation experience, 
preparatory organisational activities)  
Intensity of organisational effort (organisational objectives and degree of 
achievement) 
Organisational learning  
 
Number, intensity and nature of activities between groups of the same 
organisation  
Alignment of organisational activities (and objectives) with inter-
organisational, team and individual activities 
Combination of learning 
by doing, learning by 
searching and learning 
by interacting 
Number and intensity of practical activities (engineering and development) 
between groups of the same organisation 
Number and intensity of theoretical (research) activities between groups of 
the same organisation 
Connections between practical and theoretical activities 
Explicit-implicit balance 
 
Intensity and nature of interactions between groups  
Organisational documentation and material produced and shared 
(organisational memory) 
Employment stability (personnel turnover) 
Metrics related 







Physical investment at organisational level:  equipment, machinery, physical 
facilities 
Human capital  
Information (organisational documentation) 
Managerial capabilities (inter-group management practices, empowerment, 
coordination, communication, planning, incentives, risk, quality assurance) 




Simple capabilities for exploitation and operational activities 
Intermediate capabilities for engineering and development activities 
Advanced capabilities for research (innovation), specification and design 
activities 








Object-embodied technology, organisational level equipment (heavy and 
shared within the organisation), machinery, physical facilities 
Document-embodied technology (organisational documentation) 
Maturity and 
sophistication level of 
transferred technology 
at organisational level  
Old, established, sophisticated 
Simple, intermediate or advanced 
Transferor-transferee 
relationship 
Objectives of the transferee organisation 
International experience of the transferee organisation 





Interaction between both organisations, the transferor and transferee 
Contractual flexibility to technology transfer  
Project control  
Risk management approach 
Management practices 
that foster learning 
culture 
Transferee strategies and entities in charge of learning promotion at 
organisational level 














Intensity of interactions between individuals and project sub-teams (of the 
same team) 
Degree of involvement of these individuals and sub-teams  
Number of system subcomponents insourced  
Depth of internal development through the ratio: number of individuals 
involved / number of individuals required 
Absorptive capacity 
Level of individual and team prior knowledge (educational and professional 
background, previous individual and team experience in satellite 
development, appropriateness of prior knowledge to satellite development, 
preparatory individual and team activities for satellite projects)  
Intensity of individual and group effort (individual and group objectives and 
degree of achievement) 
Individual and group 
learning 
Number, intensity and nature of activities between individuals and sub-teams 
of the same team  
Alignment of individual and team activities (and objectives) with inter-
organisational and organisational activities 
Combination of learning 
by doing, learning by 
searching and learning 
by interacting 
Number and intensity of practical activities (engineering and development) 
between individuals and sub-teams of the same team 
Number and intensity of theoretical (research) activities between individuals 
and sub-teams of the same team 
Connections between practical and theoretical activities 
Explicit-implicit balance 
Activities of mentoring (intensity, duration) 
Theoretical and practical training  
Intensity and nature of the interactions between individuals  
Individual and team documentation and material produced and shared 
(individual and group memory) 
Employment stability (individual and team stability, personnel turnover) 
Metrics related 




Individual and team 
capabilities 
Physical investment at individual and team level:  equipment (light), 
machinery, tools, physical facilities 
Human capital: individual and team skills 
Information (individual and team documentation) 
Management capabilities (individual and team empowerment, planning, 
incentives, risk) 
Sophistication level of 
individual and team 
capabilities 
Simple capabilities for exploitation and operational activities 
Intermediate capabilities for engineering and development activities 
Advanced capabilities for research activities 








Object-embodied technology, individual and team level equipment, 
machinery, tools, physical facilities 
Person-embodied technology: individual and team skills, exposure time to 
technology  
Document-embodied technology (individual and team documentation) 
Management skills transferred at individual and team level 
Maturity and 
sophistication level of 
transferred technology 
at individual and team 
level 
Old, established, sophisticated 
Simple, intermediate or advanced 
Transferor-transferee 
relationship 
Objectives (and motives) of the transferee individuals and teams 
International experience of the transferee individuals and teams 
Languages proficiency of the transferee individuals  
Communication skills of the transferee individuals  
Coordination and interaction between individuals and teams from both sides, 




Joint management of collaborative projects 
Interaction between individuals and teams from both sides, the transferor and 
transferee  
Individual and team learning activities covered by the mechanism (practical, 
theoretical, mentoring)  
Individual and team involvement in the project phases 
Management practices 
that foster learning 
culture 
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5 Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
Research methodology refers to the theoretical considerations underpinning the 
process of conducting research. It provides insight into how the research aim 
connects with the research methods.1 Connecting aims with methods reflects 
the systematic character of research. The strengths and weaknesses of these 
connections determine the quality of the research. Hence, this chapter explains 
the rationale behind the methods employed in this study. The present research 
falls within the field of business and management. The starting point of the 
discussion is to recognise the trans-disciplinary nature of this field, and to point 
out the various methodological options available for conducting research.  
In order to reconcile the necessity for investigation in this field with the 
inevitable constraints faced (i.e. time, access to data, funding and location), 
there is a need to position the present research. The positioning, which delimits 
areas of investigation, is addressed in section 5.1.  
Section 5.2 sets the discussion within the debate of philosophical schools in the 
social sciences, and highlights the role of foundational theories in outlining the 
research design. In addition, section 5.3 offers insights into the methodological 
options commonly used in the evaluation research, particularly in the context of 
developing countries.  
Section 5.4 then builds on the foregoing discussion and suggests a 
methodological framework (i.e. research design) for addressing the research 
aim. It discusses also how ethical and quality considerations bear on the 
research.  
5.1 Research positioning 
The present research is tackled from three major perspectives, represented by 
the Venn diagram in Figure 5.1. The confluence of the circles illustrates the 
positioning of the research at the crossroads of three scientific realms: ‘space’ 
                                            
1
 Research methods refer to data collection and analysis techniques and procedures. 
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technology, management research and evaluation research. This positioning 
underpins discussion of the nature of the research and methods used.  
The management research circle denotes academic research on topics relevant 
to the field of management. The focus is on aspects that have a social science 
orientation, including both intellectual traditions and practical considerations. 
The ‘space’ technology circle symbolises space technology per se. It refers in a 
broader context to knowledge-intensive industries that are of relevance to 
developing countries. The intersection of both circles represents the set of 
management disciplines that allows organisations to manage their technological 
‘capital’, commonly known as management of technology.1  
The third circle is that of evaluation research. It designates academic research 
that draws on methodologies and methods of the social sciences in the realm of 
evaluation. The intersection of the latter circle with each of the other two 
identifies the types of evaluation conducted during this study: management 
evaluation2 and ‘space’ technology evaluation.3 The set of crosscutting 
perspectives which lie at the confluence of all three circles in Figure 5-1 informs 
about the methodological choices available to conduct the present research.  







Source: Author  
The diversity of perspectives from which the present research is conducted 




management research.4 It raises the idea that the knowledge obtained 
concurrently from a range of disciplines enables new insights to be gained that 
are not afforded by assuming a separate-discipline perspective.5  
5.1.1 Reconciling theoretical rigour with practical relevance 
The present management research includes a significant component of 
evaluation research. Practical relevance and action-oriented6 are aspects the 
present research seeks to satisfy; notably since the funding organisation which 
commissioned the present research, namely Algeria’s space organisation, 
expects practical impact.  
Indeed, in addition to embracing practical imperatives, the present doctoral 
research needs to be built on rigorous methodological and theoretical 
foundations. This naturally leads into reviewing the general debate on how 
management research in academia ties in with practice and the emergence of 
an alternative paradigm reconciling the dual imperatives of theoretical and 
methodological rigour with those of practice relevance. 
According to Gibbons et al.,7 theoretical imperatives are more often associated 
with research conducted by detached scientists working on theoretical 
questions from a mono-disciplinary perspective. The authors refer to it as mode 
1 research. By contrast, practical imperatives are associated with trans-
disciplinary research, producing practically meaningful knowledge. Gibbons et 
al.8 describe this as mode 2 research. The alternative paradigm consists in 
adopting an intermediate way that combines the strengths of the two traditional 
paradigms and bypasses their weaknesses – described as mode 1.5 research.9  
This third way is advocated by a number of scholars10 endeavouring to achieve 
a paradigm shift by questioning the outcomes of academic research. These 
scholars consider the requirements of all stakeholders, both inside and outside 
the world of academia (e.g. academics, practitioners, managers, policy makers, 
consumers and financiers). They especially take into account concerns about 
the divide between researchers in academia and practitioners.  
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The suggested compromise is called ‘pragmatic science’, as illustrated in   
Table 5-1. It corresponds to knowledge production simultaneously seeking high 
practical relevance and high theoretical and methodological rigour.   
Table 5-1: Typology of research 
 
Theoretical and methodological rigour 
Low High 
Practical relevance 
High Popularist  science Pragmatic science 
Low Puerile science Pedantic science 
Source: adapted from Hodgkinson, G.P., Herriot, P., Anderson, N., 2001. Re-aligning the Stakeholders 
in Management Research- Lessons from Industrial, Work and Organizational Psychology. British 
Journal of Management 12, S41–S48.  
 
The present research is categorised under the “pragmatic science” paradigm. 
Conducting research within this paradigm rests mainly on the nature and 
intensity of exchange between stakeholders during the research process – from 
the outset to the outcome.11 It hinges on the researcher’s ability to combine 
methodological skills needed to conduct academic research with socio-political 
skills needed to interact with various stakeholders (i.e. convince both the 
academic and practitioner communities).12  
The present researcher’s educational and professional background,13 the full-
time mode under which this doctoral research was undertaken and the support 
of Algeria’s space organisation have proven invaluable in seeking convergence 
between theory and practice in this research. 
5.1.2 Research ambition 
The present research aims to address a particular problem within a particular 
context by seeking to discover facts from empiricism. Therefore, it may be 
classed as an applied-empirical research rather than basic and non-empirical 
research.14  
From the applied research perspective (and unlike basic research that aims to 
discover new knowledge), the present research has the primary purpose of 
applying existing knowledge in the field of management (of technology) and 
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evaluation research to the poorly researched topic of small satellite capability-
building in developing countries (taking Algeria as a case study).15  
‘Local’ knowledge16 developed within this research focus is considered a 
contribution to knowledge.17 The contribution lies mainly in empiricism by 
collecting data using a wide variety of social research methods.  
5.2 Decisions underpinning the research design  
Choosing suitable methods requires an appreciation of their strengths and 
weaknesses in order to formulate a sound research design capable of 
generating meaningful findings. Using inappropriate methods might produce 
contradictory findings, leading to ambiguous or confusing recommendations.18  
To ensure research validity, it is vital that an informed choice of methods is 
made through an understanding of the underlying philosophical and 
methodological considerations. The following subsections discuss these 
considerations, that are then applied to make an informed choice in section 5.4.  
There is a great deal of debate between different schools of thought expounding 
varied philosophical and methodological views on business and management 
research. Saunders et al.19 and Easterby-Smith et al.20 use two frameworks-
cum-metaphors, the ‘research onion’ and the ‘trunk cross-section’ respectively, 
to map the layered landscape of these debates.  
The framework proposed by Saunders et al.21 stratifies the elements to be 
considered during the research design as an onion layers. The starting point is 
the outer layer, corresponding to the research philosophy. Then, the 
progressive peeling of the onion reveals subsequent layers, standing in for a 
succession of research approaches, methodological choices, and strategies. 
Finally, the core of the onion corresponds to data collection and analysis 
techniques and procedures.  
By contrast, Easterby-Smith et al.22 stratify elements in reverse order, taking 
their starting point to be a tree-trunk core corresponding to a set of ontological 
163 
 
assumptions, then, moving outwards, there follow layers representing 
epistemological assumptions, methodological choices, and finally an outer layer 
that corresponds to methods and techniques.  
The combination of these two metaphorical structures, shown in Figure 5-2, can 
inform hierarchical decision-making underlying the proposed research design. 
Figure 5-2’s three upper layers specify the philosophical considerations that 
help the researcher to ground conceptually his research. The three layers that 
follow address methodological issues that guide inquirer logic, which will lead to 
the methods selection represented by the lowest layer.  
Subsections 5.2.1 to 5.2.7 discuss each layer of the decision hierarchy. The 
top-down hierarchy (typical of conceptually-oriented research) is proposed only 
to guide discussion, because sometimes research is methods-oriented, 
adopting a bottom-up or even mixed approach.23  








Ontology  | Epistemology | Axiology 
 
Layer 2: Research 
philosophies 
Positivism | Realism | Interpretivism |  
Pragmatism 
 
Layer 3: Research 
approaches 








Quantitative methods | Qualitative methods | 
Mixed method 
 
Layer 5: Research 
strategies 
Experiment | Survey | Archival research | Case 
study | Ethnography | Action research | 
Grounded theory | Narrative inquiry 
 Layer 6: Time 
horizons 




Layer 7: Data 
collection methods 
Sampling | Secondary Data | Observation | 
Interview | Questionnaire 
 
Source: Adapted from Saunders, M., Lewis, P., Thornhill, A., 2012. Research methods for business 
students. 6th Edition, Pearson Education Limited, p.128. and from Easterby-Smith, M., Thorpe, R., 




5.2.1 Fundamental assumptions 
Data collected in the course of the research are a means of addressing the 
research aim, not its outcome per se. The chosen data collection techniques 
should thus form part of a larger coherent picture that speaks to the nature and 
academic legitimacy of the study. This picture results from an intellectual 
exercise the researcher must conduct. The exercise is triggered by the 
researcher questioning their own assumptions.  
Fundamental assumptions that influence the researcher’s approach are those 
concerning the ‘nature of reality’, ‘acceptable knowledge’ and the ‘role of 
values’. The first is the concern of the branch of philosophy called ontology, the 
second is the concern of epistemology, and the third is the concern of axiology. 
Generally, researchers build their research plan on ontological, epistemological 
and axiological positions that are consciously or unconsciously adopted.  
Saunders et al.24 discuss two major aspects of ontology that are of interest to 
business and management researchers: objectivism and subjectivism. The 
ontological position that relates to objectivism is based on the assumption that 
social entities exist and evolve independently, and are not influenced by social 
actors. This assumes that the management of social entities tends towards 
formal, descriptive and prescriptive aspects. On the other hand, subjectivism 
claims that social phenomena are the result of social actor actions, and are thus 
viewed through a social actor prism. This assumes that social entities are 
continuously changing, and management is achieved through an understanding 
of social actor perceptions and interactions.  
With regard to the epistemological position, Bryman & Bell25 ask the central 
question of whether the knowledge produced by business and management 
research is the result of the same principles, procedures and ethos as used in 
the natural sciences, or whether it is the result of a different research logic that 




For the axiological position, Creswell26 outlines the proximity during the 
research process between the researcher and the research subject, and the 
influence of researcher values on the study. The question then arises as to 
whether the study is value-free and unbiased or value-laden and biased? 
5.2.2 Research philosophies 
Even though ontological, epistemological and axiological research assumptions 
have changed over time, two major paradigms remain as constants in the 
debate over competing philosophical frameworks: positivism and interpretivism.  
Positivism and Interpretivism 
Positivism is the oldest and best established paradigm in research.27 It has 
been built on natural science assumptions, such as independence of reality 
from actors and existence of theories that explain phenomena and predict 
outcomes. Patterns found in data help discover causal relationships between 
variables, leading to ‘universal’ laws enabling generalisations (in natural 
science) or law-like generalisations (in social science). 
Just as in natural science, where theories are built or tested from factual 
observation, in social science, theories should be built and tested from real 
social facts. The concept of testing a theory is mainly associated with 
positivism. Indeed, any theory, once developed, is destined to grow, expand, be 
refined or crumble. This evolution is enabled by continually developing 
hypotheses using existing theory, collecting data and confronting hypotheses 
with actual results. These tests might confirm or refute theory, partially or totally.  
Social scientists are encountering growing complexity and diversity in their 
research. They need to consider human subjectivity. The use of traditional 
positivist methods, dealing with physical-world inanimate objects,28 has been 
challenged by social scientists, and the interpretivism paradigm has emerged.  
Interpretivism is rooted in assumptions that favour the subjectivist ontological 
position where social actor actions, interactions and perceptions are central in 
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understanding social phenomena. From an epistemological standpoint, in order 
to come to grips with complexity and uniqueness, it is imperative to adopt 
‘qualitative’ methods. The axiological position of an interpretivist researcher is 
that values are inextricably linked to facts, and the researcher should be aware 
of such sources of bias.29  
Realism and Pragmatism 
Positivism and pragmatism are paradigms which can be situated at opposite 
ends of the continuum of philosophical paradigms. Realism and pragmatism are 
two other philosophical positions relevant to business and management 
research30 that can be situated along the same continuum. 
Realism is close to positivism. As with positivism, it adopts an ontological 
position that refers to objectivism. However, it makes a distinction between 
direct and critical realism. The former considers that reality can be reached 
directly by using appropriate methods; the latter considers that the only reality 
perceived is the result of actor interpretation and thus remains socially 
conditioned.  
The critical realist’s position is more relevant to business and management 
research.31 It recognises, for instance, the value of multi-level study (e.g. 
individual, group, and organisation). The latter allows the capture of various 
levels of perception, in line with the reality of business and management 
entities.  
Pragmatism is one of the most prominent paradigms in business and 
management research. It gathers philosophical views that can be positioned in 
the middle of the positivist-interpretivist continuum. Pragmatists claim that due 
to the complex and dynamic nature of the real world, no single paradigm can 
provide an adequate philosophical framework for research. Hence, the main 
driver of research should be the research question itself.  
Pragmatists shape their philosophical position from assumptions that combine 
multiple objectivist and subjectivist views. They switch between views according 
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to their need. They make use of both natural and social science methods 
(quantitative and qualitative) to produce acceptable knowledge. Their research 
is value-laden, as subjectivist views nourish every assumption.  
In business and management research, pragmatism provides the flexible 
philosophical stance required by the majority of researchers in this field.32 
Production of practically meaningful knowledge is crucial.33 Therefore, it is 
imperative that pragmatically oriented research satisfy this requirement.34 
Combining multiple points of view allows the production of more accurate and 
applicable knowledge on management entities. 
In knowledge management, for instance, pragmatism has considerably affected 
organisation learning theories.35 The pragmatic stance adopted in Kolb’s 
Experiential Learning Cycle36 can be cited as an example of this (i.e., 
reconciling tangible and observable aspects with intangible and reflective ones).  
Finally, it is essential to recall the historical context in which all paradigms 
emerge. Interpretivism emerged out of a critique of positivism. Both realism and 
pragmatism can be seen as a combination of elements from interpretivism and 
positivism. This means that these paradigms share more similarities than 
differences. Any dichotomy is therefore false and finds its justification in the 
misconceptions and misclaims advanced by the devotees of each school of 
thought.37 
5.2.3 Research approaches 
Doctoral research has to be built on sound theoretical underpinnings. Relations 
between research and theory are critical. These relations are represented by 
two major approaches: induction and deduction. Their adoption is dictated by 
the research question, along with the theoretical knowledge available on the 
subject.  
In the deductive approach, the researcher embraces an a priori perspective by 
formulating new hypotheses from established theories and then testing, often 
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empirically, the validity of these theories. If the test is positive, then theory is 
confirmed (or enriched), otherwise, it is discarded.  
In contrast to the deductive approach, the inductive approach argues for an a 
posteriori perspective to conducting research.  With induction, researchers start 
by gathering facts on phenomena through empirical observation. Then, from 
this limited sample of facts, they try to generate general theories. Considering 
the uniqueness of situations in business and management research, any 
generalisation attempt should be viewed with caution.38   
Similarly, with philosophical research paradigms, boundaries are not sharply 
drawn between research approaches. Induction and deduction are regarded as 
two parts of the same whole. In business and management research, they are 
often combined and not necessarily in equivalent proportions, as one or the 
other approach frequently predominates.39 Their combination is even 
characteristic of sound research in this field.40  
5.2.4 Methodological choices 
This subsection represents the gateway between the philosophical 
considerations that underpin research design and the non-philosophical (or 
methodological) considerations that underpin design operationalisation. As 
mentioned earlier, the nature of the research question and the theoretical 
knowledge available on the subject determine whether the study will be theory-
testing or theory-generative. These two logics are often referred to as 
quantitative and qualitative research design.  
Quantitative research 
Quantitative research design is generally associated with the way researchers 
attempt to operationalise the deductive approach. It is wedded to numerically 
measurable data. In business and management research, numerically 
measurable data can be “pure” quantitative data (e.g. age, salaries, and product 
volume) or “quantitised” qualitative data (e.g. subjective elements, opinion or 
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feeling that are mapped to a numerical scale). Thus, quantitative research can 
include elements from interpretivist philosophy and the inductive approach. 
Qualitative research 
Researchers opt for qualitative design when seeking to operationalise the 
inductive approach. They collect non-numerical data and analyse them to gain 
an understanding of the influence of social actors and social context. Non-
numerical data collected in qualitative research can be “quantitised” and then 
analysed statistically. Thus, qualitative research can include elements from 
quantitative research.   
Mixing quantitative and qualitative research 
In business and management research, the recommended practice is to avoid 
exclusivism or dichotomy. The prevailing trend is towards combination of 
quantitative and qualitative elements in the same piece of research.41  
This form of design falls under the umbrella of the so-called mixed methods 
research design. It draws from philosophical positions that combine elements of 
positivism and interpretivism. Realism and pragmatism are the philosophical 
stances that most likely lead to this form of design.42 Quantitative and qualitative 
methods can be fully or partially integrated during data collection and analysis 
processes. A multitude of mixture variants43 can be designed. They make use of 
a range of mixed strategies according to the constraints that might be faced 
(e.g. timing, access to data) and the nature of the research.  
Research nature 
The research nature generally derives from the research purpose.44 Collis & 
Hussey45 identify four types of research. Research is exploratory when the 
subject is poorly studied. The purpose of this type of research is to gain insight 
and knowledge about the subject. Research is descriptive when its purpose is 
to describe thoroughly the studied phenomenon by featuring and informing, in 
detail, its characteristics. The third type of research is analytical, also referred to 
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as explanatory. It aims to go beyond describing phenomena and attempts to 
provide explanations. This occurs through analysing and explaining 
relationships between the problem variables so as to establish causal 
relationships. The last type of research is predictive. It aims to go beyond 
explaining phenomena and establishing causal relationships. It makes use of 
the research findings in particular situations in order to predict outcomes of 
other similar situations. Predictive studies are at the centre of the debate on 
generalisation in the social sciences.  
It should be noted that whether the study is exploratory, descriptive, analytical 
or predictive, both quantitative and qualitative methods are applicable through a 
range of strategies.  
5.2.5 Research strategies 
Based on methodological considerations, a research action plan is proposed. It 
is referred to as the research strategy. Numerous strategies are thought of as 
appropriate for social research. Eight of them are traditionally used (and well 
documented) within the management environment.  
Two of the strategies (experimental study and survey) relate to quantitative 
research. Four others (ethnography, action research, grounded theory, and 
narrative inquiry) are associated with qualitative research. The two remaining 
(archival research and case studies) are associated with quantitative, qualitative 
and mixed design. Needless to mention that despite these commonplace 
associations, the strategies can be used in any form as long as coherence is 
assured in the design.  
Experimental study and survey 
Experimental study is a strategy used to seek causal relationships amongst the 
variables of a phenomenon. The principle is to identify the change in one 
variable (i.e. the dependant variable) in response to change in or manipulation 
of other variables (i.e. independent variables).  
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Experiments in business and management are almost never pure or true. They 
deal with unpredictable facets of human behaviour that make it hard to meet 
control requirements. Sample selection and experimental context (e.g. location, 
time) are two other major aspects that affect an experiment’s validity.  
Plenty of quantitative business and management research seeks to find causal 
relationships between variables starting from non-predicted outcomes (i.e. in 
the absence of a hypothesis). Many other studies seek explanations and look 
for generalisation, or simply aim to describe a phenomenon. They often use a 
survey strategy. In the latter, data are collected from representative samples of 
the population.  
Traditionally, a survey strategy is in line with the positivist stance (i.e. large 
sample and generalisation). However, as every strategy has to be adjusted 
according to the research purpose, many variants of the survey rest on an 
interpretivist position (i.e. small sample, case-oriented).  
Ethnography, action research, grounded theory and narrative inquiry  
Ethnography is the earliest strategy associated with qualitative research.46 Its 
roots lie in anthropology, and it is used to study people’s interactions in groups. 
Ethnographers focus on the study of actor interactions through immersion in 
their environment to gain a deeper and more nuanced understanding. The most 
popular data collection technique used by ethnographers is participant 
observation.   
The next earliest strategy associated with qualitative research is action 
research.47 It focuses on addressing and resolving problems faced by 
organisations. It involves a researcher entering an organisation and 
progressively and iteratively conducting an inquiry. This process fosters 
organisational learning and promotes problem resolution from within the 
organisation. 
The third strategy associated with qualitative research is grounded theory.48 It is 
used to generate theoretical explanations of phenomena by exploitation of a 
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wide range of data. The process starts inductively by collecting data in order to 
develop an initial theoretical framework. This is then deductively tested. A back-
and-forth process between inductive and deductive reasoning continues as long 
as it enriches the theoretical framework.  
Narrative inquiry is another strategy used in qualitative research. Unlike 
grounded theory, which requires an analytical fragmentation during data 
collection, narrative inquiry considers that any predefined fragmentation may 
cause a loss in data richness. It suggests that participant experiences are better 
captured if the participants narrate them as stories within their own context and 
chronology (rather than being framed by questions, for instance).  
Archival research and case studies 
Archival research is a strategy that analyses primary and secondary data 
available in the public domain, such as government statistical databases, or 
non-public domain, such as government and company records.  
The case study is a strategy that studies phenomena within their context. It is 
used when there is no clear delineation between phenomena and context. 
Context is often underpinned by the interpretivist position. Data collection, on 
the other hand, is guided by the development of an a priori theoretical 
framework (positivist position). Due to this duality, the case study strategy 
adopts either a quantitative, qualitative or mixed design. It prescribes the use of 
several data collection techniques (i.e. triangulation) in the same research 
project for capturing qualitative and quantitative aspects.  
Several variants49 of case study design are identified in business and 
management research. Their adoption is mainly contingent upon the number of 
cases to study, the unit of analysis, and the context/case balance (i.e. to what 
extent is the context considered when studying the case). 
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5.2.6 Time horizons 
Another fundamental question that needs to be addressed is whether data will 
be collected at a particular time (i.e. a single snapshot of the phenomenon) or 
over a period of time (i.e. multiple snapshots of the phenomenon). Studies that 
rely on a single snapshot are referred to as cross-sectional. Analysis outcomes 
are drawn out from time-limited factual observations. Studies relying on multiple 
snapshots are referred to as longitudinal. Outcomes might bring out the 
phenomenon’s tendencies and evolution and reveal one-off events as 
observations spread over time.  
In business and management research, both cross-sectional and longitudinal 
studies employ quantitative, qualitative, and multiple research strategies. 
Moreover, cross-sectional study may incorporate longitudinal study elements 
and vice-versa.  
5.2.7 Data collection methods 
The research plan is completed through the selection of data collection 
methods. In practice, these can be employed with various research strategies 
and be underpinned by various philosophical stances. The choice needs only to 
cohere with the research purpose and strategy. 
Sampling 
Sampling is a method used when researchers cannot collect data from every 
entity in the research. It is used to select a limited-size subset of the population 
(i.e. sample). When the entire population is addressed rather than a sample, the 
data collection method is called a census.  
Secondary data 
Secondary data refer to the method used to collect data previously produced for 
other purposes, as opposed to primary data produced for the purpose of the 





Observation is a method used to collect data on social actor behaviour and their 
environment. Collection is done by systematically observing and recording. If 
the observer seeks to understand the internal meaning of social actor actions, 
the method is called participant observation. On the other hand, if the research 
emphasises actions and event frequency, the method is called structured 
observation.  
Four variants of participant observation can be identified. They relate to 
researcher involvement with (or detachment from) the phenomenon under 
study, and whether observations are made overtly or covertly.50 Accordingly, the 
researcher can be a complete participant (i.e. involved and observing covertly), 
a participant-as-observer (i.e. involved and observing overtly), an observer-as-
participant (i.e. distant and observing overtly), or a complete observer (i.e. 
distant and observing covertly).  
To avoid any confusion that might arise where there is overlap between roles, 
an alternative typology is proposed for business research.51 The researcher can 
observe: i) as employee (seeking complete immersion, and the research identity 
can either be revealed or concealed); ii) as per the explicit role (researcher’s 
regular presence negotiated over a period of time, and research identity is 
revealed); iii) through interrupted involvement (previous presence or sporadic 
presence over time and revealed identity); iv) through observation alone (distant 
research and revealed identity); or v) through semi-concealed research (regular 
presence negotiated over time, revealed identity but concealed focus and 
objectives).  
When the research emphasis is on the observer’s connectedness to the studied 
field (i.e. observer understanding, interpretation, experience, stories, reactions, 
interactions with informants) rather than on the field itself, observation refers 
more to auto-ethnography.52 Auto-ethnography or self-ethnography is 
sometimes defined as ‘insider’ ethnography, as opposed to outsider. It refers to 
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a situation where the researcher is a member of the observed group or 
organisation.53 
Interview 
An interview refers to the purposeful question-answer exchange a researcher 
conducts to collect data from social actors (also called interviewees or 
respondents). Depending on the research purpose, exchanges can vary from 
highly structured to unstructured. A host of combinations fall between these two 
extremes. This diversity is represented by the following typology: structured 
interviews, semi-structured interviews and unstructured interviews (or in-depth 
interviews).  
Unstructured interviews are associated with qualitative data collection, whilst 
structured interviews are associated with quantitative (or quantifiable) data. The 
latter are conducted on the basis of questionnaires that are administered by the 
researcher (interviewer-administered).  
Structured interviews relate to a data collection method called a questionnaire. 
The questionnaire collects data by asking all respondents to answer the same 
set of predetermined questions submitted in the same order. Because of this 
‘standardisation’, questionnaires lend themselves to quantitative (or 
quantifiable) data collection from large samples. They can be self-completed or 
interviewer-completed.54  
5.3 Insights into methodological options in evaluation research 
Evaluation research relies mainly on social science research methods and 
methodologies. Debate has raged among evaluation researchers about the 
relative merits of the two classical philosophical postures and approaches to 
adopt, positivist-deductive and interpretivist-inductive.55 The former is preferred 
when the researcher determines an a priori set of outcomes to measure before 
collecting data over the evaluand (i.e. subject for evaluation).56 The latter is 
used when the researcher considers that evaluation requires a clear 
176 
 
understanding of the evaluand’s outcomes, context and social actor 
interactions. 
These two separate postures entail two distinct methodological choices in 
evaluation research. Quantitative evaluators make use of highly structured and 
standardised data collection methods (e.g. questionnaires and structured 
interviews). Qualitative evaluators employ non-standardised and less-structured 
data collection methods (e.g. in-depth interviews and observation).  
5.3.1 Refuting the dichotomy in methodological choice  
The above dichotomy in dealing with practical evaluation issues has limitations. 
A growing consensus around the notion of selecting the method that best suits 
the problem at hand has emerged over time. Many scholars urge evaluators to 
use suitable methods for their problems regardless of their assumptions. Cook 
et al. argue for the need “to use them together to satisfy the demands of 
evaluation research in the most efficacious manner possible”.57 Patton58 draws 
attention to the nuances in evaluation issues and the need that evaluators 
develop a large quantitative and qualitative methods repertoire and use them 
according to the context. He considers that “the ideal in evaluation designs is 
methodological appropriateness, design flexibility, and situational 
responsiveness”.59 Methodological appropriateness does not necessarily mean 
using quantitative and qualitative methods together.  
Patton also recognises that the pragmatic way of handling evaluation stems 
from a pragmatic philosophical stance. He highlights that an increasing number 
of researchers draws out the evaluation design from a pragmatic posture, then 
integrate multiple methods into a single evaluation research.  
Using multiple methods, including mixing quantitative and qualitative methods, 
in the same evaluation study is essentially justified by the need to consider real-
world conditions. There is a need to be creative and flexible in facing these 
conditions as one method’s strengths can offset another’s weaknesses.  
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Some observers argue that mixing methods in evaluation might jeopardise 
internal consistency. However, the majority of scholars consider that the human 
mind is sophisticated enough to mix deductive and inductive approaches and to 
manipulate quantitative and qualitative data in the same study.60 To illustrate 
this, Patton offers the example of an evaluation study that begins with an 
inductive approach where the evaluator remains open to whatever comes out 
from the collected data. Then, on the basis of the data’s revealed patterns, the 
evaluator adopts, for verification purposes, a focused deductive approach to 
collect and analyse further data.61 He cites also the use of questionnaires within 
which open questions are asked.  
5.3.2 Mixing summative, formative and knowledge-generating 
evaluations  
Evaluations have essentially two discernible purposes: judgment or 
improvement. Evaluations are judgment-oriented or summative when they aim 
to “simply assess a program’s goal attainment, making an overall judgment 
about merit or worth… [They] measure outcomes and impacts, and the causal 
linkages between program activities and outcomes that constitute a program 
model or theory”.62  
They are improvement-oriented or formative when the emphasis is on improving 
“programs by getting participant feedback and identifying strengths and 
weaknesses … [They] examine implementation, program processes, and 
program adaptations to changing clients or conditions“.63 In practice, both types 
are complementary, as formative evaluation can be undertaken to ultimately 
conduct summative evaluation.  
Unlike summative evaluation in which the emphasis is on quantitative designs, 
formative evaluation (including other evaluations that share the general purpose 
of improvement and can be gathered under its umbrella) lends itself to 
qualitative designs.64 Within the continuum of evaluation types where 
summative and formative evaluations are situated at opposite ends,65 a host of 
in-between mixed method designs can be envisaged. They are defined 
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according to the evaluation’s conditions and the evaluator’s skill, creativity and 
preferences.  
Moreover, an open approach towards a variety of methods is further justified by 
the growth of the evaluation realm. This latter can no longer be confined to the 
summative-formative typology.66 Patton67 points out that instrumental use of 
outcomes or results in both summative and formative approaches prevents the 
conceptual use of findings. It limits thinking about issues, options and policy 
alternatives. For this reason, a trend towards knowledge-generating evaluations 
might be of import as “the knowledge generated can be as specific as clarifying 
a program’s model, testing theory, distinguishing types of interventions, figuring 
out how to measure outcomes, generating lessons learned, and/or elaborating 
policy options”.68  
The influence of evaluator skills and preferences in designing an inquiry is 
portrayed through the concept known as “The Law of Instrument”. Kaplan69 
formulates it as follows: “Give a small boy a hammer, and he will find that 
everything he encounters needs pounding”.70 Patton also addresses this 
phenomenon and terms it methodological prejudice.71 He argues that evaluators 
make use of methods that are in line with their methodological background 
(previous training and experience in methods use) rather than exploring 
methods more appropriate to the encountered situation. Further empirical 
studies reveal that some evaluator characteristics, such as status (e.g. 
relationship to the evaluand), experience, theoretical orientation and 
educational level influence methodological choices. 72 
5.3.3 The appropriate evaluation for developing countries 
In light of the above, the key term in evaluation may be said to be openness (to 
all methodological choices). This guiding principle should lead to a more 
question-centred rather than methods-driven evaluation. It must also be 
reconciled with the conditions under which the evaluation research is 
undertaken. In developing countries, conditions (e.g. economic, political, legal, 
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and cultural) are different, and often more severe, compared to developed 
countries.  
Bamberger et al.73 assert that the trend in evaluation research addressing 
issues in developing countries is towards holistic evaluation. It gathers 
summative and formative aspects in a single study. They argue that this 
summative-formative duality can best be addressed by using mixed method 
design. They argue that neither quantitative nor qualitative design alone can 
capture the evaluand’s environmental complexity.  
In developing countries, the nature of the research question often ranges from 
operational to policy level. Accordingly, multi-level analysis (or evaluation) is an 
issue that needs addressing by evaluation researchers in these countries. 
Mixed method design is appropriate for multi-level evaluation, as each level 
requires specific (and different) methods to be evaluated.74   
Evaluands in developing countries (e.g. projects, programmes) have tangible 
outcomes that can be measured (often quantitatively); they also have non-
tangible outcomes (or impacts) that are difficult to capture without making use of 
both qualitative and quantitative instruments. This is why a mixed design is 
valuable, as it can overcome the inherent weaknesses of both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. 
On the other hand, due to multiple constraints (e.g. deadlines, budget, data 
access), evaluation researchers tend to spend the available field-work time 
collecting data (often qualitatively) from stakeholders (or participants) directly 
involved with the evaluand (e.g. project, programme). These stakeholders tend 
to give positive feedback on the evaluand as they feel a part of it. Overcoming 
this positive bias is possible by using mixed methods – by identifying 
comparable non-participants and collecting data from them.75  
5.4 Research design  
Given the conditions under which the present study has been conducted, the 
mixed method design was deemed the most appropriate for its purposes. In 
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order to demonstrate explicitly the consistency of the chosen design with the 
research purpose, Figure 5-3 illustrates the hierarchy of philosophical 
considerations and methodological choices underlying the adoption of the 
mixed design.  
The upper part of Figure 5-3 illustrates the design formulation process through 
successive combinations of philosophies, approaches, strategies and time 
horizons.  The process results in a combination of mutually supportive data 
collection techniques (quadrilateral data collection methods) illustrated in  
Figure 5-3’s lower part. Various font sizes are used at each level (of the Figure’s 
upper-part) to indicate degree of prevalence during the design formulation 
stage. For example, in the first layer, pragmatism prevails as the research 
philosophy, combined with elements of realism and then interpretivism.   





The present study is influenced by fundamental assumptions. The author’s 
ontological position proceeds from a combination of subjective and objective 
lenses in perceiving the nature of reality. Epistemologically, the author 
considers that knowledge produced in the present research should reflect the 
human and social dimension. He also recognises that the research is value-
laden, as he has been part of the studied phenomenon (satellite capability-
building in Algeria) for approximately the last sixteen years.  
The prevailing philosophical position that addresses this anti-dualistic76 stance 
is pragmatism combined with elements of realism and interpretivism. Thus, 
pragmatism is adopted, as this research is question-centred. Pragmatism 
provides the flexibility of switching between philosophical and methodological 
options and combining multiple points of view in order to produce practically 
meaningful knowledge. This is one of the main objectives of the present 
research. Pragmatism is also adopted because of its major contribution to 
evaluation (particularly in developing countries) and management research that 
deals with knowledge management.  
Elements of realism or to be precise critical realism are incorporated. Critical 
realism mainly recognises the value of multi-level studies in capturing different 
levels of perception. This accords with the levels of analysis adopted in the 
present research (micro, meso, and macro).  
With regard to the research approach, a combination of inductive and deductive 
approaches is adopted. Inductive reasoning is predominant because of the 
limited theoretical knowledge available on the subject (i.e. satellite capability-
building in developing countries). It is also adopted because the study does not 
seek any generalisation. On the other hand, the limited theoretical knowledge 
available is approached deductively in order to guide data collection. 
The present study is at the same time exploratory, descriptive, analytical and 
predictive.  Exploratory, as it seeks to gain insight into the subject of satellite 
capability-building, poorly studied in developing countries and not at all in 
Algeria. It is also descriptive, as it aims empirically to feature and inform the 
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satellite capability-building characteristics in Algeria. The study is analytical, 
because it aims to analyse evidence and provide explanations as to satellite 
capability-building performance. Finally, it is predictive, as it attempts to 
prefigure future outcomes and suggest recommendations.  
Due to the diversity of research sub-topics, the present study is particularly well 
suited to a mixed method design. It combines quantitative and qualitative 
elements for purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration. This is reflected in the many combinations77 of strategies 
(archival research, case studies, survey, ethnography and narrative inquiry), 
time horizons (cross-sectional and longitudinal), and data collection methods 
(interviews, secondary data and observation) that have been adopted.  
5.4.1 Combination of data collection methods 
As the main contribution to knowledge in the present research stems from its 
empirical aspect, data richness and accuracy are crucial. For this reason, a 
quadrilateral data acquisition method is adopted. It incorporates mutually 
reinforcing methods: secondary data, structured/semi-structured interviews, 
semi-structured/in-depth interviews, participant observation (i.e. researcher 
observes through interrupted involvement).  
The quadrilateral model subsumes a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
methods as illustrated in Figure 5-3. It also includes data that are collected from 
diverse sources.  
The multiplicity of methods and sources refers to two types of triangulation: data 
triangulation (i.e. the use of various sources in the same study) and 
methodological triangulation (i.e. the use of diverse methods in the same 
study).78 In addition, theory triangulation79 is used as a third triangulation type in 
this study. It relates to the use of diverse theoretical perspectives emanating 
from various bodies of knowledge (technological learning, technological 
capability-building, and technology transfer) in order to analyse data. 
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Staged fieldwork is conducted to gather data at three levels of analysis: 
individual and team level (the micro level or micro actors in Figure 5-3); 
organisational and inter-organisational level (the meso level or meso actors in 
Figure 5-3); and sectoral, national and international level (the macro level or 
macro actors in Figure 5-3). Data collection is centred on three collaborative 
small satellite projects (Table 5-2) that form the backbone of small satellite 
capability-building in Algeria. This is an instance of the multiple case study 
approach, where multiple sources of evidence are used.  
Table 5-2: Algeria’s collaborative small satellite projects 






Realisation of an EO (Earth 
Observation) satellite with 
KHTT (Know-how Transfer 
&Training) programme.  
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It is worth noting that data collection has focused more on endogenous and 
local factors than exogenous and international factors. There are two reasons 
for this focus. First, the literature review highlights the preeminent role of local 
effort in any endeavour to build local technological capability through technology 
transfer. Second, time and funding limitations did not permit extension of data 
collection to international factors.  
Theoretical knowledge has guided the data collection process. It has guided the 
formulation of interviews and focused attention of the participant observer 
(author). The studied population comprises a hierarchy of individuals from 
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organisations involved in satellite activity in Algeria (policy, management, R&D 
individuals, technical individuals, academics, and foreign company 
representatives). The population is segmented by management level (micro, 
meso, and macro). 
The population is selected based on the author’s discussions with several 
individuals within the Algerian space agency who are involved in satellite 
capability-building activities or have primary knowledge of the subject. The 
make-up of the population is also determined based on the author’s own 
knowledge of the space sector in Algeria, as he worked in the space field in 
Algeria, easing access to data and individuals. 
Secondary Data  
The first step of data collection was to delve into key secondary sources related 
to the topic. These data are quantitative and qualitative and collected for 
exploratory, descriptive and explanatory purposes. They are also used to 
triangulate findings based on primary data collection methods employed in this 
study. The author is tri-lingual (Arabic, French and English), and thus an 
extensive review of Algerian-related material was conducted and supplemented 
by international and sectoral reports.  
A variety of sources was used to capture these data. This includes relevant 
research and seminar papers, annual reports, statistical abstracts, specialised 
magazines and journals, space conference proceedings, international reports 
on outer space activities (e.g. COPUOS2 Reports, African space activities 
reports), commercial sources, ASAL’s (Algerian space agency) publications, 
websites. In addition, governmental resources were exploited, such as 
documents relating to national development plans, science, technology and 
industrial policies. 
                                            
2
 United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - UNCOPUOS 
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As a member of the space community in Algeria, the author was granted access 
to the space organisation’s records, which contributed a sizeable part of the 
secondary data collected. These records include internal documentation on the 
National Space Programme, elements from satellite procurement contracts, 
agreements, accords and MoUs on space technology, meeting minutes, 
blueprints, and project work packages.  
The principal online resources used are listed in Table 5-3. The analysis of 
some online publications of the Algerian Space Agency required the use of 
certain functionality (e.g. word frequency) of the software NVivo 11 Pro.  
Table 5-3: Online resources used in the study 
Organisations Websites 
Algerian Space Agency http://www.asal.dz/ 
Surrey Satellite technology http://www.sstl.co.uk/ 
Airbus Defence and Space https://airbusdefenceandspace.com 
Centre National des Etudes Spatiales-CNES 
Satellite Platform : Myriade 
https://myriade.cnes.fr/en/MYRIADE/index.htm 
Korea Aerospace Research Institute https://www.kari.re.kr 
Indian Space Research Organisation http://isro.gov.in 
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space – UNCOPUOS 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/COPUOS/copuos.html 
Algerian Prime Minister http://www.premier-ministre.gov.dz 
Algerian Ministry of Industry http://www.industrie.gov.dz 
Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and 
Scientific Research 
https://www.mesrs.dz 
World Bank, Doing Business http://www.worldbank.org , 
http://www.doingbusiness.org   
International Monetary Fund http://www.imf.org   
World Economic Forum https://www.weforum.org 
International Telecommunication Union http://www.itu.int 
United Nations Development Programme http://www.undp.org 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development 
http://www.oecd.org 





Structured and semi-structured interviews at micro level  
To collect data required for the evaluation of satellite capability-building at micro 
level (individuals and teams), two sets of mixed, structured, and semi-
structured, interviews were employed. The first set (Appendices 1-a and 1-b) 
was addressed to every member of ASAL’s satellite project teams. The 
population interviewed is listed in Table 5-4. The list of participants is in 
Appendix 1-c. 
Table 5-4: Number of members interviewed against satellite projects 




Alsat-1 11 7 CDS-Oran (Algeria) 
Alsat-2 (2A & 2B) 23 11 
CDS-Oran and ASAL-Algiers 
(Algeria) 
Alsat-1B 18 17 
CDS-Oran (Algeria) 
Total 52 35  
Source: Author 
The second set (Appendices 1-d and 1-e) was addressed to ASAL’s satellite 
project managers. The population interviewed is listed in Table 5-5. 








CDS – Oran (Algeria) 
Head, Research Department on 
Space Instruments / CDS 





Director of Programmes/ASAL 





CDS-Oran (Algeria) Project manager Alsat-1B 
Source: Author 
Focused interviews containing a mixture of structured and semi-structured 
questions were employed for both populations. The structured questions were 
used to identify general patterns at micro level, apropos of the descriptive 
aspect to the study. The semi-structured questions are used to collect data on 
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both the context, apropos of the exploratory aspect to the study, and on the 
relationships between variables revealed by the structured questions and prior 
theoretical knowledge available, apropos of the explanatory aspect. 
The questions were organised in sections. The latter cover themes that 
emerged from the theoretical knowledge developed in chapters 2 and 3 and 
were synthesised through the analytical framework presented in chapter 4. In 
the second set of interviews, addressed to satellite project managers, themes 
related to team management and group work were emphasised.  
Structured and semi-structured interviews at meso level  
Three sets of ‘mixed’ – structured and semi-structured – interviews were 
employed to collect data at meso level. The first set (Appendices 2-a and 2-b) 
was addressed to representatives from ASAL’s entities involved in satellite 
capability-building. Questions were selected from the list in Appendices 2-a   
and 2-b according to participant positions. The population interviewed is listed in 
Table 5-6. 
Table 5-6: Interviewees from ASAL’s entities 
Name Position Organisation and location 
Mr. Tahar Iftene Director of Research & Training ASAL – Algiers (Algeria) 
Mr. Fethi Benhamouda 
Director of Studies, in charge of 
scientific and technological watch 
ASAL – Algiers (Algeria) 
Mr. Djawed Benachir Director of Space Applications ASAL – Algiers (Algeria) 
Mr. Abdelouahab 
Chikouche 
Director of space programmes 
and industry development 
ASAL – Algiers (Algeria) 
Mr. Madani Arizou 
Director, Centre of Space 
Techniques (CTS) 
CTS – Arzew (Algeria) 
Mr. Djamal Djebouri 
Director, Centre of Satellite 
Development (CDS) 
CDS – Oran (Algeria) 
Mr. Ali Hassani backed 
by his collaborator Mrs 
R. Salah 
Director, Centre of Space 
Applications (CAS) 





The second set (Appendices 2-c, 2-d, 2-e and 2-f) was addressed to 
representatives from ASAL’s local partners involved in satellite capability-
building. Questions were selected from the list in Appendices 2-c, 2-d, 2-e and 
2-f according to participant positions. The population interviewed is listed in 
Table 5-7. 




Mr. Mostefa Rahli 
Coordinator of  
Doctoral School of Technology and 
Space Applications (EDTAS).  
This school is a joint platform between 
five Universities: Algiers, Oran, 
Constantine, Setif, Tlemcen. 
University of Oran 
(USTO) – Oran (Algeria) 
Mr. Mohamed Bencib 
Coordinator of relations with ASAL, 
representative of 
Aircraft construction company –ECA 
ECA - Tafraoui (Algeria) 
Source: Author 
The third set (Appendices 2-g and 2-h) was addressed to representatives from 
ASAL’s foreign satellite suppliers (contractors). The population interviewed is 
listed in Table 5-8. 
Table 5-8: Interviewees from ASAL’s satellite foreign suppliers (contractors) 
 
Name Position Organisation and location 
Mr. Andrew Cawthorne 
Director of Earth 
Observation 
Surrey Satellite Technology SSTL 
Mr. Michel Siguier 
backed by Mr. Laurent Frech 
(in charge of relations with 
Algeria/Dpt of Marketing) 
Alsat-2 Project manager Airbus Defence and Space 
Source: Author 
The three sets of ‘mixed’ – structured and semi-structured – interviews 
employed at meso level were devised to collect data on organisational and 
inter-organisational aspects. The questions were aimed towards collecting data 
on connections between individual/group considerations and organisation/inter-
organisation considerations.  
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The two sets of interviews addressed, respectively, to representatives from 
ASAL’s entities and ASAL’s local partners are organised according to thematic 
sections. These sections reflect the theoretical knowledge synthesised through 
the analytical framework presented in chapter 4. Interviews addressed to 
ASAL’s local partners emphasise their activities as partners of the Algerian 
Space Agency.  
The third set of interviews addressed to ASAL’s foreign satellite suppliers 
(contractors) essentially deals with factors which are at the interface between 
the foreign supplier and the Algerian Space Agency (i.e. only one theme which 
is technology transfer-related).  
Semi-structured/in-depth interviews at meso and macro levels  
Semi-structured and in-depth interviews were held at both meso (i.e. 
organisation and inter-organisation) and macro (i.e. sectoral, national and 
international) levels. Questions were addressed to representatives from ASAL’s 
entities (Appendices 2-a and 2-b), ASAL’s local partners (Appendices 2-c, 2-d, 
2-e and 2-f), and ASAL’s top management (Appendices 2-i and 2-j). The 
population interviewed is listed in Tables 5-6 and 5-7 (for ASAL’s entities and 
local partners) and Table 5-9 (for ASAL’s top management). 
Table 5-9: Interviewees from ASAL’s top-management 
Name Position Organisation and location 
Mr. Omar Farouk 
Zerhouni 
Chairman of the Board, Algerian 
Space Agency - ASAL 
ASAL – Algiers (Algeria) 
Mr. Azzeddine 
Oussedik 
Director General, Algerian Space 
Agency - ASAL 
ASAL – Algiers (Algeria) 
Source: Author 
Interviews at these levels were devised to collect data on sectoral, national and 
international aspects. A number of questions were aimed towards collecting 
data on connections between organisational considerations, on the one hand, 
and sectoral, national, and international considerations, on the other.  Some 
open-ended questions were included in order to allow interviewees to talk freely 
190 
 
about aspects of the satellite capability-building process within the national and 
international context. Open-ended questions were also used to gain insight into 
the beliefs of participants, particularly decision-makers, and their intentions 
regarding the direction the satellite capability-building process should take. This 
is apropos of the predictive aspect to the present study. 
In all interviews (structured, semi-structured, and in-depth), the Arabic language 
was naturally used in discussion (except for interviews with foreign companies). 
However, because of the potential confusion that may arise from the translated 
technical satellite-related terminology, interviews were administered in French 
and English, as interviewees use one or both of these languages in their 
everyday professional activities. Questions were checked for translational 
accuracy during the interviews.  
Questions at micro level were pilot-tested by two ASAL members of the satellite 
ground segment project with regard to the first set of interviews, and by a former 
project manager with regard to the second set of interviews. A sample of 
questions at meso and macro level was pilot-tested by the former director of 
international cooperation of the Algerian space agency. Questions were 
amended based on feedback from the pilot study. Amendments mainly had to 
do with the fact that the author might be perceived by participants (at lower 
levels, micro level) as a non-independent researcher because he is part of the 
space community in Algeria. Questions about relationships with managers, 
management commitment, and the decision-making process had to be de-
sensitised.    
Questions were updated and sent to interviewees well before the interviews. It 
was clearly stated that questions would be self-administered in the initial stage, 
and then interviewer-administered. Providing questions in advance of the 
interview session was thought to be a way of promoting validity and reliability, 
by allowing the interviewee to think thoroughly about the questions and 
assemble any supporting information or documentation for his/her response.80 
In the second stage, questions were interviewer-administered and reviewed 
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during the face-to-face encounter to ensure proper understanding and to 
achieve a higher response rate. Later, during the data analysis stage, follow-up 
telephone conversations were conducted with some interviewees for 
clarification.  
Interviews lasted from about one hour and a half to three hours. Interviews with 
members of satellite projects took the most time, as there was a need to 
develop trust. The issue of trust was implicitly encountered with Algerian 
participants. Amongst them, three conversations only were audio-recorded 
because the majority of participants did not give consent. It should be 
underlined that the present study is the first of its kind involving the space 
community in Algeria, and participants showed discomfort, as they had never 
experienced audio-recorded interviews before. This situation might reflect the 
secretive culture and lack of research culture within ASAL. Interviews with 
foreign company representatives were administered through Skype and 
recorded. 
Interview translation (into English) and transcription was carried out using the 
“just the gist” mode of transcription. Gibbs81 recommends this approach in 
evaluation research. “Just the gist” was also used to save time. Quantitative 
data were stored and analysed using MS Excel. 
To sum up, interviews were conducted through three fieldwork campaigns: 19 
face-to-face interviews during the first campaign (April and May 2016); 27 face-
to-face interviews during the second campaign (July and August 2016); and 02 
internet-mediated interviews during the third campaign (April 2017). The final 
pair of interviews, with foreign company representatives, were conducted later. 
The author sought to allow time for identifying the right persons to interview – by 
retrospection as to the complementary or other data that was lacking.  
In addition, several follow-up interviews (via telephone or internet-mediated) 
were conducted; they are spread over approximately 10 months (from 
September 2016 to May 2017).   
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The original aim was to conduct 65 interviews, representing the whole 
population involved in small satellite projects (i.e. a census). However, five of 
the targeted interviewees left the organisation before the study and attempts to 
contact them were unsuccessful. Furthermore ten of the targeted interviewees 
were unavailable, as they were fully occupied with other tasks (e.g. Alsat-1B 
and Alsat-2B launch campaigns in India, commissioning satellites after launch). 
Two potential interviewees did not reply or declined the invitation to participate 
in the study. The participation rate for this study was thus 73.84%.  
Interviews were conducted according to three levels of analysis: micro, meso, 
and macro. The targeted number of interviews at micro level was 52. However, 
35 interviews were conducted, which corresponds to 67.30%. At this level, it 
was noticed that during the later interviews no new or relevant information was 
provided, which could be taken as an indication that the data gathering had 
attained saturation.  
The targeted number of interviews at meso and macro levels was 13, 
corresponding to a 100% response rate.  
The fieldwork approach also allowed collection of relevant secondary resources 
and internal documentation. 
Participant observation (interrupted involvement) 
Participant observation fits in well with this research, as the author has spent 
the past 16 years working in the space field in Algeria, at both technical and 
managerial level. The author was among those representatives of the Algerian 
Ministry of Defence most closely involved with the Algerian space agency’s 
activities. The author also has first-hand experience of space policy formulation 
in Algeria. The close relationship the author enjoys with the Algerian space 
agency (at both management and operational levels) facilitated data collection 
through observation.  
Accordingly, the present researcher’s role has been a mixture of participant-as-
observer (i.e. involved in space activity and observing overtly) and observer-as-
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participant (i.e. distant from space activity and observing overtly).82 The role 
overlap corresponds to interrupted involvement (i.e. previous or sporadic 
presence over time and revealed identity).83  
The author’s participatory observation generated data consisting of primary and 
secondary observations as well as experiential data. Primary observation data 
relate mainly to proceedings in the three Alsat-1B meetings held at Surrey 
Space Centre/UK between ASAL and the Alsat-1B satellite supplier (SSTL) in 
November 2014, November 2015, and July 2017.  
Secondary observation data relate to a number of informal conversations 
conducted in the author’s presence. In general, conversations were held when 
the author visited ASAL, CDS and ECA (i.e. ASAL’s local partner) facilities and 
had discussions with staff. Informal interviews were used to clarify observations. 
For instance, some of the most valuable data collected through secondary 
observation comes from informal interviews with: i) staff in charge of IT services 
and documentation management at CDS about memorising experience through 
a shared on-line database; ii) staff from ASAL’s HQ about small satellite 
technology in the future space programme; and iii) personnel from ECA about 
communication difficulties with ASAL.  
Experiential data relate to perceptions formed by the author in the process of 
observation. For instance, a number of instances were recorded where Alsat-1 
project members expressed a wistful sense of unfinished business, regret, and 
even bitterness.  
5.4.2 Ethical considerations 
Ethics refers to “norms and standards of behaviour that guide moral choices 
about our behaviour and our relationships with others”.84 In the context of 
research, it refers to the appropriateness of researcher conduct when dealing 
with the research subject.85 Discussion about ethical considerations revolves 
around key principles.86 The first is that research which harms or does not 
respect the dignity of participants is regarded as unacceptable. The second is to 
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protect the integrity of the research community by clarifying the nature and aim 
of the research and declaring any aspects that can lead to conflicts of interest 
(e.g. affiliations, funding sources). The third is to get the informed consent of the 
participant, protect his privacy and anonymity, and ensure the confidentiality of 
the data collected. The final principle relates to the moral integrity of the 
researcher, being honest, transparent when communicating, and avoiding 
misleading claims or false reporting.  
It is important to mention that the present research is championed by the 
chairman of the board of the Algerian space agency. Based on a support letter 
from the researcher’s supervisor (Appendix 3-a), the chairman of the board 
formerly requested the Director General of ASAL and his team to assist the 
researcher and provide access to data.   
The purpose and context of this investigation were explained to participants 
ahead of time (Appendix 3-b). The author explained that participation is 
voluntary and participants are free to withdraw from the research at any time, 
without having to give reasons and without further consequences. The author 
avoided questions that might put participants under pressure or create stress or 
discomfort. The author assured participants that their privacy and anonymity 
would be protected. Participants were assured that they could withdraw their 
data from the study at any time. The author also assured participants that data 
collected would be treated as confidential, stored in a safe place that only the 
researcher had access to. No participants would be named in any publication 
and no information that identifies participants would be published without 
consent. To preserve anonymity, the participants are identified through codes 
(ID-1, ID-2, etc.). Finally, prior to conducting interviews, participants were asked 
to give their formal consent (Appendices 3-c and 3-d). It is important to mention 
that this study gained Cranfield University3 ethical approval prior to its 
commencement.  
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5.4.3 Research quality  
Research quality is usually examined through its reliability and validity.87 
Reliability refers to whether “data collection techniques and analytical 
procedures would produce consistent findings”.88 Reliability is not sufficient to 
ensure research quality. The validity of the findings should be examined by 
determining whether they are really what they pretend to be.89 As explained 
above (section 5.4), consistency between the research design and the research 
purpose has been explicitly demonstrated. The process led to the adoption of a 
methodological ‘quadrangulation’ (Figure 5-3). In addition, a triangulation of 
sources was used. Participants at several levels of analysis were involved (i.e. 
micro, meso, and macro levels). Secondary and internal documentation were 
also used.  
The following factors further fostered research quality: i) The number of 
interviews (and response rate) and the way they were conducted; ii) The 
diverse theoretical perspectives (i.e. theory triangulation) used in analysing 
data;  iii) The researcher’s dual role, as an insider within the space organisation 
in Algeria and as a ‘detached’ outsider pursuing a full-time PhD in the UK; iv) 
The duality in the researcher’s professional and academic backgrounds 
(engineering and management) which makes it easier to collect, manipulate and 
analyse data.         
Finally, it is important to recognise that the present research was conducted 
under particular settings. It is both technology-specific and country-specific. Its 
findings are unique to small satellite technology within the Algerian context. 
They are not generalisable; however, they can offer useful insights into 
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6 Chapter 6: Planning small satellite capability-building in 
the Algerian context  
The analysis and findings concerning the evaluation of small satellite capability-
building in Algeria are synthesised in the present and following chapter 
(chapters 6 & 7). The scope of the present chapter takes in mostly macro 
considerations, and the manner in which they cascade down to lower levels of 
aggregation (i.e. meso level). Algeria’s technological context is reviewed. First, 
section 6.1 sets out key ideas salient to Algeria’s developmental path over the 
last five decades. Then, section 6.2 identifies the major milestones of Algeria’s 
technological capability development. It also analyses the related industrial, 
science, and technological policies adopted, highlighting elements of an 
emerging National Innovation System. Section 6.3 evaluates the elements that 
shape the satellite sectoral innovation system. It traces and evaluates the 
process of small satellite capability-building from an innovation system 
perspective. Finally, section 6.4 examines the planning process of small satellite 
capability-building in Algeria.    
6.1 Key ideas for grasping Algeria’s development context 
Given the paucity of academic resources examining the relatively short path of 
Algeria’s technological development, it is necessary to devote a part of this 
thesis to addressing this lacuna in the literature. The discussion begins with a 
description of three key ideas that scholars consider essential for understanding 
Algeria’s development.  
The first idea is ‘historical’, and has been clearly enunciated by Benbitour.1 It 
refers to the situation in Algeria on the eve of the outbreak of the 1954 armed 
revolution against the French colonialists, which led to independence in 1962. 
Algeria’s population had suffered under colonial repression that dated back 
more than a century, in spite of the actions of resistance movement (political 
and military); all efforts to overthrow the French regime seemed doomed to 
failure. Algerian pro-independence politicians and elites were divided, and 
engaged in a relentless ideological struggle for leadership. In the country’s 
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independence efforts, attempts to bring change through political action were 
suppressed by the French. In this atmosphere of misery, despair, and lack of 
leadership, a group of young Algerians, who came from political movements, 
organised and unified themselves, and triggered the liberation war in November 
1954.  
Faced with this powerful liberation movement, the elites had no choice but to 
line up behind this new young generation. The elites of that time had lost the 
initiative at a crucial moment in Algeria’s history. Benbitour2 qualifies this as a 
hard blow that still, today, has resonance in the marginalisation of elites in 
favour of the unity of action. This conflict prevented the fostering of proper 
critical thinking, delaying the adoption of development policies and strategies. 
Djeflat3 argues that the need to overcome such distractions requires a new pact 
between political leaders and the knowledge elite. 
The second idea underpinning Algeria’s development is ‘ideological’. It refers to 
the post-independence political and economic choices opted into by Algeria. 
Self-reliance, self-sufficiency and indigenisation are central to the national 
debate and perceived as objectives towards completion of independence.  
The third idea is ‘economic and managerial’. It refers to Algeria’s confusion of 
industrialisation and development. This confusion is engendered by a number of 
Algerian politicians, and even economists, who believe that industrialisation 
necessarily leads to development (see chapter 2, sections 2.1 and 2.2). The 
view conceals the conditions, mainly managerial, necessary to turn an 
industrialisation process into one of development.4  
Overall, the combination of the above three foundational ideas underpins 
Algeria’s developmental path over the previous five decades. 
6.2 Major milestones in Algeria’s technological capability-building  
Few studies5 address technological capability development in Algeria, alongside 
related industrial, science, and technology policies. Generally, there is 
agreement that the capability-building process started in the late 1960s 
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following a gradual maturation period that began in 1962, just after 
independence. The main characteristic of this post-independence period was 
the plethora of development barriers. The country lost hundreds of thousands of 
people out of its population during the Liberation War, mostly among the 
younger and the more productive. The country also had an illiteracy rate close 
to 90% and a schooling rate of somewhere around 20%.6  
The colonial infrastructure (industrial plants, agricultural land, schools and 
administrative services) was left virtually without supervision because of the 
exodus of French settlers after the independence. The priority was to cater the 
urgent need of operating and developing the existing infrastructure, helping to 
lay the foundations of the new fledgling Algerian state. Algeria opted for the 
socialist political model, and this choice was influenced, inter alia, by the 
support given by the Eastern Bloc in Algeria’s liberation war.  
6.2.1 Unrealistic industrialisation strategy 
By the end of the 1960s, industrialisation choices were made and confirmed. 
Unbridled industrialisation commenced. It was based on an import substitution 
strategy inspired by the theoretical model of De Bernis,7 who promoted the idea 
of the ‘industrialising industry’, favouring heavy industry and its products (e.g. 
steel, petrochemicals). This would allow the establishment of equipment 
industries (e.g. trucks, machine tools), which would in turn stimulate small and 
medium enterprises, processing industries, consumption and services. 
In this strategy, the spearhead of development was state-owned companies 
guided by centralised government planning. Four government plans allocated 
considerable resources to an investment programme from 1967 to 1984.    
Table 6-1 shows the evolution of investment by sector and particularly the 
increasing importance of the industrial sector. These plans were funded 
primarily by hydrocarbon income and external debt. In 1970, the external debt 
of Algeria was 0.5 billion US dollars, but by 1978, it reached 18 billion US 




Table 6-1: Investment programmes and allocated resources 
 
Source: adapted from plan documents. Second reference in Lamiri, A., 2013.La décennie de la dernière 
chance : émergence ou déchéance de l’économie algérienne. Chihab Editions, p.62. And from Dahmani, 
A.M., 1985. L’Engineering dans la Maîtrise Industrielle et Technologique. Office des Publications 
Universitaires, Algiers. Second reference in Saad, M., Zawdie, G., 2005. From Technology Transfer to 
the Emergence of a Triple Helix Culture: The Experience of Algeria in Innovation and Technological 
Capability Development. Technology Analysis & Strategic Management 17(1), 89-103. 
 
With regard to technology, Algeria’s industrialisation rested on embodied 
advanced technology.10 This was imported by the 15 state companies created 
to cover key strategic sectors or industries (e.g. petrochemical, steel, metallurgy 
engineering, electronics, building materials, electrical goods, food processing, 
mining and textiles).11 The expectations were that linkages between these state-
owned companies would permit upstream and downstream integration (i.e. 
inter-sectoral or inter-industry) of the whole economy. Additionally, each 
company would be the main component of an industrial cluster (i.e. sectoral) 
with forward and backward linkages (i.e. intra-sectoral or intra-industry).12   
The technology transfer mechanism used in the beginning was ‘turnkey 
contracts’. Technology was embodied and contracts were complex and highly 
integrated. Foreign companies completed all of the project phases until the 
facilities were commissioned. The Algerian counterpart then operated the 
system. Requirements for effectively operating and managing the system went 
beyond the basic operational training Algeria received as part of the package. 
Algerians had limited capabilities, finding technology complex and difficult to 
understand. Moreover, often technological choices were inappropriate to the 
local socio-economic conditions.13   
Plan 
Investment 




















1967-1969 24.6 4.9 53.4 1.9 20.7 2.3 25.8 





8.9 7.3 74.1 61.1 38.2 31.6 
1978/79 / / / / / / 
1980-1984 60.0 / / / / / / 
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Later, in order to bypass these problems, ‘product-in-hand contracts’ were used 
as the mechanism for technology transfer. Technology provider involvement 
went beyond commissioning. They were asked to provide assistance and 
training to ensure effective operations and management. This mechanism was 
obviously more effective in terms of production output, whether in terms of 
quality or quantity. However, the mechanism had its downsides, “it fails to give 
local managers the hands-on experience of project design and project 
implementation they would need to be able to move up on the learning curve”.14 
The reasons were that foreign contractors, in seeking to minimise exposure to 
risk, did not wish to completely hand over responsibility to local managers 
during the transitory period. In addition, the overseas management team 
resorted to experienced foreign sub-contractors rather than involving 
inexperienced local companies.15 Therefore, both mechanisms, ‘turnkey 
contracts’ and ‘product-in-hand contracts’, turned out to be unsuccessful in 
enabling technology absorption at the local level. 
In respect of scientific and technological policies, despite attempts to build a 
stronger nexus between such policies and development strategies, decision 
makers failed in reconciling them. They addressed market failures by creating 
institutions.16 Two approaches were simultaneously adopted. The first was 
basic research, led by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. 
The second was applied research, led by a scattered industrial sector 
represented through separate central administrations and state-owned 
companies.  
However, the overall system came progressively to be slanted towards scientific 
and basic research rather than technological and applied research.17 This was 
mainly the consequence of: i) the lack of leadership and coordination of the 
industrial sector, where inconsistencies, and even contradictions, emerged with 
regard to priorities; ii) a biased incentive system which did not foster indigenous 
technological production; and also iii) the lack of support for an incremental 




Analysis of this period reveals that the average capacity utilisation rate of 
Algeria’s industries was below 55%.19 Economic growth was around 6.5%, and 
it was funded by approximately 45% of GDP.20 Around the same time, South 
Korea had also invested in industrialisation; it had a capacity utilisation rate of 
over 90%, and it reached 7% growth by investing only 18% of its GDP.21 The 
rest was funded by the positive cash flows of companies.22 In Algeria, the 
‘industrial production/fixed capital stock’ ratio fell by half between 1967 and 
1978, and the ‘industrial production/workforce’ ratio dropped by 11% over the 
same period.23 “During this period, to produce one additional dinar, 3.6 dinars 
had to be invested in other sectors”,24 with investments continuously bankrolled 
by foreign capital.25 
The verdict on this first development experience in Algeria was disappointing. 
The expected inter- and intra-industry linkages never materialised. Industries 
that were supposed to diffuse technology locally and be engines of 
development had only a small ripple effect on other branches. The 
industrialisation programme failed to meet its promise, i.e. kick-start a process 
of wealth-creation. It was, rather, a process of wealth-destruction - at the 
opposite of the development spectrum.26 
6.2.2 Reforms, and industrial base rationalisation 
A new governing team in Algeria took office in the late 1970s, and questioned 
the foundations of the economic model chosen. This team halted the unbridled 
industrialisation process but did not formally challenge the ‘socialist’ model.27 It 
conducted reforms qualified as ‘reorientation’, like all the socialist bloc states at 
that time. Central planning continued to be the main instrument of economic 
management. These reforms accorded greater importance to SMEs, improving 
managerial skills, increasing consumption, and organically restructuring large 
state-owned enterprises.28 Between 1981 and 1985, economic growth was 
around 5% per year.29 This was achieved, in part, by improving the capacity 
utilisation rate, which increased from 55% to 70%.30 Debt levels remained the 
same as in 1978 (i.e. 18 billion US dollars) because the price of oil rose during 
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this period, enabling the financing of investment and consumption plans without 
resorting to debt.31 
After the 1986’s oil price collapse, the reforms were interrupted. The economic 
and social situation deteriorated and led to the 1988 revolt that called for more 
social justice and political freedom. A new constitution was adopted; it 
enshrined the multi-party system and all principles that are the mainstay of 
modern democracies. A new governing team broke with the planned economy 
and adopted a market economy as the principal economic doctrine. However, 
the measures taken to effect the transition were not sufficient, as they were an 
attempt to build a market economy with inefficient state-owned companies, 
representing more than 80% of the non-hydrocarbon economy and more than 
90% if the hydrocarbon sector is included.32 
With regard to technological capability-building, the large, unmanageable state-
owned companies were broken up into smaller companies, either vertically or 
horizontally, in the early 1980s. The aim was to enhance learning and improve 
performance.33  Also, in an attempt to reconcile the needs of an appropriate 
technological and scientific environment with the government’s strategy of 
balanced regional development, company head offices were installed in various 
regions, with new universities (if none already existed).34 However, the results 
of university-industry linkages fell far short of expectations. ‘Relationships’ 
turned out to be central planning-dependent and bureaucratic.  
Privatisation and SME development formed a significant part of the reform 
package of the 1980s. It strove to conform with a new competition-driven 
efficiency culture by enhancing learning and innovation. Incremental innovation 
activity was promoted (to improve product quality, enlarge product functionality, 
and secure ISO certification) supported by embryonic partnerships between 
industry and R&D institutions.35 
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6.2.3 Development continuity despite major difficulties 
In the early 1990s, an acute political crisis manifested with the rise of political 
and later armed Islamism. Economic strategy was no longer a priority due to the 
security situation. All the while, the economic and social crisis deepened. 
Algeria was forced to negotiate with the IMF in 1994 to reschedule its public and 
private debt. It also negotiated a structural adjustment plan. The market 
liberalisation and removal of price controls imposed by the IMF had adverse 
effects on Algerian companies.36 They were not prepared for global competition, 
and, while the IMF agreements enabled Algeria to become solvent, they worked 
against sustainable development.37  
The decade 1990-2000 is considered by a large number of Algerian scholars, 
politicians and economists to have seen a break in the process of 
development.38 However, other scholars take the view that there were signs of 
an emerging national innovation system, despite the crisis.39 Privatisation 
continued, the importance accorded to SMEs rose, and steps towards learning 
enhancement and skill development were ramped up. The maturation of ideas 
led to the promulgation of the 1998 Law of Orientation and Programmes for the 
Development of Scientific Research and Technological Development.40  
The 1998 law laid the foundations of a national innovation system, covering 
institutional aspects, regulatory frameworks, planning priorities, resource 
mobilisation (e.g. human, financial), and incentive schemes.41 The Law declared 
22 broad objectives, including ‘the development and application of space 
techniques’ (Article 3). The law introduced 19 National Research Programmes 
(PNRs), including a programme for space technologies and their applications 
(Article 10). These PNRs were launched in 1999 by the Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research and targeted more than 30 sectors. Sectoral 
and inter-sectoral commissions were installed for coordinating and orienting 
research activity.    
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6.2.4 Growth in financial resources, ‘easy’ choices and ‘Dutch Disease’ 
In the late 1990s, the easing of the security crisis became noticeable and oil 
prices rose. Algeria could be financially self-sufficient once again. The 
government opted for an economic recovery strategy based on Keynesian-type 
government spending to stimulate growth and employment.42 Three plans were 
successively adopted: i) the plan for economic recovery support (2001-2004); ii) 
a complementary plan for economic growth support (2004-2009); and iii) a 
complementary plan for growth support (2010-2014). The overall strategy was 
to develop and modernise the socio-economic infrastructure, in the hopes that 
the productive sector would receive a productivity boost and grow as a 
consequence.43 Expenditure across these three plans was around 500 billion 
US dollars (equivalent to about 500,000 billion Algerian dinars).44 The industrial 
sector, notably state-owned companies, benefited from significant resources, 
including over 2,000 billion dinars for industrial revival and 150 billion dinars in 
SME upgrading.45 
In terms of results, despite the arguments put forward by the government in 
favour of the macroeconomic rebalancing enabled by these plans,46 many 
scholars47 wonder ‘at what cost?’ They questioned the results and their 
sustainability for the following reasons: i) the Keynesian-type remedy was not 
adapted to the Algerian situation;48 and ii) micro-economic indicators showed 
signs of weakness (e.g. decreasing productivity, decreasing international 
competitiveness, insufficient numbers of companies created, low spending on 
R&D, a discouraging business environment, a low technological development 
index and a low Human Development Index).49 
Overall, there is almost complete consensus among experts50 that the transition 
process from a planned to a market economy, initiated 25 years ago, is not yet 
complete. Analyses show that over the last fifteen years Algeria has been a 
victim of the “Dutch Disease".51 To stage a recovery, optimistic observers hold 
that Algeria still has room for manoeuvre in her effort to become a North African 
‘tiger’ – by adjusting her policy and correcting for past mistakes.52 However, 
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pessimistic opinion holds that the 2008 financial crisis and the failure of extreme 
liberalism in developed countries could prolong the uncertainty around 
economic choices and the status quo in Algeria’s administered economy.53  
With regard to technological capability-building, international technological 
partnerships were sought in order to develop products for both domestic and 
international markets. Needs of the international technological partnerships in 
terms of engineering and R&D activities competed with indigenous engineering 
and R&D activities. The indigenous capacity of local companies was already 
rather limited.54 Companies faced a shortage of skilled human resources, 
equipment, time, incentives, and institutional frameworks. As a consequence, 
foreign engineering and R&D activities have progressively eclipsed local 
activities.55 Local R&D capacity substitution occurred by recourse to foreign 
capacities instead of tapping domestic sources of expertise, or at least 
complementing foreign capacity with local.56 Consequently, less than 16% of 
the funds injected into the national research system were absorbed.57   
In order to make the required adjustments, particularly in coordination and 
research promotion, a new law was promulgated in 2008.58 It modified and 
supplemented the 1998 Law of Orientation and Programmes for the 
Development of Scientific Research and Technological Development. This new 
law attempted to strengthen the national innovation system’s components. It 
declared 30 broad objectives and affirmed the development and application of 
space techniques as an objective (Article 3). The general report annexed to the 
new law was more explicit in terms of objectives. It named small satellite 
technology development (i.e. nano and micro satellites) as a specific R&D 
objective. The law also enlarged to 34 the number of National Research 
Programmes (PNRs), including space technologies and their applications 
(Article 4).  
On a biographical note, the author was appointed in 2008 to sit on a committee 
charged with the preparation of a national research programme on space 
technologies and their applications. The group’s activities were under the 
212 
 
coordination of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. From 
2008 to 2014, the group did not hold any meetings, exemplifying the lack of 
coordination and group work at national level. It is worth noting that the space 
programme has been led from inception by the Algerian Space Agency, which 
was successively under the authority of the prime minister (i.e. head of 
government), the Minister of Information and Communication Technology, and 
again that of the prime minister.    
Thus, despite the aforesaid efforts and numerous others, deficiencies persist in 
terms of coordination, research promotion, and industry/R&D collaboration. The 
construction of an effective and consistent national innovation system has not 
been successful.59  
6.2.5 New pressures as a consequence of low oil prices 
Since 2014, oil prices have dropped dramatically and have exposed the limits of 
government economic, industrial and S&T policies. Algeria’s economy is still 
heavily oil-dependent.60 The government has limited room for manoeuvre. It is 
difficult to find any scholarly work explaining clearly the strategy adopted by the 
government to address this critical situation. A new plan for economic growth 
(2015-2019) has been adopted, introducing some austerity measures. It 
emphasised the role of the private sector, the importance of SMEs, and 
management capability development, particularly through international 
partnerships.61  
However, the situation is exacerbated by, inter alia, the limited awareness 
Algeria’s decision makers possess about capitalism. Inefficient state-owned 
companies remain protected and central to the strategy. Yet again, 
rationalisation ’half-measures’ have been proposed. The burdensome post-
independence legacy of the ‘socialist’ development model and ideology appears 
to still prevail in the economic decision-making.62  
The confusion around the right strategy to adopt is mirrored in the repeated 
calls by international institutions for Algeria to embark on ambitious reforms.63 It 
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is also noticeable in the statements made by Algerian officials. For instance, the 
prime minister (2012-2017) has continually let it be known that the priority is to 
export, implying that Algeria is adopting an export-oriented regime.64 His 
minister for industry, on the other hand, has stated that the industrialisation 
effort is oriented towards an import substitution regime.65    
With regard to technological development, it is worth mentioning that the 
proposed plan for economic growth revisits the importance of innovation. It also 
explicitly identifies satellite technology as a sector to develop.66 
6.2.6 Lessons learnt 
Based on the above Algerian development trajectory, there is a near-consensus 
among experts67 that incorrect choices, inconsistencies, interruptions, short-
sighted perspectives, and hesitation in adopting nationwide development 
policies and strategies have all been constant factors in Algeria’s development 
process. This is evidenced by the poor results obtained under the planned 
economy model adopted in the initial phase of Algeria’s development. It is also 
evidenced by the inability of Algeria to transition effectively to a market 
economy. The transition process from a planned to a market economy, initiated 
in the late 1980s (and the beginning of the 1990s), is not yet complete. Algeria 
is stuck in transition. 
With regard to national technological capability-building, due to the nation’s 
systemic complexity, successfully combining, in a coherent national innovation 
system, the many enmeshed subsystems with diverse objectives and within 
multiple contexts has proved to be an enormous challenge for Algeria. 
Evaluating the national innovation system appears to be challenging, too. 
Therefore, it would seem appropriate to evaluate Algeria’s technological 
capability-building in a less aggregative manner. The sectoral innovation system 
perspective brings in additional elements that are peculiar to satellite activities 
and, consequently, to the present evaluation.  
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The less aggregative perspective is encouraged by some ‘relatively’ successful 
sectoral case studies, notwithstanding Algeria’s national-level constraints. 
These include Algeria’s knowledge-intensive pharmaceutical industry and the 
remarkable achievements of SAIDAL.68 This latter is a state-owned company 
created in 1982 which succeeded in building efficient innovative capabilities. 
This achievement is a result of sustained government efforts and effective 
company management, despite existing constraints in terms of resources and 
market failures.69  
Likewise, current government efforts to develop the automotive sector,70 despite 
lack of public access to a record of results,71 can bring in additional elements to 
the evaluation of satellite (or space) innovation systems. Traditionally, the 
satellite (or space) manufacturing supply chain shares elements (or segments) 
with the automotive supply chain. 
6.3 Algeria’s small satellite capability-building from a process-
tracing perspective 
What emerges from this brief history of Algeria’s development since 
independence can be summed up in the following recurring motif: uncertainty in 
picking choices and failure in the management of development. This is 
particularly the case because of the range of conflicting interests that a country 
must balance and the complexity of the challenges faced. Hafsi72 considers that 
when causal relationships are obscure, then all solutions are considered equal. 
He argues that uncertainty comes from the fact that everyone is convinced that 
his/her opinion is the right one. Therefore, views become difficult to reconcile at 
the highest level. Thus, he recalls an important principle in the theory of 
decision making in complex situations: “where opinions are not reconcilable at 
the highest level, they are more likely to be at a lower level. It is necessary then 
to avoid taking decisions at the highest level and get them taken at the lower 
level”.73 
It is within this context that the idea of building satellite capabilities in Algeria 
emerged. Indeed, Algeria has been a user of space technology for a relatively 
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long time. Its territory extends over more than 2.3 Million Km², mostly desert. 
Territory which is difficult and expensive to map and monitor. To cover this 
territory and to reduce the isolation of remote areas, space technology has long 
been recognised as a partial solution. The first ground telecommunications 
satellite station was installed in 1975,74 and the first satellite images covering 
Algerian territory were used in the 1980s.75 Space applications and space 
techniques began to be taught at university level from the beginning of the 
1980s. A specialised (university level) centre for space techniques was set up in 
the late 1980s.76  
The recognition of the strategic value of space technology and its application in 
Algeria has increased over time.  In the late 1990s, it reached a level of maturity 
that made it necessary to move to a new phase. The latter aimed to achieve a 
greater degree of independence and acquire the means to develop basic space 
technology. There was a need to move from being a passive ‘user’ to becoming 
an active ‘developer’. The idea of setting up a National Space Programme with 
a governing organisation (the Algerian Space Agency) was born.77 
6.3.1 Small satellites, a lever for building capabilities 
The need for developing and framing space activities in Algeria coincided with 
an international context favourable to the transfer of space technology to 
developing countries such as Algeria (see chapter 1, Figure 1-2). It in particular 
coincided with a suitable and advantageous commercial offer on the 
international market tendered by the UK company SSTL.78 Algeria seized upon 
this offer, based on a ‘Know-How Transfer and Training-KHTT’ programme 
towards small Earth observation satellite manufacture, to take her first steps 
into satellite manufacturing.79 
The first small satellite collaborative project was named Alsat-1, which started in 
2001.80 Alsat-1 was designed and manufactured by SSTL over a 15-month 
collaborative programme involving Algerian engineers and scientists. The 
Algerians participated in the manufacture and pre-flight testing at SSTL’s 
facilities in the UK. 
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The small satellite market had by this time opened up, with new competitive 
offers being tendered. Algeria accepted one such offer and a second small 
satellite collaborative project was undertaken. This was the Alsat-2 programme, 
which started in 2005 with Airbus Defence and Space, previously EADS-
Astrium. The project was aimed at developing two identical satellites, Alsat-2A 
and Alsat-2B.  The first, Alsat-2A, was developed by the supplier team with the 
participation of Algerian engineers in France. The satellite was launched in July 
2010. Algerian engineers, based in Algeria, commenced assembly and 
integration of Alsat-2B in 2012,81 which was launched in 2016. 
In 2014, a third small satellite collaborative project called Alsat-1B was begun 
with SSTL/UK. In this project, Algerian engineers carried out the integration and 
test phase of the satellite at Algeria’s local facilities.82 Alsat-1B was launched in 
2016. 
Algeria used the above three satellite collaborative projects (Alsat-1, Alsat-2, 
and Alsat-1B) as vehicles for acquiring satellite technology from abroad, with a 
view towards indigenising it.83 These projects inspired and served as the 
backbone for the design of a broader space programme in Algeria.84 Indeed, 
their centrality is reflected in the number of actions and projects planned around 
collaborative projects and around images these satellites provide.  
The centrality of satellite collaborative projects can be seen through the word 
cloud displayed in Figure 6-1. The word cloud was generated on April 2017 by 
running an NVivo word frequency query over the Algerian Space Agency’s -
(ASAL) website.85 The query covered the webpages that publicise ASAL 
activities as part of the Algerian space programme from January 2010 to March 
2017.1 Figure 6-1 shows that ‘alsat’ is the most frequently occurring word on 
ASAL’s website. The term ‘alsat’ is a prefix referring to satellite collaborative 
projects Alsat-1, Alsat-2, and Alsat-1B. The rest of the cloud’s words surround 
‘alsat’. They mostly refer to activities where satellite images are used for 
                                            
1
 ASAL often publicises its activities in Arabic and French (and rarely in English). The word frequency query was run 
over the French version. 
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satellite applications (forestry, land-use planning, environment and ecology, 
desertification, water resources, desert locust).   




6.3.2 Small satellite technology within the burgeoning Space 
Innovation System 
As noted above, the strategic value of space technology and the need for a 
coordinated effort to mature space capability in Algeria brought into relief the 
necessity of codifying a sustainable space programme with a leading 
organisation.86 This led to the establishment of the Algerian Space Agency in 
2002.87 
The Algerian Space Agency formulated a national space programme in 
conjunction with various governmental bodies and in accordance with 
development requirements. The national space programme was adopted by the 
government on the 28th of November, 2006. It covers a period of 15 years 
(2006-2020), with five-year reviews. It is the reference programme for space 
policy in Algeria and represents a governmental support tool for sustainable 
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development and strengthening national sovereignty.88 The strategic objectives 
of the programme are threefold: i) development of industrial capabilities; ii) 
satisfaction of national needs; and iii) knowledge capability-building.89 The 
programme laid the foundations of a sectoral Space Innovation System, 
composed of actors, networks and institutions.  
Actors involved in small satellite development  
The programme identifies the organisations which are to be involved. Four 
operational entities2 were set up under the Algerian Space Agency. One of 
them is the Centre for Satellite Development (CDS), which is responsible for 
satellite development. Other organisations are identified and set to be involved 
in space activities: ministerial departments as users, as well as public research 
centres, universities, and a few public industrial companies (e.g. aircraft 
construction company – ECA).  
The Centre for Satellite Development is supposed to coordinate the activities of 
organisations which contribute to satellite development.90 Certain universities 
and research centres are identified (the universities of Algiers, Oran, 
Constantine, Setif, Tlemcen, and the Centre for Development of Advanced 
Technologies - CDTA). The national space programme remains rather limited in 
its purview when it comes to identifying local industrial organisations to partner 
with, particularly those in the private sector. This is due to the fact that no 
thorough audit of the industrial environment had been undertaken prior to the 
formulation of the programme.91 This failure persists 12 years on since the 
programme was adopted (in 2006); ASAL has only undertaken one limited audit 
involving the mechanical engineering industry, in 2008.92 It is important to note 
that the space programme puts no limitation on collaboration with public and 
private actors, as well as local and foreign actors (including industrial actors), 
along vertical and/or horizontal linkages.93 
                                            
2
 Centre des Techniques Spatiales (CTS), Centre des Applications Spatiales (CAS), Centre d’Exploitation 
des Systèmes de Télécommunications (CEST), and Centre de Développement des Satellites (CDS).  
http://www.asal.dz/entites.php (Accessed on 10 March 2017). 
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Networking of actors  
The national space programme envisages linking space actors together in 
networks around joint projects.3 Some 68% of these projects are intended to 
satisfy user needs in terms of space applications (use of satellite images in 
thematic applications like agriculture, forestry, and the environment).94 The rest 
(32%) is dominated by: i) infrastructure projects; ii) training and education 
projects (a cluster of universities, including a doctoral school specialising in 
space applications and technologies jointly formed by a consortium of 
universities - EDTAS);95 iii) satellite acquisition from abroad (e.g. a 
telecommunication satellite project); and iv) small satellite collaborative projects 
with foreign companies (e.g. Alsat-2, Alsat-1B).  
Little is explicitly stated in the programme about ‘local’ technological 
development (e.g. local development of satellite systems or components). Very 
little is also explicitly stated about technological and industrial actors, their roles, 
objectives and networking.96 This is reflective of the weak linkages ASAL has 
with the local industrial environment and, beyond that, the weak linkages with 
national industrial policies that relate to ASAL activities.  
This shallow approach with respect to technological and industrial actors might 
also be reflective of prevailing practices, and corporate culture, in ASAL. 
Indeed, the human resources component of ASAL is mostly drawn from an 
academic-type environment (universities or research centres/institutes).97 It is 
likely that it has brought with it inherited deficiencies as to university/industry 
and research/industry linkages typical of developing countries.98 Moreover, it is 
likely that it has also brought the inherited deficiencies of organisational learning 
between knowledge organisations (e.g. linkages between universities, research 
centres).99 For instance, the fieldwork identifies the weak linkages ASAL entities 
have with the doctoral school specialising in space applications and 
technologies – EDTAS.100   
                                            
3
 86 projects are identified. http://www.asal.dz/psn.php (Accessed on 10 March 2017). 
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Institutions governing interactions between actors 
The space programme was devised primarily from a ‘bureaucratic and non-
market’ perspective. Actors and interactions that may occur within market 
networks were absolutely not dealt with.101 The exclusive source of funding for 
the programme was always intended to be the state budget. The reason given 
for this in the particular case of the satellite industry is that it is an ‘infant’ 
industry requiring significant learning costs and protection.102 In addition, market 
competition could stifle capability-building efforts if market failures exist.103 
However, protection would generally be extended for a limited period. 
Protection was intended to address challenges associated with resource 
allocation and not all market failures (failures outside organisations, such as 
institutional and infrastructure inadequacies, and labour market deficiencies). 
The space programme is now in its twelfth year and questions relating to these 
aspects still do not appear to have been addressed.104  
Some national regulations and practices governing interaction between 
governmental actors were adapted for the space sector. For instance, the 
framework provided by the Law of Orientation and Programmes for the 
Development of Scientific Research and Technological Development was used 
by ASAL.105 University regulations and practices were adopted for the 
governance of the doctoral school specialising in space applications and 
technologies.  
As stated previously, the space programme contains virtually no explicit 
institutional policies intended to shape networks and interactions between 
industrial actors. Indeed, the programme identifies ASAL and its operational 
entity CDS4 as ‘prime movers’ or ‘system builders’ for the development of 
satellite technology.106 It remains vague as to what should be the means of 
involving local actors, particularly those supposed to contribute to the 
development of satellite technology. For instance, no reference is made as to 
                                            
4
 Centre for Satellites Development -CDS 
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how technology should be transferred from CDS to local industrial actors. No 
programme of accompanying policies exists for upgrading local actors to 
comply with space industry requirements. The vital issue of intellectual property 
rights is also grossly neglected. Incentives towards local actors and funding 
options are not addressed. 107 In short, policies and actions intended to build 
local industrial capabilities for the development of satellites are vague or non-
existent. 
By contrast, the space programme leaves plenty of room for space applications 
that target the use of satellite images.108  More than 15 ministerial departments 
are presently involved as users of satellite images, and more than 50 
application projects are based on satellite images.109  
Successful technological policies are based on three interrelated types of 
measures:110  i) policies intended to create and foster market needs for the 
technology in question (e.g. need for satellite images), known as demand-side 
strengthening – the space programme does indeed promote this aspect; ii) 
policies intended to build technological capabilities (e.g. build satellites that 
satisfy certain needs), known as supply-side strengthening – the space 
programme obliquely addresses this aspect; and finally, iii) policies intended to 
link both the demand and supply side – the space programme does not address 
this aspect. 
ASAL finds itself in a lopsided position typical of developing countries, where 
users (or market) demand more technological products (e.g. satellite images) 
and the supplier does not have the technological capability to deliver them. This 
makes it difficult, nay impossible, for ASAL to devise policies that effectively link 
demand to supply.  
Learning type fostered in the space programme 
The ‘knowledge-base’ is sometimes discussed as the fourth element of a 
technological innovation system.111 It is important because it provides guidance 
on the precise learning that needs to take place for building local capabilities. In 
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general, technological capability-building refers to building complementary and 
balanced capabilities in engineering, development, and research. The adopted 
capability-building policy should be adjusted to a particular need. For instance, if 
there is a need for learning by searching (i.e. research activity) (see chapter 2, 
subsection 2.4.5), the capability-building policy should promote investment in 
research. On the other hand, if there is a need for learning by doing (i.e. 
engineering activity), the policy should encourage market growth. 112  
The Algerian space programme takes an off-balance approach when it comes 
to satellite development.113 Learning by searching (or research investment) 
appears to be addressed by enlisting the services of research centres and 
universities. This is, indeed, commendable given the highly knowledge-intensive 
and high-risk nature of satellite technology. Basic research and public research 
organisations have an important role to perform in complementing applied 
research and development activities. However, the latter, along with 
engineering, are made less explicit in the space programme. As mentioned 
earlier, their actors, networks (enabling learning by interacting - see chapter 2, 
subsection 2.4.5), and institutional measures are virtually not addressed. 
The satellite sector imbalance identified in ASAL’s planned strategy on 
research, development, and engineering, is reminiscent of Algeria’s national 
imbalance in the 1970s, described above in section 6.2.1. Indeed, strategic 
emphasis appears to be almost exclusively placed on research activities. 
Development and engineering activities, by contrast, are insufficiently well 
addressed. This leads, almost inevitably, to a system that is biased towards 
research activities and disconnected from development and engineering 
aspects (i.e. scientific and basic research disconnected from technological and 
applied research). This issue is not unique to the satellite sector: the Ministry of 
Industry has recently (in 2017) pointed out that the whole National Innovation 
System is skewed in favour of research activities.114   
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6.4 Planning of small satellite capability-building 
The foregoing section underlined the role of satellite collaborative projects as a 
vehicle for acquiring satellite technology in Algeria. It identified imbalances 
between actions geared towards research, development and engineering in the 
satellite programme. Similarly, it highlighted the imbalance between actions 
targeting satellite applications and satellite technology development. The 
imbalances reflect the difficulty, or confusion, ASAL has in perceiving and 
managing interactions and cross-linkages across the battery of activities 
required to build small satellite capability. 
From a strategic planning perspective, this confusion reflects limitations in 
establishing strong linkages between planning levels. Moreover, given the 
centrality of satellite collaborative projects in building satellite capabilities, the 
observed confusion might equally be reflective of a non-alignment of ASAL’s 
strategy with collaborative projects (or the project portfolio).115 In other words, 
the projects should be embedded into ASAL’s strategy, and if the strategy is not 
well thought through, it is difficult to assess whether the collaborative projects 
suit the strategy and how closely aligned they are to it.  
This section therefore examines how rigorous the planning of small satellite 
capability-building has been.    
The fieldwork reveals the vagueness surrounding the process used by ASAL 
when planning small satellite capability-building in Algeria. No recognised and 
‘rigorous’ process such as the ‘strategic planning’116 was used for planning.117 
Consequently, a lot of gaps exist in the strategic roadmap; that is, the National 
Space Programme devised by ASAL. One of the strategic objectives of the 
latter is the development of small satellite industrial capabilities. In order to 
attain this objective, first, ASAL should have assessed its situation by 
appraising its external and internal environment.  
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6.4.1 Assessment of external and internal environment 
To assess the external environment, data should be collected on the character 
of and trends present in the industrial environment, including competitors, 
suppliers, partners and funders. Data should also be collected on the macro-
environment (i.e. PESTEL: Political, Economic, Social, Technological, 
Environmental and Legal). Analysis of the national space programme along with 
interviews conducted with ASAL’s senior-management echelon reveals limited 
assessment of the external environment.118 As mentioned earlier, no thorough 
audit of the industrial environment had been undertaken prior to the formulation 
of the space programme and even during its implementation. Aspects related to 
intellectual property rights were grossly neglected. The exclusive source of 
funding was the state budget, and no other funding options were contemplated. 
With the state budget now shrinking as a consequence of low oil prices, ASAL 
faces a real challenge in funding its activities.  
Deficiencies observed in the assessment of the external environment might be 
partly explained by the nature and status of ASAL and its staff. It is a 
governmental organisation, hence the emphasis is on its mission of public 
service (e.g. need to provide satellite images, training) and certain political 
objectives (e.g. sovereignty, prestige, public image). Other considerations such 
as markets, economic return, financial return and business environment do not 
receive enough attention.  
With regard to the internal environment, data should be collected on existing 
internal capabilities, such as organisational structure, human resources, 
material resources, and facilities required for satellite exploitation, engineering, 
development and research. The fieldwork reveals that internal environment 
assessment was centred on exploitation activities and, to a lesser extent, on 
research activities.  
Internal capabilities in terms of engineering and development were not properly 
assessed.119 A zero-based approach was adopted, based on the judgement 
that engineering and development capabilities had to be built from scratch. For 
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instance, putting in place a new organisational entity (i.e. CDS), building new 
facilities, acquiring new equipment, recruiting and training new human 
resources.120 This incomplete approach has consequently blurred connectivity 
between existing and intended capabilities in terms of engineering and 
development (see chapter 7). This is important as the spearhead of satellite 
development capabilities in Algeria was the collaborative projects, which are 
engineering and development projects par excellence.  
6.4.2 Assessment of strategic direction, according to organisational 
capacity 
The previous section suggested that ASAL did not rigorously assess its external 
and internal environment. It is likely, therefore, that it has defined its strategic 
direction, in terms of building small satellite industrial capabilities, based on a 
distorted vision of its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. The 
relative opacity of ASAL’s organisational potential was reflected, during the 
fieldwork, by difficulties present in identifying a clear strategic direction for the 
development of the satellite industry. The majority of interviewees (70%) at 
senior- and mid-management level could not respond clearly to the question 
“Where do you (i.e. ASAL) want to be in the future?” This is indicative of a lack 
of strategic vision, and a lack of communication within the organisation.  
Moreover, interviewee responses were disconnected from data related to the 
external and internal environments. For instance, many of the interviewees 
(40%) highlighted ASAL’s strategic direction for building an indigenous satellite 
platform (see chapter 3, subsection 3.2.1).121 It is apposite to note that 
mechanical engineering knowledge is of crucial importance when it comes to 
building a satellite platform’s structure. Yet, data collected during the fieldwork 
show that mechanical engineering knowledge is one of the weakest aspects of 
ASAL’s internal capabilities (lack of human resources in mechanical 
engineering, lack of equipment, lack of R&D activities).122  
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6.4.3 Assessment of action plan and related project portfolio 
In a properly articulated process of strategic planning, strategic direction should 
be the basis for developing an action plan and a related projects portfolio in an 
organisation.123 In the case under study, however, strategic direction for building 
satellite industrial capability is not clearly defined, as noted above. It is therefore 
not altogether surprising that the action plan was also found wanting, i.e. lacked 
clarity. When inquiring into the latter, the most common response given by 
interviewees at senior- and mid-management level (85%) was that ASAL 
pursues actions that enable “step-by-step access to satellite technology”. The 
corresponding French phrase very often heard in the course of the fieldwork 
was “Accéder par palier à la technologie.”124 This very same generic phrase is 
found in documents related to the national space programme.125 
According to interviewees,126 the implicit two steps required to access (or 
transfer) technology were: Step 1: Algerian engineers partook in the 
manufacturing tasks of Alsat-1 and Alsat-2A at the facilities of the suppliers, and 
Step 2: they undertook the assembly, integration and test tasks of Alsat-2B and 
Alsat-1B at ASAL’s own facilities. It is significant that the generic phrase “step-
by-step access to satellite technology” is translated by ASAL exclusively 
through actions related to a portfolio of satellite collaborative projects (with 
foreign companies), again underlining their centrality in the process of building a 
satellite industry. No other actions or projects (other than collaborative projects) 
have been identified during the fieldwork.  
In addition, even with regard to the somewhat narrow collaborative projects 
portfolio, the fieldwork reveals inaccuracies in the supposedly SMART127 criteria 
(where goals should be Specific, Measurable, Agreed-upon, Realistic, Time-
based) that should accompany an action plan or projects portfolio in the 
planning process. For instance, no specific target is defined, no specific 
technology is targeted, with only very generic metrics defined and an inaccurate 
schedule proposed (several actions had been delayed as revealed in chapter 7, 
section 7.1.2). Put differently, very loosely articulated goals were explicitly 
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stated by ASAL in the planning process. Similarly, actions are loosely cascaded 
across organisational, functional and individual levels. Interviews conducted at 
micro and meso level reveal the non-existence of clear action plans for 
individuals, groups, and even organisations involved in building industrial 
capabilities.128 For instance, ASAL, as the parent organisation, formally 
entrusted the mission of satellite development to its operational entity CDS 
(Centre for Satellite Development). The fieldwork reveals (see chapter 7) that 
CDS had no clear action plan for this purpose and ASAL kept a close control 
over the process, and even micro-managed it.  
It is clear therefore that the planning of small satellite capability-building was 
loosely carried out at central level, evincing virtually no connectivity with 
operational activities. Obviously, as shown in chapter 7, this major weakness 
has negatively affected actor mobilisation during the implementation of the plan.  
6.5 Key findings of the planning evaluation 
From the foregoing analysis, the major findings of the evaluation of the planning 
process of small satellite capability-building are summarised in Tables 6.2, 6.3 
and 6.4, corresponding to macro, meso and micro levels. The key aspect 
revealed is ASAL’s non-adoption of a rigorous planning methodology. As a 
consequence, the macro, meso and micro planning levels are not aligned.   
 
Table 6-2: Macro planning evaluation 
Key findings 
-The strategic directions for satellite industry development are not clear  
-There are two distinct and disconnected (not coordinated) planning processes, a primary process led 
by ASAL, and a secondary process led by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research 
-The planning is incomplete and based on an incomplete assessment of the external and internal 
environment 
-The national space programme is vague in planning the sectoral satellite innovation system (i.e. there 
is vagueness in the identification and involvement of actors, their networking and institutions) 
-The action plan at this level is loosely defined 




Table 6-3: Meso planning evaluation 
Key findings 
-The action plan is based on an incomplete assessment of the internal environment 
-The action plan at this level is loosely cascaded (for the purposes of implementation) 
-The action plan is ASAL-centred, essentially involving ASAL’s internal capabilities and overlooking the 
external environment 
-The action plan is off-balanced as the majority of actions are application-centred (e.g. satellite 
exploitation) or research-centred, overlooking engineering and development activities 
Source: Author  
 
Table 6-4: Micro planning evaluation 
Key findings 
-The action plan at this level is loosely cascaded (for the purposes of implementation)  
-The action plan is off-balanced as collaborative projects (based on a significant foreign contribution) 
are the only actions identified, rather than a portfolio of diversified projects that require indigenous effort 
-The satellite collaborative projects are inaccurately planned   
-The non-existence of clear action plans for teams and individuals 
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7 Chapter 7: Implementation of Algeria’s small satellite 
capability-building programme  
Chapter 6 provided the contextual backdrop to Algeria’s technological 
development and laid out key elements of the burgeoning Satellite (or Space) 
Innovation System. It also evaluated the planning of the small satellite 
capability-building programme in Algeria. 
As discussed, three small satellite collaborative projects (Alsat-1, Alsat-2, and 
Alsat-1B) formed the backbone for technology acquisition and building local 
capabilities. Alsat-1 and Alsat-1B are two small satellites built in 2000 and 2014 
respectively in conjunction with SSTL-UK. Alsat-1 and Alsat-1B were launched 
in 2002 and 2016 respectively. Alsat-2 comprises a pair of identical satellites 
(Alsat-2A & B) built jointly with Airbus-France. The Alsat-2 project is perceived 
as one system, as most project phases were started in 2005 and involved both 
satellites. Alsat-2A was completed and launched in 2010, whereas the 
integration and test phase of Alsat-2B commenced in 2012. Alsat-2B was 
launched in 2016.  
The present chapter follows on from chapter 6 by way of evaluating the 
implementation of the capability-building programme from individual and team 
level through to organisational and, ultimately, inter-organisational levels. The 
chapter critically analyses the programme’s implementation according to three 
categories of evaluation metrics. Section 7.1 addresses technological learning 
occurring during and after the collaborative projects’ completion. Section 7.2 
evaluates the locally built technological capabilities, mostly relating to 
endogenous factors. Lastly, section 7.3 complements the latter by evaluating 
the transferor-transferee interface via metrics reflective of exogenous factors.  
7.1 Learning occurring during the capability-building process 
Technological learning is at the heart of this study. Its evaluation is conducted 
via the implementation of two systemic models described in chapter 4   
(sections 4.3 and 4.4).  
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The first of these models is the ‘knowledge flow model’. It evaluates learning 
that occurred during the collaborative projects Alsat-1, Alsat-2, and Alsat-1B, 
used to transfer technology to Algeria. The second model is the ‘experiential 
learning model’. It evaluates learning occurring within the Algerian Space 
Agency setting, following implementation of the three collaborative projects. The 
sequential use of these two models traces knowledge flow from its acquisition 
from abroad to its diffusion locally (Figure 7-1). 
Figure 7-1: Positioning of the two evaluation models 
 
Source: Author. 
7.1.1 Learning during the projects’ lifetime - implementation of the 
‘knowledge flow model’  
The model is applied to the three collaborative small satellite projects Alsat-1, 
Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B. Small satellite systems can be divided into a ground and 
space segment (see chapter 3, subsection 3.4.1). The space segment refers to 
the satellite itself (or a constellation of satellites like Alsat-2A & B). The ground 
segment refers to the components used to operate the satellite once in orbit so 
as to receive and process data (satellite images).  
Knowledge flow with regard to the ground segment is not evaluated in this 
section as the focus of all Algerian collaborative projects has been on the space 
segment. Ground segments were acquired only for the exploitation of space 
segments. No joint development or integration activities were carried out around 
ground segments.  
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Accordingly, in the following subsections, the knowledge flow model is applied 
only to the space segment (i.e. satellite), as the bulk of joint development and 
integration activities were carried out on the satellite. Eight (08) components of 
the satellite are identified and referred to as C1, C2,…, C8 in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1: Components of the jointly developed satellites  
Source: Author 
a. Model implementation on Alsat-1 project 
As detailed in chapter 4 (subsection 4.3.3, equation (10)), the transferred 
knowledge is KT0 = KVis0 + KVel0. KVis0 = I0, providing an indication of the 
depth of integrative knowledge required to put satellite components C1, C2, …, 
C8 together. KVel0 = C1 + C2 + ... + C8 and provides an indication on the breadth 
of the transferred knowledge during the project’s lifetime. It is reflected through 
the number of components involved in the transfer process along with the depth 
of knowledge associated with each component. 
a.1. Measuring the depth of integrative knowledge 
The depth of integrative knowledge is measured using two metrics: the intensity 
of interactions between Algerian team members (as a proxy for group work), 
and their degree of involvement during the project in the integration and test 
operations.  
The N2 diagram (Figure 7-2) is used to illustrate these interactions. This matrix 
is compiled from responses to questions about joint tasks shared amongst 
individual team members in the course of the project. The shaded cells indicate 
how each component (or individuals in charge of it) interacts with the others. 














RF Propulsion Payload 
Component 
Codes 
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 
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made: full integrative knowledge is attained when the acquirer knows how all 
components in the matrix interact with one another (i.e. 8x8 cells are shaded) 
and total interaction is then expressed by the ratio (number of shaded cells/total 
cells =) 64/64=1.  
For Alsat-1 team members, interaction is depicted in Figure 7-2. The score is 
thus: number of shaded cells/total cells = 19/64 = 0.29 




To ascertain degree of involvement in the integration (putting components 
together) and test operations, each team member was questioned (see 
questionnaire in appendix 1-a) regarding their level of involvement during the 
project. On a scale of 0-to-1, participants gave an average rating of 0.37. 
Consequently, the depth of integrative knowledge for Alsat-1, referred to 1, is 
given by KVis0 = I0 = (interaction score + involvement score)/2 = (0.29 + 0.37)/2 
= 0.33 
a.2. Measuring the breadth of knowledge 
The transferred component knowledge, or breadth of knowledge transfer, during 
the project is reflected in the number of components involved in the transfer 
process, along with the depth of knowledge associated with each component. 
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Eight (08) components were made use of in the Alsat-1 project, corresponding 
to the highest component score (=1). With respect to the depth of knowledge of 
each component, this is measured through questions about the actual number 
of Algerian engineers who participated in the development of each component 
compared to the required number for the development of the component, 
ceteris paribus. According to the participants, 65 individuals are typically 
required by SSTL-UK to build all the components of the system, whereas only 
eight (08) Algerian engineers took part in this project. This gives the following 
ratio: number of Algerian engineers/the required number = 8/65 = 0.14 
Consequently, breadth of knowledge for Alsat-1 is KVel0 = C1 + C2 + ... + C8 = 
actual number of participants / required number of participants = 8/65= 0.14 
a.3. Graphical representation of the knowledge flow 
The transferred knowledge for the satellite Alsat-1 is given by KT0 = KVis0 + 
KVel0 = 0.33 + 0.14 = 0.47 (Figure 7-3) 
 







b. Model implementation on Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B projects 
The steps outlined above for the implementation of the model on the Alsat-1 
project were implemented on both the Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B projects. Table 7-2 
summarises the value of the transferred knowledge according to the proposed 
model. Figure 7-4 shows interaction matrices of Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B. 
Table 7-2: Knowledge flow values of Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B 
Alsat-2  Alsat-1B 
KVis0 
Depth of integrative 
knowledge = 
(0.25+0.90)/2=0.57 
Intensity of interactions 
= 0.25 
KVis0 
Depth of integrative 
knowledge = 
(0.5+0.65)/2=0.57 
Intensity of interactions = 0.5 
Degree of involvement = 
0.90 
Degree of involvement = 0.65 
KVel0  
Breadth of knowledge = 0.11 




knowledge = 0.18 
Number of components = 7 
The ratio number of 
Algerian engineers/the 
required number = 
8/70=0.11 
The ratio number of Algerian 
engineers/the required number = 
13/70=0.18 
Prior knowledge 0.62  0.78 
  
KT0 = KVis0 + KVel0 = 0.57+0.11=0.68  KT0 = KVis0 + KVel0 = 0.57 + 0.18 = 0.75 
Source: Author 
 







Based on the values in Table 7-2, graphical illustrations of knowledge 
transferred (knowledge flow) in the Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B projects are presented 
in Figures 7-5 and 7-6.  
 











c. Impact of transferee absorptive capacity on knowledge flow 
The graphical representation of the knowledge flow model applied to the three 
projects analysed shows that there are shifts in terms of initial values on the 
ordinate axis. These shifts relate to the initial value of knowledge. These shifts 
are denoted ‘IV’ (for initial value) and highlighted in Figure 7-7. Even though the 
shifts are not significant, the graphical representation shows that IVAlsat-1B > 
IVAlsat-2 > IVAlsat-1.  
Figure 7-7: Effect of absorptive capacity 
 
Alsat-1 Alsat-2 Alsat-1B 
Source: Author 
The author contends that the initial value of knowledge is correlated to the 
absorptive capacity of learners involved in the satellite projects. An attempt is 
made below to estimate the value of the absorptive capacity of learners in the 
projects, where AC denotes absorptive capacity. This capacity results from the 
prior knowledge possessed by the learner (denoted by PK) and the intensity of 
effort invested in the learning process (denoted by Inty).1  Consequently, it can 
be posited that the learner’s absorptive capacity is:  
AC = PK + Inty     (14) 
Prior knowledge (PK) is measured through an evaluation of the academic and 
professional background of participants in the project, the preparatory activities 
ahead of the project, and the appropriateness of knowledge possessed to 
requirements during the project (see questionnaire in appendix 1-a). On a scale 
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of 0-to-1, the average PK ratings in the three projects are: PKAlsat-1 = 0.58, 
PKAlsat-2 = 0.62, and PKAlsat-1B = 0.78  
With regard to the intensity of learning effort, it is important to recall that 
technological knowledge includes two complementary elements, tacit and 
explicit knowledge. Intensity of effort is then a combination of the intensity of 
tacit learning and the intensity of explicit learning. Due to the difficulty of 
estimating the two elements and their appropriate combination quantitatively, 
intensities of effort during the three projects are assumed to be similar.   
Consequently, learners’ absorptive capacity is reflected only in the prior 
knowledge of learners on each project. It is thus apparent that the prior 
knowledge in Alsat-1B (PKAlsat-1B = 0.78) is more significant than that in Alsat-2 
(PKAlsat-2 = 0.62) and Alsat-1 (PKAlsat-1 = 0.58). The increase over time reveals a 
tendency towards improving the prior knowledge of participants in projects. This 
has been confirmed, as managerial-level participants in this empirical study 
have pointed out the improvements in the selection process of team members 
and their preparation for the project.2  
d. Findings from the implementation of the ‘knowledge flow model’ 
The application of the knowledge flow model to the three Algerian small satellite 
collaborative projects has only been possible at the upper level of the 
decomposition-integration process (Figure 7-8). No significant activities have 









Figure 7-8: Upper level of the decomposition-integration process 
 
Source: Author. 
The application of the model reveals that Algerian teams involved in the process 
slightly improved the architectural knowledge required for the integration of 
small satellites. Figures 7-3, 7-5 and 7-6 illustrate the increase in terms of 
architectural knowledge (KVis0). However, component knowledge (KVel0) 
remains limited in all projects.  
This result corroborates responses to questions regarding the knowledge 
acquired by Algerian teams asked during managerial-level interviews.3 Indeed, 
interviewees point to the fact that, unlike with the initial satellites (Alsat-1, and 
Alsat-2A), Algerian teams locally integrated the two subsequent satellites (Alsat-
2B, and Alsat-1B) at CDS/Oran facilities, demonstrating great independence. 
They emphasise that the integration was carried out under minimal supervision 
from transferor representatives, a deliberate measure intended to enhance local 
team confidence. 
On the other hand, responses were less categorical when it came to ability to 
build components locally (acquiring component knowledge). At individual and 
team level,4 there was a general consensus that human resources allocated at 
component level were well below the requirements for building such 
components. Interviewees consider that only 14% of the required human 
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resources for component development were allocated to projects.5 
Consequently, due to the low number of individuals taking an active part, the 
absorptive capacity of the acquirer was reduced from the outset.  
This deficiency is acknowledged at managerial level.6 However, no clear 
alternative is suggested to channel resources towards less scattered 
participation (i.e. a limited number of individuals scattered over a wide range of 
components).7 Similarly, no clear alternative is suggested with regard to the 
depth of component knowledge targeted.8 This is reflective of the difficulty of 
finding the right component/architectural balance across all levels of the 
technological system’s decomposition-integration spectrum. 
Another aspect appears to particularly affect component knowledge acquisition. 
A slight difference is observed in terms of component knowledge acquired in 
projects conducted with SSTL-UK (i.e. Alsat-1 and Alsat-1B) and on the project 
with Airbus-France (i.e. Alsat-2). Component knowledge in Alsat-1 and Alsat-1B 
seems to be slightly higher than in Alsat-2. This can be explained by company 
size and the business model adopted by the technology transferor. 
With respect to Alsat-1 and Alsat-1B, empirical data reveal that the bulk of 
component development, satellite integration and testing were insourced at 
SSTL-UK.9 This high level of vertical integration,10 which goes a long way 
towards explaining SSTL’s durability, provides an opportunity for transferees in 
collaborative projects to be in direct contact with component technology, and to 
increase their knowledge thereby. On the other hand, data collected on the 
Alsat-2 project highlight that the Airbus approach to building satellites is 
different.11 It is a large company which focuses on building integrative 
knowledge and outsourcing component development.12 This business model 
seems to inadvertently steer Algerian participants away from acquiring 
component knowledge.  
With regard to the indigenisation level of the acquired knowledge, data collected 
reveal13 that for such a nascent activity (i.e. satellite development in Algeria), it 
is considered premature to broach questions about local value creation, through 
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for instance establishing a local supply chain. However, some initiatives have 
been set underway to involve local industry in the manufacturing of some non-
core elements of the satellite system.  
In the first successful initiative of its kind, the company ECA (Aeronautical 
Construction Enterprise) in Tafraoui/Oran was involved in the manufacture of 
some mechanical ground support equipment (MGSE) for Alsat-2 (e.g. transport 
container, vertical trolley, ballast, metal plate, collar ferrules and 
mechanical seal).14 The second attempt was less successful. ECA was involved 
in the manufacture of three on-board mechanical components (part of the 
satellite structure) and two MGSE components for Alsat-1B. In this batch, only 
one (on-board) component was delivered. The rest were either non-compliant 
with the timescale or non-compliant with space industry quality requirements.15   
Another local research centre (i.e. the Centre for Development of Advanced 
Technologies – CDTA/Algiers) was involved in the manufacture of some 
electrical ground support equipment (EGSE). However, this initiative was also 
unsuccessful due to non-compliance with the timescale on the part of CDTA.16   
In spite of such setbacks, interviewees17 involved in the outsourcing process 
consider that both ECA and CDTA have the requisite technical expertise. 
However, these companies need upgrading so as they comply with space 
industry quality requirements (e.g. specification definition, accuracy, traceability 
of measurements, test procedures), as well as an appropriate project 
management system. In this regard, ECA’s representatives18 have raised the 
need for more visibility vis-à-vis their future relationship with ASAL and the 
durability of ECA’s involvement in the space programme. It is a need for a 
proper assessment of the risks involved and a cost-benefit analysis.  
These concerns extend to the incentives offered and to the broader policy 
towards local actors and the building of a space-compliant national industry. 
They relate also to the mechanism used for technology transfer (and technology 
diffusion) from the Algerian space agency to local industrial actors.  
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7.1.2 Post-project learning - implementation of the ‘experiential 
learning model’ 
As mentioned earlier, Algeria’s strategy of small satellite technological 
capability-building takes a two-pronged approach: on the one hand, acquiring 
technology (or knowledge) from abroad by means of three successive 
collaborative projects (Alsat-1, Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B); on the other hand, 
diffusing technology locally and gradually in order to build local capabilities. The 
experiential learning model presented in chapter 4 (section 4.4) and 
implemented in this section aims to evaluate the level of local diffusion of 
acquired knowledge. In other words, it evaluates learning occurring after the 
projects, within the Algerian space agency and its environment, corresponding 
to the four learning levels: individual, group, organisation and inter-organisation. 
Engineers and scientists directly involved in the development of Alsat-1, Alsat-2, 
and Alsat-1B, are essentially those who possess the acquired knowledge.19 
This knowledge, which stems from ‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning by 
searching’, is supposedly enriched and converted through interactions (learning 
by interacting) into group opportunities and is then embedded and amplified in 
the context of the organisation and inter-organisation. 
a. Individual learning 
At the individual level, learning is effective when it combines action (learning by 
doing) and reflection (learning by searching).20 Individuals involved in satellite 
development largely agreed (78%) that a ‘fair’ combination of hands-on and 
theoretical knowledge was provided for each individual during the lifetime of the 
projects (Alsat-1, Alsat-2, and Alsat-1B).21 However, they almost unanimously 
(98%) deplored the imbalance in their assigned work activities since the 
conclusion of the projects. Indeed, 92% of them consider that their post-project 
activities were greatly oriented towards theoretical research without an eye to 
practical implementation (i.e. engineering aspects). Conversely, 6% consider 
that their post-project activities were oriented strictly towards engineering and 
exploitation. Only 2% found an acceptable balance between action and 
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reflection in their activities. The latter are mainly those who interacted with the 
satellite during its operational phase. 
Individuals from Alsat-1, and to a lesser extent from Alsat-2, as well as Alsat-1B 
did not employ (and still do not employ) the practical knowledge (i.e. 
development and engineering aspects) acquired during Alsat-1, Alsat-2 and 
Alsat-1B after these projects had ended. They recognise an erosion in the 
knowledge previously acquired.  
Alsat-1 individuals appear to be the most affected, as their practical experience 
dates back to 2000-2002. In addition, 36% of the Alsat-1 team gradually left 
ASAL after the project ending (mainly as a consequence of ‘brain drain’ to 
Western organisations).22 This was also reflected in the strong sense of 
‘unfinished business’ observed among Alsat-1 individuals.23 Indeed, as part of 
the Alsat-1 project, they, working alongside SSTL engineers, built two satellites; 
one which flew, and a second as a training model, brought back to Algeria after 
the project. Alsat-1 individuals regret that it was not possible to conduct 
experiments on it (or to ‘play’ with it) once back.24 This regret is understandable, 
as the best way to make learning effective and to accelerate its pace is to make 
skilful use of ‘playing’ (i.e. learning by playing, see chapter 2,              
subsection 2.4.5).25 This also likely reflects the relative risk-averse environment 
within CDS. It might also reflect individuals’ fear of reprisal should they make 
mistakes when experimenting or ‘playing’ with objects; to wit, around 49% of 
satellite team members believe that ASAL is a highly risk-averse organisation. 
With regard to the reflective component of learning (learning by searching), 
formal research and development is thought of as a significant enabler of 
learning by searching.26 However, its effectiveness is doubtful in the case under 
study, as many research projects are not directly linked to small satellite 
technology.27 Moreover, those related to small satellite technology do not go 
beyond the laboratory stage of development in terms of experimentation and 
simulation.28 This is also reflected in the absence of any proclivity for patenting 
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within the culture of CDS and even ASAL. No patent has yet been granted as a 
result of research activity within CDS.29  
In answering questions about the reasons behind, firstly, the imbalance 
between research and engineering activities and, secondly, the trend towards 
too much non-channelled research, interviewees cited several constraints. 
These relate mainly to: (i) lack of clear objectives, visibility and communication; 
(ii) lack of equipment and funds; (iii) ill-balanced incentives, as incentives for 
research activities greatly exceed those of engineering; and (iii) a deep 
misunderstanding of questions relating to property rights infringement and 
confidentiality and non-disclosure agreements signed when joining either ASAL 
or the project teams. These constraints have resulted in poor alignment of 
individual effort with the objectives of small satellite development. As some 
constraints directly affect the transformation of individual learning into collective 
learning, they are discussed further in the following sections.  
From the foregoing, it is clear that learning at the individual level is ineffective, 
as its purpose is not always aligned with organisational goals and the learning 
cycle is thus not completed. It does not combine action (learning by doing) and 
reflection (learning by searching). It is also alarming that the bulk of individuals 
previously involved in collaborative satellite projects are impacted by this 
ineffectiveness.  
Moreover, Kolb30 explains that combining action with reflection is not always a 
natural ability and individuals develop particular learning styles throughout their 
lives. Consequently, an unanswered question in the present study is whether 
individuals involved in satellite development always maintain the ability to 
combine action and reflection, acquired during the previous satellite projects, or 
whether they have subsequently developed an established style towards 
theoretical (or non-practical) learning, which is difficult to overcome.  
b. Group learning 
Group learning refers to knowledge held by the group as a whole and not by 
single individuals. As the rationale of the present evaluation is to trace 
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knowledge flow from its acquisition abroad to its diffusion locally, evaluation of 
group learning begins by evaluating the activities of the satellite project teams 
subsequent to project completion. The idea is to determine whether subsequent 
group knowledge is built on previous experience (i.e. Alsat-1, Alsat-2, and Alsat-
1B projects).  
- Project team activities subsequent to collaborative project completion 
The Alsat-1 team was virtually dismantled following completion of the project.1 
Its members were scattered across various organisational structures 
(departments and services in CTS and then CDS).31 They continued to support 
ASAL’s activities, such as specifying and evaluating Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B 
missions. However, no significant common goal in terms of satellite 
development (design or engineering) led them to reassemble again. It is 
problematic to talk about post-Alsat-1 group knowledge, irrespective of the 
nature of this knowledge (theoretical or practical).  
The Alsat-1B team finished building the satellite at the end of 2016, and the 
present study does not thoroughly examine its activity post-project. However, 
during the fieldwork conducted in April, May, July, and August of 2016, its 
members had been assigned new roles and been split between four separate 
organisational structures (departments).2 In this period the project was in its 
final phases, and team members already raised some concerns as to difficulties 
of interaction because of organisational boundaries. In addition, they had no 
clear visibility as to their future positions and missions.32 In this regard, lack of 
visibility and poor internal communication were recurrent issues raised by the 
majority of team members, irrespective of the project concerned.33 
The Alsat-2 team proved to be a special case. It was not easy to evaluate post-
Alsat-2 group knowledge because the Alsat-2 project had lasted a long time and 
                                            
1
 In addition, 36% of team members who gradually left ASAL after the project ending (mainly as a 
consequence of ‘brain drain’ to Western organisations). 
2
 33% of the team were assigned to two research departments (22% to the department of research in 
space instruments and 11% to the department of space mechanics). 45% were assigned to the 
department of engineering and 22% to the department of exploitation and operations.    
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the team had not been completely disbanded. The project started in 2006. The 
first satellite, Alsat-2A, was built and then launched in 2010. The second, Alsat-
2B, was integrated and then launched in September 2016.34 Consequently, the 
Alsat-2 team was more or less kept intact over the term of the Alsat-2 project.  
However, because of the serious delay (four years) in building integration 
facilities at Oran/Algeria,3 the team faced many periods of interruption.35  During 
these interruptions, team members were assigned new roles across three 
separate organisational structures (departments) within CDS. Two of these 
departments are of a more or less similar nature (engineering and AIT - 
assembly, integration and test), whilst the third is dedicated to satellite 
operations and exploitation. Meanwhile, 10% of team members left the group 
over the long duration of the project.36 Interruptions of group work, member 
turnover, and confinement into separate departments led inevitably to 
degradation of group knowledge previously acquired.37   
On the other hand, there is general agreement that the most valuable aspect of 
the Alsat-2 project was its long duration.38 Indeed, Alsat-2 members spent more 
than twice as much time in direct contact with the transferor as Alsat-1 and 
Alsat-1B members.4 This longer-term exposure to technology likely contributed 
positively to knowledge acquisition through “socialisation”5 and “combination”6, 
as described by Nonaka.39 Indeed, on a scale of 1-to-5, Alsat-2 members gave 
an average rating of 4.33 on the intensity of interaction with their mentors 
(against 3.18 for Alsat-1 and 3.92 for Alsat-1B). This might well be reflective of 
the degree of tacit knowledge acquired from their mentors (i.e. socialisation). 
Likewise, the longer exposure time may have enabled them to participate in 
authoring important documentation (i.e. combination) pertaining to the project 
                                            
3
 As Alsat-2B was integrated into CDS Oran/Algeria 
4
 Alsat-2 members spent 42 months at Airbus facilities (on average), whereas Alsat-1 and Alsat-1B 
members spent 16 and 17 months respectively at SSTL facilities (on average).   
5
 “socialisation” refers to the conversion of tacit knowledge held by individual to another tacit knowledge 
held by another individual (e.g. through on-the-job-training). 
6
  “combination” refers to the situation where an individual receives pieces of explicit knowledge from 




(e.g. reports, routines, test and quality procedures), which may be useful for 
future projects. The experience is partially ‘memorised’, as the documents 
(acquired from abroad or locally generated) are saved in a shared online 
database.  
Alsat-1 and Alsat-1B are both at lower levels of “socialisation” and 
“combination”. First, because the exposure time of the Algerian teams is 
shorter. Second, because the SSTL approach to building satellites is different 
than that of Airbus. SSTL adopts a more FBC7-like philosophy, with minimal 
documentation.40   
It is noteworthy that the three group memories built up during the projects 
remained isolated from one another (i.e. no project member had access to any 
other project’s database).41 Isolation was justified, inter alia, by considerations 
relating to the technology provider’s intellectual property rights and internal 
ASAL non-disclosure agreements signed by project members.42 The same 
considerations were brought up by interviewees when they were asked whether 
they have trained or mentored new engineers from ASAL.43 The 
misunderstanding of the scope of intellectual property rights appears to inhibit 
the diffusion of knowledge to local engineers.44   
It is clear from the above that discontinuities exist, in varying degrees, in the 
progression of teamwork based on consecutive teams’ experiences formed out 
of the Alsat-1, Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B projects. The question arises as to whether 
interrupted teamwork has been offset by countervailing forms of collective work 
(or group formation).  
- Are there any other group activities occurring?  
Two types of groups are identified in CDS: firstly, nine (09) thematic groups 
wherein individuals are gathered according to technological themes; and, 
secondly, four (04) ‘functional’ groups arrayed according to functional 
structure.45 These groups can be represented by reference to a matrix structure 
                                            
7
 FBC for Faster, Better, Cheaper 
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(Figure 7-9). Vertical solid lines represent the linear chain of command. 
Horizontal dotted lines represent the cross-functional relations among the 
various thematic groups. Black circles denote the number of personnel in each 
thematic group, including the functional authority.      
 
Figure 7-9: CDS group matrix (functional vs thematic groups) 
 




Six (06) out of nine (09) thematic groups are dedicated to research (i.e. learning 
by searching). Each research department hosts three groups (Figure 7-9). 
According to interviewees, very few cross-functional activities are conducted in 
terms of research.46 In addition, group activities are heavily slanted towards 
research which does not go beyond the laboratory stage (i.e. experimentation 
and simulation).47 In addition, group research foci are not clearly aligned with 
the objective of developing small satellites. Research groups interact (i.e. 
learning by interacting) with some university-based research teams (e.g. the 
universities of Oran-USTO, Sidi Belabes and Tlemcen). Two of these groups 
are instituted as part of the National Research Programme (PNR) overseen by 
the Algerian Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research.48   
The scarcity of Development and Engineering group activities is noticeable 
(Figure 7-9). The only engineering activity (i.e. learning by doing) worth 
mentioning is conducted by the Development and Engineering Ground Segment 
group.49 This particular group has been able to, firstly, align its activity with the 
objective of developing small satellites, and, secondly, to combine development 
and engineering skills in order to deliver some in-house technical solutions 
related to the ground segment.8 Paradoxically, in the small satellite collaborative 
projects contracted by ASAL, the focus of joint development and integration 
activities was on the space segments. The ground segments were acquired 
only for the exploitation of space segments. The proclivity for developing ground 
solutions after the completion of collaborative projects might relate to the fact 
that Development and Engineering Ground Segment group is in daily interaction 
(i.e. learning by interacting) with the satellite operation team because it is 
hosted by the Department of Operations and Exploitation.50  
To sum up, interactions between individuals resulted in the creation of nine (09) 
groups. Group components are virtually mono-departmental (almost every 
group’s members are from the same department). This likely reflects separate 
                                            
8
 The group is developing some ground segment equipment (e.g. demodulator, X-band downconverter, 
flight control calculator, telemetry processing software) 
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individual efforts (i.e. individual learning) being converted to group level efforts 
(i.e. group learning) within the same functional department. No significant cross-
functional group is identified, particularly between departments in charge of 
research and those in charge of development and engineering. This bespeaks 
the fact that groups do not include members with diverse learning styles.51  
Consequently, learning at research group level is not clearly aligned with the 
objective of developing small satellites. Moreover, learning is not effective 
because groups do not combine reflection (i.e. learning by searching) with 
action (i.e. learning by doing). Learning at Development and Engineering group 
level is aligned with the objective of developing small satellites. Interaction (i.e. 
learning by interaction) has facilitated alignment. However, the learning is not 
effective because the group does not combine reflection (i.e. learning by 
searching) with action (i.e. learning by doing). 
c. Organisational and inter-organisational learning 
Organisational learning is a system-level learning where all organisation 
members, be they individuals or groups, collectively use their capabilities in 
order to achieve organisational goals. The aim of the present subsection is to 
evaluate whether learning within CDS is converted to the organisational level. 
Emphasis is put on whether inter-group activities are intense enough to be 
considered as organisational.  
As mentioned earlier, no common objectives exist between the Alsat-1, Alsat-2 
and Alsat-1B project teams. The teams are virtually isolated from each other for 
reasons that relate, inter alia, to the technology provider’s intellectual property 
rights and internal non-disclosure agreements. Instead, CDS management have 
put in place a new organisational architecture based on nine (09) thematic 
groups and four (04) functional groups. 
Figure 7-9 shows that cross-functional activities are virtually non-existent. This 
is reflective of a significant dearth of interactions between functional groups (i.e. 
across organisational boundaries). With respect to thematic group interactions 
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(i.e. vertical interactions in Figure 7-9), the only interactions revealed are those 
occurring within the Department of Research in Space Mechanics, where 
groups in charge of data handling, mechanics and propulsion, and attitude 
control, undertake certain collaborative activities.52 These findings reveal once 
again the striking imbalance between research activities (i.e. learning by 
searching) and engineering activities (i.e. learning by doing) within CDS at inter-
group (or organisational) level.  
In addition, the findings reveal the ineffectiveness of the cross-functional and 
cross-thematic structure put in place at CDS (Figure 7-9). Such a matrix 
structure should fundamentally be built around the immediacy and intensity of 
interactions between groups (i.e. learning by interacting). However, interactions 
are missing. The inter-group coordination mission is shared between the CDS 
director and the internal scientific committee. The CDS director recognises his 
inability to coordinate effectively inter-group activities in view of the 
overwhelming weight of administrative and bureaucratic tasks.53 On the other 
hand, the scientific committee is not appropriate, as its mission is to steer 
activities at a relatively ‘high’ level, whereas no entity is there to handle day-to-
day coordination.54 One of the ideas proposed by an interviewee as a way to 
foster inter-group interaction is to appoint a manager in charge of technical and 
scientific coordination.55 This idea sits in accordance with what is commonly 
recommended in FBC-philosophy projects; namely, the appointment of a chief 
scientist or ‘principal investigator’.56 
From a Kolb-cycle perspective,57 CDS does not diversify its experience as its 
limited inter-group activity is oriented towards research. In addition, the clear 
lack of interaction jeopardises CDS’s ability to collectively integrate and interpret 
knowledge acquired from previous experience. Limited and isolated CDS 
engineering capabilities prevent the translation of knowledge into tangible 
outcomes. Consequently, CDS is not a learning organisation with regard to 
developing small satellites.  
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With respect to inter-organisational learning, CDS has been designated as the 
lead institution in Algeria charged with developing small satellite capabilities. A 
network of organisations is supposed to be built around CDS and contribute to 
the goal of satellite development. However, CDS as a unified and cohesive 
whole does not exist from a learning perspective, and is thus incapable of 
addressing learning cycles at the inter-organisational level.  
d. ‘Too’ many missing links for generating systemic learning 
Learning is systemic when processes occur at separate levels of aggregation 
and interrelate with each other. Shared experience is then built over time 
through dense and continuous interactions. In the case of CDS, there is 
evidence to suggest that two types of activity trigger off two distinct learning 
dynamics. The first is satellite collaborative projects with foreign companies. 
The Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B teams triggered interactions with one local partner 
regarding engineering issues (i.e. manufacturing mechanical components). 
These interactions were ‘exploitative-exploitative’,9 in the sense of the proposed 
‘experiential learning model’ (Table 7-3). These one-time actions ceased after 
project completion.58  
Table 7-3: Dialogue between project groups and the local partner 
General combinations Detailed combinations Dialogue between 
Exploitative-Exploitative 
Exploitative action-Exploitative action Nil 
Exploitative action-Exploitative reflection Nil 
Exploitative reflection-Exploitative action 
Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B groups, who mature 
the task conceptually (using mature design 
of the mechanical components) 
and  
Local partner ECA, who (regularly) 
performs practical tasks (regularly 
manufacturing mechanical components) 
Exploitative reflection-Exploitative reflection Nil 
Source: Author 
                                            
9
 Corresponding to the dialogue between a learner who (regularly) performs practical tasks (e.g. 
manufacturing tasks) or conceptually matures the tasks (e.g. mature design) and a learner who (regularly) 
performs practical tasks (e.g. manufacturing tasks) or conceptually matures the tasks (e.g. mature design) 
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The second activity was undertaken by CDS outside the collaborative projects. 
As illustrated in Figure 7-9, two communities of learners are formed. The 
community of engineers and the community of researchers (be they individuals 
or groups). Intra-engineers interactions are fledgling. These interactions are 
exploitative-exploitative, in the sense of the proposed ‘experiential learning 
model’ (Table 7-4). However, this community has virtually no interaction with its 
environment (inside and outside CDS). 
Table 7-4: Dialogue within engineering groups 
General combinations Detailed combinations Dialogue between 
Exploitative-Exploitative 
Exploitative action-Exploitative action 
Individuals within the group (development 
& engineering ground segment) on 
manufacturing (or practical 
implementation) aspects 
Exploitative action-Exploitative reflection 
 Individuals within the group (development 
& engineering ground segment) on 
manufacturing (or practical 
implementation) aspects and mature 
concepts (e.g. mature design) 
Exploitative reflection-Exploitative action 
Individuals within the group (development 
& engineering ground segment) on mature 
concepts (e.g. mature design) and 
manufacturing (or practical 
implementation) aspects 
Exploitative reflection-Exploitative reflection 
Individuals within the group (development 
& engineering ground segment) on mature 
concepts (e.g. mature design)  
Source: Author 
 
With respect to the community of researchers, intra-community interactions are 
emerging. Many research groups are active, but inter-group activities are still 
poorly developed. The community of researchers also continuously interacts 
with its external environment by conducting research with other communities of 
researchers (e.g. universities). Both intra- and inter-community interactions are 
not necessarily channelled towards small satellite development. They are 
predominantly ‘explorative-explorative’,10 in the sense of the proposed 
‘experiential learning model’ (Tables 7-5 and 7-6). 
 
                                            
10
 Corresponding to the dialogue between a learner who tests and explores practical tasks (e.g. laboratory 
experience) or conceptual ideas (e.g. research), and a learner who tests and explores practical tasks (e.g. 
laboratory experience) or conceptual ideas (e.g. research) 
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Table 7-5: Dialogue within research groups 
General combinations Detailed combinations Dialogue between 
Explorative-Explorative 
Explorative action-Explorative action 
Individuals within research groups (e.g. data 
handling, mechanics and propulsion, RF and 
Telecom) on laboratory experiences and 
simulations 
Explorative action-Explorative reflection 
Individuals within research groups (e.g. data 
handling, mechanics and propulsion, RF and 
Telecom) on laboratory experiences, 
simulations and theoretical research 
Explorative reflection –Explorative action 
Individuals within research groups (e.g. data 
handling, mechanics and propulsion, RF and 
Telecom) on theoretical research and 
laboratory experiences and simulations 
Explorative reflection-Explorative reflection 
Individuals within research groups (e.g. data 
handling, mechanics and propulsion, RF and 
Telecom) on theoretical research 
Source: Author 
Table 7-6: Dialogue of research groups with external communities of researchers 
General combinations Detailed combinations Dialogue between 
Explorative-Explorative 
Explorative action-Explorative action 
Research groups (e.g. data handling, 
mechanics and propulsion, RF and Telecom) 
and groups in universities (e.g. Oran-USTO, 
Sidi Belabes, Tlemcen) on laboratory 
experiences and simulations 
Explorative action-Explorative reflection 
 Research groups (e.g. data handling, 
mechanics and propulsion, RF and Telecom) 
and groups in universities (e.g. Oran-USTO, 
Sidi Belabes, Tlemcen) on laboratory 
experiences, simulations and theoretical 
research 
Explorative reflection –Explorative action 
Research groups (e.g. data handling, 
mechanics and propulsion, RF and Telecom) 
and groups in universities (e.g. Oran-USTO, 
Sidi Belabes, Tlemcen) on laboratory 
experiences, simulations and theoretical 
research 
Explorative reflection-Explorative reflection 
Research groups (e.g. data handling, 
mechanics and propulsion, RF and Telecom) 
and groups in universities (e.g. Oran-USTO, 
Sidi Belabes, Tlemcen) on theoretical 
research 
Source: Author 
In the development of small satellites in Algeria, it is clear from the above 
analysis that many links are missing for learning to be systemic. Considerable 
effort should be made towards linking learners at all levels of aggregation and 
through diversified combinations. 
e. Findings from implementation of the ‘Experiential learning model’ 
The application of the experiential learning model to evaluate learning occurring 




CDS acquired an initial knowledge from the satellite collaborative projects (i.e. 
Alsat-1, Alsat-2, and Alsat-1B). This inceptive knowledge is mainly integrative 
(or architectural), as detailed earlier in subsection 7.1.1 (knowledge flow model). 
It is noteworthy that integrative (or architectural) knowledge is organisational in 
nature.59 It is held by the organisation as a whole. After project completion, CDS 
does not exist as an organisational learning entity. The organisational 
arrangements set up in CDS are ineffective for acquiring and developing 
integrative (or architectural) knowledge. Learning is oriented towards 
components. Thematic (i.e. component-centred) activities prevail, whereas 
cross-thematic (or integrative) activities are non-existent. 
This situation can be described as non-alignment between the knowledge 
flowing from the collaborative projects and the knowledge that CDS attempts to 
create after completion of the collaborative projects (Figure 7-10). In other 
words, the integrative learning dynamic, triggered during the collaborative 
projects, is interrupted and diverted towards component-centred learning. 




7.2 Extent of locally built technological capability  
Evaluation of locally built small satellite technological capability was undertaken 
in two phases: firstly, identifying these capabilities; secondly, evaluating their 
levels of complexity (or sophistication). In accordance with the evaluation 
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framework proposed in the present study (chapter 4), micro-, meso-, and 
macro-level technological capabilities can be evaluated. For each level of 
analysis, the technological capabilities identified are embodied into physical 
investment (e.g. equipment, machinery, tools, and physical facilities), human 
capital (e.g. skills, experience, wisdom), information (e.g. documentation, 
process specification, procedures, concepts, theories, observations), and 
management capabilities (e.g. planning, organising, motivating, incentivising, 
commitment).  
These capabilities interact. Physical investment is developed, installed and 
operated by human capital. Human capital is guided by information which is 
maintained and updated by human capital. Physical investment, human capital 
and information are brought together through management capabilities. 
Technological capabilities are then characterised in terms of degrees (i.e. 
basic/simple, intermediate, or advanced) of sophistication (or complexity). 
Satellite development is usually conducted though phases. These phases are 
gathered in three broad categories: specification & design, engineering & AIT 
(assembly, integration and testing), and operations & exploitation. Data 
collected from interviews and in situ observations reveal that in terms of satellite 
operations & exploitation, ASAL (or CDS) has progressively built the physical 
investment, human capital, information, and the required management 
capabilities to enable local engineers to operate and exploit the satellite 
independently and effectively.60  
By contrast, further data reveal the paradoxical status of these capabilities when 
it comes to specifying and designing small satellites. Algerian engineers have 
steadily built a slew of capabilities required for satellite system specification.61 
More than two thirds of engineers interviewed contend that these capabilities 
are basic. Additionally, there is an almost complete consensus on the non-
existence of satellite design capabilities (e.g. physical resources, human capital, 
information, and management).62 Indeed, no Algerian engineers took part in the 
design phase of the collaborative projects (i.e. Alsat-1, Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B). 
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They generally worked on mature technologies inherited from previous 
approved designs. Moreover, no local effort has been made to advance this 
aspect after completion of the collaborative projects.  
The paradox is that ASAL’s emphasis during the collaborative projects was on 
developing integrative (or architectural) knowledge (subsection 7.1.1). 
Architectural knowledge originates from knowledge on how the product is 
designed.63 This means that building architectural knowledge is largely 
explained by the birth phase of this knowledge, which is the design phase, but 
ASAL virtually overlooked these capabilities. 
With respect to engineering & AIT activities, the bulk of physical investment has 
been dedicated to AIT activities. Relatively ‘heavy’ AIT facilities have been 
installed in CDS (i.e. AIT clean room and thermal chambers) along with certain 
accompanying equipment.64 Other ‘heavy’ AIT facilities have not been installed 
(e.g. electromagnetic and acoustic compatibility) and associated activities are 
supposed to be outsourced abroad. By contrast, a significant amount of ‘light’ 
equipment (e.g. tools and small electronic equipment) is missing. This 
equipment is used in both engineering and AIT activities. It turned out that 
despite the fact that this equipment is ‘simple’ and ‘light’, it has an impact on the 
whole of the engineering and AIT activities. This is reflective of the paradoxical 
situation surrounding the physical investment relating to engineering & AIT 
activities. The organisation achieved the more challenging primary investment 
but had difficulties in achieving a complementary and, indeed, ‘simpler’ 
investment. This handicap has negatively affected the development of 
engineering activities, as explained in subsection 7.1.2. 
Issues relating to information capabilities (e.g. documentation) have been 
addressed above (subsection 7.1.2). As has been discussed, separate project 
memories were built but remained isolated from one another. Consequently, 
information capabilities were partially built, but they have not reached the 
organisational level. What is evident from the fieldwork is that building a 
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dynamic, interactive organisational memory dedicated to satellite technology is 
not a priority.65 
Where human capital in engineering & AIT activities is concerned, CDS suffers 
an imbalance in its human resources. Approximately 80% of resources are 
earmarked for research and only 20% for engineering.66 There is an increasing 
awareness about this issue and the need to ‘reverse’ the situation.67 Several 
actions (i.e. recruitment and training) have been implemented with the aim of 
bolstering human engineering resources; however, they have foundered on the 
issue of incentives. CDS personnel generally lean towards a research career, 
as the incentives of research greatly exceed those of engineering. A senior 
researcher’s salary can be three times higher than the salary of an engineer 
(with the same number of years’ service).68 This serious imbalance arises out of 
a more general imbalance relating to the national public sector. Researchers on 
the government payroll have a more rewarding legal status (i.e. career profile 
and remuneration package) as compared to engineers of the same ilk. CDS 
researchers greatly prize this status. For instance, 68% of engineers who took 
part in the collaborative projects are now either a PhD-holder or pursuing PhD 
studies, with the intention of engaging in a research career afterwards.69 
Interviewees at high-level management confirmed that initiatives are underway 
to create an appropriate status for engineers.70  
Faced with this multitude of deficiencies in engineering activities, interviewees 
in mid- and high-level management demonstrated awareness that bringing in 
other Algerian engineering organisations (by developing a local supply chain) 
could be a way to overcome obstacles.71 They consider that it is difficult to 
identify organisations in the local industrial environment having capabilities that 
are compliant with satellite industry requirements. Consequently, any action 
should be preceded by a thorough audit of this environment.11  
                                            
11
 It is worth noting that the company (ECA) which was involved in the manufacture of mechanical 
components for Alsat-2 and Alsat-1B was identified through a limited audit undertaken by ASAL in 2008. 
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Interviewees argue that there is no clear and explicit strategy towards achieving 
such objectives. Reasons given often refer to a country-specific non-conducive 
environment (e.g. bureaucracy, procurement regulation, and cumbersome 
procedures). Interviewees also recognise that current managerial and 
organisational capabilities in ASAL and CDS are not comparable with those 
attained in the realms of physical investment, human resources and information 
handling.  
This highlights the centrality of building internal managerial capabilities once 
again. Indeed, physical investment, human capital and information handling are 
brought together through management capabilities. The country-specific non-
conducive environment (discussed in chapter 6) should not distract ASAL from 
taking a critical look at its internal managerial capabilities. Indeed, building 
internal managerial capability offers increased flexibility in managing the 
challenging external environment.72 
7.2.1 Centrality of management capabilities 
The evaluation of management capabilities is conducted by comparing the 
management practices of ASAL and CDS with those acknowledged to be the 
best available management practices in small satellite and complex system 
development. Because the development of such technological systems hinges 
largely on team performance (chapter 3, section 3.5), the management 
practices examined below are twofold: (i) team-level; and (ii) organisational-
level management practices. In small satellite technology, the organisation is 
expected to provide the appropriate environment; however, the team leads the 
development.73 The twin challenge lies in confidence building at the 
organisation-team interface that then leads to team empowerment.  
As noted earlier (subsection 7.1.2), CDS has considerable difficulties putting in 
place cross-functional teams that can address multiple small satellite 
requirements. It is therefore difficult to tackle empowerment at team level. For 
this reason, the proposed evaluation looks at empowerment at lower levels of 
management. This should reflect empowerment practices in CDS and ASAL.  
268 
 
The starting point for the evaluation is the paradoxical case highlighted earlier 
concerning physical investment in engineering & AIT activities. CDS/ASAL 
demonstrate relative success in realising primary (or ‘heavy’) investments, 
whereas they are able to show only limited results in terms of simple (or ‘light’) 
investment. According to interviewees74 and field observation, primary 
investments were relatively successful because particular attention was paid to 
them by upper-level management. By contrast, ‘simpler’ investments, which are 
generally left to lower levels of management, suffer from many deficiencies in 
implementation. This rather suggests that empowerment of lower levels of 
management is limited.  
Contrary to recommendations for empowerment of teams and lower levels of 
management, ASAL is a highly centralised organisation when it comes to 
managing small satellite development. Despite the fact that CDS is located in 
Oran and is the host organisation for this activity, ASAL, the parent 
organisation, located in Algiers (about 400 km from Oran), still overmanages 
and micromanages the ongoing CDS collaborative projects. This situation could 
have been justified 10 or 15 years ago, at the beginning of Algeria’s satellite 
programme, when ‘decentralised’ resources were missing. However, it can no 
longer be justified, as the required resources are now available within CDS, 
and, paradoxically, the entity which manages these projects in the parent 
organisation (i.e. ASAL) itself lacks the appropriate resources.75  
According to interviewees, there is a need to build mutual confidence across 
ASAL-CDS prior to addressing CDS-team relationships.76 This situation is 
further complicated by a general lack of clear objectives, visibility and 
communication between CDS and ASAL.77 The situation is replicated within 
CDS, where nearly all interviewees (96%) deplore the confusion and blurriness 
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surrounding their activities.78 As a consequence, their commitment and 
motivation to engage productively in satellite development has decreased.12  
ASAL’s emphasis on primary and ‘heavy’ investment to the detriment of simple 
and ‘light’ investment mirrors its failure to empower lower levels of 
management. Moreover, it might be grounded in the misconception that ‘heavy’ 
investment is more important than ‘light’ investment. This misconception can 
potentially have dire consequences for the whole satellite programme. It is 
necessary to recall that traditionally in small satellite projects, modest additional 
resources (or investments) improve performance significantly, whereas 
significant additional resources impact performance only modestly.79  
This misconception was revealed during the fieldwork as a bifurcation of 
opinions on the question of how CDS/ASAL should build satellites.13 There are 
proponents of the SSTL way of building satellites, who are in favour of an FBC-
like philosophy (i.e. limited resources, minimal documentation, small teams, 
extensive use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) components and high vertical 
integration). On the other hand, proponents of the Airbus way rely more on 
‘heavy’ investment (i.e. bespoke solutions, extensive documentation, large 
teams and a large network of subcontractors).  
To prevent further confusion, greater clarity is needed regarding ASAL’s 
strategy for building satellites, and, over and above that, clarity regarding the 
goals of satellite development. One set of strategies are usually leveraged when 
the prevailing goal is ‘technology application’; they aim at fostering downstream 
activities through, for instance, promoting satellite image utilisation. Other 
strategies are adopted when the prevailing goal is ‘technological learning’; for 
example, fostering design, manufacture and integration of satellite systems 
(wherein learning how to build satellites is a priority).  
                                            
12
 On a scale of 1-to-5, the members of satellite projects interviewed gave an average rating of 3.93 for 
their motivation during the fieldwork (i.e. after the projects), as against 4.81 before engaging in the 
projects.  
13
 70% of interviewees are of the view that ASAL should adopt the SSTL way of building satellites, 
whereas 30% prefer the Airbus way.  
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The confusion around high-level management goals is evident from Table 7-7. 
One interviewee at this level reckoned that the priority when making use of 
successive collaborative projects was technology application.80 Another felt that 
the priority was technological learning.81 Two of the interviewees82 could not 
identify a priority and five83 considered that both goals were being pursued. 
However, the bulk of the interviewees (seven out of nine) pointed out that goal 
priorities were not made explicit.  
 
Table 7-7: Collaborative project goals 
collaborative project goal priority 
Number of interviewees  
(high-level management) 
Technology application 1/9 (11%) 
Technology learning 1/9 (11%) 
Technology application and technology 
learning 
5/9 (56%) 
Not known 2/9 (22%) 
Source: Author 
The goal confusion has resulted in confusion as to which risk management 
approach to adopt. Indeed, when downstream activities or technology 
application are predominant, a highly risk-averse attitude is generally observed, 
reflecting the organisation’s commitment to end-users (e.g. the absolute need to 
deliver images to users). On the other hand, when technological learning is 
preferred, higher risk is generally accepted as individuals are still building 
capabilities and skills. When both are promoted, it is difficult to convey clear 
guidelines to lower management levels, researchers and engineers with regard 
to the definition of risk margins. This absence of clarity is an inhibiting factor, 
since 49% of team members interviewed believe that ASAL is a highly risk-
averse organisation where risk taking is not rewarded.84  
Other management deficiencies were also identified. Indeed, it is recognised in 
small satellite projects that organisational responsiveness to lower levels of 
management and to project teams should be good enough to deliver resources 
whenever needed, rather than loading them with extra-resources. This is 
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facilitated by an a priori building of a reservoir of resources.85 Data collected on 
the critical aspect of human resources reveal the poor performance of ASAL 
and CDS in spite of their accumulated experience. For instance, members of 
the Alsat-1 project were informed of their selection only three weeks (on 
average) before the project kick-off. Alsat-2 members were informed three 
months before, whereas Alsat-1B members were informed two months before. 
Such durations are deemed insufficient for appropriate preparation.86      
Data collected reveal a severe lack of project management training. All 
interviewees involved in project management tasks state that they have had 
little or no formal training in management tools (e.g. scheduling and budgeting), 
and had learnt ‘on-the-job’.87 Similar findings hold regarding communication 
skills and communication tools. The interactional deficiencies mentioned in 
subsection 7.1.2 result partly from communication shortfalls.   
Moreover, a severe lack of ‘best practice’ awareness is revealed with regard to 
small satellite or complex technology management, such as: (i) the separation 
between project management tasks and system engineering tasks; (ii) the need 
to formally and explicitly manage individuals and groups who hold knowledge 
(particularly tacit knowledge) by pinpointing them and by attributing value to 
their work; (iii) the need to put in place learning routines; (iv) the need to 
implement a quality assurance approach that relaxes or eliminates bureaucratic 
procedures.88      
Despite the many challenges faced by CDS and ASAL due to their severe lack 
of management skills and capabilities, no clear strategies seem to have been 
adopted to address these issues.89  This situation reflects the chronic lack of 
awareness of the preeminent role of management in developing satellite 
capabilities. Despite the significance of ASAL’s investment and the relative 
achievements, efforts remain fragmented and non-channelled.  
To sum up, the evaluation reveals a significant number of paradoxical 
situations. For instance, the acquisition of integrative (or architectural) 
knowledge and the overlooking of knowledge that relates to design, upon which 
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integrative knowledge is in turn developed. Realising primary and ‘heavy’ 
investments and failing to realise complementary and ‘simpler’ investments. 
Over-investing in research capabilities and under-investing in engineering and 
development capabilities.14 These fragmented efforts led ASAL to build a 
heterogeneous set of capabilities. These non-systemic capabilities have 
prevented ASAL from going beyond the simple (basic) use of technology, 
realising neither development (i.e. intermediate level) nor innovation (i.e. 
advanced level) activities. 
The above findings affirm the sagacity of Drucker’s argument that management 
creates capabilities and that capabilities are the result of management. These 
findings particularly recall his famous quote, “There are no ‘underdeveloped 
countries’. There are only ’undermanaged’ ones”.90 
7.3 Evaluation at the nexus between transferor and transferee  
The previous section evaluated locally built small satellite technological 
capabilities. It addressed factors which are endogenous to ASAL’s local context. 
The present section complements the previous by siting the evaluation at the 
transferor-transferee interface – applying metrics involving factors that are 
exogenous to the local context. Metrics are examined at three levels of analysis, 
micro, meso and macro. 
Transferred technology is examined from different technological components: 
physical investment, human capital, information handling, and management 
capabilities. As mentioned previously (section 7.2), ASAL has imported a 
substantial number of physical components and units of equipment from 
abroad, ranging from basic, ‘light’ and micro-level equipment to sophisticated, 
‘heavy’ and macro-level equipment. As small satellite technology is usually 
readily accessible on the international market, no noticeable restrictions were 
                                            
14
 In contradiction to the sequence ‘engineering, development, and research’ which should be used by 
developing countries when building technological capabilities. Kim, L., 1997. Imitation to Innovation: The 
Dynamics of Korea's Technological Learning. Harvard Business School Press, p.90. 
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faced by ASAL regarding its transfer to Algeria. Even if the sale of certain items 
is subject to restrictive regimes,15 alternatives are generally available in the 
marketplace.91  
Data collected reveal that information transferred from abroad (i.e. 
documentation and procedures) is either limited (basic)92 or specific to the 
satellite system developed. It pertains, first of all, to documentation required for 
the exploitation of the system. Other documentation that essentially relates to 
test procedures and results for particular systems and subsystems was also 
transferred. The latter have a bearing on system integration. Beyond the 
immediate system and specific context, this documentation is not of great 
value.93 Participants in the satellite projects insist on the need for producing 
local documentation tied in to a locally developed system.94 However, they 
recognise that transferred documentation can inspire or guide the production of 
locally generated documentation. 
Unlike physical investment, and, to a lesser extent information (e.g. 
documentation), human capital and management capabilities cannot easily be 
transferred, as they are heavily dependent on indigenous considerations. 
Despite the centrality of management capabilities, ASAL has not parlayed 
collaborative projects in support of local management capability-building efforts. 
As outlined above, interviewees involved in project management tasks state 
that they had no formal management training on satellite projects.95 
As to human capital, ASAL’s engineers have had the opportunity to acquire 
academic and hands-on knowledge from abroad. Little was acquired in the way 
of satellite design, since foreign companies are very protective of this 
knowledge due to its paramount importance to their survivability. Moreover, 
ASAL and CDS interviewees contend that transferors adopted a variety of 
stances when conveying technology.96 From a flexible stance regarding transfer 
of technology that has been exploited up to its limits, and could therefore be 
                                            
15
 such as ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) and EAR (Export Administration Regulations). 
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transferred without risk,16 to a rigid stance when it came to transferring new and 
advanced technology – by limiting the extent of training provided.17 For the 
latter, implicit restrictions were set out, for instance, through limiting the number 
of Algerian participants receiving training on particular subsystems, and through 
shortening their exposure time to particular technologies.  
According to ASAL interviewees, different transferor stances, which are a 
function of the variety of technologies used, each with a specific degree of 
maturity, mean that no one-size-fits-all solution can be adopted to acquire 
technology, and there is a need to be more selective when targeting 
technologies for acquisition.97 The interviewees did not indicate what selection 
should be made (e.g. which technology or subsystem ought to be targeted). On 
the other hand, they emphasise that restrictions and varying degrees of 
transferor versatility fully justify the utility of the local learning effort in leveraging 
the transferred asset.98 However, the interviewees did not indicate where the 
focus needed to be in terms of local engineering, development and research 
efforts to assist maximally in acquiring the variety of technologies used.99 In 
other words, data collected reveal ASAL’s confusion in formulating a learning 
strategy for acquiring technology which is composed of ‘sub-technologies’ at 
various degrees of maturity. The same confusion has been identified by 
transferor representatives.100 
7.3.1 Transferor-transferee mutual understanding 
From the foregoing, it is clear that transferor-transferee mutual understanding 
primarily hinges on the capacity of the two parties to identify a shared view of 
‘learning’ during projects, based on mutual interests. However, in the context of 
technology transfer from developed to developing countries, the transferor’s 
motives are economic, whereas the transferee’s motives are primarily non-
economic. The latter aim to acquire new knowledge for building local 
                                            
16
 53.13% of interviewees believe that technology conveyed has been exploited up to its limits and can be 
transferred without any risk. 
17




capabilities. Consequently, another fundamental question needs to be posed 
during evaluation: to what extent is knowledge transfer affected by non-
alignment of objectives? 
Transferor-transferee exchanges occur predominantly during the lifetime of the 
project. The proposed approach is thus to look at the strategic objective of 
‘learning’ during the project – through the joint management mechanism 
adopted by both ASAL and foreign companies. The management mechanism is 
“fostered around project goals and paced by the project life cycle”. 101 The 
project cycle V model (chapter 3, section 3.5) is then used to frame the 
evaluation of the mutual understanding of ‘learning’ from the perspective of both 
the transferor and transferee.  
Traditionally, the project cycle captures three congruent aspects of the project; 
namely, the business, budget, and technical aspects. However, it should not be 
used as a generic tool. It should be customised (or tailored) according to the 
strategic objectives of the project and the tactical approaches adopted for 
achieving those objectives.102 As the strategic objective under evaluation in the 
present study is ‘learning’, the V model is tailored accordingly.  
The first step of tailoring is to select the appropriate period that is relevant for 
the ‘learning’ objective. The traditional phases of satellite projects are used for 
this purpose (Figure 7-11): mission analysis/needs identification, feasibility, 
preliminary definition, detailed definition, manufacturing (or procurement), 
assembly and testing, launch and operation of the system, and disposal. 103   
The second step in tailoring is to mark the decision gates (or milestones) and 
the associated phases that are relevant for ‘learning’ (i.e. LEM for Learning 
Evaluation Milestones in Figure 7-11).  
The third step is to identify project deliverables and associated metrics that 
must evidence learning at the end of each phase. The final step is to identify 










Learning Evaluation Milestones (LEM) are interim milestones wherein transfer 
of knowledge should be evaluated by the transferee. For instance, in LEM 1 
(Figure 7-11), the emphasis is on evaluating learning to conduct a mission 
analysis, identify needs, and translate them into a technological system. In LEM 
2 and LEM 3, the emphasis is on metrics measuring integrative knowledge (e.g. 
system engineering function, skills, software, equipment, facilities, 
documentation) and component knowledge (e.g. the subsystem involved, skills, 
software, equipment, facilities, documentation) required for designing the whole 
system.104 At this level, capabilities of the local acquirer should be evaluated 
and this yields an evaluation of local value. In LEM 3 and LEM 4, the emphasis 
is on designing subsystems. With regards to local value, actors involved are 
those at the lower level in the supply chain. The same rationale applies at each 
of the Learning Evaluation Milestones in both legs of the V model (Figure 7-11): 




During the fieldwork, emphasis was put on whether the strategic objective of 
‘learning’ was explicitly recognised all throughout the project phases. This 
should be reflected in whether each phase has an explicit learning objective, 
whether the metrics for evaluating learning are known, whether deliverables that 
evidence learning are understood and tasks required for producing the 
deliverables are explicitly defined. Table 7-8 summarises degree of explicitness 
(i.e. explicit, moderately explicit, lowly explicit, non-explicit) revealed by 
participants in the collaborative projects.105  
Algerian engineers did not participate in the project design phase and instead 
mainly worked on technologies inherited from previous approved designs.106 
Consequently, learning as part of the design/decomposition and definition 
phases (i.e. left leg of the V model in Figure 7-11) is overlooked. An exception 
has been made for the first phase (i.e. mission analysis/needs identification in 
Table 7-8) where learning is explicit or moderately explicit as an objective. 
Learning in the final phase (disposal) is explicit. This is reflective of the 
importance given by ASAL to building capabilities that enable local engineers to 
independently operate satellites.107 On the other hand, learning aspects in the 
prior phases (i.e. manufacturing (or procurement), assembly and testing, and 
launch and operations) are either non-explicit or not explicit enough (i.e. lowly or 
moderately explicit). For instance, during manufacturing, assembly and testing, 
work packages were used to guide the actions to be undertaken by Algerian 
engineers during the projects. These work packages, which are supposed to 
trace the road map for learning, were: (i) sometimes not understood; (ii) 
deemed very general and not detailed enough; or (iii) too narrowly oriented 
towards rather specialised aspects; or (iv) not properly balanced (i.e. fostering 
neither theoretical nor practical aspects); or (v) disregarding of the prior 
knowledge of learners; or even (vi) dependent upon the transferor’s willingness 






Table 7-8: Learning objective during collaborative projects 


















Explicit Moderately explicit Moderately explicit Moderately explicit 
Feasibility N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Preliminary 
Definition 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Detailed 
Definition 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Manufacturing 
(or procurement) 
Lowly explicit Non-explicit Non-explicit Non-explicit 
Assembly and 
Testing 
Lowly explicit Moderately explicit Moderately explicit Moderately explicit 
Launch and 
operations  
Lowly explicit Non-explicit Non-explicit Non-explicit 
Disposal Explicit Explicit Explicit Explicit 
N/A: Mentioned when learning is completely not considered 
Source: Author. 
 
In addition, interviews with higher levels of management109 and with foreign 
company representatives revealed that less attention was paid to learning as an 
objective at interim milestones. According to foreign company representatives, 
the disparity in the prior knowledge of Algerian engineers made it difficult to 
thoroughly devise and evaluate a homogeneous and detailed learning 
programme.110   
Consequently, at the interim milestones, learning strategy and tactics were 
rarely examined, and risks and opportunities related to learning were rarely 
assessed. Additionally, learning objectives and schedules were not often re-
examined or adjusted. Learning via networking between individuals, groups and 
organisations was also not often discussed or facilitated. 
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The author reviewed the minutes of meetings relating to milestones in the Alsat-
2 and Alsat-1B projects,18 and attended three meetings of the Alsat-1B 
project.19 The author noted that learning as an objective was rarely examined. 
The bulk of discussions or actions were centred around technical aspects and 
scheduling.  
According to interviewees,111 a detailed project learning plan was insufficiently 
addressed. The reason given is that it would be a difficult task given the wide 
range of uncertainties and changes faced. It is apt to highlight that the Algerian 
attitude towards a detailed learning plan runs contrary to the adage: ‘The harder 
it is to plan, the more you need to’.  
Evidence gathered, and represented by the shaded areas in Table 7-8, 
suggests that ASAL assessed learning more through a summative perspective, 
with an emphasis on final and tangible outcomes and results. In other words, 
the learning processes within the project were addressed as a black box, where 
the emphasis is on outcomes. However, learning in such projects is often a long 
and laborious process, and rarely produces swift, tangible outputs. Therefore, 
Algeria’s small satellite projects do not easily lend themselves to traditional 
evaluation based on the ‘instrumental’ use of outcomes. Such evaluation 
approaches cause distorted perceptions of the transfer process, preventing 
deep understanding and the adoption of appropriate measures for enhancing 
transfer. 
Even though learning should have been the strategic objective of ASAL, it is 
clear from the foregoing that it was not the driving force behind the projects. It is 
likely that other aspects (i.e. technical, cost-related and scheduling) prevailed. 
These other aspects are reflecting the prevalence of foreign partner’s strategic 
objectives. Consequently, the initial non-alignment of objectives led to the 
                                            
18
 Examples: Minutes of Preliminary Design Review-PDR, Critical Design Review-CDR of Alsat-2 and 
Alsat-1B. 
19
 Preliminary Design Review-PDR held in SSTL/UK on 25-28 November 2014. 
Module Readiness Review-MRR held in SSTL/UK on 26-31 November 2015. 
In-Orbit Commissioning Review 17-20 July 2017. 
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adoption of management tools (i.e. project cycle) that serve the interests of 
foreign companies more than those of ASAL. This often resulted in an uneasy, 
conflicting, relationship between ASAL and its foreign partners.112 
The prevalence of non-learning objectives goes a long way towards explaining 
the ambivalent management perspective within CDS and ASAL on learning 
performance. Interviewees from all management levels expressed a sense of 
frustration and dissatisfaction over this inability to overcome learning barriers 
after three attempts (i.e. Alsat-1, Alsat-2, and Alsat-1B).113 They argued that 
some of the reasons are domestic, whereas others relate to the transferor’s lack 
of willingness to fully transfer technology. No clear approach was observed 
during the fieldwork as to how ASAL should address learning when objectives 
are not aligned.  
7.3.2 Other factors impacting on transferor-transferee linkages  
As the evidence suggests, management tools used by ASAL during the projects 
do not prioritise transferee learning objectives. This prompts questions about 
the appropriateness of ASAL’s other management practices during the projects, 
and whether they foster the building of sound linkages between ASAL and 
foreign companies.  
Mutual understanding between ASAL and foreign companies is also a matter of 
negotiation balance. This largely hinges on the prior knowledge of ASAL, its 
international experience and the market (whether it is a buyer or a supplier 
market).  
The analysis of the effects of transferee absorptive capacity on knowledge flow 
(subsection 7.1.1) shows that ASAL increased its prior technological knowledge 
over time and over the projects’ timeline. ASAL’s international experience 
increased after three collaborative projects. ASAL’s interviewees recalled 
differences in ways of building satellites between SSTL and Airbus. They 
pointed out that the diversification of foreign partners brought diversity of 
international experience.114 These interviewees highlighted, for instance, the 
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importance of the human dimension when it comes to SSTL (i.e. a small 
company), and the importance of administrative procedures when it comes to 
Airbus (i.e. a large company).  
In addition, ASAL’s interviewees stressed that the diversification of international 
experience offered broader perspectives and greater bargaining power in a 
market which is dominated by a few suppliers.115 However, they expressed 
concerns about the future, as large companies such as Airbus perceive a threat 
in the emergence of smaller companies, such as SSTL. To address this threat, 
Airbus, for instance, acquired SSTL in 2008. The effect of this acquisition has 
been felt by ASAL. ASAL’s interviewees pointed out the relative ease with which 
ASAL used to collaborate with SSTL during the Alsat-1 project when SSTL was 
an independent company. They explained that this ease in collaboration was no 
longer present to the same extent during the Alsat-1B project, as SSTL had 
become part of Airbus. Collaboration has become ‘heavier’ and dominated by 
administrative procedures and contractual clauses.116 Moreover, ASAL’s 
interviewees expressed concerns about the consequences of this trend in terms 
of further limiting their bargaining power and rendering relationships with 
suppliers difficult.117 No clear strategy was observed during the fieldwork as to 
how ASAL should address such a trend in the international market.118  
For a better understanding of the relationship between ASAL and foreign 
companies, the former should enhance management practices to overcome 
cultural barriers. Given the complexity of the cultural construct, the present 
evaluation has only looked at a subset of factors that influence mutual ‘cultural’ 
understanding. For instance, in the projects conducted with SSTL-UK (i.e. Alsat-
1 and Alsat-1B), English as the working language made communication difficult 
between the Algerian engineers and their counterparts from SSTL. Not to 
mention the difficulties in relationships caused by the idiosyncrasies of 
personality type.119 Project managers, even foreign company representatives, 
expressed concern about the selection process for the engineers and stressed 
the need to improve it. In addition to appropriate language training, ASAL’s 
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project managers suggested the need to introduce psycho-technical tests for 
team members.  
7.3.3 Appropriateness of the technology transfer mechanism  
ASAL used collaborative projects as a mechanism for learning how to develop 
satellites. The mechanism offered ASAL’s engineers a combination of 
theoretical and hands-on technical training. Projects were led by foreign 
companies. Algerians did not have effective project control. Consequently, the 
central aspect in the management of satellite development was under-explored 
by Algerian teams. This is reflected through the way risk was managed. 
Because contractual responsibility lies primarily with the supplier, the common 
practice of ASAL representatives was to transfer risk to foreign companies. 
ASAL was involved, guided some decisions, provided inputs, but was not 
primarily responsible for the final product.20  
As mentioned above, satellites were built using technologies inherited from 
previous approved designs. The satellite design aspect was not covered by this 
transfer mechanism,120 and Algerians could not develop technical and 
managerial skills related to design. Yet the primary significance of the design 
phase is in acquiring long-lasting architectural knowledge and gaining creative 
independence (see section 7.2). 
As explained above (section 7.3), learning turns out not to have been the main 
thrust of the transfer mechanism. As the projects were led by foreign 
companies, aspects which are more relevant to foreign companies (i.e. 
technical, cost-related and scheduling) prevailed. In addition, the mechanism 
used did not allow proper monitoring and assessment of learning due to the 
management tools adopted. Difficulties increased as the bulk of the projects 
were conducted at supplier facilities (i.e. UK or France), far away from ASAL 
management. 
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This distance isolated the Algerian participants technologically from their local 
environment. Project emphasis was placed on these participants only. Projects 
did not involve other local actors in Algeria. Consequently, the learning effort 
fostered during the projects (known also as discontinuous learning under 
crisis)121 ceased at the end of the projects. The mechanism used lacks 
connectivity with post-crisis learning.  
 
To sum up, the previous and the present chapters have respectively analysed 
the context and the planning as well as implementation of the small satellite 
capability-building programme in Algeria. The analysis has revealed mixed 
results for this programme in all its aspects (i.e. embedment in the Algerian 
context, planning and implementation). These results, which affect a wide range 
of issues, are presented in the following chapter through a set of conclusions 
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8 Chapter 8: Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Summary 
The purpose of this study has been to evaluate the small satellite capability-
building programme in Algeria. In the context of developing countries, 
technological development usually involves two categories of factors: those 
exogenous and those endogenous to the host country. Exogenous factors are 
those factors that mediate the transfer of technology from abroad. Such factors 
are grouped under the body of knowledge called ‘technology transfer’. 
Endogenous factors, on the other hand, are those impacting local efforts to 
acquire the transferred technology, and indigenise it. These factors are grouped 
under the body of knowledge called ‘technological capability-building’. 
The technology transfer or technological capability-building debate in 
developing countries is traditionally dominated by market perspectives and 
largely informed by mono-dimensional economic approaches. Indeed, the 
debate builds on cases where transferor economic (i.e. business oriented) 
motives are in alignment with transferee economic motives. 
This market perspective is deemed inappropriate for the purposes of the 
present study, which investigates technology transfer to Algeria of small satellite 
technology used in Earth observation satellites. Internationally this technology 
generates only modest profit, and its market is not yet well developed. 
Therefore, its exploitation cannot easily be justified in economic terms. By 
investing in small satellite technology, the Algerian Space Agency, unlike its 
foreign partners (i.e. technology transferors), is driven by developmental and 
non-economic goals. 
In the current era, development, including technological development, is a 
knowledge-centred process. Transferring and indigenising technology is 
tantamount to acquiring and diffusing knowledge. In simple terms, it is a 
learning process. Accordingly, a knowledge-oriented stance has been adopted, 
placing the evaluation of technological learning at the heart of the present 
293 
 
thesis. The learning perspective has been substantiated (i.e. triangulated) by 
theoretical perspectives stemming from two other bodies of knowledge: 
technology transfer and technological capability-building. 
The study has revealed that technological capability-building through 
technology transfer involves factors that are categorised at individual and team 
level (i.e. micro level), organisational level (i.e. meso level), and sectoral, 
national and international level (i.e. macro level). Macro considerations are 
insufficiently treated by the above mentioned analytical perspective; 
accordingly, they have been further examined using the Innovation System 
analytical approach. The latter perspective dovetails with the knowledge-
centred approach adopted in the evaluation, to which it is complementary. 
Specifically, an Innovation System framework has been applied at the satellite 
sectoral level. The aim being to appraise the embedment of the small satellite 
capability-building programme into its environment.  
8.1.1 Technological learning 
This study builds on knowledge typologies and learning theories that are suited 
to the technological context. In the latter, knowledge is often thought of as a 
resource that includes two complementary components, tacit and explicit 
knowledge, and seldom one component without the other. Accordingly, for 
learning to be effective in technological-based industries, there is a need to 
combine explicit (or codified) knowledge with implicit (or tacit) knowledge.  
Learning conventionally occurs at the individual, group, organisational and inter-
organisational level. The study builds on the idea that learning is a complex 
phenomenon and occurs on separate, but interrelated, levels. For learning to be 
effective, it should be systemic, involving intra- and inter-level processes.  
Experiential learning theory has been used to support the argument that 
‘learners’, whether they be individuals, groups, organisations, or inter-
organisations, might be more effective when both reflection and action are 
combined during the learning process. Parallels were therefore drawn with the 
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typology of technological learning, which identifies three types of learning: 
learning by doing (referring to action), learning by searching (referring to 
reflection) and learning by interacting (referring to intra- and inter-level 
interactions). When learning by doing, by searching and by interacting are 
combined, the learner’s ability to learn effectively improves substantially. 
Evaluation of learning has also been carried out by drawing on the concepts of 
knowledge ‘viscosity’ and ‘velocity’. ‘Velocity’ refers to the speed with which 
knowledge is transferred, whereas ‘viscosity’ represents its richness. Successful 
transfer of knowledge is achieved through a delicate balance between velocity 
and viscosity.  
The study has additionally built on the idea that the successful development of a 
technological product requires two types of knowledge: ‘component’ knowledge 
that relates to the core design concept of each product component, and 
‘architectural’ knowledge that relates to the way that components are put 
together to form a system (i.e. product). It may be recalled that organisations 
with limited resources, such as those in developing countries, are forced to 
make a trade-off between architectural and component knowledge to 
successfully acquire technology. 
The study highlights that absorption of new knowledge is a slow, sometimes 
long and laborious process. The technology acquirer’s absorptive capacity is 
contingent upon their existing knowledge base (i.e. prior knowledge or 
accumulated knowledge) and intensity of effort. The former accumulates over 
time and grows through continuous learning that occurs under normal 
circumstances. The latter refers to the level of effort undertaken to assimilate 
new knowledge and pertains to the discontinuous learning that occurs under 
abnormal circumstances. 
8.1.2 Technological capability-building 
Technological capability is a concept that establishes the level of organisational 
capability attained through the dynamic process of technological learning. 
295 
 
Technological capability-building refers to the process of going beyond mere 
possession of knowledge. The latter should ultimately be employed towards 
generating new knowledge (i.e. creating and implementing new technology). 
Capabilities are embodied into physical investment, human capital, information 
(i.e. documentation), and management. They evolve on a complexity continuum 
from basic to higher, from skills required for simple tasks to skills required for 
complex tasks. 
Technological capabilities in developing countries often derive from transferred 
technology. The process starts by acquiring technology in the form of 
‘packages’ from abroad. From a technical perspective, an engineering effort is 
mostly required during this stage. Then, experience over this initial stage leads 
to indigenous development activities taking root, requiring indigenous 
engineering and development effort to achieve more sophisticated tasks. The 
technological capability process should finally reach the level of innovation 
when indigenous scientists and engineers possess the capacity to engineer, 
develop and research. 
Consequently, this study was premised on the understanding that capabilities in 
developing countries are built according to the sequence: engineering, 
development, and research. This same sequence illustrates the complexity 
continuum, going from basic to intermediate and, ultimately, to advanced 
capabilities. What is more, technological capabilities have been examined by 
the combination of multiple factors at individual and team level (i.e. micro level), 
as well as organisational and firm level (i.e. meso level), and within a national, 
sectoral and international environment (i.e. macro level). 
8.1.3 Technology transfer 
The objective of technology transfer is to serve the purpose of local 
technological capability-building. Technologies transferred can also be 
embodied into physical investment, human capital, information (i.e. 
documentation), and management. These capabilities interact dynamically and 
operate simultaneously in managing the transfer process. 
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Multiple mechanisms are used to transfer technology. They are greatly affected 
by industry-specific factors (e.g. products and facilities), region-specific factors 
(e.g. cultural considerations), country-specific factors (e.g. the political and 
economic system), and organisation-specific factors (e.g. existent knowledge 
and management). The complexity that arises from the association of these 
factors with the available mechanisms indicates that there is no one-size-fits-all 
solution for developing countries. Each country has to seek its own solution to 
the transfer of technology. This study has focused on the mechanism of 
collaborative projects, which has been used by Algeria to transfer small satellite 
technology from abroad.  
Successful transfer is highly dependent on the soundness of the linkages 
between the transferor and the transferee. Indeed, building sound linkages is 
underpinned by the convergence of mutual interests between the transferor and 
transferee. This mutuality is a matter of negotiation balance and bargaining 
power. It also depends on the ability of the transferee to adapt its technology 
transfer strategies according to the stages of technological development and 
lifecycle (i.e. mature, established or new). It likewise depends on the 
transferor’s ability to adhere to these strategies.  
The study has emphasised that transfer success is predominantly a matter of 
the absorptive capacity of learners. The intensity of organisational effort has a 
more prominent role compared to that of prior knowledge, particularly for long-
term learning. This intensity is translated through the actions of both continuous 
and discontinuous learning. This is particularly true in today’s fast-changing 
technological landscape, where knowledge does not always accumulate, and is 
not necessarily path-dependent.  
Therefore, the study has argued that, in addition to the knowledge-accumulation 
perspective, the knowledge non-accumulation perspective is no less relevant for 




Cultural differences are another potential impediment to sound linkages and 
mutual understanding between transferor and transferee. In view of the 
complexity of the cultural construct, this study has limited itself to examining 
management practices at the organisational level that shape a learning culture 
and facilitate technology transfer. 
The evaluation approach adopted in this study has taken into account the 
peculiarities of small satellite technology. It has explored satellites as complex 
systems (CoPS) and as systems developed under the FBC (Faster-Better-
Cheaper) philosophy. Small satellite managerial challenges have been 
reviewed at individual, team, and organisational level. Managerial challenges 
that depend on the external environment have also been reviewed.  
Due to the complexity of satellite technology, absorbing it is a slow and long 
process, particularly in developing countries. Therefore, the study posits that 
satellite technological learning does not lend itself to a traditional evaluative 
framework (i.e. summative or formative), which relies on the instrumental use of 
outcomes. A knowledge-generating approach has thus been adopted. Particular 
attention has been paid to a less aggregative level of analysis (i.e. individual 
and team) in order to capture ‘micro’ changes.  
An evaluative framework has been devised. It has used the Innovation System 
analytical approach to examine the context (i.e. macro environment). The 
‘strategic planning’ analytical tools have been used to evaluate the planning of 
the small satellite capability-building programme. The implementation of the 
latter has been evaluated through a framework that gathers ‘triangulated’ 
factors affecting technological learning, technological capability-building, and 
technology transfer; these factors are spread across different analytical levels 
(i.e. micro, meso, and macro). With technological learning having been placed 
at the heart of this evaluative approach, two systemic models were used to 
conduct the analysis. These models (i.e. the knowledge flow model and the 
experiential learning model) were devised by the author to evaluate the flow of 
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knowledge from its initial conveyance (i.e. through the transferor-transferee 
relationship) to its local diffusion (Figure 8-1). 
 





The evaluation framework has been implemented through a mixed method 
research design. A quadrilateral data acquisition method has been adopted, 
and a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods has been used. Data have 
also been collected from diverse sources. It is important to recognise that data 
have been collected under the particular settings of Algeria where different 
languages are often used and lack of research culture and secretive culture are 
common. 
A comprehensive evaluation of Algeria’s small satellite capability-building 
programme led to the following set of conclusions, listed in the next section.  
8.2 Conclusions 
This study offers a set of conclusions that stem from the evaluation findings 
synthesised in chapters 6 and 7. The evaluation first sought to analyse Algeria’s 
technological context, then to analyse the elements that shape the sectoral 
satellite innovation system and its connections to the national environment. The 
study has critically appraised the strategic objectives of small satellite capability-
building. The planning adopted towards achieving those objectives has also 
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been examined. Following on from this, an evaluation of the implementation 
process was conducted using metrics related to technological learning, the 
expansion of locally-built technological capabilities, and technology transferred 
from abroad. Particular attention has been paid to management practices 
underpinning the capability-building process. The conclusions address macro, 
meso, and micro considerations. 
In light of the above, this study offers the following conclusions:   
Satellite capability-building, an ‘isolated’ and ‘bureaucratic’ process 
within a non-conducive national environment  
Algeria’s developmental trajectory has been characterised by poor/incorrect 
choices, inconsistencies, interruptions, short-sighted perspectives and a 
reluctance in adopting nationwide developmental policies and strategies (see 
chapter 6, section 6.2). This is evidenced by the poor results obtained under the 
planned economy model from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. It is also 
evidenced by Algeria’s inability to transit effectively to a market economy since 
the late 1980s.  
Algeria’s development is heavily oil-dependent. Its economic, industrial and 
science and technology policies are subject to risks driven by volatility in oil 
prices. The government has dithered and has adopted no clear strategy to 
address this critical situation. The situation is further compounded by a post-
independence ideological legacy and ‘socialist’ developmental model, which still 
factor heavily into decision making. In the late 1990s, Algeria attempted to lay 
down the foundations of a national innovation system. She adopted a systemic 
approach that covered the institutional aspects of the innovation system, its 
regulatory framework, planning with defined priorities, resource mobilisation, 
and incentive schemes. International technological partnerships were sought. 
However, the indigenisation capacity of local companies was limited. 
Companies faced a shortage of skilled human resources, equipment, time, 
incentives and an institutional framework. Foreign engineering and R&D 
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activities have therefore gradually eclipsed local activities, instead of having the 
opposite effect, i.e. enhancing local technological absorptive capacity. 
In sum, Algeria has not succeeded in establishing an effective and consistent 
national innovation system. Despite all her efforts, weaknesses remain in terms 
of coordination, research promotion and industry-R&D synergy. The idea of 
building a satellite capability emerged bottom-up, from the lower echelons within 
this unfavourable industrial environment. The gradual recognition of the 
strategic value of satellite technology, and its potential applications in Algeria, 
has increased over time. In the late 1990s, it reached the level of maturity, 
resulting in the need to move from being a passive ‘user’ of satellites to 
becoming an engaged actor. A national space programme and a leading space 
agency were set up in the 2000s.  
 Satellite capability-building: a process ‘detached’ from the national and 
international environment  
Algeria used the mechanism of collaborative small satellite projects to acquire 
technology from abroad and build local capability. Three collaborative projects 
were used (i.e. Alsat-1, Alsat-2, and Alsat-1B) and formed the backbone of the 
national space programme. The latter laid the foundations of a sectoral satellite 
innovation system. The present study has revealed that this innovation system 
is still burgeoning after nearly two decades of existence. 
The study has also revealed that the satellite programme is detached from the 
local environment (see chapter 6, sections 6.3 and 6.4). It was devised and 
conducted without a thorough audit of the environment. The programme 
identifies ASAL and its operational entity CDS as ‘prime movers’ or ‘system 
builders’ for the development of satellite technology. However, the programme 
remains vague as to the involvement of local actors, particularly those meant to 
contribute to the development of satellite technology. Little is explicitly stated in 
the national space programme about technological and industrial actors, their 
roles, objectives and networking media. This is reflective of the weak linkages 
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ASAL has nurtured with the local environment. It also reflects ASAL’s 
academia-esque posture, practices and corporate culture. 
 Satellite capability-building: the prevalence of a bureaucratic approach  
The satellite programme was devised from a predominantly ‘bureaucratic’ 
perspective, wherein the role of the state became overstated (see chapter 6, 
sections 6.3 and 6.4). Market forces were entirely neglected. The exclusive 
source of funding envisaged by the programme was the state budget. The overt 
reason given is that the satellite sector is a fledgling industry, incurring 
significant learning costs and in need of protection. The present study questions 
whether this reason is fully valid after nearly two decades of the programme’s 
existence. 
Non-alignment of ASAL’s strategic objectives with the collaborative 
project portfolio 
Algeria seized the opportunity to leverage satellite collaborative projects to seed 
her own satellite development capabilities. Based on these projects, an 
overarching space programme was devised, for which three strategic objectives 
were stipulated: (i) development of industrial capabilities; (ii) satisfaction of 
national needs; and (iii) knowledge capability-building. 
The present study reveals that ASAL has failed to translate these generic 
strategic objectives into goals aligned with the portfolio of collaborative projects 
(see chapter 6, section 6.4, chapter 7, section 7.3). This failure engendered 
confusion towards the primary goal of developing satellites. If the prevailing goal 
is ‘technology application’, then appropriate strategies usually stress 
downstream activities; for instance, through satellite image utilisation. Moreover, 
a highly risk-averse approach is generally adopted as the commitment towards 
end-users should be prioritised (e.g. the categorical need to deliver images to 
end-users). 
On the other hand, when the prevailing goal is ‘technology learning’, suitable 
strategies usually stress design, manufacture and integration of satellite 
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systems. Learning how to build satellites is the priority in these strategies. 
Higher risk is generally accepted, as learners are still building capabilities and 
skills.  
By not prioritising objectives, ASAL failed to adopt clear goals and strategies. 
This leads to unclear direction being fed through to lower levels of 
management, researchers and engineers. The failure to define clear goals is 
also reflected in opaque requirements respecting the capability to be built and 
the technology to be developed. The findings reveal that the technology 
transferor in collaborative projects adopts a stance that ranges from flexibility, 
when transferring technology that has been exploited up to its limits and can be 
transferred without any risk, to rigidity, when transferring new and advanced 
technology. Acquisition of a variety of technologies, each with its own level of 
complexity and maturity, is virtually impossible for a resource-limited 
organisation such as ASAL. There is, therefore, a need to define clearly which 
technologies to target (e.g. system or subsystem) and which capability to build 
(e.g. design, development or integration). ASAL has failed in all these goals.  
Confusion in defining goals is carried over into ASAL’s poor planning of 
resources needed for small satellite development. Traditionally with small 
satellite technology, small incremental increases in resources (or investments) 
improve performance significantly, whereas large additional resources impact 
performance only modestly. The findings reveal that, paradoxically, ASAL’s 
emphasis was on primary and ‘heavy’ investment to the detriment of small, 
simple and ‘light’ investment (see chapter 7, section 7.2).   
The observed confusion in clearly defining objectives reflects the non-alignment 
of ASAL’s goals and strategy with the collaborative projects (or project 
portfolio). Ideally, projects should be premised on ASAL’s goals and be 
embedded in its strategy. If the goals are not clearly defined and the strategy 
not well thought through, it is difficult to know whether collaborative projects are 
the right projects, whether they are in conformance with the strategy, and 
whether they meet the stated objectives. 
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Disjointed planning of small satellite capability-building 
ASAL did not rigorously plan the small satellite capability-building programme 
(see chapter 6, section 6.4). It has failed in establishing a strong nexus between 
planning levels. It has not adopted a recognised and rigorous process for 
developing strategic plans. Deficiencies in terms of planning are reflected in 
multiple gaps that exist in the strategic roadmap, which is the national space 
programme.  
ASAL’s plan is loosely grounded in the local environment. Substantial 
weaknesses in the assessment of this environment are revealed by the study. 
ASAL collected few data on the macro environment (e.g. political, economic, 
social, technological, environmental, and legal). No thorough audit has been 
conducted for collecting data on the industrial environment, competitors, 
suppliers, partners and funders. The gravity of this omission is such that, after 
some fifteen years from the first planning exercise (between 2002 and 2006), 
the weaknesses of the environmental assessment are still very much in 
evidence. For instance, aspects relating to intellectual property rights are still 
grossly neglected (i.e. a failure to fully assess the legal environment). Also, 
market forces are still neglected. The state budget is still seen as the exclusive 
source of funding, even with the risk posed by the volatility in oil prices.  
ASAL’s plan is effectively built on an unknown internal environment. The 
findings reveal that the internal environmental assessment was centred on 
exploitation and research activities (see chapter 6, section 6.4). Internal 
resources in terms of engineering and development were not properly 
assessed. This incomplete approach has blurred the lines between existing and 
intended capabilities vis-à-vis engineering and development. This is particularly 
unsettling since the spearhead of satellite development capability is the 
collaborative projects, and the latter are par excellence engineering and 
development projects. 
Deficiencies in planning have predictably led to unclear strategic direction 
based on a distorted vision of ASAL’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
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threats. Accordingly, the action plan is substantially limited and unclear. It is 
limited, as it is exclusively translated through a portfolio of collaborative 
projects, leaving other options unexplored. No further actions or projects have 
been identified for building satellite capabilities. The action plan is unclear, 
because it is loosely cascaded over organisational, functional and individual 
levels. Its goals are not SMART (Specific, Measurable, Agreed-upon, Realistic, 
Time-based). For instance, no specific target is defined, no specific technology 
is targeted, very few generic metrics are defined, and an unrealistic schedule is 
proposed.  
Evaluation of the planning for small satellite capability-building reveals that 
ASAL suffers from a chronic lack of awareness of planning tools.  
Fragmentation, imbalance and inconsistency in implementation  
Evaluation of the implementation process of the small satellite capability-
building programme has led to the following subsidiary conclusions, covering 
several analytical levels (i.e. macro, meso and micro) and combining 
considerations related to technological learning, locally-built technological 
capability and technology transferred from abroad: 
 Satellite capability-building: an ill-balanced process biased towards 
satellite application at the expense of satellite technology development 
The ASAL satellite capability-building process has fostered market demand for 
satellite applications and use of images (i.e. demand-side). However, it has 
virtually ignored the supply side that consists of building satellites and 
developing technology that can satisfy local needs.  
Successful technology development policies are based on three interrelated 
types of measures: (i) policies intended to create and foster market needs for 
the technology in question (demand-side strengthening); (iii) policies intended to 
build technological capability that can satisfy needs (supply-side strengthening); 
and (iii) policies intended to link demand and supply sides. ASAL’s satellite 
capability-building process has fallen into the ‘traditional’ trap of developing 
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countries. The end-users (i.e. market) call for more technological products (e.g. 
satellite images), while ASAL does not have the technological capability to 
deliver the product. ASAL then faces an ill-balanced situation where it is hard to 
devise policies that effectively bridge demand and supply. 
 Satellite capability-building: an ill-balanced process, biased towards 
research rather than development and engineering 
Building technological capability involves building complementary and balanced 
capabilities in terms of engineering, development, and research. The policy 
adopted should be adjusted to the need. If there is a need for research 
activities, the policy should be to promote investment in research. On the other 
hand, if there is a need for engineering and development activities, the policy 
should be to encourage market growth. 
ASAL has taken a poorly balanced set of actions focused on research 
investment (see chapter 6, section 6.4, and chapter 7, sections 7.1 and 7.2). 
The research that has been conducted does not go beyond the laboratory 
setting. At the same time, far less attention has been paid to engineering and 
development, even though these two aspects are crucial for acquiring 
technology through collaborative projects.   
Consequently, ASAL has failed in managing the balance between engineering, 
development, and research.  
 Non-alignment of knowledge transferred from abroad with ASAL’s 
locally developed knowledge   
ASAL has acquired knowledge from abroad during the various satellite 
collaborative projects. Following completion of the projects, ASAL has also built 
knowledge locally based on its endogenous resources. The findings reveal that 
knowledge acquired during the projects is mainly architectural (or integrative). 
This knowledge is organisational (or collective) in nature and perceived as 
‘gestalt’, i.e. knowledge held by the organisation as a whole (see chapter 7, 
sections 7.1).  
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On completion of the projects, ASAL did not make the transition into an 
organisational learning entity. Its organisational arrangements are ineffective for 
acquiring architectural (or integrative) knowledge and developing it. 
Consequently, post-project knowledge is component-centred (or component 
knowledge) rather than architectural. 
ASAL has thus failed in aligning the knowledge flowing out of the collaborative 
projects with the knowledge created after the collaborative projects had ended 
(Figure 8-2). In other words, ASAL has interrupted the architectural learning 
dynamic triggered during the collaborative projects, diverting it towards a 
component-centred learning dynamic. 
 




 Establishing a local satellite supply chain remains a distant goal  
Building a local supply chain relies on ASAL’s interactions with other 
organisations involved in satellite development. ASAL’s interaction density and 
continuity of interactions are virtually non-existent (see chapter 7, section 7.1). 
Building a local supply chain is also influenced by the technical architecture of 
the satellite, and whether its components can be insourced or outsourced. 
ASAL acquired a shallow form of satellite architectural knowledge. The latter 
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was mostly engineering- & development-oriented, and was only acquired during 
the limited duration of the collaborative projects. Following completion of the 
projects, ASAL did develop certain component knowledge, albeit locally 
fragmented and research-oriented.  
The distinct nature of the knowledge acquired through the capability-building 
process and its shallow and fragmented form reflect the limited satellite 
knowledge ASAL has developed, either in terms of architectures or 
components. No clear option is envisaged by ASAL for channelling resources 
towards less scattered efforts and for acquiring deeper knowledge consistently. 
Consequently, establishing a local satellite supply chain is not tenable at this 
stage.   
 ASAL’s satellite capabilities are fragmented and heterogeneous and do 
not go beyond the basic stage  
The analysis has identified the range of satellite capabilities built in Algeria and 
has attempted to characterise their levels of complexity (or sophistication) (see 
chapter 7, section 7.2). The identified capabilities take the form of physical 
investment, human capital, information (and documentation), and management. 
The levels of sophistication attained are reflective of the organisation’s ability to 
progressively conduct tasks of operation and exploitation, engineering and AIT 
(assembly, integration and test), and specification and design.  
The findings reveal that in terms of satellite operations and exploitation, ASAL 
has gradually built the physical investment, human capital, information handling, 
and the required management capabilities to enable local engineers to operate 
and exploit satellites independently. In terms of engineering and AIT, the 
findings reveal a paradoxical situation vis-à-vis physical investment. ASAL 
achieved primary and ‘heavy’ investment, but failed in achieving 
complementary, simpler and ‘lighter’ investment. The findings also reveal an 
imbalance in terms of human capital vis-à-vis engineering and AIT activities. 
Due to a major misalignment of incentives, only 20% of human resources are 
allocated to engineering, the rest is earmarked for research.  
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Moreover, information capabilities are only partially built and have not yet 
reached the organisational level. What is notable from the fieldwork is that 
building a dynamic and interactive organisational satellite technology memory is 
not a priority, as revealed by ASAL’s ongoing initiatives. 
The study notes the paradoxical status of certain capabilities when it comes to 
specifying and designing satellites. ASAL has built basic capability for 
specifying satellites, but it has virtually overlooked design capability. The 
paradox being that ASAL emphasised developing architectural knowledge 
during the collaborative projects. Architectural knowledge originates from 
knowledge of how a product is designed. This means that building architectural 
knowledge is largely predicated on the design phase, which in turn is the ‘birth’ 
phase of architectural knowledge. ASAL, however, have overlooked design 
capabilities.  
In sum, ASAL has built a heterogeneous set of capabilities and the fragmented 
and non-systemic approach adopted has prevented ASAL from going beyond 
simple (or basic) use of technology, benefiting neither from development (i.e. 
intermediate-level actions) nor from innovation activities (i.e. advanced-level 
actions). 
Chronic management deficiencies in Algeria’s small satellite 
capability-building programme 
The findings reveal that satellite capability-building in Algeria is a process that 
has been conducted from a bureaucratic posture detached from the national 
environment. This process has over-relied on an inappropriate mechanism of 
technology transfer, namely, the collaborative project (see chapter 7,       
section 7.3). Process planning was not rigorous. The implementation process 
has also resulted in a set of heterogeneous, fragmented, poorly balanced, and 
inconsistent capabilities (i.e. physical, human, and information). This is 
indicative of major deficiencies in terms of management capabilities, which are 
supposed to bring together, synergistically, the remaining capabilities.    
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ASAL’s internal management deficiencies are only partly acknowledged within 
the organisation itself. The country-specific non-conducive environment is 
blamed for the ‘mixed’ outcomes of the capability-building process (see   
chapter 7, section 7.2). This attitude has distracted ASAL from taking a critical 
look at its internal managerial capabilities. Indeed, building internal managerial 
ability to solve problems offers increased flexibility in managing external factors 
that are out of its control. 
The findings have revealed the following major management deficiencies:  
 ASAL has inappropriately managed collaborative projects, and 
collaborative projects do not offer the appropriate framework for 
building the required management capabilities  
Collaborative projects are central to ASAL’s strategy of building satellite 
capability. Effective transfer of technology, or learning, through collaborative 
projects was a major, perhaps even the primary, strategic objective of ASAL 
during the lifetime of these projects. 
Effective learning relies primarily on the capacity of the two parties, ASAL and 
foreign companies, to identify a shared view of ‘learning’ during the projects, 
based on mutual interest. However, in the present context, the foreign 
companies’ motives are economic, whereas ASAL’s motives are primarily non-
economic, aiming at acquiring new knowledge for building local capability.  
This non-alignment of objectives has implicitly led to the adoption of project 
management tools that better serve the interests of foreign companies (i.e. 
technical, cost and scheduling) and omit those of ASAL (i.e. learning aspects) 
(see chapter 7, section 7.3). This omission largely explains the ambiguous 
perception ASAL have come to about learning performance during the projects. 
Indeed, there is a sense of frustration and dissatisfaction felt by ASAL’s 
management over their inability to overcome learning barriers after three 
collaborative projects (i.e. Alsat-1, Alsat-2, and Alsat-1B). Additionally, rather 
than taking a critical look at the project management tools adopted during the 
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projects, ASAL attributes responsibility to foreign companies (e.g. lack of 
willingness, non-cooperation). 
The collaborative projects were led by foreign companies. ASAL did not exert 
effective project control. Consequently, a principal lever in the management of 
satellite development has remained under-exploited by ASAL. This is reflected, 
for instance, in the way risk was managed. Because the contractual 
responsibility lay primarily with the supplier, the common practice of ASAL 
representatives was to transfer risk to foreign companies. It was also reflected 
in the early phases of development, as satellites were built using technologies 
inherited from previous approved designs. Satellite design was not covered by 
this mechanism, and ASAL could not develop technical and managerial skills 
related to design.  
 ASAL is a highly centralised organisation, which does not empower 
lower management levels 
Small satellite development is based on empowerment of teams and lower 
management levels. ASAL is highly centralised, particularly when it comes to 
managing small satellite development. Satellite development activities are 
formally located within one of ASAL’s affiliates, namely CDS, which is located in 
the city of Oran, approx. 400 km out from Algiers. Despite the distance, ASAL 
contrives to over-manage as well as micro-manage satellite development 
activities. This situation could have been justified 10 or 15 years ago, at the 
dawn of Algeria’s satellite programme, when ‘decentralised’ resources were 
missing. However, it is no longer justified, as the required resources are 
presently available in CDS, and, paradoxically, the entity which manages these 
projects in the parent organisation (i.e. ASAL) in fact lacks appropriate 
resources. 
ASAL’s inability to empower CDS has induced an inability in CDS to effectively 
coordinate its internal ‘inter-group’ activities. ASAL’s highly centralised 
management posture has resulted in severe communication and interaction 
shortfalls at all management levels. Individual and group learning is scattered 
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and poorly aligned with the goal of small satellite development. Consequently, 
ASAL as a learning organisation is far from a coherent entity.   
 Poor management practices, burdened with administrative and 
bureaucratic tasks  
There is a severe lack of training related to management functions for small 
satellite development (see chapter 7, sections 7.2 and 7.3). ASAL’s personnel 
have had little to no formal training in management tools and techniques. A 
severe lack of awareness is apparent with regard to crucial management 
practices, such as putting in place learning routines, implementing a quality 
assurance approach that relaxes or eliminates bureaucratic procedures, 
formally and explicitly managing individuals and groups, particularly those who 
hold tacit knowledge, by singling them out and by attributing value to their work, 
and separating project management tasks from technical (systems engineering) 
tasks.  
ASAL’s responsiveness to lower management levels and project teams in 
particular is poor in spite of its many years’ experience. These management 
levels are loaded down with extra-resources and are, consequently, burdened 
with administrative and bureaucratic tasks, being done to the detriment of the 
main mission. 
Despite the many challenges faced by ASAL, especially the severe lack of 
managerial skills and capabilities, no clear strategies or measures have been 
adopted or planned going forward to address these issues. This situation 
reflects a chronic lack of awareness of the preeminent role of management in 
developing satellite capabilities.  
8.3 Recommendations 
The non-conducive domestic environment is a major constraint on Algeria’s 
technological development. Algeria has proved ineffective in building a 
consistent national innovation system into which small satellite development 
can be integrated. This leads to two fundamental precepts that underpin the 
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validity of the below recommendations. Firstly, ASAL should explicitly recognise 
the complexity of a ‘national’ perspective and the need to adopt an intermediate 
sectoral perspective through building a satellite innovation system. Secondly, 
ASAL has been tentative in its undertaking. Its satellite capability-building 
process has been visibly slow in delivering tangible outcomes. To avoid 
stagnation, ASAL should recognise that the stepping-stones to achieving its 
objectives are not readily discernible and prima facie obvious, and it should 
gradually explore and evolve its strategic vision.    
Therefore, the recommendations, as derived from the conclusions (section 8.2), 
are as follows: 
ASAL needs to clearly articulate a strategy for the development of 
small satellites 
ASAL is a limited-resource organisation. It is thus recommended that it narrow 
the scope of its activities. A plausible option would be that ASAL develop 
internal satellite assembly, integration, and test capabilities (i.e. architectural 
knowledge). In parallel, some crucial components should be insourced (i.e. 
component knowledge), whereas “non-bottleneck” components should be 
outsourced.  
This strategic choice might be perceived as inconsistent with Algeria’s objective 
of generating local value through establishing a national satellite industry. 
Assembly, integration, and test operations in the particular case of small 
satellite technology should not be underestimated and viewed as mere 
‘screwdriver’ operations. The ability to conduct such operations is vital in small 
satellite development, notably when the industry trend is towards bringing 
together commercial off-the-shelf components, where little component 
knowledge is required. On the other hand, given the interwoven nature of 
satellite integrative and component knowledge, the choice of components to 
insource should be based on how strongly coupled they are with the 
architectural capabilities ASAL intends to build. 
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ASAL needs to dissociate the strategic objective of ‘satellite 
technological learning’ from that of ‘satellite application’. It also 
needs to clearly prioritise the objective of ‘technological learning’ 
for small satellite capability-building. 
This should clear up confusion as to the implementation mechanisms ASAL 
needs to adopt. It implies that larger risk margins are acceptable and lower 
management levels, engineers and researchers would be more learning-
focused and risk-tolerant or risk-disposed. Prioritising technological learning 
also implies clear identification of the technology being targeted. However, the 
disconnect between the objectives of ‘satellite technological learning’ and 
‘satellite application’ should not prevent ASAL from devising balanced policies 
linking the demand and supply sides of satellite technology by narrowing these 
two market forces. It is recommended that ASAL develop market segments 
requiring less sophisticated technology. ASAL should concurrently channel 
efforts towards developing less sophisticated technology. 
ASAL’s isolation from its external environment has had a 
detrimental effect on satellite capability-building. To maintain the 
momentum, there is an urgent need to establish a strong foothold in 
this environment. 
This can be realised using a two-pronged approach; namely, the setting up of a 
local supply chain and establishing connectivity to the global supply chain.     
Policies and actions intended to build local industrial capability should be 
detailed and explicit. They should recognise the government’s role in 
developing the satellite industry, without conflating it with a bureaucratic state-
centred vision. For instance, there is a need to overcome ASAL’s academia-
esque culture which carries with it the deficiencies inherent to university-
industry and research-industry linkages. It is recommended that ASAL diversify 
its human resources component by including personnel from the private sector 




A technology transfer programme from ASAL to local industry should be 
devised. Accompanying measures for upgrading local actors in order that they 
comply with space industry requirements should be envisaged. Considerations 
of intellectual property rights should be included. Funding options and other 
incentives towards local actors should be addressed. In order to break ASAL’s 
bureaucratic and state-centric vision, private sector participation should be 
encouraged. Market forces should be addressed. Protectionist policies towards 
the burgeoning satellite capability should be intended to overcome resource 
limitations for a limited time only. Any protectionism intended to address market 
failures (e.g. factors outside the remit of organisations: institutional, 
infrastructure inappropriateness and labour market deficiencies) will be 
ineffective unless market-based measures are taken.  
The local satellite supply chain should leverage segments of other local supply 
chains with which elements are shared (e.g. automotive and electronics). Given 
increasing ‘geographical’ fragmentation of the satellite industry worldwide, 
ASAL should stimulate local actors to join segments of the global chain. 
Ultimately, local activities should be driven by the requirements of the 
international satellite industry market.   
ASAL would benefit from undertaking a comparative evaluation of 
strategies and international experiences of satellite industry 
development.  
The South Korean and Indian experiences are highly relevant to Algeria, 
especially in the way these countries have continuously aligned their strategies 
and implementation mechanisms with their objectives. Lessons can be learned 
from how South Korea brilliantly aligned local development efforts with 
architectural knowledge acquired from abroad. Their experience is instructive in 
terms of transforming government-led satellite organisations from bureaucratic 
and research-centred organisations into managers and supporters of satellite 
industry development. India’s experience is particularly relevant in view of the 
way that they cleverly diversified international partners as a strategic choice to 
increase technology transfer opportunities. India’s case is also apposite for the 
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way they built a local supply chain, as well as strong engineering and 
development sectors.  
ASAL should seek a balance between engineering, development, 
and research capabilities.  
To strengthen ASAL’s engineering and development capabilities, it is 
recommended that it develop internal capabilities by adopting appropriate 
incentive regimes. In parallel, it should encourage the development of external 
capabilities by gradually enlarging the size of its satellite market. This could be 
enabled by increasing the number of projects, diversifying themes and 
encouraging the entry of new local suppliers into the value chain segments. To 
foster a local satellite supplier network, ASAL should devise technology transfer 
programmes from its industrial facilities to public and private companies. Such 
programmes should include training, sharing of information and facilities, 
prototype development, and applied R&D. 
ASAL’s research network should be re-shaped, and applied research and 
development capabilities should be put in place. They should be internal to 
ASAL and its immediate environment (e.g. partners, specialised research 
centres, companies). At this stage, activities should be entrusted to 
government-sponsored organisations. In parallel, ASAL should enforce 
intellectual property regulation to promote activities within companies (private 
and public). Given the high-risk nature of satellite technology, further incentives 
should be provided to ASAL’s partners. Basic research should be assigned to 
universities (e.g. by channelling EDTAS activities). 
ASAL should align its locally created knowledge with knowledge 
acquired from abroad.  
To promote learning alignment, ASAL should adopt a number of strategies. 
ASAL has acquired architectural knowledge from abroad and the priority must 
now be to build ‘architectural’ capabilities locally, which can absorb and enrich 
this knowledge. It should encourage density and continuity of interactions, 
internally and with its external partners, as part of the effort to expand the local 
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supply chain. ASAL should establish continuous and dense interactions with the 
organisations already identified as forming part of the local supply chain (i.e. 
ECA and CDTA). Based on a thorough external audit, ASAL should bring new 
actors into its supply chain from the public and private sectors. It is strongly 
recommended that ASAL promote local supply chains within the electronic and 
mechanical engineering industries. Algeria’s burgeoning automotive supply 
chain should particularly be explored. ASAL should devise policy towards 
incentivising such actors, turning them into space-compliant industries (i.e. 
using incentives, risk management and cost-benefit analysis).   
ASAL should also develop internal satellite design capabilities as they largely 
explain endogenous architectural knowledge, essential for attaining 
technological independence. Design capabilities should incorporate, from the 
outset, the technical architecture of the system to be developed, as this can aid 
in shaping ASAL strategy (e.g. on whether parts of a system should be 
insourced or outsourced). ASAL should also decide on the trade-off between 
using custom or standard components (i.e. off-the-shelf components). 
Management capability-building must be ASAL’s absolute priority.  
To overcome ASAL’s chronic managerial deficiencies, a thorough plan for 
building managerial capability is strongly recommended. Such a plan might 
include some of the following points:  
- Planning capabilities should be built and rigorous planning tools should be 
adopted to cover all planning levels. At the strategic level, for instance, ASAL 
personnel should be trained in strategic management/planning.  
- ASAL will also benefit by training its personnel in areas such as technology 
management/planning, leadership and innovation management. 
- ASAL should build internal capabilities for managing issues regarding 
intellectual property rights. 
- ASAL should set up a permanent internal mechanism for learning evaluation 
based on knowledge-generating approaches. At the project level, project 
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management tools and techniques, particularly those addressing learning as 
a strategic objective, should be adopted. 
- There is a need to adopt new mechanisms for developing small satellites, 
handing over the management of satellite projects to ASAL. They should 
foster local development by entwining ASAL’s engineers with the local 
environment, instead of seconding them to foreign countries for extended 
periods of time, disconnected from local realities. 
- To enable empowerment of lower management levels, there is a need to 
build trust through clarity of objectives, rigorous action plans, and appropriate 
lower-level managerial capabilities. ASAL should provide more visibility on 
objectives and plans by sharing information and communicating extensively 
with its personnel. A culture of risk-tolerance and innovation must be 
encouraged through appropriate incentives. Communication should help 
align individual activities with group and organisational objectives.  
- ASAL should adopt small satellite project management practices. It should 
distinguish between technical tasks and project management. ASAL and 
CDS should, a priori, build up a reservoir of resources and deliver them to 
project teams whenever needed. CDS needs to adapt its organisational 
structure to ensure better communication and coordination. CDS should also 
entrust a ‘principal investigator’, who will be in charge of technical and 
scientific coordination.  
8.4 Proposals for further research 
The present study is one of only a few empirical researches addressing satellite 
technology development in developing countries. The following research 
directions can be pursued to extend the work herein and address remaining 
open questions.  
8.4.1 Choice of small satellite technology for developing countries  
Prioritising satellite technological learning by developing countries implies a 
clear identification of the technology to be targeted. It is appropriate to conduct 
research on the selection of the suitable small satellite technologies for those 
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countries; technologies that are aligned with the absorptive capacity of these 
countries. Such a research would entail a review of emerging trends in small 
satellite technology and their appropriateness to conditions in developing 
countries. Technological forecasting techniques would be critical in this 
research.     
8.4.2 ‘Generalisation’ potential of knowledge flow and experiential 
learning models 
Technological learning should be placed at the heart of any knowledge-
generating evaluation of technology transfer from developed to developing 
countries. This study has the merit of proposing and testing two models (i.e. the 
knowledge flow model and experiential learning model) devised for evaluating 
satellite knowledge flow from the genesis of the transferor-transferee 
relationship to its local diffusion. The author believes that these models have 
the potential for ‘generalisation’ to other technologies, provided that they are 
empirically tested, enriched and adapted through further research.  
8.5 Summary of findings and recommendations of the 
programme evaluation 
From the foregoing, the major findings of the evaluation of Algeria’s small 
satellite capability-building programme and the associated recommendations 
are summarised in Tables 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3. The principal overarching policy 
messages revealed by this study are that ASAL has failed to establish a strong 
foothold in its environment through a local supply chain and that clear strategies 
with prioritised objectives need to be adopted. Also, ASAL as a coherent 
learning entity does not yet exist. Its actions are inconsistent, fragmented, and 
ill-balanced, and there is an urgent need to build management capabilities 
effectuating synergy for coherent organisation. Finally, ASAL’s actions are not 
aligned with its objectives, and there is a need to adopt appropriate 




Table 8-1: Findings and recommendations at macro level 
Findings  Recommendations 
-The satellite programme is ‘detached’ from the 
national and international environment (ASAL has 
failed in creating a local supply chain) 
-The satellite programme is implemented through a 
bureaucratic approach with an outsize role played 
by the state   
-The satellite programme is ill-balanced, i.e. biased 
towards satellite application at the expense of 
satellite technology development 
-The satellite programme is ill-balanced, biased 
towards research, rather than development and 
engineering 
-ASAL needs to dissociate the strategic objective of 
‘satellite technological learning’ from that of ‘satellite 
application’. 
-ASAL needs to clearly prioritise the objective of 
‘technological learning’ for small satellite capability-
building 
-ASAL should narrow the scope of its technological 
development activities 
-ASAL needs to establish a strong foothold in its 
external environment through the setting up of a 
local supply chain and connectivity with the global 
supply chain 
-ASAL should seek a satellite sectoral balance 
between engineering, development, and research 
capabilities 
Source: Author  
Table 8-2: Findings and recommendations at meso level 
Findings Recommendations 
-ASAL does not act as a coherent learning entity 
-ASAL has acted as a highly centralised 
organisation and does not empower lower 
management levels 
-ASAL has failed in aligning goals and strategy with 
implementation tools (i.e. collaborative projects) 
-ASAL’s capabilities are fragmented and 
heterogeneous, and are at a basic stage of 
development  
-ASAL has managed the satellite capability-building 
programme inappropriately (i.e. poor management 
practices) 
-Organisational management capability-building 
must be ASAL’s absolute priority 
-ASAL should seek an internal balance between 
engineering, development, and research 
capabilities 
-ASAL needs to adopt rigorous planning tools 
Source: Author  
Table 8-3: Findings and recommendations at micro level 
Findings Recommendations 
-ASAL has failed to align the satellite knowledge 
transferred from abroad, through collaborative 
projects, with ASAL’s locally developed knowledge   
-ASAL has managed the collaborative projects 
inappropriately 
-ASAL’s individual- and team-level resources are 
fragmented  
-Appropriate mechanisms and a diversified project 
portfolio need to be adopted      
-Appropriate collaborative project management 
tools need to be adopted 
-ASAL should align its locally created knowledge 
with knowledge acquired from abroad 
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Questions on building small satellite capabilities in Algeria 
 
Addressed to Alsat-1 project team members 
 
Research aim: To collect data in order to gain better understanding of satellite technology 
transfer to Algeria. This will enable Algerians to gain an appreciation on the effectiveness of 
the mechanisms that they have used to build satellite technological capabilities, and will 
provide guidance regarding effective processes to transfer satellite technology.  
 
Guidance in responding to questions:  
- Please feel free to use Arabic, French or English when responding.  
- Some responses require circling a number ① or ticking a box √ , some other responses 
require written comments. If the space provided on the form is insufficient for your 
comments, use additional sheets as required. Feel free to include any additional material 
deemed relevant.  
- Once you have responded to questions, the researcher will be interviewing you by 
himself in a face-to-face meeting to ensure proper understanding of questions and 
responses.  
- All responses will be treated as confidential with only the researcher having access to 
them. Your identity will not be revealed and you will remain anonymous. You will be only 
identified as Participant A, B, C, etc.  
 
Sections covered:  
A. General information 
B. Activities as part of the project 
C. Activities after the project 




Participant ID: Date: 
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A. General Information 
 
1) What is your educational background? Indicate the corresponding educational organisations and time 
frame (Please indicate from the “Baccalaureat”). 
 
Education/Degree Time frame Educational organisations 
   
 
2) What is your professional background? Indicate the corresponding organisation and time frame. 
 








3) Before you participated in this project, have you ever participated in any project or activity involving 
foreigners (e.g. joint project, negotiations, joint R&D, etc.)? 
 
4) When did you join the project team? Why and how were you selected for the project? Describe the entire 
process. 
 
5) How long before the beginning of the project were you informed of your selection? 
 
6) Did you participate in any preparatory activity related to the project before its beginning? (For example: 
technology assessment, project negotiation with the firm, design or specification study, introductory 
sessions, practical training, theoretical training, language training, etc.). Explain what were these activities? 
How useful were they? How appropriate were their durations? How would have they been performed for 
better result? 
 
7) How often did you meet (formally or informally) senior leaders from your organisation before the 
beginning of the project in order to discuss about the project? Who were they? In which occasion and what 
was the aim of the meeting?  
 
8) How motivated were you before the beginning of this project?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
My motivation was  
Low                                                                     High 
                       1          2           3           4            5 
  
-Why? What motivated you most, what motivated you less? 
 
 
B. Activities as part of the project 
 
9) In which component(s) (e.g. unit/module/sub-system/system) or function(s) were you specialised? Tick the 
appropriate box or boxes. Indicate how deep were you involved in components and functions other than 




component(s) (e.g. unit/module/sub-system/system) or function(s) 
I was specialised in 
this/these 
component(s) 
My involvement in this/these 
components/functions was 
Not deep Deep 
Space  Segment  1       2        3        4         5 
Platform  1       2        3        4         5 
Structure  1       2        3        4         5 
Thermal control  1       2        3        4         5 
On-board power supply  1       2        3        4         5 
Attitude control  1       2        3        4         5 
Data handling  1       2        3        4         5 
Payload  1       2        3        4         5 
Integration, Assembly, and Test  1       2        3        4         5 
Spacecraft Integration  1       2        3        4         5 
Payload-to-spacecraft Integration  1       2        3        4         5 
Satellite Testing  1       2        3        4         5 
Ground Support Equipment-GSE  1       2        3        4         5 
Ground Segment  1       2        3        4         5 
Mission Control   1       2        3        4         5 
Payload Control   1       2        3        4         5 
Communication System  1       2        3        4         5 
Support Functions  1       2        3        4         5 
Management task (Programme Management)  1       2        3        4         5 
Engineering tasks (System Engineering)  1       2        3        4         5 
Product assurance tasks  1       2        3        4         5 
Training  1       2        3        4         5 
Launch, Operations and Maintenance  1       2        3        4         5 
Launch  1       2        3        4         5 






10) Where and how was developed the component you specialised in? (Designed, built partially, integrated, 
tested, completely by the firm within its facilities, or partially, etc.).  
 
-If the component was developed partially or entirely outside the firm, to what extent were you involved to 
the outside development (e.g. participating in the development, or trained, within the 
suppliers/subcontractor’s facilities, meetings/exchange)? Describe how was the technical collaboration 
between the Prime and the Suppliers/Subcontractor carried out? And how deep was the knowledge of the 













11) With regard to the components/functions you specialised in, what was your role (duties/mission/objectives)? 
 
component(s) or function(s) 







-How appropriate did you find your prior knowledge (background/skills/knowledge/profiles) to the 
requirements of the components/functions you specialised in?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component/function you specialised in 
component(s) or function(s) you 
specialised in 
My prior knowledge was 
Less than 
requirement             
close to  





1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why? and what was the most needed knowledge? 
 
-How clear did you find the objectives of your participation in the project?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component/function you specialised in 
component(s) or function(s) you 
specialised in 
I found the objectives 
Not clear  clear 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  
 
-How ambitious did you find the objectives of your participation in the project? 
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component/function you specialised in 
component(s) or function(s) you 
specialised in 
I found the objectives 
Not ambitious  Ambitious  
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  




Fill in the appropriate cells and Circle the appropriate number for each training type 
Training type Duration 
How the training was 
controlled and monitored 
(Academic evaluation, tests, 
dissertation, presentation, 
practical tasks, etc.) 
How appropriate did you find the training for the rest of your 
activity 
During the project After the project 
Inappropriate Appropriate Inappropriate Appropriate 





1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Practical training  
(Performed on non-




1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
On the Job training  
(Practical work 
performed on the 
actual system) 
  
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
12) With regard to the components or functions you specialised in, how deep did you find the knowledge you 
acquired during the project?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component/function you specialised in 
component(s) or function(s) you 
specialised in 
I find the knowledge 
Not deep  Deep 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
- Why? (Give explanation on whether the required disciplines were covered, was the time spent sufficient? 
was the number of Algerians trained sufficient? Was this knowledge focused on components architecture, 
integration process, or on particular aspects of the component you specialise in, etc.? What would be the 
right number of trainees and the right background to effectively acquire knowledge? 
 
13) With regard to the components or functions you were involved in (not specialised in), how deep did you find 
the knowledge you acquired?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component/function you were involved in (not specialise in) 
component(s) or function(s) you 
were involved in (not specialised in) 
I found the knowledge 
Not deep  Deep 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 












Phase description What were your Mission/duties/objectives 
My involvement in this/these phases 
was 
Not deep Deep 
Phase 0 Mission analysis/needs 
identification, where mission 
aims and functions to be 





1       2        3        4         5 
Phase A  Feasibility, where mission 
general concepts and system 






1       2        3        4         5 
Phase B  Preliminary Definition, where 
sub-systems functional 
requirements are defined, all 
activities and resources for the 
project development are 
identified, and preliminary risk 








1       2        3        4         5 
Phase C  Detailed Definition, where the 
detailed technical and 
functional specifications of the 







1       2        3        4         5 
Phase D  Manufacturing, Assembly and 
Testing, where the 
development and qualification 
of the system (space and 
ground segment) and its 







1       2        3        4         5 
-Procurement (of service or 
equipment, from third-party) 
 
 
1       2        3        4         5 
-Manufacturing/development 
(either within the firm or 




1       2        3        4         5 
-Assembly (either within the 
firm or outside the firm) 
 
 
1       2        3        4         5 
-Testing (either within the firm 
or outside the firm) 
 
 
1       2        3        4         5 
Phase E  Launch and operations of the 
system, where activities 
related to launch, 
commissioning, maintaining 
space segment orbital 
elements and utilising ground 
segment are performed 
 
 
1       2        3        4         5 
Phase F  Disposal, referring the 
activities needed to put the 
system at customer’s (or 
operator’s) disposal 
 
1       2        3        4         5 
Other    
Give further details if required? 
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15) Describe the phases in which you participated?  
 








What types of training were 
provided 
Was the time you spent in this 
phase sufficient to effectively 
acquire knowledge? 
How appropriate you find the training for your activity 
During the project After the project 



































1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 




16) During your participation in the project, what were the project meetings/reviews in which you took part?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each meeting/review 
Meetings/reviews To what extent you have contributed in 
these meetings/reviews? 
I have 
To what extent you have learnt from the 










Mission Definition Review-MDR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Preliminary Requirements Review-PRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
System Requirements Review-SRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Preliminary Design Review-PDR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Critical Design Review-CDR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Qualification Review-QR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Acceptance Review-AR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Operational Readiness Review-ORR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Flight Readiness Review-FRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Launch Readiness Review-LRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Commissioning Result Review-CRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
End-of-life Review-ELR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 




Give further details if required. 
 
17) How often did you meet (formally or informally) senior leaders from your organisation during the project in 
order to discuss about the project? Who were they, in which occasion and what was the aim of the meeting?  
 
18) How reliable was the component you specialised in?  
 
Tick the appropriate box for each component you specialised in 
component(s) you 
specialised in 



















 □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
19) How complex was the component you specialised in? Considering that complexity is a mix of: Number of 
developed/customised sub-components required for developing the component, Number of skills (diversity) 




Circle the appropriate number for each component you specialised in 
component(s) you specialised in 
I found the component complexity 
Ordinary  High 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why? 
 
20) How do you find the performances of the component(s) you specialised in?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component you specialised in 
component(s) you specialised in 
I found the component performances 
Low  High 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why? 
 
21) How do you find the share of COTS (Commercial off-the-shelf) in the components?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component you specialised in 
component(s) you specialised in 
I find COTS components share 
Low  High 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
22) How do you find the share of mature elements in the components?  (e.g.  Technology that has an established 
heritage in space usage, technology that scores high on the scale of Technology Readiness Level-TRL or 
Manufacturing readiness level-MRL)  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component you specialised in 
component(s) you specialised in 
I find mature elements share 
Low  High 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 




23) With regard to the component you specialised in, how do you find the knowledge provided by the foreign 
company during the project for each of the following characteristics: 
 
a/ In terms of Newness (compared to the knowledge already available in this sector)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component you specialised in 
component(s) you specialised in 
I found the provided knowledge  
Old  New 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  
 
b/ In terms of Breadth (diversity of disciplines involved in the component you specialised in)?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component you specialised in 
component(s) you specialised in 
The provided knowledge involved 
Few disciplines  Multitude of disciplines 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why? 
 
c/ In terms of Depth (Depth in the disciplines involved in the component you specialised in)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component you specialised in 
component(s) you specialised in 
The provided knowledge was 
Not very deep  Very deep 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why? 
 
24) In your view, how complex was the whole satellite system? Considering that complexity is a mix of: Number 
of developed/customised components required for the satellite system, Number of skills (diversity) required 
for the satellite project, and New knowledge required for the satellite project. 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I found the satellite system complexity 
Ordinary  High 





25) How do you find the performance of the whole satellite system? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I found the satellite system performances 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why? 
 
26) List the engineering tools, equipment, software and facilities used for the development of the component 
you specialised in?  
 
Phases 
The engineering tools, equipment, software and facilities 
Used by the foreign company 
You used yourself during the 
project 
That are available in your facilities 
in Algeria (or can be easily found 
elsewhere in Algeria) 

























During the launch and 
operations 





-If engineering tools, equipment, software and facilities required for the development of the 
component/function in which you specialised are not available (or missing) in your facilities in Algeria, tell 
how important are they? and can they be acquired? 
 
27) List the documentation and knowledge resources used for the development of the component you 
specialised in?  
 
Phases 
The documentation and knowledge resources 
Used by the foreign company 
You used yourself during the 
project 
That are available in your facilities 
in Algeria (or can be easily found 
elsewhere in Algeria) 



































-If the documentation and knowledge resources required for the development of the component/function 
in which you specialised are not available (or missing) in your facilities in Algeria, tell how important are 
they? Why couldn’t they be acquired? Have you attempted to reproduce them (or some of them)? 
-With regard to the project documentation and knowledge resources brought in Algeria, how are they 
managed? Where are they? How easy are they accessible? Who has access to them? Has this 
documentation been used since then?  
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28) On the basis of the knowledge acquired during the project (either through written or unwritten resources), 
have you attempted to prepare any documentation (e.g. theoretical documentation, practical 
documentation, report/routines/tests/procedures, etc.) for the internal use within your organisation in 
Algeria? and how important is this documentation for performing independently tasks in Algeria? 
 
29) On the basis of the knowledge acquired during the project (either through written or unwritten resources), 
have you attempted to conduct any R&D work, published or not published, (e.g. journal papers, conferences 
papers, study reports, patent, etc.)? How many works have been done? Who are the persons involved and to 
which organisation they belong? 
 
30) List the human skills/resources required for the development of the component you specialised in?  
 
Phases 
The human skills/resources 
Used by the foreign company 
That are available in your facilities in Algeria (or can 
be easily found elsewhere in Algeria) 


































-If the human skills/resources required for the development of the component/function in which you 
specialised are not available (or missing) in your facilities in Algeria, tell how important are they? How 
difficult can they be developed or acquired? 
 
31) What was the work language during the project? How comfortable were you with this (these) language(s)?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each language used in the project 
Language(s) 
I was  
Less comfortable  Very comfortable 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
32) During your participation in the project, how many mentors did you have and how long have you been under 
their mentoring?  
 













Circle the appropriate number for each mentor you got in the project 
Mentor (s) 














 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Give further details if required: (For example, He couldn’t provide further knowledge because of 
restrictions from his company, protection of the technology, contractual terms, the two personalities were 
different which made communication not easy, etc.) 
 
34) How would you describe your mentors knowledge and pedagogical capabilities? 
Circle the appropriate number for each mentor you got in the project 
Mentor Theoretical knowledge of the 
mentor 
Practical knowledge of the 
mentor 
Pedagogical capabilities 





 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Give further details if required, and give indication on the amount of knowledge you acquired from him 
and why couldn’t you acquire everything (for example, he has limited knowledge, he lacks communication, 
the language he used were difficult to understand, the knowledge conveyed was not enough detailed, the 
knowledge conveyed cannot be easily explained, the knowledge was conveyed using unusual codes, 
symbols, frameworks, the time spent with him was not sufficient, your initial knowledge on the matter was 
limited and you needed to first update your knowledge and then follow with him, etc.) 
 
35) When, how often and to whom did you use to report (and give feedback) on the work progress during the 
project? (to the mentor, to the Algerian team leader, Was this done regularly, occasionally when situation 
were deemed un-acceptable, formally, informally, etc.?) Did you experience situations where you raised 
issues/questions? How autonomous were you in dealing with these issues/questions?   
 
36) How would you describe your work relationship during the project with colleagues working on the same 
component(s) you specialised in?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each colleague working on the same components 
colleagues 














 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Give further details if required: 
 
37) How would you describe your work relationship during the project with colleagues working on other satellite 




Circle the appropriate number for each colleague working on other satellite components/functions (e.g. team leader, 
system engineering, AIT, Power, Payload, etc.) 
colleagues 














 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Give further details if required: 
 
38) Describe how were you involved in tasks related to the integration of the whole satellite system?  
 
-How deep was this involvement?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
My involvement in the integration of the whole satellite was  
Not deep  Very deep 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
39) Rank from ” 1” to “5” the following sources of knowledge in order of contribution on the whole knowledge 
you acquired during the project? 
e.g. “1” being the source that contributes the most in the knowledge you acquired during the project.  
 
Sources of knowledge Rank  Give details if necessary 





Other individuals and experts 




Project documentation and 
databases (blueprints, 
handbooks, workbooks, guides, 
system requirements, 
specifications, interfaces, 
implementation plans and 
procedures, test routines, 
reports, etc.) 
  
Libraries (books, specialised 




Other   
 
40) Based on your experience, which of the following statement matches your view most closely on the focus of 
the knowledge you acquired during the project? 
 








The provided knowledge was focused on the component you specialised in as 
an independent component □ □ □ □ 
The provided knowledge was focused on the component you specialised in as 
part of the whole system or satellite (e.g. interaction with other components, 
process of integration within the larger system, etc.) 
□ □ □ □ 
 
41) Based on your experience, which of the following statement matches your view most closely on the risk the 














I feel the training provided was about a technology that has been exploited up 
to its limits and can be transferred without any risk (e.g. risk of fuelling future 
competition, security considerations). 
□ □ □ □ 
I feel the technology was advanced but the training provided was not deep 
enough to be risky for the foreign company (e.g. risk of fuelling future 
competition, security considerations). 
□ □ □ □ 
I feel the technology was advanced, but the foreign company considers the 
Algerian’s capabilities are deemed to be not well enough advanced to make 
use of the advanced technology. 
□ □ □ □ 
 
 
C. Activities after the project 
 
42) Have you maintained relationships with the foreign firm personnel after the project? If yes, are these 
relationships informal or formal, a courtesy relationships or professional?  
 
43) During your activities after this project, have you been involved in any satellite technology development?  
 
- Describe your activities as part of other collaborative satellite projects with foreign companies (Alsat-2A, 
Alsat-2B, Alsta-1B, etc.) 
 
- Describe your activities outside collaborative satellite projects (local activities, etc.) 
 
44) As part of your satellite technology activities in Algeria, outside the collaborative projects (Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, 
Alsat-1B), what were the aim and objectives of your activities?  
 
45) How were the objectives defined? Who defined them? 
 
45-a/ If the objectives were defined by you, were they discussed and agreed by other upper management 
levels? Which levels? Did they fit with other objectives?  
 
-How clear do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives clarity 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-How complex do you find these objectives? Considering that complexity is a mix of: Number of 
developed/customised components required for achieving the objective, Number of skills (diversity) 
required for the project, and New knowledge required for the project. 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives complexity 
Low  High 




-How risky do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives risk 
Low  High 




-How flexible are these objectives in terms of specification (freedom to adjust specifications or to 
completely review objectives)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives specification flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-How flexible are these objectives in terms of funding (freedom to ask more money)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives funding flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-How flexible are these objectives in terms of time (freedom to go beyond timeline)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives timeline flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-In general, how ambitious do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find these objectives 
Not ambitious  Ambitious 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How do you report work progress related to these objectives? How often? to whom?   
 
45-b/ If objectives were defined elsewhere, where exactly? Which management levels? Did they fit with 
other objectives? 
 
-How clear do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives clarity 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
- How complex do you find these objectives? Considering that complexity is a mix of: Number of 
developed/customised components required for achieving the objective, Number of skills (diversity) 
required for the project, and New knowledge required for the project. 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives complexity 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 





Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives risk 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How flexible are these objectives in term of specification (freedom to adjust specifications or to 
completely review objectives)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives specification flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How flexible are these objectives in term of funding (freedom to ask more money)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives funding flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How flexible are these objectives in term of time (freedom to go beyond timeline)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives timeline flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-In general, how ambitious do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find these objectives 
Not ambitious  Ambitious 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How do you report work progress related to these objectives? How often? to whom?   
 
46) How often have you met (formally or informally) senior leaders from your organisation to discuss about these 
objectives during the period from the end of the project until now? Who were they? In which occasion? and 
what was the aim of the meeting?  
 
47) How motivated were you in order to achieve these objectives?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
My motivation was 
Low   High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Why, what motivated you the most, what motivated you the less?  
 
48) Based on your experience on the component you specialised in during the project, how is the related 
technology evolving (rate of system development) and how different are the new systems (architecture, 
components) compared to the old ones and how different are the processes of their development? 
(Even/uneven, slow rate, fast, too fast, completely different, similar, etc.). Indicate changes for the case of 





49) With regard to your activities in Algeria that are related to the component(s) you specialised in during the 
project, are you part of a larger team/project or your activity is rather individual?  
 
49-a/ If you are part of a larger team/project  
 
-What is the size of this team/project (number of personnel, specialisation, position, location, 
organisation, etc.)? Indicate if members were part of any collaborative satellite projects (with foreign 
firms) and indicate which projects?  
 
-If this team involved more than one organisation, was this collaboration framed by explicit agreement 
between organisations or just informal collaboration? What is the core-competencies that you 
distinguish you or your organisation from the others?  
 
-How would you describe relationship with the team/project members? Rate for each member, including 
the team leader 
 
Circle the appropriate number for each member (including the team leader) 
Team/project 
members 














 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
Give further details if required: 
 
49-b/ If your activity is rather individual, have you built your own network of individuals / specialists / 
academics (within or outside your organisation) that can contribute in your work? (number of personnel, 
specialisation, positions, organisations, etc.). Give examples 
 
50) With regard to your activities in Algeria that are related to the component(s) you specialised in during the 
project,  
 
- Have you benefited from a training that is related (or complements) to the knowledge you acquired 




- How easily do you participate in seminars and conferences that are related to the component you 
specialised in?  
 




51) With regard to your activities in Algeria that are related to the component(s) you specialised in during the 
project, have you trained, mentored, supervised people in your organisation? Give details on trainees, how 
many trainees? Why were they trained? How long the training lasted?  What kind of training you provided?  
 
 
52) Do you have in your organisation in Algeria any entity (department, laboratory, etc.) that is in charge of 
developing components on which you specialised? What is your relation to this entity?  
 
 
53) Indicate your activities in Algeria that are related to, or make use of, the knowledge acquired on the 
component(s) you specialised in during the project?  
Fill in the table considering that:  
- “Research” refers to basic research 
- “Development” refers to translating technical and scientific knowledge into products, processes, and services 



























54) In your view, what would be the share of your activities related to the component(s) you specialised in, 
compared to all your activities in Algeria?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
Activities related to the component(s) I specialised in represent 
Small share of my total  
activity in Algeria 
 Big share of my total  
activity in Algeria 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
55) In general, how do you find the nature of your activities in Algeria? Fill in the table considering that: 
- “Research” refers to basic research 
- “Development” refers to translating technical and scientific knowledge into products, processes, and 
services 






















….….% Teaching  
Other ….%  
 
D. Final suggestions 
 
56) Based on your experience on the component(s) you specialised in during the project, how reasonable would 
be the objective of developing similar or equivalent component(s) locally?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each component/function you specialised in 
component(s) you specialised in 
I find the objective of developing similar or equivalent 
component(s) locally 
Not reasonable 
objective                                         




1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Why? What would be the local effort and the foreign contribution?  
 
57) Based on your experience on satellite technology, which of the following statement matches your view most 
closely in order to start developing similar or equivalent component locally? 
 








I would suggest to work with foreign firms on relatively old, less complex 
technology providing relatively modest or low system performances □ □ □ □ 
I would suggest to work with foreign firms on relatively new, complex 
technology providing relatively high system performances □ □ □ □ 
I would prefer to work more often on technology with higher risk of failure 
(non-completion of the project or system failure) rather than working less 
often on technology with lesser risk of failure    
□ □ □ □ 
 
58) How averse to risk do you find your organisation when it comes to developing satellite component locally? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find my organisation 
Low risk averse   High risk averse 






59) How motivated are you right now in order to participate in developing similar or equivalent component 
locally? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
My motivation is 
Low   High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 -Why?  
 
60) How confident do you feel about your current abilities in order to participate in developing similar or 
equivalent component locally? 
  
Circle the appropriate number 
My confidence in my current abilities is 
Low   High 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  
 
61) How satisfied are you with your career development in your organisation? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
With regard to my career development, my satisfaction is 
Low   High 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  
 
62) In general, how conducive do you find the environment within your organisation for your work and the 
development of your activities?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find the environment in my organisation 
Not conducive   Very conducive 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  
 
63) In general, how conducive do you find the national environment for your work and the development of your 
activities? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find the national environment 
Not conducive   Very conducive 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  
 
64) How confident do you feel about the process of building satellite system in Algeria? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
With regard to building satellite system in Algeria, I feel 
Not confident   Very confident 












Questions sur la mise en place de capacités de développement de 
petits satellites en Algérie  
 
adressées aux membres de l’équipe du projet Alsat-1 
 
Objectifs de le recherche: Recueillir des données qui permettent de mieux comprendre le 
processus de transfert des technologies satellitaires pour le cas de l’Algérie. Cela permettra 
aux Algériens d'avoir une appréciation sur l'efficacité des mécanismes qu'ils utilisent pour 
mettre en place un potentiel de développement des technologies de petits satellites, et 
fournira des indications sur les processus les plus efficaces à adopter pour transférer les 
technologies satellitaires. 
 
Orientations pour répondre aux questions: 
- Utilisez, à votre convenance, l'arabe, le français ou l'anglais au moment de répondre. 
- Certaines réponses sont formulées en encerclant un nombre ① ou en cochant une case  
√  , d'autres réponses exigent des commentaires écrits. Si l'espace prévu sur le 
formulaire est insuffisant pour vos commentaires, utilisez des feuilles supplémentaires. 
Vous pouvez également joindre des documents que vous estimeriez pertinents. 
- Une fois que vous aurez répondu aux questions, le chercheur lui-même vous interviewera 
(face-à-face) lors d’une réunion, à convenir, pour s’assurer de la bonne compréhension 
des questions et de la bonne formulation des réponses. 
- Toutes les réponses seront traitées de manière confidentielle. Seul le chercheur aura 
accès à ces réponses. Votre identité ne sera pas révélée. Vous serez identifié seulement 
par un code (ex. participant A, B, C, etc.). 
 
Sections couvertes: 
A. Informations générales  
B. Activités dans le cadre du projet  
C. Activités après le projet  
D. Suggestions finales  
Participant ID: Date: 
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A. Informations générales  
 
1) Quelle est votre formation? Indiquez les institutions de formation et les périodes correspondantes 
(Indiquez à partir du «Baccalauréat»). 
 
Formation/Diplôme Période Institution de formation 
   
 
2) Quel est votre parcours professionnel? Indiquez les organisations (employeurs) et les périodes 
correspondantes. 
 








3) Avant de participer à ce projet, aviez-vous déjà pris part à d’autres projets ou activités impliquant des 
étrangers (Exemple : projets conjoints, négociations, R&D conjoints, etc.)? 
 
4) Quand aviez-vous rejoint l’équipe du projet? Pourquoi et comment aviez-vous été sélectionné pour le 
projet? Décrivez l'ensemble du processus. 
 
5) Combien de temps avant le début du projet aviez-vous été informé de votre sélection? 
 
6) Aviez-vous participé à des activités préparatoires liées au projet avant son début? (Par exemple: 
l'évaluation des technologies, négociation du projet avec la firme étrangère, des études de conception ou 
de spécification, des sessions d'initiation au projet, formation pratique, formation théorique, formation de 
langue, etc.). Expliquez quelles étaient ces activités? Comment elles étaient utiles pour le projet? Est-ce 
que leurs durées étaient appropriées ? Comment auraient-elles pu être effectuées pour un meilleur 
résultat? 
 
7) Combien de fois aviez-vous rencontré (d’une manière formelle ou informelle) des hauts dirigeants de votre 
organisation avant le début du projet afin de discuter sur le projet? Qui étaient-ils? A quelle occasion et 
quel était le but des rencontres? 
 
8) Quelle était votre motivation avant le début de ce projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le niveau de ma motivation était 
Bas                                                                   Haut  
                       1          2           3           4            5 
  
-Pourquoi? Qu’est-ce qui vous motivait le plus, qu’est-ce qui vous motivait le moins? 
 
B. Activités dans le cadre du projet  
 
9) Dans quel(s) composant (s) (par exemple: Unité/Module/Sous-système/Système) ou fonction (s) vous vous 
êtes spécialisés? Cochez la ou les cases appropriées. Donnez une indication sur la profondeur de votre 




composant (s) (par exemple: Unité/Module/Sous-système/Système) 
ou fonction (s) 
Je me suis spécialisé 
dans ce/ces 
composant(s) 
Mon implication dans ce / ces 
composants/fonctions était 
Non profonde Profonde 
Segment spatial (Space  Segment)  1       2        3        4         5 
Plate-forme (Platform)  1       2        3        4         5 
Structure  1       2        3        4         5 
Contrôle thermique (Thermal control)  1       2        3        4         5 
Alimentation de bord (On-board power supply)  1       2        3        4         5 
contrôle d'attitude (Attitude control)  1       2        3        4         5 
Traitement des données (Data handling)  1       2        3        4         5 
Charge utile (Payload)  1       2        3        4         5 
Intégration, Assemblage et test (Integration-Assembly-Test)  1       2        3        4         5 
Intégration plate-forme (Spacecraft Integration)  1       2        3        4         5 
Intégration plate-forme avec charge utile (Payload-to-
spacecraft Integration) 
 1       2        3        4         5 
Test Satellite (Satellite Testing)  1       2        3        4         5 
Equipement de servitude au Sol (Ground Support 
Equipment-GSE) 
 1       2        3        4         5 
Segment Sol (Ground Segment)  1       2        3        4         5 
Contrôle de mission (Mission Control)   1       2        3        4         5 
Contrôle charge utile (Payload Control)   1       2        3        4         5 
Système de communication (Communication System)  1       2        3        4         5 
Fonctions de support (Support Functions)  1       2        3        4         5 
Management (gestion du programme) - Management task 
(Programme Management) 
 1       2        3        4         5 
ingénierie système - Engineering tasks (System Engineering)  1       2        3        4         5 
Assurance de produit (Product assurance tasks)  1       2        3        4         5 
Formation (Training)  1       2        3        4         5 
Lancement, Exploitation et entretien (Launch, Operations and 
Maintenance) 
 1       2        3        4         5 
Lancement (Launch)  1       2        3        4         5 






10) Où et comment le composant dans lequel vous vous êtes spécialisés a été développé? (Conçu, 
manufacturé, intégré, testé, complètement par la firme dans ses installations, partiellement, etc.). 
 
-Si le composant a été développé partiellement à l’extérieur de la firme, quelle a été votre niveau 
d’implication dans le développement extérieur (par exemple : en participant au développement, à la 
formation, dans des installations des fournisseurs/sous-traitant, aux réunions/échanges)? Décrivez 
comment la collaboration technique entre la firme (Prime) et ses fournisseurs/sous-traitants a été 
effectuée? Et quelle est la profondeur des connaissances de la firme (Prime) sur ce composant et pourquoi 






















-Avez-vous trouvé vos connaissances préalables (formation/compétences/connaissances/expériences) 
appropriées aux exigences des composants/fonctions dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composants/fonctions dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants/fonctions dont vous 
vous êtes spécialisés 
Mes connaissances préalables étaient 
Inferieures aux 
exigences            
Proches des 
exigences            
Au-delà des 
exigences            
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? et quelles sont les connaissances qui ont été les plus requises? 
 
-Comment avez-vous trouvé la clarté des objectifs de votre participation au projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composants/fonctions dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants/fonctions dont vous 
vous êtes spécialisés 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs  
Pas clairs  clairs 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi?  
 
-Comment avez-vous trouvé l’ambition des objectifs de votre participation au projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composants/fonctions dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants/fonctions dont vous 
vous êtes spécialisés 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas ambitieux  Ambitieux  
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi?  




Remplissez les cellules et encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque type de formation 
Type de formation Durée 
Comment la formation a été 
contrôlée et supervisée  
(Evaluation académique, tests 
et examens, mémoires et 
dissertation, présentation, 
travaux pratiques, etc.) 
Est-ce que la formation a été appropriée pour le reste de vos 
activités 
Durant le projet Après le projet  
Inappropriée Appropriée Inappropriée Appropriée 
Formation Théorique  
(Cours académiques, 
cours axés sur des 
projets, etc.) 
  
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Formation Pratique  
(Effectuées sur des 
systèmes non-réels, 




1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Formation sur les 
systèmes Réels (On 
Job training)  
Travaux pratiques 
effectués sur des 
systèmes réels) 
  
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
12) En ce qui concerne les composants/fonctions dont vous vous êtes spécialisés, Comment avez-vous trouvé la 
profondeur des connaissances acquises durant le projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composants/fonctions dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants/fonctions dont vous 
vous êtes spécialisés 
J’ai trouvé les connaissances 
Pas profondes  Profondes 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? (Donnez des explications sur les disciplines requises et celles qui ont été couvertes, est ce que 
le temps passé durant les formations était suffisant? Est-ce que le nombre d'Algériens formés était 
suffisant? Est-ce que les connaissances transmises ont été axées sur les architectures, processus 
d'intégration, ou sur des aspects particuliers du composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés, etc.? Quel 
serait le nombre approprié de stagiaires et les profils (background) appropriés pour une acquisition efficace 
des connaissances? 
 
13) En ce qui concerne les composants/fonctions dont vous étiez seulement impliqués (et non spécialisés), 
Comment avez-vous trouvé la profondeur des connaissances acquises? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composants/fonctions dont vous étiez impliqués (et non spécialisés) 
composants/fonctions dont vous 
étiez impliqués (et non spécialisés) 
J’ai trouvé les connaissances 
Pas profondes  Profondes 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Comment et pourquoi?   
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Description des phases 
Quelles étaient vos 
Missions/obligations/objectifs 
Mon implication dans cette phase 
était 
Pas profonde Profonde 
Phase 0 Analyse de mission / identification des 
besoins, où les objectifs et les fonctions 
de la mission sont définis (Mission 
analysis/needs identification, where mission 





1       2        3        4         5 
Phase A  Faisabilité, où les concepts généraux de 
la mission et les exigences fonctionnelles 
du système sont définies (Feasibility, where 
mission general concepts and system functional 
requirements are defined) 
 
 1       2        3        4         5 
Phase B  Définition préliminaire, où les exigences 
fonctionnelles des sous-systèmes sont 
définies, toutes les activités et les 
ressources pour le développement du 
projet sont identifiés, l’évaluation 
préliminaire des risques est effectuée 
(Preliminary Definition, where sub-systems 
functional requirements are defined, all 
activities and resources for the project 
development are identified, and preliminary 








1       2        3        4         5 
Phase C  Définition détaillée, lorsque les 
spécifications techniques et 
fonctionnelles détaillées des segments, 
spatial et sol, sont définis (Detailed 
Definition, where the detailed technical and 
functional specifications of the space and 





1       2        3        4         5 
Phase D  Fabrication, assemblage et essais, où le 
développement et la qualification du 
système (segment spatial et sol) et ses 
produits (images) sont réalisées 
(Manufacturing, Assembly and Testing, where 
the development and qualification of the 
system (space and ground segment) and its 





1       2        3        4         5 
- Approvisionnement (de service ou 
d'équipement, auprès des tiers). 
(Procurement (of service or equipment, from 
third-party)) 
 
 1       2        3        4         5 
- Fabrication/Développement (soit au 
sein de l'entreprise ou à l'extérieur de 
l'entreprise) (Manufacturing/development 
(either within the firm or outside the firm)) 
 
 1       2        3        4         5 
- Assemblage (Soit au sein de 
l'entreprise ou à l'extérieur de 
l'entreprise) (Assembly (either within the firm 
or outside the firm)) 
 
 1       2        3        4         5 
- Tests ou essais (Soit au sein de 
l'entreprise ou à l'extérieur de 
l'entreprise) (Testing (either within the firm 
or outside the firm)) 
 
 1       2        3        4         5 
Phase E  Lancement et exploitation du système, 
où les activités liées au lancement, la 
mise en service, le maintien des 
éléments orbitaux du segment spatial en 
utilisant le segment sol sont effectuées 
(Launch and operations of the system, where 
activities related to launch, commissioning, 
maintaining space segment orbital elements 
and utilising ground segment are performed) 
 
1       2        3        4         5 
Phase F  Livraison, il s’agit des activités 
nécessaires pour mettre le système à la 
disposition du client (ou de l'opérateur). 
(Disposal, referring the activities needed to put 





1       2        3        4         5 
Autres    







15) Décrivez les phases auxquelles vous avez participé? 
 




Durée de votre 
participation 
(Jours/heures) 
Quels types de formation ont été 
dispensés 
Est-ce que le temps passé dans 
cette phase était suffisant pour 
acquérir efficacement les 
connaissances? 
Est-ce que la formation a été appropriée pour vos activités 
Durant le projet Après le projet 



































1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire.
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16) Durant le projet, quelles sont les réunions/revues dans lesquelles vous avez pris part ? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque réunion/revue 
Réunions/Revues Dans quelle mesure vous avez contribué 
dans ces réunions/revues 
Dans quelle mesure vous avez appris de la 
contribution des autres participants? 




Je n’ai pas appris 
beaucoup 
J’ai beaucoup  
appris 
Revue de Définition de Mission (Mission 
Definition Review-MDR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue des Spécifications Préliminaires 
(Preliminary Requirements Review-PRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue des Spécifications Système 
(System Requirements Review-SRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Conception Préliminaire 
(Preliminary Design Review-PDR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Conception Critique (Critical 
Design Review-CDR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Qualification (Qualification 
Review-QR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue d’Acceptation (Acceptance 
Review-AR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue d’Aptitude Opérationnelle 
(Operational Readiness Review-ORR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue d’Aptitude au Vol (Flight 
Readiness Review-FRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue d’Aptitude au Lancement 
(Launch Readiness Review-LRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue des Résultats de Mise en service 
(Commissioning Result Review-CRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Fin de Vie (End-of-life Review-
ELR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Clôture de la Mission (Mission 
Close-out Review-MCR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Autres   
Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire. 
 
17) Combien de fois aviez-vous rencontré (d’une manière formelle ou informelle) des hauts dirigeants de votre 
organisation au cours du projet afin de discuter sur le projet? Qui étaient-ils? A quelle occasion et quel était 
le but de ces rencontres? 
 
18) Quelle est la fiabilité des composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée pour chaque composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants dont vous vous 
êtes spécialisés 














 □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 □ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
 
19) Quelle est la complexité des composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? Considérant que la complexité est 
une combinaison de: -Nombre de sous-composants à développer /personnaliser pour l'élaboration du 




Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants dont vous vous êtes 
spécialisés 
La complexité du composant était 
Ordinaire  Haute 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? 
  
20) Quelle est la performance des composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants dont vous vous êtes 
spécialisés 
La performance du composant était 
Basse  Haute 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? 
 
21) Quelle est la part des COTS (Commercial off-the-shelf)  dans les composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants dont vous vous êtes 
spécialisés 
La part des COTS était  
Basse  Haute 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
22) Quelle est la part des éléments matures dans les composants? (Par exemple : la technologie qui a un héritage  
établi dans l'utilisation dans l'espace, la technologie qui a des scores élevés sur les échelles  Technology 
Readiness Level-TRL ou Manufacturing readiness level-MRL) 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants dont vous vous êtes 
spécialisés 
La part des éléments matures était  
Basse  Haute 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 




23) En ce qui concerne les composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés, Comment trouviez-vous les connaissances 
fournies par la société étrangère au cours du projet, pour chacune des caractéristiques suivantes: 
 
a/ En terme de Nouveauté (par rapport à la connaissance déjà disponible dans ce secteur)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants dont vous vous êtes 
spécialisés 
Les connaissances fournies étaient 
Vielles  Nouvelles 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi?  
 
b/ En terme d’ampleur (diversité des disciplines impliquées dans le composant dont vous vous êtes 
spécialisés)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants dont vous vous êtes 
spécialisés 
Les connaissances fournies impliquent 
Peu de 
disciplines 




1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? 
 
c/ En terme de Profondeur (par rapport aux disciplines impliquées)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants dont vous vous êtes 
spécialisés 
Les connaissances fournies étaient 
Pas très profondes  Très profondes 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? 
 
24) A votre avis, quelle est la complexité du système satellitaire en entier? Considérant que la complexité est une 
combinaison de: -Nombre de composants à développer /personnaliser pour l'élaboration du système 
satellitaire, -Nombre de compétences (diversité) nécessaires pour le projet satellitaire, -Nouvelles 







Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La complexité du système satellitaire était 
Ordinaire  Haute 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? 
 
25) A votre avis, quelle est la performance du système satellitaire en entier ? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La performance du système satellitaire était 
Basse  Haute 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? 
 
26) Donnez la liste des outils d'ingénierie, équipements, logiciels et installations utilisés pour le développement 
des composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
Phases 
Les outils d'ingénierie, équipements, logiciels et installations 
Utilisés par la compagnie 
étrangère 
Que vous avez utilisé 
vous-même durant le 
projet  
Qui sont disponibles dans vos 
installations en Algérie (ou peuvent 
être facilement trouvés ailleurs en 
Algérie) 
Durant la spécification et la 

























Durant le lancement et 
l’exploitation (launch and operations) 
   
Autres    
-Si les outils d'ingénierie, équipements, logiciels et installations nécessaires pour le développement des 
composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés ne sont pas disponibles (ou manquant) dans vos installations 
en Algérie? A quel point ils sont importants ? et peuvent-ils être achetées ou acquis ? 
 
27) Donnez la liste de la documentation et des ressources documentaires utilisées pour le développement des 
composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
Phases 
La documentation et les ressources documentaires 
Utilisées par la compagnie 
étrangère 
Que vous avez utilisé 
vous-même durant le 
projet  
Qui sont disponibles dans vos 
installations en Algérie (ou peuvent 
être facilement trouvées ailleurs en 
Algérie) 
Durant la spécification et la 

























Durant le lancement et 
l’exploitation (launch and operations) 
   
Autres    
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-Si la documentation et les ressources documentaires nécessaires pour le développement des 
composants/fonctions dont vous vous êtes spécialisés ne sont pas disponibles (ou manquant) dans vos 
installations en Algérie? A quel point elles sont importantes ? Pourquoi elles n’ont pas pu être achetées ou 
acquises? Avez-vous essayé de les reproduire (même en partie)? 
 
-En ce qui concerne la documentation du projet et les ressources documentaires ramenées en Algérie, 
Comment sont-elles gérées? Où sont-elles? Est-ce qu’elles sont facilement accessibles? Qui a accès à elles? 
Est-ce que cette documentation a été utilisée depuis lors? 
 
28) En se basant sur les connaissances acquises au cours du projet (soit à travers des ressources écrites ou non 
écrites), avez-vous tenté de préparer une documentation (ex. documentation théorique, documentation 
pratique, rapport/routines/tests/procédures, etc.) pour un usage interne au sein de votre organisation en 
Algérie? Et quelle est l'importance de cette documentation pour effectuer indépendamment des tâches en 
Algérie? 
 
29) En se basant sur les connaissances acquises au cours du projet (soit à travers des ressources écrites ou non 
écrites), avez-vous tenté de mener une activité de R&D, publiée ou non publiée, (ex. articles de revues, 
conférences, rapports d'études, brevets, etc. )? Combien de travaux ont été menés? Quelles sont les 
personnes impliquées et quelles sont leurs organisations/institutions d’appartenance? 
 
30) Donnez la liste des ressources humaines et compétences nécessaires pour le développement des composants 
dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
Phases 
Les ressources humaines et compétences  
Utilisées par la compagnie étrangère 
Qui sont disponibles dans vos installations en 
Algérie (ou peuvent être facilement trouvées 
ailleurs en Algérie) 
Durant la spécification et la 

























Durant le lancement et l’exploitation 








-Si les ressources humaines et compétences nécessaires pour le développement des composants/fonctions 
dont vous vous êtes spécialisés ne sont pas disponibles (ou manquant) dans vos installations en Algérie? A 
quel point elles sont importantes ? A quel point il est difficile de les former ou de les recruter ?  
 
31) Quelle était la langue (ou les langues) de travail durant le projet? Etiez-vous à l’aise avec cette langue (ou ces 
langues)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque langue utilisée durant le projet 
Langue(s) 
J’étais  
Moins à l’aise  Très à l’aise 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 




32) Durant votre participation au projet, combien de mentors (superviseurs) aviez-vous ? et combien de temps 










33) Comment qualifiez-vous votre relation de travail avec vos mentors durant le projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chacun des mentors durant le projet  
Mentor (s) 















 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire: (ex. il ne pouvait pas fournir plus de connaissances et d’information 
en raison des restrictions appliquées par son entreprise, la protection de la technologie, les termes 
contractuels ne prévoyaient pas cela, les deux personnalités étaient différentes ce qui rendait la 
communication difficile, etc.) 
 
34) Comment qualifiez-vous les connaissances et les capacités pédagogiques de vos mentors? 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chacun des mentors durant le projet 
Mentor Connaissances théoriques du 
mentor 
Connaissances pratiques du 
mentor 
Capacités pédagogiques 
Limitées Etendues Limitées Etendues Limitées Hautes 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire, et donnez une indication sur le volume des connaissances que vous 
avez acquises de lui et pourquoi vous ne pouviez pas acquérir tout (ex. il a des connaissances limitées, il 
manque de communication, la langue (ou langage) qu'il utilisait était difficile à comprendre, les 
connaissances transmises n’étaient pas assez détaillées, les connaissances transmises ne pouvaient pas 
être facilement expliquées, les connaissances ont été transmises en utilisant des codes, symboles, 
frameworks inhabituels, le temps passé avec lui n’était pas suffisant, vos connaissances initiales sur la 
question étaient limitées et il était nécessaire, en premier, de mettre à jour les connaissances, puis suivre 
avec lui, etc.) 
 
35) Quand, à quelle fréquence et à qui aviez-vous l’habitude de rapporter (et donner des feedbacks) sur 
l'avancement des travaux durant le projet? (Au mentor, au chef de projet algérien, est-ce que cela était fait 
régulièrement, occasionnellement lorsque la situation était jugée inacceptable, de façon formelle, de façon 
informelle, etc.?) Aviez-vous vécu des situations où vous avez soulevé des questions/problèmes? Aviez-vous 







36) Comment qualifiez-vous votre relation de travail durant le projet avec des collègues travaillant sur les mêmes 
composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque collègue travaillant sur le même composant 
collègues 















 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
-Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire. 
 
37) Comment qualifiez-vous votre relation de travail durant le projet avec des collègues travaillant sur d’autres 
composants/fonctions du système satellitaire (et pas les composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque collègue travaillant sur d’autres composants/fonctions du système satellitaire 
(ex. chef de projet, ingénierie système, AIT, Energie, Charge utile, etc.) 
collègues 















 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
-Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire. 
 
38) Décrivez comment vous aviez été impliqué dans des tâches liées à l'intégration de l'ensemble du système 
satellitaire? 
 
-Quelle était la profondeur de votre implication?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Mon implication dans l'intégration de l'ensemble du satellite était 
Pas profonde  Très profonde 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
39) Veuillez classer de "1" à "5" les sources de connaissances suivantes en fonction de leur contribution dans 
l'ensemble des connaissances que vous avez acquises durant le projet? 












Sources de connaissances classement  Donnez des détails si nécessaire. 
Mentor (s) (son jugement et 
appréciation) 
  
D'autres individus et experts 
(leurs jugements et 
appréciations) 
  
la documentation et les bases de 
données du projet (plans, 
manuels, guides, exigences 
système, spécifications, 
interfaces, plans et procédures 
d’implémentation, routines de 
test, rapports, etc.) (Blueprints, 
handbooks, workbooks, guides, system 
requirements, specifications, interfaces, 
implementation plans and procedures, test 
routines, reports, etc.) 
  
Bibliothèques (livres, publications 




Autres    
 
40) Sur la base de votre expérience, laquelle des déclarations suivantes correspond le plus à votre point de vue 
sur l’orientation des connaissances que vous avez acquises durant le projet? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée 






Je suis en 
accord 
Les connaissances fournies ont été axées sur le composant dont vous vous 
êtes spécialisés en tant que composant indépendant □ □ □ □ 
Les connaissances fournies ont été axées sur le composant dont vous vous 
êtes spécialisés en tant qu’élément appartenant à l'ensemble du système 
satellitaire (ex. l'interaction avec d'autres composants, processus 
d'intégration au sein de l'ensemble du système, etc.) 
□ □ □ □ 
 
41) Sur la base de votre expérience, laquelle des déclarations suivantes correspond le plus à votre point de vue 
sur le risque pris par la compagnie étrangère lorsqu’elle dispensait des formations sur les composants dont 
vous vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée 






Je suis en 
accord 
Je crois que la formation dispensée était sur une technologie qui a été 
exploitée jusqu'à ses limites et peut être transférée sans risque (ex. risque 
d’alimenter une concurrence future, considérations sécuritaires). 
□ □ □ □ 
Je crois que la technologie était avancée, mais la formation dispensée 
n’était pas assez profonde pour constituer un risque pour la société 
étrangère (ex. risque d'alimenter une concurrence future, considérations 
sécuritaires). 
□ □ □ □ 
Je crois que la technologie était avancée, mais la société étrangère 
considérait que les capacités algériennes n’étaient pas assez avancées 
pour faire usage d’une technologie avancée. 
□ □ □ □ 
 
C. Activités après le projet 
 
42) Avez-vous entretenu des relations avec le personnel de la compagnie étrangère après le projet? Si oui, est-ce 
que ces relations sont formelles ou informelles, de courtoisie ou professionnelles? 
 
43) Au cours de vos activités après ce projet, avez-vous été impliqué dans des développements de technologie 
satellitaire? 
 
- Décrivez vos activités dans le cadre d'autres projets satellitaires avec des firmes étrangères (Alsat-2A, 




- Décrivez vos activités en dehors des projets satellitaires avec des compagnies étrangères (activités locales, 
etc.) 
 
44) Dans le cadre de vos activités liées aux technologies satellitaires en Algérie, en dehors des projets (Alsat-2A, 
Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B), quels étaient les buts et objectifs de vos activités?  
 
45) Comment les objectifs ont été définis? Qui les a définis? 
 
45-a/ Si les objectifs ont été définis par vous, est-ce qu’ils ont été discutés et approuvés par d'autres 
niveaux supérieurs de management? Quels sont ces niveaux? Est-ce que ces objectifs se complémentent 
avec d’autres objectifs? 
 
-Comment avez-vous trouvé la clarté de ces objectifs? 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas clairs  clairs 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
- Comment avez-vous trouvé la complexité de ces objectifs ? Considérant que la complexité est une 
combinaison de: -Nombre de composants à développer/personnaliser pour atteindre l’objectif, -Nombre 
de compétences (diversité) nécessaires pour le projet, -Nouvelles connaissances nécessaires pour le 
projet. 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La complexité des objectifs est 
Basse  Haute 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
- Comment avez-vous trouvé le risque associé à ces objectifs? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le risque associé aux objectifs est 
Bas  Haut 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de spécifications (liberté d'ajuster les spécifications ou 
de revoir complètement les objectifs)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de spécifications est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de financement (liberté de demander plus d'argent)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de financement est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de délais (liberté d'aller au-delà des délais)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de délais est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 




-En général, comment avez-vous trouvé l’ambition de ces objectifs ?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas ambitieux  Ambitieux 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Comment avez-vous l’habitude de rapporter (et donner des feedbacks) sur les travaux relatifs à ces 
objectifs? À quelle fréquence? à qui? 
 
45-b/ Si les objectifs sont définis ailleurs, où exactement? A quel niveau de management? Est-ce que ces 
objectifs se complémentent avec d’autres objectifs? 
 
-Comment avez-vous trouvé la clarté de ces objectifs? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas clairs  clairs 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
- Comment avez-vous trouvé la complexité de ces objectifs ? Considérant que la complexité est une 
combinaison de: -Nombre de composants à développer/personnaliser pour atteindre l’objectif, -Nombre 
de compétences (diversité) nécessaires pour le projet, -Nouvelles connaissances nécessaires pour le 
projet. 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La complexité des objectifs est 
Basse  Haute 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
- Comment avez-vous trouvé le risque associé à ces objectifs? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le risque associé aux objectifs est 
Bas  Haut 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de spécifications (liberté d'ajuster les spécifications ou 
de revoir complètement les objectifs)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de spécifications est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de financement (liberté de demander plus d'argent)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de financement est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de délais (liberté d'aller au-delà des délais)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de délais est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 




-En général, comment avez-vous trouvé l’ambition de ces objectifs ?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas ambitieux  Ambitieux 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Comment avez-vous l’habitude de rapporter (et donner des feedbacks) sur les travaux relatifs à ces 
objectifs? À quelle fréquence? à qui? 
 
46) Combien de fois avez-vous rencontré (d’une manière formelle ou informelle) des hauts dirigeants de votre 
organisation afin de discuter sur ces objectifs? Qui étaient-ils? A quelle occasion et quel était le but des 
rencontres? 
 
47) Quelle était votre motivation pour la réalisation de ces objectifs? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le niveau de ma motivation était 
Bas                                                                   Haut  
                       1          2           3           4            5 
  
-Pourquoi? Qu’est-ce qui vous motivait le plus, qu’est-ce qui vous motivait le moins? 
 
48) En se basant sur votre expérience sur les composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés, comment la 
technologie évolue (vitesse de développement du système) et quelles sont les similitudes/différences entre 
les nouveaux systèmes (architecture, composants) par rapport aux anciens, et quelles sont les 
similitudes/différences dans leurs processus de développement? (réguliers/irréguliers, vitesse lente, vitesse 
élevée, trop élevée, des systèmes complètement différents, systèmes similaires, etc.). Donnez des indications 
sur les changements pour le cas des satellites algériens. 
 
49) En ce qui concerne vos activités en Algérie qui sont liées aux composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
durant le projet, est-ce que vous faite partie d'une équipe/projet ou votre activité est plutôt individuelle? 
 
49-a/ Si vous faite partie d'une équipe/projet, 
 
-Quelle est la taille de cette équipe/projet (nombre de personnel, spécialisation, leurs postes/positions, 
emplacement, leurs organisations/institutions, etc.)? Indiquez si les membres faisaient partie des 
projets satellitaires et indiquez lesquels? 
 
-Si cette équipe implique plus d'une organisation/institution, est-ce que cette collaboration est encadrée 
par un accord explicite entre organisations ou bien elle est informelle? Quelles sont les compétences 
clés qui distinguent votre organisation des autres? 
 
-Comment qualifiez-vous votre relation de travail avec les membres de l’équipe/projet? Evaluez pour 


































 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
-Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire 
 
49-b/ Si votre activité est plutôt individuelle, avez-vous construit votre propre réseau d'individus / 
spécialistes / universitaires (à l'intérieur ou l'extérieur de votre organisation) qui peuvent contribuer dans 
votre travail? (Nombre de personnes, spécialisation, positions/postes, organisations, etc.). Donnez des 
exemples. 
 
50) En ce qui concerne vos activités en Algérie liées aux composants dont vous vous-êtes spécialisés durant le 
projet,  
 
-Avez-vous bénéficié d'une formation qui est liée aux connaissances acquises durant le projet (ou les 
complète)? (Indiquez les formations en dehors de celles prévues dans le cadre des autres projets 
satellitaires) 
 
-Est-ce que vous participez facilement à des séminaires et conférences liées aux composants dont vous 
vous êtes spécialisés? 
 
- Est-ce que vous accédez facilement aux informations sur les brevets liés aux systèmes sur lesquels vous 
avez travaillé durant le projet? 
 
51) En ce qui concerne vos activités en Algérie liées aux composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés durant le 
projet, avez-vous formé, encadré, supervisé des gens dans votre organisation? Donnez des détails sur les 
stagiaires, combien de stagiaires? Pourquoi ils ont été formés? Combien de temps a duré la formation? Quel 




52) Avez-vous dans votre organisation en Algérie une entité (département, laboratoire, etc.) en charge du 
développement des composants sur lesquels vous vous êtes spécialisés? Quelle est votre relation avec cette 
entité? 
 
53) Indiquez vos activités en Algérie qui sont liées à, ou utilisent, des connaissances acquises durant le projet sur 
les composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés? Remplissez le tableau en considérant que: 
- "Recherche" fait référence à la recherche fondamentale 
- "Développement" fait référence à la traduction de connaissances techniques et scientifiques en 
produits, procédés et services 





















54) Selon vous, quelle serait la part de vos activités liées aux composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés, par 
rapport à toutes vos activités en Algérie? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Les activités liées aux composants dont je me suis spécialisé représentent 
une petite part du total de 
mes activités en Algérie 
 une grande part du total de 
mes activités en Algérie 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
55) En général, comment vous trouvé la nature de vos activités en Algérie? Remplissez le tableau en considérant 
que: 
- "Recherche" fait référence à la recherche fondamentale 
- "Développement" fait référence à la traduction de connaissances techniques et scientifiques en 
produits, procédés et services 
- "Engineering" fait référence à des aspects très pratiques 
 


















….….% Enseignement  








D. Suggestions finales 
 
56) Selon votre expérience sur les composants dont vous vous êtes spécialisés durant le projet, est-ce que 
l'objectif de développer des composants similaires ou équivalents au niveau local serait raisonnable? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque composant dont vous vous êtes spécialisés 
composants dont vous vous êtes 
spécialisés 
Je trouve l'objectif de développer des composants similaires 
ou équivalents au niveau local 
Non raisonnable                                          Très raisonnable 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Pourquoi? Quels seraient l'effort local et la contribution de l’étranger?  
 
57) Sur la base de votre expérience dans les technologies satellitaires, laquelle des déclarations suivantes 
correspond le plus à votre point de vue sur le début de développement de composants similaires ou 
équivalents au niveau local? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée 






Je suis en 
accord 
Je suggère de travailler avec des entreprises étrangères sur des 
technologies relativement anciennes, moins complexe, offrant des 
performances système relativement modestes ou faibles 
□ □ □ □ 
Je suggère de travailler avec des entreprises étrangères sur des 
technologies relativement nouvelles, complexe, offrant des 
performances système relativement élevées 
□ □ □ □ 
Je préférerais travailler plus souvent sur des technologies avec un 
risque d'échec plus élevé (non-achèvement de projet ou défaillance du 
système) plutôt que de travailler moins souvent sur des technologies 
avec un risque d'échec moindre  
□ □ □ □ 
 
 
58) Selon vous, est-ce que votre organisation est favorable à prendre des risques lorsqu’il s’agit de développer 
des composants de satellites au niveau local?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Je trouve que mon organisation est plutôt  
favorable à prendre 
des risques  
 Non favorable à 
prendre des risques 




59) Quelle est votre motivation actuelle pour prendre part au développement de composants similaires ou 
équivalents au niveau local? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le niveau de ma motivation est 
Bas                                                                   Haut  





60) Est-ce que vous êtes confiant de vos aptitudes actuelles pour prendre part au développement de composants 
similaires ou équivalents au niveau local? 
  
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Ma confiance dans mes capacités actuelle est 
Basse                                                                   Haute  




61) Êtes-vous satisfait de votre parcours professionnel (développement de carrière) dans votre organisation? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
S’agissant du développement de ma carrière, ma satisfaction est 
Basse                                                                   Haute  




62) En général, comment trouvez-vous l'environnement au sein de votre organisation pour votre travail et le 
développement de vos activités? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Je trouve l’environnement au sein de mon organisation 
Non favorable                                                                   Très favorable  




63) En général, comment trouvez-vous l'environnement national pour votre travail et le développement de vos 
activités? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Je trouve l’environnement national 
Non favorable                                                                   Très favorable  




64) Est-ce que vous êtes confiant du processus de développement de petits satellites en Algérie? 
  
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
S’agissant du développement local, ma confiance est 
Basse                                                                   Haute  
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Questions on building small satellite capabilities in Algeria 
 
addressed to Alsat-1 project manager 
 
Research aim: Collection of data in order to gain better understanding of satellite 
technology transfer to Algeria. This will enable Algerians to gain an appreciation on the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms that they have used to build satellite technological 
capabilities, and will provide guidance regarding effective processes for transferring satellite 
technology.  
 
Guidance in responding to questions:  
- Please feel free to use Arabic, French or English when responding.  
- Some responses require circling a number ① or ticking a box √  , some other responses 
require written comments. If the space provided on the form is insufficient for your 
comments, use additional sheets as required. Feel free to include any additional material 
deemed relevant.  
- Once you have responded to questions, the researcher will be interviewing you by 
himself in a face-to-face meeting to ensure proper understanding of questions and 
responses.  
- All responses will be treated as confidential with only the researcher having access to 
them. Your identity will not be revealed and you will remain anonymous. You will be only 
identified as Participant A, B, C, etc.  
 
Sections covered:  
A. General information 
B. Activities as part of the project 
C. Activities after the project 




Participant ID: Date: 
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A. General Information 
 
1) What is your educational background? Indicate the corresponding educational organisations and time 
frame (Please indicate from the “Baccalauréat”). 
 








2) What is your professional background? Indicate the corresponding organisation and time frame. 
 









3) Before you participated in this project, have you ever participated in any project or activity involving 
foreigners (e.g. joint project, negotiations, joint R&D, etc.)? 
 
4) Before you participated in this project, have you been trained on, or practiced, project management tools? 
 
5) Before you participated in this project, have you been trained on satellite technology? 
 
6) When did you join the satellite project team? Why and how were you selected for the project? Describe 
the entire process. 
 
7) How long before the beginning of the project were you informed of your selection and of your 
appointment as team leader or project manager? 
 
8) Did you participate in the selection of your team members? If Yes, to what extent?  
 
9) Did you participate in any preparatory activity related to the project before its beginning? (For example: 
project management training, technology assessment, project negotiation with the firm, design or 
specification study, introductory sessions, practical training, theoretical training, language training, etc.). 
Explain what were these activities? How useful were they? How appropriate were their durations? How 
would have they been performed for better result? 
 
10) How often did you meet (formally or informally) senior leaders from your organisation before the 
beginning of the project in order to discuss about the project? Who were they? In which occasion and what 
was the aim of the meeting?  
 
11) How motivated were you before the beginning of this project?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
My motivation was  
Low                                                                     High 
                       1          2           3           4            5 
  




12) How motivated did you find your team members before the beginning of this project?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
Their motivation was  
Low                                                                     High 
                       1          2           3           4            5 
  
-In your view, what motivated them most, what motivated them less? 
 
B. Activities as part of the project 
 
13) What was your team size?  Describe your management chart and indicate areas of specialisation by 
individual? 
 
14) What were the satellite component(s) (e.g. unit/module/sub-system/system) or function(s) you managed 
as part of your duties? Tick the appropriate box or boxes. Indicate how deep were you involved in the 
management of these components and functions? Number of your team members involved? Number of 
Algerian individuals, other than your team members, involved? 
 
component(s) (e.g. unit/module/sub-
system/system) or function(s) 
My involvement in the 
management was  
Number of my 
team members 
involved 
Number of Algerians, 
other than my team 
members, involved Not deep  Deep 
Space  Segment 1       2        3        4         5   
Platform 1       2        3        4         5   
Structure 1       2        3        4         5   
Thermal control 1       2        3        4         5   
On-board power supply 1       2        3        4         5   
Attitude control 1       2        3        4         5   
Data handling 1       2        3        4         5   
Payload 1       2        3        4         5   
Integration, Assembly, and Test 1       2        3        4         5   
Spacecraft Integration 1       2        3        4         5   
Payload-to-spacecraft 
Integration 
1       2        3        4         5   
Satellite Testing 1       2        3        4         5   
Ground Support Equipment-
GSE 
1       2        3        4         5   
Ground Segment 1       2        3        4         5   
Mission Control  1       2        3        4         5   
Payload Control  1       2        3        4         5   
Communication System 1       2        3        4         5   
Support Functions 1       2        3        4         5   
Management task (Programme 
Management) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Engineering tasks (System 
Engineering) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Product assurance tasks 1       2        3        4         5   
Training 1       2        3        4         5   
Launch, Operations and Maintenance 1       2        3        4         5   
Launch 1       2        3        4         5   
Operations and Maintenance 1       2        3        4         5   
Other 
 




15) Where and how was the satellite system developed? (Designed, built, integrated, tested, completely by the 
firm within its facilities, or partially, etc.).  
 
-If the satellite development was partially outsourced (developed outside the firm), what are components 
that have been outsourced? How deep was the knowledge of the Prime about the component and why did 
it rely on the supplier/subcontractor? Describe how was the collaboration between the Prime and the 
Suppliers/Subcontractor carried out? 
 
- If the satellite development was partially outsourced, to what extent were you involved to the 
management of the outside development (e.g. participating in the development management, or trained 
on managing outsourced development, within the suppliers/subcontractor’s facilities, 
meetings/exchange)?  
 
16) The customer project manager in satellite collaborative project might have multiple roles when partaking in 
the project, so: 
 
-What was your role (duties/mission/objectives) as the project customer representative (e.g. ensure the 
contract performance, negotiations with foreign firms representatives, etc.)? 
 
-What was your role (duties/mission/objectives) as team leader (e.g. motivating the team, providing 
guidance, encouraging and facilitating communication development, and coordinating)? 
 
-What was your role (duties/mission/objectives) as management skills learner or trainee (e.g. participating in 
training session on management tools, etc.)? Have you been trained on management tools and techniques 
(project structure, system of monitoring of schedules and budget, supply management, quality management, 
etc.)?  Have you used these tools? Have your team members used these tools? 
 
-What was your role (duties/mission/objectives) as engineer or technical leader? (e.g. if you participated in 
technical activities) 
 
-What would be the proportions of tasks during your participation in the project? 
 
Role (or tasks nature) Proportions (%) 
Project customer representative ……….% 
Algerian team leader ……….% 
Management skills learner ……….% 
Engineer or technical leader ……….% 
Other:  
 
17) In your view, what are the functions that are critical for satellite project management?  
 
18) With regard to tasks requiring satellite management skills, how appropriate did you find your prior 
knowledge (background/skills/knowledge/profiles) to the requirements?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
My prior knowledge was 
Less than 
requirement             
close to  
requirement                      
beyond 
requirement 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Why? and what was the most needed knowledge? 
 
19) How clear did you find the objectives of your participation in the project?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I found the objectives 
Not clear  clear 





-In your view, which of the following statement matches your view most closely on the priority in this 
project?  








The priority of this project was the acquisition of a satellite system and its 
deployment □ □ □ □ 
The priority of this project was learning how to develop a satellite system □ □ □ □ 
 
20) How ambitious did you find the objectives of your participation in the project? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I found the objectives 
Not ambitious  Ambitious  




21) What kind of training your team participated in during the project? Considering that three types of training 
are often provided in collaborative projects: 
-Theoretical training refers to Academic courses, Project focused courses, etc. 
-Practical training refers to that performed on non-real system such as tasks, projects, experiments, etc. 
-On the Job training refers to practical work performed on the actual system. 
 
-How appropriate did you find the training provided with regard to the needs of your team?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each type of training 
Training type  
I find the training   
Inappropriate  Appropriate 
Theoretical training refers to Academic 
courses, Project focused courses, etc. 
1          2           3           4            5 
Practical training refers to that 
performed on non-real system such as 
tasks, projects, experiments, etc. 
1          2           3           4            5 
On the Job training refers to practical 
work performed on the actual system 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Why? How was the training controlled and monitored (Academic evaluation, tests, dissertation, 
presentation, practical tasks, etc.)? 
 
22) How deep do you find the knowledge your team acquired during the project?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I found the knowledge 
Not deep  Deep 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
- Why? (Give explanation on whether the required disciplines were covered, was the time spent sufficient? 
was the number of Algerians trained sufficient? What would be the right number of trainees by 









23) What were the project phases in which your team took part? How deep was your team involved in these phases and how deep were you involved in managing these 
phases?  
 






Was the time your team spent 
in this phase sufficient to 
effectively acquire knowledge? 
How deep your team were 
involved in the phase 
How deep you were involved 
in the management of the 
phase  
Insufficient     Sufficient Not deep   Deep Not deep           Deep 
Phase 0 Mission analysis/needs identification, where mission aims and functions to be performed 
are defined 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase A Feasibility, where mission general concepts and system functional requirements are 
defined 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase B Preliminary Definition, where sub-systems functional requirements are defined, all 
activities and resources for the project development are identified, and preliminary risk 
assessment is carried out 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase C Detailed Definition, where the detailed technical and functional specifications of the space 
and ground segments are defined 
 








Manufacturing, Assembly and Testing, where the development and qualification of the 
system (space and ground segment) and its products (images) are carried out 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Procurement (of service or equipment, from third-party)  1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Manufacturing/development (either within the firm or outside the firm)  1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Assembly (either within the firm or outside the firm)  1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
-Testing (either within the firm or outside the firm)  1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase E Launch and operations of the system, where activities related to launch, commissioning, 
maintaining space segment orbital elements and utilising ground segment are performed 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase F Disposal, referring the activities needed to put the system at customer’s (or operator’s) 
disposal 
 






   
 
Give further details if required. 
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24) During your participation in the project, what were the project meetings/reviews in which you (or your team) 
took part?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each meeting/review 
Meetings/reviews To what extent you (or your team) have 
contributed in these meetings/reviews? 
We have 
To what extent you (or your team) have 










Mission Definition Review-MDR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Preliminary Requirements Review-PRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
System Requirements Review-SRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Preliminary Design Review-PDR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Critical Design Review-CDR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Qualification Review-QR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Acceptance Review-AR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Operational Readiness Review-ORR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Flight Readiness Review-FRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Launch Readiness Review-LRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Commissioning Result Review-CRR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
End-of-life Review-ELR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Mission Close-out Review-MCR 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Other   
Give further details if required, and indicate whether other representatives from your organisation took 
part to these reviews/meetings   
 
25) How often did you meet (formally or informally) senior leaders from your organisation during the project in 
order to discuss about the project? Who were they, in which occasion and what was the aim of the meeting?  
 
26) How reliable was the satellite system?  
 
Tick the appropriate box 










95 and 99% 
More than 
99% 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
27) How complex did you find the satellite project?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each complexity elements 
Elements of complexity 
I find the elements 
Low   High 
Number of components developed/customised to fit in the project 1       2        3        4         5 
Number of skills (diversity) required for the project 1       2        3        4         5 
New knowledge required for the project 1       2        3        4         5 
 




Circle the appropriate number 
I find the satellite system performances 
Low  High 




29) How do you find the share of COTS (Commercial off-the-shelf) components in the satellite system?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find COTS components share 
Low  High 




30) How do you find the share of mature components in the satellite system? (e.g.  Technology that has an 
established heritage in space usage, technology that scores high on the scale of Technology Readiness Level-
TRL or Manufacturing readiness level-MRL)  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find mature components share 
Low  High 




31) With regard to the satellite system, how do you find the knowledge provided by the foreign company during 
the project for each of the following characteristics: 
 
a/ In terms of number of components about which knowledge has been provided?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find the number of components about which 
knowledge has been provided   
Ordinary  High 




b/ In terms of Newness (compared to the knowledge already available in this sector)?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find the provided knowledge  
Old  New 




c/ In terms of Breadth (diversity of disciplines involved in the project)?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
The provided knowledge involved 
Few disciplines  Multitude of disciplines 





d/ In terms of Depth (Depth in the disciplines involved in the project)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
The provided knowledge was 
Not very deep  Very deep 




32) What are the main engineering tools, equipment, software and facilities used for the development of the 
satellite? Indicate whether they are COTS. 
 
Phases 
The main engineering tools, equipment, software and facilities 
Used by the foreign company 
Your team used during the 
project 
That are available in your facilities 
in Algeria (or can be easily found 
elsewhere in Algeria) 



































-If these main engineering tools, equipment, software and facilities required for the development of the 
satellite are not available (or missing) in your facilities in Algeria, tell how important are they? and can they 
be acquired? 
 
33) List the main documentation and knowledge resources used for the development of the satellite?  
 
Phases 
The main documentation and knowledge resources 
Used by the foreign company 
Your team used during the 
project 
That are available in your facilities 
in Algeria (or can be easily found 
elsewhere in Algeria) 




































-If the main documentation and knowledge resources required for the development of the satellite are not 
available (or missing) in your facilities in Algeria, tell how important are they? Why couldn’t they be 




-With regard to the project documentation and knowledge resources brought in Algeria, how are they 
managed? Where are they? How easy are accessible? Who has access to them? Has this documentation 
been used since then?  
 
-With regard to managerial documentation, have you brought the relevant documentation for satellite 
project management (including documentation on management tools used during the project)? How is this 
documentation managed? Where is it? How easy is accessible? Who has access to it? Has this 
documentation been used since then?  
 
34) On the basis of the knowledge acquired during the project (either through written or unwritten resources), 
have you (or your team) attempted to prepare any documentation (e.g. theoretical documentation, practical 
documentation, report/routines/tests/procedures, etc.) for the internal use within your organisation in 
Algeria? and how important is this documentation for performing independently tasks in Algeria? 
 
35) Have you kept records (e.g. comments, notes) on project progress during the project in addition to the 
meeting minutes? Are these records archived, stored in a database, diffused internally, re-used?  
 
36) On the basis of the knowledge acquired during the project (either through written or unwritten resources), 
have you (or your team) attempted to conduct any R&D work, published or not published, (e.g. journal 
papers, conferences papers, study reports, patent, etc.)? How many works have been done? Who are the 
persons involved and to which organisation they belong? 
 
37) List the human skills/resources required for satellite development?   
 
Phases 
The human skills/resources 
Used by the foreign company 
That are available in your facilities in Algeria (or can 
be easily found elsewhere in Algeria) 

































-If the human skills/resources required for satellite development are not available (or missing) in your 
facilities in Algeria, tell how important are they? How difficult can they be developed or acquired? 
 
38) Did you have an individual in your team who played the role of team lead engineer? Describe his role and 
your relationship with him?  
 
-Describe the role of the individual in your team who was in charge of the system engineering function. 







39) What was the work language during the project? How comfortable were your team members with this 
(these) language(s)?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each language used in the project 
Language(s) 
The team members were  
Less comfortable  Very comfortable 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
40) How would you describe your work relationship with your counterpart (or counterparts if there are more 
than one) and representatives from the foreign firm you regularly deal with?  
 


















 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
-Give further details if required: (For example, they couldn’t cooperate further because of restrictions from 
their company, protection of the technology, the two personalities were different which made 
communication not easy, contractual terms were not clear enough, incentives in the contract were 
inappropriate or not sufficient,  etc.) 
 
41) How would you describe your counterpart managerial skills, communication skills, and technical knowledge? 
 
Circle the appropriate number for each counterpart 
Counterpart Managerial skills of the 
counterpart 
Communication skills of the 
counterpart 
Technical knowledge of the 
counterpart 
Limited High Limited High Limited  High 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
-Give further details if required. 
 
42) What was the institutional management team (or entity) managing from Algeria this project?  
 
-When, how often and to whom did you use to report (and give feedback) on the work progress during the 
project? (Was this done regularly, occasionally when situation were deemed un-acceptable, formally, 
informally, etc.?)  
 
-How empowered were you in dealing with technical and managerial issues/questions faced during the 




43) Based on your experience, which of the following statement matches your view most closely on the way you 
were controlling tasks and objectives achievement during the project? 
 








I was deeply involved in the project and the choices, I used to guide the foreign 
firm on how to achieve objectives and provide inputs needed to achieve these 
objectives 
□ □ □ □ 
I used to leave the foreign firm on its own,  I transferred the risk to it and I was 
not hold responsible for providing direction □ □ □ □ 
I used to rely on feedback given by my team members and opinions of persons 
involved in the project on what is acceptable and non-acceptable during the 
project 
□ □ □ □ 
 
44) How would you describe the work relationship between your team members during the project?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 














1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
-Give further details if required: 
 
45) How appropriate did you find your team members prior knowledge (background/ skills/ experience/ 
knowledge/ profiles) to the project requirements?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
My team members prior knowledge was 
Less than 
requirement             
close to  
requirement                      
beyond 
requirement 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Why? and what was the most needed knowledge? 
 
46) How skilled did you find your team members during the project?  (technical competencies, communication 
skills, autonomy) 
 
Circle the appropriate number for each criterion 
Criterion 
The team members skills were  
Low  High 
Technical competencies 1          2           3           4            5 
Communication skills 1          2           3           4            5 
Autonomy in dealing with problems 1          2           3           4            5 
 
47) Among the members of your team, did you have individuals that stood out from the rest,  (e.g. they 
acquired and hold important share of tacit knowledge, practical skills, theoretical skills, communication 
skills, etc.). Have these skills formally reported, recognised and/or administratively recorded (in their 
administrative records, team report, etc.) 
 
48) Describe how was your team involved in tasks related to the assembly, integration and test of the satellite 
system?  
 
-How deep was this involvement at component level?  
 





49) Rank from ” 1” to “5” the following sources of knowledge in order of contribution on the whole knowledge 
your team acquired during the project? 
e.g. “1” being the source that contributes the most in the knowledge the team acquired during the project.  
 
Sources of knowledge Rank  Give details if necessary 





Other individuals and experts 




Project documentation and 
databases (blueprints, 
handbooks, workbooks, guides, 
system requirements, 
specifications, interfaces, 
implementation plans and 
procedures, test routines, 
reports, etc.) 
  
Libraries (books, specialised 








50) Based on your experience, which of the following statement matches your view most closely on the focus of 
the knowledge your team acquired during the project? 
 








The provided knowledge was focused on satellite components as independent 
components, referring to the knowledge that relates to the core design 
concepts of each component 
□ □ □ □ 
The provided knowledge was focused on satellite components as part of the 
whole system or satellite (e.g. interactions between components, process of 
integration within the larger system, etc.), referring to Architectural knowledge 
(system integration) required to put together these components in order to 
form a system? 
□ □ □ □ 
 
51) Based on your experience, which of the following statement matches your view most closely on the risk the 
foreign company was taking when it provided training on the satellite? 
 








I feel the training provided was about a technology that has been exploited up 
to its limits and can be transferred without any risk (e.g. risk of fuelling future 
competition, security considerations). 
□ □ □ □ 
I feel the technology was advanced but the training provided was not deep 
enough to be risky for the foreign company (e.g. risk of fuelling future 
competition, security considerations). 
□ □ □ □ 
I feel the technology was advanced, but the foreign company considers the 
Algerian’s capabilities are deemed to be not well enough advanced to make 
use of the advanced technology. 
□ □ □ □ 
 
C. Activities after the project 
 
52) How many individuals from your project team left your organisation after the project? Indicate whether they 
left the country. 
 
53) Have you maintained relationships with the foreign firm personnel after the project? If yes, are these 




54) Have you organised or got involved in any post-project workshop or meeting aiming to record the project 
experience and the lesson learned? Describe the event, objectives, participants, outcomes, etc.  
 
55) During your activities after the project, have you been involved in any satellite technology development?  
 
- Describe your activities as part of other collaborative satellite projects with foreign companies (Alsat-2A, 
Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B, etc.) 
 
- Describe your activities outside collaborative satellite projects (local activities, etc.) 
 
56) As part of your satellite technology activities in Algeria, outside the collaborative projects, what were the aim 
and objectives of your activities?  
 
57) How were the objectives defined? Who defined them? 
 
a/ If the objectives were defined by you, were they discussed and agreed by other upper management 
levels? Which levels? Did they fit with other objectives?  
 
-How clear do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives clarity 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-How complex do you find these objectives? Considering that complexity is a mix of: Number of 
developed/customised components required for achieving the objective, Number of skills (diversity) 
required for the project, and New knowledge required for the project. 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives complexity 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-How risky do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives risk 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How flexible are these objectives in terms of specification (freedom to adjust specifications or to 
completely review objectives)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives specification flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How flexible are these objectives in terms of funding (freedom to ask more money)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives funding flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 








-How flexible are these objectives in terms of time (freedom to go beyond timeline)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives timeline flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-In general, how ambitious do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find these objectives 
Not ambitious  Ambitious 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How do you report work progress related to these objectives? How often? to whom?   
 
 
b/ If objectives were defined elsewhere, where exactly? Which management levels? Did they fit with other 
objectives? 
 
-How clear do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives clarity 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How complex do you find these objectives? Considering that complexity is a mix of: Number of 
developed/customised components required for achieving the objective, Number of skills (diversity) 
required for the project, and New knowledge required for the project. 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives complexity 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How risky do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives risk 
Low  High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How flexible are these objectives in terms of specification (freedom to adjust specifications or to 
completely review objectives)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives specification flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 








-How flexible are these objectives in terms of funding (freedom to ask more money)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives funding flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-How flexible are these objectives in terms of time (freedom to go beyond timeline)? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find objectives timeline flexibility 
Low flexibility  High flexibility 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-In general, how ambitious do you find these objectives? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find these objectives 
Not ambitious  Ambitious 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-How do you report work progress related to these objectives? How often? to whom?   
 
 
58) How often have you met (formally or informally) senior leaders from your organisation to discuss about these 
objectives during the period from the end of the project until now? Who were they? In which occasion? and 
what was the aim of the meeting?  
 
 
59) How motivated were you in order to achieve these objectives?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
My motivation was 
Low   High 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Why, what motivated you most, what motivated you less?  
 
 
60) Based on your experience on satellite, how is the related technology evolving (rate of system development) 
and how different are the new systems (architecture, components) compared to the old ones and how 
different are the processes of their development? (Even/uneven, slow rate, fast, too fast, completely 
different, similar, etc.). Indicate changes for the case of Algerian satellites.   
 
 
61) With regard to your activities in Algeria that are related to satellite technology, are you leading or part of a 
larger team/project, or your activity is rather individual?  
 
a/ If you are leading or part of a larger team/project  
 
-What is the size of this team/project (number of personnel, specialisation, position within the 
organisation, location, organisation, etc.)? Indicate if members were part of any collaborative projects 




-If this team involved more than one organisation, was this collaboration framed by explicit agreement 
between organisations or just informal collaboration? What is the core-competencies that you 
distinguish you or your organisation from the others?  
 
-How would you describe work relationship with the team/project members?  
 
Circle the appropriate number for each member 














1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
Give further details if required: 
-Describe the team/project structure. How appropriate do you find this structure for satellite projects?  
 
-Describe the management documentation and tools used (system of monitoring of schedules and 
budget, supply management, quality management, cost management, stock management, etc.).  How 
often do team/project members use these tools? Among these management tools, what were already 
used during the collaborative project (the same or similar tools)?  
 
b/ If your activity is rather individual, have you built your own network of individuals/specialists/ academics 
(within or outside your organisation) that can contribute in your work? (Number of personnel, 
specialisation, positions, organisations, etc.). Give examples 
 
62) With regard to your activities in Algeria that are related to satellite technology, how is the related supply 
management function performing?  
 
63) With regard to your activities in Algeria that are related to satellite technology and knowledge you acquired 
during the project,  
 
- Have you benefited from a training that is related (or complements) to the knowledge you acquired 
during the project? (Indicate training that was provided outside other satellite collaborative projects) 
 
- How easily do you participate in seminars and conferences that are related to your area of interest?  
 
- How easily do you access to patent information related to the technology you managed during the 
project? 
 
64) With regard to your activities in Algeria that are related to satellite technology and knowledge you acquired 
during the project, have you trained, mentored, supervised people in your organisation? Give details on 
trainees, how many trainees? Why were they trained? How long the training lasted?  What kind of training 
you provided?  
 
-As part of the same activity, how easily you can recruit qualified personnel from the labour market? 
Indicate how effective is the recruitment process within your organisation (time, anticipation, targeting 
skilled persons, etc.)?    
 
65) Do you have in your organisation in Algeria any entity (department, laboratory, centre, etc.) that is in charge 
of managing satellite development projects? What is your relation to this entity?  
 
66) Indicate your activities in Algeria that are related to, or make use of, the knowledge you acquired during the 
project?  
Fill in the table considering that:  
- “Research” refers to basic research 

























67) In your view, what would be the share of your activities related to satellite project management, compared to 
all your activities in Algeria?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
Activities related to satellite management project represent 
Small share of my total  
activity in Algeria 
 Big share of my total  
activity in Algeria 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
68) In general, how do you find the nature of your activities in Algeria? Fill in the table considering that: 
- “Research” refers to basic research 
- “Development” refers to translating technical and scientific knowledge into products, processes, and services 
- “Engineering” refers to very practical aspects 
 

































D. Final suggestions 
 
69) Based on your experience during the project, how reasonable would be the objective of developing similar or 




Circle the appropriate number 
I find the objective of developing similar or equivalent 
satellites locally 
Not reasonable 
objective                                         
 Very reasonable 
objective 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Why? What would be the core competencies and functions to develop within your organisation, those to 




70) Based on your experience on satellite technology, which of the following statement matches your view most 
closely in order to start developing satellite locally? 
 








I would suggest to work with foreign firms on relatively old, less complex 
technology providing relatively modest or low system performances □ □ □ □ 
I would suggest to work with foreign firms on relatively new, complex 
technology providing relatively high system performances □ □ □ □ 
I would prefer to work more often on technology with higher risk of failure 
(non-completion of the project or system failure) rather than working less 
often on technology with lesser risk of failure    
□ □ □ □ 
 
71) How averse to risk do you find your organisation when it comes to developing satellite locally? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find my organisation 
Low risk averse   High risk averse 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why 
 
72) How motivated are you right now in order to participate in developing satellite locally? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
My motivation is 
Low   High 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  
 
73) How confident do you feel about your current abilities in order to manage satellite project development 
locally? 
  
Circle the appropriate number 
My confidence in my current abilities is 
Low   High 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  
 
74) How satisfied are you with your career development in your organisation? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
With regard to my career development, my satisfaction is 
Low   High 





75) In general, how conducive do you find the environment within your organisation for your work and the 
development of your activities?  
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find the environment in my organisation 
Not conducive   Very conducive 




76) In general, how conducive do you find the national environment for your work and the development of your 
activities? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
I find the national environment 
Not conducive   Very conducive 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Why?  
 
77) How confident do you feel about the process of building satellite system in Algeria? 
 
Circle the appropriate number 
With regard to building satellite system in Algeria, I feel 
Not confident   Very confident 















Questions sur la mise en place de capacités de développement de 
petits satellites en Algérie  
 
adressées au chef de projet Alsat-1 
 
Objectifs de le recherche: Recueillir des données qui permettent de mieux comprendre le 
processus de transfert des technologies satellitaires pour le cas de l’Algérie. Cela permettra 
aux Algériens d'avoir une appréciation sur l'efficacité des mécanismes qu'ils utilisent pour 
mettre en place un potentiel de développement des technologies de petits satellites, et 
fournira des indications sur les processus les plus efficaces à adopter pour transférer les 
technologies satellitaires. 
 
Orientations pour répondre aux questions: 
- Utilisez, à votre convenance, l'arabe, le français ou l'anglais au moment de répondre. 
- Certaines réponses sont formulées en encerclant un nombre ① ou en cochant une case  
√  , d'autres réponses exigent des commentaires écrits. Si l'espace prévu sur le 
formulaire est insuffisant pour vos commentaires, utilisez des feuilles supplémentaires. 
Vous pouvez également joindre des documents que vous estimeriez pertinents. 
- Une fois que vous aurez répondu aux questions, le chercheur lui-même vous interviewera 
(face-à-face) lors d’une réunion, à convenir, pour s’assurer de la bonne compréhension 
des questions et de la bonne formulation des réponses. 
- Toutes les réponses seront traitées de manière confidentielle. Seul le chercheur aura 
accès à ces réponses. Votre identité ne sera pas révélée. Vous serez identifié seulement 
par un code (ex. participant A, B, C, etc.). 
 
Sections couvertes: 
A. Informations générales  
B. Activités dans le cadre du projet  
C. Activités après le projet  
D. Suggestions finales  
Participant ID: Date: 
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A. Informations générales  
 
1) Quelle est votre formation? Indiquez les institutions de formation et les périodes correspondantes 
(Indiquez à partir du «Baccalauréat»). 
 






2) Quel est votre parcours professionnel? Indiquez les organisations (employeurs) et les périodes 
correspondantes. 
 






3) Avant de participer à ce projet, aviez-vous déjà pris part à d’autres projets ou activités impliquant des 
étrangers (Exemple : projets conjoints, négociations, R&D conjoints, etc.)? 
 
4) Avant de participer à ce projet, avez-vous déjà utilisé (ou avez-vous été formé sur) des outils de 
management de projet? 
 
5) Avant de participer à ce projet, avez-vous été formé sur les technologies satellitaires? 
 
6) Quand aviez-vous rejoint l’équipe du projet? Pourquoi et comment aviez-vous été sélectionné pour le 
projet? Décrivez l'ensemble du processus. 
 
7) Combien de temps avant le début du projet aviez-vous été informé de votre sélection et de votre 
désignation comme chef de projet? 
 
8) Aviez-vous participé à la sélection des membres de votre équipe ? Si oui, jusqu’à quel degré?  
 
9) Aviez-vous participé à des activités préparatoires liées au projet avant son début? (Par exemple: 
l'évaluation des technologies, négociation du projet avec la firme étrangère, des études de conception ou 
de spécification, des sessions d'initiation au projet, formation pratique, formation théorique, formation de 
langue, etc.). Expliquez quelles étaient ces activités? Comment elles étaient utiles pour le projet? Est-ce 
que leurs durées étaient appropriées ? Comment auraient-elles pu être effectuées pour un meilleur 
résultat? 
 
10) Combien de fois aviez-vous rencontré (d’une manière formelle ou informelle) des hauts dirigeants de votre 
organisation avant le début du projet afin de discuter sur le projet? Qui étaient-ils? A quelle occasion et 
quel était le but des rencontres? 
 
11) Quelle était votre motivation avant le début de ce projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le niveau de ma motivation était 
Bas                                                                   Haut  
                       1          2           3           4            5 
  





12) Quelle était le niveau de motivation des membres de votre équipe avant le début de ce projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le niveau de leur motivation était 
Bas                                                                   Haut  
                       1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? Qu’est-ce qui les motivait le plus, qu’est-ce qui les motivait le moins? 
 
B. Activités dans le cadre du projet  
 
13) Quelle est la taille de votre équipe? Décrivez votre schéma de gestion (management chart) et indiquez les 
domaines de spécialisation par individu? 
 
14) Quel(s) composant (s) (ex. Unité/Module/Sous-système/Système) ou fonction (s) vous avez managé dans le 
cadre de vos missions ? Cochez la ou les cases appropriées. Donnez une indication sur la profondeur de 
votre implication dans le management de ces composants et ces fonctions ? Nombre d’individus de votre 
équipe impliqués ? Nombre d’Algériens impliqués, autres que ceux de votre équipe? 
 
composant (s) (ex: Unité/Module/Sous-
système/Système) ou fonction (s) 













Segment spatial (Space  Segment) 1       2        3        4         5   
Plate-forme (Platform) 1       2        3        4         5   
Structure 1       2        3        4         5   
Contrôle thermique (Thermal control) 1       2        3        4         5   
Alimentation de bord (On-board power 
supply) 
1       2        3        4         5   
contrôle d'attitude (Attitude control) 1       2        3        4         5   
Traitement des données (Data handling) 1       2        3        4         5   
Charge utile (Payload) 1       2        3        4         5   
Intégration, Assemblage et test (Integration-
Assembly-Test) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Intégration plate-forme (Spacecraft 
Integration) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Intégration plate-forme avec charge utile 
(Payload-to-spacecraft Integration) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Test Satellite (Satellite Testing) 1       2        3        4         5   
Equipement de servitude au Sol (Ground 
Support Equipment-GSE) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Segment Sol (Ground Segment) 1       2        3        4         5   
Contrôle de mission (Mission Control)  1       2        3        4         5   
Contrôle charge utile (Payload Control)  1       2        3        4         5   
Système de communication (Communication 
System) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Fonctions de support (Support Functions) 1       2        3        4         5   
Management (gestion du programme) - 
Management task (Programme Management) 
1       2        3        4         5   
ingénierie système - Engineering tasks (System 
Engineering) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Assurance de produit (Product assurance tasks) 1       2        3        4         5   
Formation (Training) 1       2        3        4         5   
Lancement, Exploitation et entretien (Launch, 
Operations and Maintenance) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Lancement (Launch) 1       2        3        4         5   
Exploitation et entretien (Operations and 
Maintenance) 
1       2        3        4         5   
Autres    
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15) Où et comment le système satellitaire a été développé? (Conçu, manufacturé, intégré, testé, 
complètement par la firme dans ses installations, partiellement, etc.). 
 
-Si le système satellitaire a été développé partiellement à l’extérieur de la firme, quels étaient les 
composants développés à l’extérieur? Quelle est la profondeur des connaissances de la firme (Prime) sur 
ces composants et pourquoi elle a eu recours à ces fournisseurs/sous-traitants? Décrivez comment la 
collaboration technique entre la firme (Prime) et ses fournisseurs/sous-traitants a été effectuée?  
 
- Si le développement du satellite a été partiellement externalisé, quel est votre degré d’implication dans le 
management du développement à l'extérieur (ex. participation dans le management du développement, 
formation sur le management du développement externalisé, chez des fournisseurs/sous-traitants, 
Réunions/échanges)? 
 
16) Le chef de projet de satellite (représentant le client) peut avoir plusieurs rôles dans le projet, alors: 
 
-Quel était votre rôle (obligations/missions/objectifs) en tant que représentant du client (ex. assurer la bonne 
exécution du contrat, négociations avec les représentants de la firme étrangère, etc.)? 
 
-Quel était votre rôle (obligations/missions/objectifs) en tant que chef d'équipe (ex. motiver l'équipe, donner 
des conseils, encourager et faciliter le développement de la communication, et coordonner)? 
 
-Quel était votre rôle (obligations/missions/objectifs) en tant que stagiaire ou apprenti des outils de 
management (ex. participer à des sessions de formation sur les outils de management, etc.)? Avez-vous été 
formé sur les outils et techniques de management (structure de projet, système de suivi des calendriers et du 
budget, gestion des approvisionnements, gestion de la qualité, etc.)? Avez-vous utilisé ces outils? Est-ce que 
les membres de votre équipe ont utilisé ces outils? 
 
-Quel était votre rôle (obligations/missions/objectifs) comme ingénieur ou leader technique? (ex. si vous 
participez à des activités techniques) 
 
-Quelles seraient les proportions des tâches liées aux différents rôles lors de votre participation au projet? 
 
Rôle (ou nature des tâches) Proportions (%) 
Représentant du client ……….% 
Chef d'équipe Algérien ……….% 
Stagiaire ou apprenti des outils de management ……….% 
Ingénieur ou leader technique ……….% 
Autres :  
 
17) Selon vous, quelles sont les fonctions qui sont essentielles pour le management d’un projet satellite? 
 
18) En ce qui concerne les tâches nécessitant des compétences dans le management des satellites, avez-vous 
trouvé vos connaissances préalables (formation/compétences/connaissances/expériences) appropriées aux 
exigences 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Mes connaissances préalables étaient 
Inferieures aux 
exigences            
Proches des 
exigences            
Au-delà des 
exigences            
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? et quelles sont les connaissances qui ont été les plus requises? 
 
19) Comment avez-vous trouvé la clarté des objectifs de votre participation au projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas clairs  clairs 





-Selon vous, laquelle des déclarations suivantes correspond le plus à votre point de vue sur les priorités 
dans ce projet? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée 






Je suis en 
accord 
La priorité de ce projet a été l'acquisition d'un système de satellite et son 
déploiement □ □ □ □ 
La priorité de ce projet a été d'apprendre à développer un système de 
satellite □ □ □ □ 
 
20) Comment avez-vous trouvé l’ambition des objectifs de votre participation au projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas ambitieux  Ambitieux 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi?  
 
21) Quel type de formation votre équipe a suivi durant le projet? Considérant que trois types de formation sont 
souvent dispensés dans des projets de satellites : 
-Formation Théorique: Cours académiques, cours axés sur des projets, etc. 
-Formation Pratique: Effectuées sur des systèmes non-réels, tels que des projets et tâches spécifiques, 
expériences, etc. 
-Formation sur les systèmes Réels (On Job training): Travaux pratiques effectués sur des systèmes réels. 
 
-Est-ce que la formation a été appropriée aux besoins de votre équipe?  
 
encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque type 
Type de formation 
J’ai trouvé la formation   
Inappropriée  appropriée 
Formation Théorique : Cours académiques, 
cours axés sur des projets, etc. 
1          2           3           4            5 
Formation Pratique : Effectuées sur des 
systèmes non-réels, tels que des projets 
et tâches spécifiques, expériences, etc. 
1          2           3           4            5 
Formation sur les systèmes Réels (On 
Job training) : Travaux pratiques 
effectués sur des systèmes réels 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Pourquoi? Comment les formations ont été contrôlées et supervisées (évaluation académique, tests, 
dissertation, présentation, travaux pratiques, etc.)? 
 
22) Comment avez-vous trouvé la profondeur des connaissances acquises par votre équipe durant le projet? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les connaissances 
Pas profondes  Profondes 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Pourquoi? (Donnez des explications sur les disciplines requises et celles qui ont été couvertes, est ce que 
le temps passé durant les formations était suffisant? Est-ce que le nombre d'Algériens formés était 
suffisant? Quel serait le nombre approprié de stagiaires et les profils (background) appropriés pour une 





23) Quelles sont les phases du projet dans lesquelles vous avez pris part ? Quel était le niveau d’implication de votre équipe dans ces phases ? et quel était votre niveau 
d’implication dans le management de ces phases? 
 
Remplissez les cellules et encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque phase 






Est-ce que le temps passé par 
l’équipe dans cette phase était 
suffisant pour acquérir 
efficacement les 
connaissances? 
Le niveau d’implication de 
mon équipe dans ces 
phases était 
Mon niveau d’implication 
dans le management de ces 
phases était 
Insuffisant     Suffisant Pas profond profond Pas profond profond 
Phase 0 Analyse de mission / identification des besoins, où les objectifs et les fonctions de la 
mission sont définis (Mission analysis/needs identification, where mission aims and functions to be 
performed are defined) 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase A Faisabilité, où les concepts généraux de la mission et les exigences fonctionnelles du 
système sont définies (Feasibility, where mission general concepts and system functional 
requirements are defined) 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase B Définition préliminaire, où les exigences fonctionnelles des sous-systèmes sont définies, 
toutes les activités et les ressources pour le développement du projet sont identifiés, 
l’évaluation préliminaire des risques est effectuée (Preliminary Definition, where sub-systems 
functional requirements are defined, all activities and resources for the project development are 
identified, and preliminary risk assessment is carried out) 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase C Définition détaillée, lorsque les spécifications techniques et fonctionnelles détaillées des 
segments, spatial et sol, sont définis (Detailed Definition, where the detailed technical and 
functional specifications of the space and ground segments are defined) 








Fabrication, assemblage et essais, où le développement et la qualification du système 
(segment spatial et sol) et ses produits (images) sont réalisées (Manufacturing, Assembly and 
Testing, where the development and qualification of the system (space and ground segment) and its 
products (images) are carried out) 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
- Approvisionnement (de service ou d'équipement, auprès des tiers). (Procurement (of 
service or equipment, from third-party)) 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
- Fabrication/Développement (soit au sein de l'entreprise ou à l'extérieur de 
l'entreprise) (Manufacturing/development (either within the firm or outside the firm)) 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
- Assemblage (Soit au sein de l'entreprise ou à l'extérieur de l'entreprise) (Assembly 
(either within the firm or outside the firm)) 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
- Tests ou essais (Soit au sein de l'entreprise ou à l'extérieur de l'entreprise) (Testing 
(either within the firm or outside the firm)) 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase E Lancement et exploitation du système, où les activités liées au lancement, la mise en 
service, le maintien des éléments orbitaux du segment spatial en utilisant le segment sol 
sont effectuées (Launch and operations of the system, where activities related to launch, 
commissioning, maintaining space segment orbital elements and utilising ground segment are performed) 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Phase F Livraison, il s’agit des activités nécessaires pour mettre le système à la disposition du client 
(ou de l'opérateur). (Disposal, referring the activities needed to put the system at customer’s (or 
operator’s) disposal) 





   
Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire. 
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24) Durant le projet, quelles sont les réunions/revues dans lesquelles vous (ou votre équipe) avez pris part ? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque réunion/revue 
Réunions/Revues Est-ce que vous (ou votre équipe) avez 
contribué dans ces réunions/revues 
Est-ce que vous (ou votre équipe) avez 
appris dans ces réunions/revues? 
On n’a pas  
contribuée 
On n’a fortement 
contribué 
Je n’ai pas appris 
beaucoup 
J’ai beaucoup  
appris 
Revue de Définition de Mission (Mission 
Definition Review-MDR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue des Spécifications Préliminaires 
(Preliminary Requirements Review-PRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue des Spécifications Système 
(System Requirements Review-SRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Conception Préliminaire 
(Preliminary Design Review-PDR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Conception Critique (Critical 
Design Review-CDR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Qualification (Qualification 
Review-QR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue d’Acceptation (Acceptance 
Review-AR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue d’Aptitude Opérationnelle 
(Operational Readiness Review-ORR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue d’Aptitude au Vol (Flight 
Readiness Review-FRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue d’Aptitude au Lancement 
(Launch Readiness Review-LRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue des Résultats de Mise en service 
(Commissioning Result Review-CRR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Fin de Vie (End-of-life Review-
ELR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Revue de Clôture de la Mission (Mission 
Close-out Review-MCR) 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
Autres   
Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire, et indiquez si d'autres représentants de votre organisation ont pris 
part à ces revues/réunions 
 
25) Combien de fois aviez-vous rencontré (d’une manière formelle ou informelle) des hauts dirigeants de votre 
organisation au cours du projet afin de discuter sur le projet? Qui étaient-ils? A quelle occasion et quel était 
le but de ces rencontres? 
 
26) Quelle est la fiabilité du système satellitaire? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée 
La fiabilité du satellite était 
inférieure 
à 70% 
entre 70 et 
80% 
entre 80 et 
90% 
entre 90 et 
95% 
entre 
95 et 99% 
Supérieure 
à 99% 
□ □ □ □ □ □ 
 
27) Quelle est la complexité du système satellitaire?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque élément de complexité 
Eléments de complexité 
La complexité de cet élément est 
Basse   Haute 
Nombre de composants à développer/personnaliser pour l'élaboration 
du système 
1       2        3        4         5 
Nombre de compétences (diversité) nécessaires pour le projet 1       2        3        4         5 
Nouvelles connaissances nécessaires pour le projet 1       2        3        4         5 
 




Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La performance du système satellitaire est 
Basse   Haute 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? 
 
29) Quelle est la part des COTS (Commercial off-the-shelf)  dans le système satellitaire? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La part des COTS était 
Basse  Haute 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? 
 
30) Quelle est la part des éléments matures dans le système satellitaire? (ex. la technologie qui a un héritage  
établi dans l'utilisation dans l'espace, la technologie qui a des scores élevés sur les échelles  Technology 
Readiness Level-TRL ou Manufacturing readiness level-MRL) 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La part des éléments matures était 
Basse  Haute 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi? 
 
31) En ce qui concerne le système satellitaire, Comment trouviez-vous les connaissances fournies par la société 
étrangère au cours du projet, pour chacune des caractéristiques suivantes: 
 
a/ En terme de nombre de composants sur lesquels des connaissances ont été transmises? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Je trouve le nombre de composants sur lesquels des 
connaissances ont été transmises  
Ordinaire  Haut 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi?  
 
b/ En terme de Nouveauté (par rapport à la connaissance déjà disponible dans ce secteur)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Les connaissances fournies étaient 
Vielles  Nouvelles 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi?  
 
c/ En terme de d’ampleur (diversité des disciplines impliquées)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Les connaissances fournies impliquent 
Peu de disciplines  Beaucoup de disciplines 
1          2           3           4            5 
- Pourquoi? 
 
d/ En terme de Profondeur (par rapport aux disciplines impliquées)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Les connaissances fournies étaient 
Pas très profondes  Très profondes 





32) Donnez la liste des outils d'ingénierie, équipements, logiciels et installations utilisés pour le développement 
du système satellitaire ? Indiquez s’ils sont COTS? 
 
Phases 
Les outils d'ingénierie, équipements, logiciels et installations 
Utilisés par la compagnie 
étrangère 
Que votre équipe a utilisé 
durant le projet 
Qui sont disponibles dans vos 
installations en Algérie (ou peuvent être 
facilement trouvés ailleurs en Algérie) 
Durant la spécification et 
la conception 
(specification and design) 



























Durant le lancement et 











-Si les outils d'ingénierie, équipements, logiciels et installations nécessaires pour le développement du 
système satellitaire ne sont pas disponibles (ou manquant) dans vos installations en Algérie? A quel point 
ils sont importants ? et peuvent-ils être achetées ou acquis ? 
 
33) Donnez la liste de la documentation et des ressources documentaires majeures utilisées pour le 
développement du système satellitaire? 
 
Phases 
La documentation et les ressources documentaires 
Utilisées par la compagnie 
étrangère 
Que votre équipe a utilisé 
durant le projet 
Qui sont disponibles dans vos 
installations en Algérie (ou peuvent être 
facilement trouvées ailleurs en Algérie) 
Durant la spécification et 
la conception 
(specification and design) 



























Durant le lancement et 











-Si la documentation et les ressources documentaires majeures et qui sont nécessaires pour le 
développement du système satellitaire ne sont pas disponibles (ou manquant) dans vos installations en 
Algérie? A quel point elles sont importantes ? Pourquoi elles n’ont pas pu être achetées ou acquises? Avez-




-En ce qui concerne la documentation du projet et les ressources documentaires ramenées en Algérie, 
Comment sont-elles gérées? Où sont-elles? Est-ce qu’elles sont facilement accessibles? Qui a accès à elles? 
Est-ce que cette documentation a été utilisée depuis lors? 
 
-En ce qui concerne la documentation managériale, avez-vous ramené la documentation pertinente pour la 
gestion d’un projet satellitaire (y compris la documentation sur les outils de management utilisés durant le 
projet)? Comment cette documentation est gérée? Où est-elle? Est-ce qu’elle est facilement accessible? 
Qui a accès à elle? Est-ce que cette documentation a été utilisée depuis lors? 
 
34) En se basant sur les connaissances acquises au cours du projet (soit à travers des ressources écrites ou non 
écrites), avez-vous (vous-même ou votre équipe) tenté de préparer une documentation (ex. documentation 
théorique, documentation pratique, rapport/routines/tests/procédures, etc.) pour un usage interne au sein 
de votre organisation en Algérie? Et quelle est l'importance de cette documentation pour effectuer 
indépendamment des tâches en Algérie? 
 
35) Avez-vous conservé vos propres documents de suivi, vos commentaires, notes, etc. portant sur l'avancement 
du projet, en plus des minutes de réunion (et documents officielles)? Est-ce que ces documents sont archivés, 
stockés dans des bases de données, diffusés en interne, réutilisés? 
 
36) En se basant sur les connaissances acquises au cours du projet (soit à travers des ressources écrites ou non 
écrites), avez-vous (vous-même ou votre équipe) tenté de mener une activité de R&D, publiée ou non 
publiée, (ex. articles de revues, conférences, rapports d'études, brevets, etc. )? Combien de travaux ont été 
menés? Quelles sont les personnes impliquées et quelles sont leurs organisations/institutions 
d’appartenance? 
 




Les ressources humaines et compétences 
Utilisées par la compagnie étrangère 
Qui sont disponibles dans vos installations en 
Algérie (ou peuvent être facilement trouvées ailleurs 
en Algérie) 
Durant la spécification et la 



























Durant le lancement et 







-Si les ressources humaines et compétences nécessaires pour le développement d’un système satellitaire 
ne sont pas disponibles (ou manquant) dans vos installations en Algérie? A quel point elles sont 
importantes ? A quel point il est difficile de les former ou de les recruter ?  
 
38) Aviez-vous une personne dans votre équipe qui a joué le rôle de l'ingénieur en chef (lead engineer)? Décrivez 
son rôle et votre relation avec lui? 
 
-Décrivez le rôle de l'individu de votre équipe qui était en charge de la fonction d'ingénierie système 




39) Quelle était la langue (ou les langues) de travail durant le projet? Est-ce que votre équipe était à l’aise avec 
cette langue (ou ces langues)?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque langue utilisée durant le projet 
Langue(s) 
L’équipe était  
Moins à l’aise  Très à l’aise 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
40) Comment qualifiez-vous votre relation de travail avec votre/vos homologue(s) ou les représentants de la firme 
étrangère avec qui vous traitiez régulièrement? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chacun des homologues et représentants de la firme 
Homologue ou 
représentant 














 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
-Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire: (ex. il ne pouvait pas coopérer plus en raison des restrictions 
appliquées par son entreprise, la protection de la technologie, les deux personnalités étaient différentes ce 
qui rendait la communication difficile, les termes contractuels ne prévoyaient pas cela, les incitations 
(incentives) dans le contrat étaient inappropriées ou insuffisantes, etc.) 
 
41) Comment qualifiez-vous les connaissances managériales, les capacités communicatives, les connaissances 
techniques de vos homologues? 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chacun des homologues 
Homologues  Connaissances managériales Capacités communicatives Connaissances techniques 
Limitées Elevées Limitées Elevées Limitées Elevées 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
- Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire. 
 
42) Quelle était l'équipe managériale ou l’entité institutionnelle qui gérait le projet à partir de l'Algérie ? 
 
-Quand, à quelle fréquence et à qui aviez-vous l’habitude de rapporter (et donner des feedbacks) sur 
l'avancement des travaux durant le projet? (Est-ce que cela était fait régulièrement, occasionnellement 
lorsque la situation était jugée inacceptable, de façon formelle, de façon informelle, etc.?) 
 
-Quelle était le degré d’autonomie dont vous aviez pour régler des questions/problèmes techniques et 




43) Sur la base de votre expérience, laquelle des déclarations suivantes correspond le plus à votre point de vue 
sur la façon avec laquelle vous aviez l’habitude de contrôler l’accomplissement des tâches et objectifs durant 
le projet? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée 






Je suis en 
accord 
J'étais très impliqué dans les choix liés au projet, j’orientais la firme étrangère 
sur la façon d'atteindre les objectifs et de fournissais les intrants (inputs) 
nécessaires pour atteindre ces objectifs 
□ □ □ □ 
J’intervenais peu, je transférais le risque vers la firme étrangère et je n’étais 
pas tenu responsable de leur choix □ □ □ □ 
Je comptais sur le feedback donné par les membres de mon équipe et les 
opinions des personnes impliquées dans le projet sur ce qui est acceptable et 
non-acceptable durant le projet. 
□ □ □ □ 
 
44) Comment qualifiez-vous la relation de travail entre les membres de votre équipe durant le projet ?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 















1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
-Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire 
 
45) Avez-vous trouvé les connaissances préalables (formation/compétences/connaissances/expériences) de 
votre équipe appropriées aux exigences du projet ? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Les connaissances préalables de l’équipe étaient 
Inferieures aux 
exigences            
Proches des 
exigences            
Au-delà des 
exigences            
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Pourquoi? et quelles sont les connaissances qui ont été les plus requises? 
 
46) Comment qualifiez-vous les compétences des membres de votre équipe durant le projet? (Connaissances 
techniques, capacités communicatives, autonomie) 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque critère 
Critères  
Les compétences des membres de l’équipe étaient 
Limitées   Elevées 
Connaissances techniques 1          2           3           4            5 
Capacités communicatives 1          2           3           4            5 
Autonomie en face des problèmes 1          2           3           4            5 
 
47) Parmi les membres de votre équipe, avez-vous des individus qui se distinguent du reste, (ex. ils ont acquis 
et détiennent une part importante de la connaissance tacite, des compétences pratiques, les compétences 
théoriques, les compétences de communication, etc.). Est-ce cela a été formellement déclaré, reconnu 
et/ou administrativement enregistré (dans leurs dossiers administratifs, rapports de l'équipe, etc.) 
 
48) Décrivez comment votre équipe était impliquée dans des tâches liées à l’Assemblage, Intégration et Test, du 
système satellitaire? 
 
-Quelle était la profondeur de cette implication au niveau des composants?  
 




49) Veuillez classer de "1" à "5" les sources de connaissances suivantes en fonction de leur contribution dans 
l'ensemble des connaissances que votre équipe avez acquises durant le projet? 
Exemple : "1" étant la source qui contribue le plus dans les connaissances acquises durant le projet. 
 
Sources de connaissances classement  Donnez des détails si nécessaire. 
Mentor (s) (son jugement et 
appréciation) 
  
D'autres individus et experts (leurs 
jugements et appréciations) 
  
la documentation et les bases de 
données du projet (plans, manuels, 
guides, exigences système, 
spécifications, interfaces, plans et 
procédures d’implémentation, routines 
de test, rapports, etc.) (Blueprints, 
handbooks, workbooks, guides, system 
requirements, specifications, interfaces, 
implementation plans and procedures, test routines, 
reports, etc.) 
  
Bibliothèques (livres, publications et 






50) Sur la base de votre expérience, laquelle des déclarations suivantes correspond le plus à votre point de vue 
sur l’orientation des connaissances que votre équipe avez acquises durant le projet? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée 






Je suis en 
accord 
Les connaissances fournies ont été axées sur les composants du satellite 
en tant que composants indépendant. Elles portaient sur les concepts de 
de base pour chaque composant 
□ □ □ □ 
Les connaissances fournies ont été axées sur les composants du satellite 
en tant qu’élément appartenant à l'ensemble du système satellitaire (ex. 
l'interaction avec d'autres composants, processus d'intégration au sein de 
l'ensemble du système, etc.). Elles portaient sur les connaissances 
architecturales (intégration du système) requises pour mettre ensemble 
tous les composants et former un système    
□ □ □ □ 
 
51) Sur la base de votre expérience, laquelle des déclarations suivantes correspond le plus à votre point de vue 
sur le risque pris par la firme étrangère lorsqu’elle dispensait des formations sur le système satellitaire ? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée 






Je suis en 
accord 
Je crois que la formation dispensée était sur une technologie qui a été 
exploitée jusqu'à ses limites et peut être transférée sans risque (ex. risque 
d’alimenter une concurrence future, considérations sécuritaires). 
□ □ □ □ 
Je crois que la technologie était avancée, mais la formation dispensée 
n’était pas assez profonde pour constituer un risque pour la société 
étrangère (ex. risque d'alimenter une concurrence future, considérations 
sécuritaires). 
□ □ □ □ 
Je crois que la technologie était avancée, mais la société étrangère 
considérait que les capacités algériennes n’étaient pas assez avancées 
pour faire usage d’une technologie avancée. 
□ □ □ □ 
 
C. Activités après le projet 
 
52) Combien de personnes de votre équipe ont quitté votre organisation après le projet? Indiquez s'ils ont quitté 
le pays. 
 
53) Avez-vous entretenu des relations avec le personnel de la compagnie étrangère après le projet? Si oui, est-ce 




54) Avez-vous organisé ou été impliqué dans des ateliers post-projets ou des rencontres visant à étudier et 
consigner l'expérience et les leçons tirées du projet? Décrivez l'événement, les objectifs, les participants, les 
résultats, etc. 
 
55) Au cours de vos activités après ce projet, avez-vous été impliqué dans des développements de technologie 
satellitaire? 
 
- Décrivez vos activités dans le cadre d'autres projets satellitaires avec des compagnies étrangères (Alsat-
2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B, etc.) 
 
- Décrivez vos activités en dehors des projets satellitaires avec des compagnies étrangères (activités locales, 
etc.) 
 
56) Dans le cadre de vos activités liées aux technologies satellitaires en Algérie, en dehors des projets (Alsat-2A, 
Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B), quels étaient les buts et objectifs de vos activités?  
 
57) Comment les objectifs ont été définis? Qui les a définis? 
 
a/ Si les objectifs ont été définis par vous, est-ce qu’ils ont été discutés et approuvés par d'autres niveaux 
supérieurs de management? Quels sont ces niveaux? Est-ce que ces objectifs se complémentent avec 
d’autres objectifs? 
 
-Comment avez-vous trouvé la clarté de ces objectifs? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas clairs  clairs 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
- Comment avez-vous trouvé la complexité de ces objectifs ? Considérant que la complexité est une 
combinaison de: -Nombre de composants à développer/personnaliser pour atteindre l’objectif, -Nombre 
de compétences (diversité) nécessaires pour le projet, -Nouvelles connaissances nécessaires pour le 
projet. 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La complexité des objectifs est 
Basse  Haute 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
- Comment avez-vous trouvé le risque associé à ces objectifs? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le risque associé aux objectifs est 
Bas  Haut 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de spécifications (liberté d'ajuster les spécifications ou 
de revoir complètement les objectifs)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de spécifications est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 





-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de financement (liberté de demander plus d'argent)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de financement est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de délais (liberté d'aller au-delà des délais)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de délais est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-En général, comment avez-vous trouvé l’ambition de ces objectifs ?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas ambitieux  Ambitieux 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Comment avez-vous l’habitude de rapporter (et donner des feedbacks) sur les travaux relatifs à ces 
objectifs? À quelle fréquence? à qui? 
 
45-b/ Si les objectifs sont définis ailleurs, où exactement? A quel niveau de management? Est-ce que ces 
objectifs se complémentent avec d’autres objectifs? 
 
-Comment avez-vous trouvé la clarté de ces objectifs? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas clairs  clairs 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
- Comment avez-vous trouvé la complexité de ces objectifs ? Considérant que la complexité est une 
combinaison de: -Nombre de composants à développer/personnaliser pour atteindre l’objectif, -Nombre 
de compétences (diversité) nécessaires pour le projet, -Nouvelles connaissances nécessaires pour le 
projet. 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La complexité des objectifs est 
Basse  Haute 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
- Comment avez-vous trouvé le risque associé à ces objectifs? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le risque associé aux objectifs est 
Bas  Haut 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de spécifications (liberté d'ajuster les spécifications ou 




Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de spécifications est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de financement (liberté de demander plus d'argent)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de financement est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Est-ce que ces objectifs sont flexibles en termes de délais (liberté d'aller au-delà des délais)? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
La flexibilité des objectifs en termes de délais est 
Basse (flexibilité)  Haute (flexibilité) 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
 
-En général, comment avez-vous trouvé l’ambition de ces objectifs ?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
J’ai trouvé les objectifs 
Pas ambitieux  Ambitieux 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Comment avez-vous l’habitude de rapporter (et donner des feedbacks) sur les travaux relatifs à ces 




58) Combien de fois avez-vous rencontré (d’une manière formelle ou informelle) des hauts dirigeants de votre 
organisation afin de discuter sur ces objectifs? Qui étaient-ils? A quelle occasion et quel était le but des 
rencontres? 
 
59) Quelle était votre motivation pour la réalisation de ces objectifs? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le niveau de ma motivation était 
Bas                                                                   Haut  
                       1          2           3           4            5 
  
-Pourquoi? Qu’est-ce qui vous motivait le plus, qu’est-ce qui vous motivait le moins? 
 
60) En se basant sur votre expérience dans les satellites, comment la technologie évolue (vitesse de 
développement du système) et quelles sont les similitudes/différences entre les nouveaux systèmes 
(architecture, composants) par rapport aux anciens, et quelles sont les similitudes/différences dans leurs 
processus de développement? (réguliers/irréguliers, vitesse lente, vitesse élevée, trop élevée, des systèmes 
complètement différents, systèmes similaires, etc.). Donnez des indications sur les changements pour le cas 
des satellites algériens. 
 
61) En ce qui concerne vos activités en Algérie qui sont liées aux systèmes satellitaires, est-ce que vous faite 
partie d'une équipe/projet ou votre activité est plutôt individuelle? 
 




-Quelle est la taille de cette équipe/projet (nombre de personnel, spécialisation, leurs postes/positions, 
emplacement, leurs organisations/institutions, etc.)? Indiquez si les membres faisaient partie des 
projets satellitaires (avec des firmes étrangères) et indiquez lesquels? 
 
-Si cette équipe implique plus d'une organisation/institution, est-ce que cette collaboration est encadrée 
par un accord explicite entre organisations ou bien elle est informelle? Quelles sont les compétences 
clés qui distinguent votre organisation des autres? 
 
-Comment qualifiez-vous votre relation de travail avec les membres de l’équipe/projet ? 
Encerclez le nombre approprié pour chaque membre 














1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 1     2     3      4     5 
 
-Donnez plus de détails si nécessaire 
 
-Décrivez la structure de l’équipe/projet. Est-ce que cette structure est appropriée pour des projets de 
satellites? 
 
-Décrivez la documentation de management et les outils utilisés (système de suivi de calendrier et du 
budget, gestion des approvisionnements, gestion de la qualité, gestion des coûts, gestion des stocks, 
etc.). A quelle fréquence les membres de l'équipe/du projet utilisent ces outils? Parmi ces outils de 
management, est-ce qu’il y a des outils qui ont été déjà utilisés durant le projet satellitaire ave la firme 
étrangère (les mêmes outils ou des outils similaires)? 
  
b/ Si votre activité est plutôt individuelle, avez-vous construit votre propre réseau d'individus / spécialistes/ 
universitaires (à l'intérieur ou l'extérieur de votre organisation) qui peuvent contribuer dans votre travail? 
(Nombre de personnes, spécialisation, positions/postes, organisations, etc.). Donnez des exemples. 
 
62) En ce qui concerne vos activités en Algérie liées aux technologies satellitaires, Comment qualifiez-vous les 
performances de la fonction gestion des approvisionnements ? 
 
63) En ce qui concerne vos activités en Algérie liées aux technologies satellitaires et aux connaissances que vous 
avez acquises durant le projet,  
 
-Avez-vous bénéficié d'une formation qui est liée aux connaissances acquises durant le projet (ou les 
complète)? (Indiquez les formations en dehors de celles prévues dans le cadre des autres projets 
satellitaires) 
 
-Est-ce que vous participez facilement à des séminaires et conférences liées aux technologies que vous avez 
managées durant le projet? 
 
- Est-ce que vous accédez facilement aux informations sur les brevets liés aux technologies que vous avez 
managées durant le projet? 
 
64) En ce qui concerne vos activités en Algérie liées aux technologies satellitaires et aux connaissances que vous 
avez acquises durant le projet, avez-vous formé, encadré, supervisé des gens dans votre organisation? 
Donnez des détails sur les stagiaires, combien de stagiaires? Pourquoi ils ont été formés? Combien de temps 
a duré la formation? Quel type de formation a été dispensé? 
 
-Dans le cadre de ces mêmes activités, Est-ce que vous pouvez facilement recruter du personnel qualifié 
sur le marché du travail? Indiquez quelle est l'efficacité du processus de recrutement au sein de votre 




65) Avez-vous dans votre organisation en Algérie une entité (département, etc.) en charge du management des 
projets de développement de satellites? Quelle est votre relation avec cette entité? 
 
66) Indiquez vos activités en Algérie qui sont liées à, ou utilisent, des connaissances acquises durant le projet? 
Remplissez le tableau en considérant que: 
- "Recherche" fait référence à la recherche fondamentale 
- "Développement" fait référence à la traduction de connaissances techniques et scientifiques en 
produits, procédés et services 



















67) Selon vous, quelle serait la part de vos activités liées au management de projets satellitaires, par rapport à 
toutes vos activités en Algérie? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Les activités liées au management de projets satellitaires représentent 
une petite part du total de 
mes activités en Algérie 
 une grande part du total de 
mes activités en Algérie 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
68) En général, comment vous trouvé la nature de vos activités en Algérie? Remplissez le tableau en considérant 
que: 
- "Recherche" fait référence à la recherche fondamentale 
- "Développement" fait référence à la traduction de connaissances techniques et scientifiques en 
produits, procédés et services 
- "Engineering" fait référence à des aspects très pratiques 
 


















….….% Enseignement  
Autres ….%  
 
D. Suggestions finales 
 
69) Selon votre expérience durant le projet, est-ce que l'objectif de développer des satellites similaires ou 





Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Je trouve l'objectif de développer des satellites similaires ou 
équivalents au niveau local 
Non raisonnable                                          Très raisonnable 
1          2           3           4            5 
 
-Pourquoi? Quels seraient les domaines de spécialisation (core competencies) et fonctions à développer 
localement, et ceux à importer de l’étranger?  
 
70) Sur la base de votre expérience dans les technologies satellitaires, laquelle des déclarations suivantes 
correspond le plus à votre point de vue sur le début de développement de satellites au niveau local? 
 
Cochez la case appropriée 






Je suis en 
accord 
Je suggère de travailler avec des entreprises étrangères sur des 
technologies relativement anciennes, moins complexe, offrant des 
performances système relativement modestes ou faibles 
□ □ □ □ 
Je suggère de travailler avec des entreprises étrangères sur des 
technologies relativement nouvelles, complexe, offrant des 
performances système relativement élevées 
□ □ □ □ 
Je préférerais travailler plus souvent sur des technologies avec un 
risque d'échec plus élevé (non-achèvement de projet ou défaillance du 
système) plutôt que de travailler moins souvent sur des technologies 
avec un risque d'échec moindre  
□ □ □ □ 
 
71) Selon vous, est-ce que votre organisation est favorable à prendre des risques lorsqu’il s’agit de développer 
des satellites au niveau local?  
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Je trouve que mon organisation est plutôt  
favorable à prendre 
des risques  
 Non favorable à 
prendre des risques 
1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi ? 
 
72) Quelle est votre motivation actuelle pour prendre part au développement de satellites au niveau local? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Le niveau de ma motivation est 
Bas                                                                   Haut  
                       1          2           3           4            5 
-Pourquoi?  
 
73) Est-ce que vous êtes confiant de vos aptitudes actuelles pour manager des projets de développement de 
satellite au niveau local? 
  
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Ma confiance dans mes aptitudes actuelles est 
Basse                                                                   Haute  
                       1          2           3           4            5 
      -Pourquoi?  
 
74) Êtes-vous satisfait de votre parcours professionnel (développement de carrière) dans votre organisation? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
S’agissant du développement de ma carrière, ma satisfaction est 
Basse                                                                   Haute  
                       1          2           3           4            5 
    -Pourquoi?  
425 
 
75) En général, comment trouvez-vous l'environnement au sein de votre organisation pour votre travail et le 
développement de vos activités? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Je trouve l’environnement au sein de mon organisation 
Non favorable                                                                   Très favorable  




76) En général, comment trouvez-vous l'environnement national pour votre travail et le développement de vos 
activités? 
 
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
Je trouve l’environnement national 
Non favorable                                                                   Très favorable  




77) Est-ce que vous êtes confiant du processus de développement de petits satellites en Algérie? 
  
Encerclez le nombre approprié 
S’agissant du développement local, ma confiance est 
Basse                                                                   Haute  


















Questions on building small satellite capabilities in Algeria 
 
addressed to representatives of entities involved in the process 
 
Research aim: To collect data in order to gain better understanding of satellite technology 
transfer to Algeria. This will enable Algerians to gain an appreciation on the effectiveness of 
the mechanisms that they have used to build satellite technological capabilities, and will 
provide guidance regarding effective processes to transfer satellite technology.  
 
Guidance in responding to questions:  
- The researcher will be interviewing you by himself in a face-to-face meeting to ensure 
proper understanding of questions and responses.  
- Please feel free to use Arabic, French or English when responding.  
- Feel free to include any oral or written comments, or material deemed relevant or 
supportive to your responses.  
- All responses will be treated as confidential with only the researcher having access to 
them.  
 
Sections covered:  
A. General information 
B. Learning effort 
C. Capability-building management 
D. Technology transfer management 







Participant ID: Date: 
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A. General information 
 
1) What is your current position and describe your responsibilities and duties within your organisation? How 
long have you been in this position? How long have you been in this organisation?  
 
2) Describe your missions (roles) with regard to the development of small satellite technology? Do you have 
an explicit (written) policy and strategy with regard to small satellite development (or remote sensing small 
satellite development)?  
 
3) One of the stated goals of the Algerian space programme is to progressively develop satellite capabilities. 
The successive collaborative projects with foreign partners (e.g. Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) have 
been used as a mechanism, what are the targeted progressive phases? Are these targets explicitly 
formulated and are timelines defined?  
 
4) In your view, what was the priority when successive satellite collaborative projects with foreign partners 
(Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) were used: the acquisition of satellite systems and their deployment 
for meeting national needs in terms of satellite images and applications, or learning how to develop 
satellites (completely or partially)?  
 
5) How clear you find these objectives when it comes to implementing them? 
 
6) How flexible are these objectives in terms of: a) specification (freedom to adjust specifications or to 
completely review objectives); b) funding (freedom to ask more money); and c) time (freedom to go 
beyond the agreed timeline)?  
 
7) How risky do you find these objectives?  
 
8) How ambitious do you find these objectives?  
 
9) In your view, what motivates people the most to join your organisation and partake in developing satellite 
technology?  
 
B. Learning effort 
 
10) With regard to small satellite projects, in your view, which activity for each satellite project was given the 
most emphasis: Design, Project management, Systems engineering, System integration, or Operations? 
What are the areas targeted for learning and development by your organisation? 
 
11) With regard to satellite technology, what are the areas of training and research targeted by your 
organisation (e.g. Space instrumentation, Space telecommunications and computing, Image processing and 
GIS, optics and precision mechanics, Space telecommunications, etc.)?  
 
12) How these areas of specialisation have been defined? Were they defined according to ASAL’s needs and 
priorities? Were they defined according to the national available capabilities?   
 
13) What are the shares for each area of specialisation in the training and research effort? (e.g. number of 
students in masters, doctorate, number of projects, shares of funding, etc.). What is the share of satellite 
technology-centred areas compared to space application-centred areas?  
 
14) What are the mechanisms and institutions used to carry out the training and research activities? (e.g. 
EDTAS, internal centres -CTS, CDS-, local universities and institutes, foreign cooperation, satellite 
collaborative projects Alsat-1, 2, etc.). What would be the share of each mechanism in this training and 
research effort?  
 
15) How are satellite project management experiences and lessons learnt stored? How is documentation and 
knowledge acquired throughout collaborative projects or produced internally managed (gathered, 
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recorded, stored in DB, diffused locally, updated, computer-aided information system etc.)? Describe the 
strategy adopted and the mechanisms that have been put in place? 
 
16) How are research projects identified or defined, conducted, funded, and managed?  
 
17) To what extent are individuals involved in these research projects kept working on similar tasks and 
activities in Algeria? Describe whether mechanisms are put in place to ensure that this happens? What is 
ASAL’s role in employing these individuals and making use of these project results?  
 
18) What are the mechanisms used to ensure that individuals involved in satellite collaborative projects are 
involved in activities of training and research in Algeria in order to share their knowledge? 
 
19) Satellite technology development involves multiple disciplines, which are the disciplines to develop in high 
priority and those considered of lower priority? (e.g. what about structural mechanics and space 
mechanics, power and energy, propulsion, system engineering, technology and satellite project 
management, system engineering, etc.)  
 
20) In your view, what were the main contributions of the successive satellite projects (Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-
2B, Alsat-1B)?  
 
21) What are the disciplines that you are seeking to develop in terms of small satellite technology? Indicate 
whether the objective is to develop components of satellite systems; develop capabilities to integrate small 
satellites from components developed elsewhere, or a mixture of the two?  If the mixture is targeted, what 
would be the right balance between components knowledge and integrative knowledge? and which 
components would be developed as a priority and why? 
 
22) How would you describe interactions between project teams (intense, formal, informal, framed, etc.)? and 
how interaction and communication between teams or entities in your organisation are fostered? 
 
23) One of the goals of the Algerian space programme is to develop capabilities to integrate satellites. What 
would be the role of training, R&D in developing integrative knowledge (technology management, system 
engineering, etc.) 
 
24) In your view, what were the main contributions of the successive satellite projects, components knowledge 
or integrative knowledge?  
 
25) What are the actions undertaken in order to foster and develop integrative knowledge (training, 
communication, flat project structure, organisational entities such as system engineering departments, 
etc.) 
 
26) How do you find the labour market when it comes to recruiting personnel for satellite development? How 
do you identify your needs? How are the personnel selected? How early on do you anticipate the projects’ 
needs (e.g. forming a reservoir and recruiting internally when required, etc.)?  To what extent do you 
envisage recruiting from the international labour market (Algerian abroad or foreigners)? 
 
27) What is the impact on the skills (i.e. skills of Engineering, R&D) of the personnel involved when partaking in 
collaborative projects? In your view, how close is their knowledge to that required for developing satellites 
locally? Do you have any feedback on their skills with regard to work requirements or/and satellite 
development? 
 
28) To what extent are/were individuals trained (or having conducted R&D activities) as part of other 







For developing technological capabilities, three activities are often jointly fostered: Research, 
Development and Engineering, wherein:   
- “Research” refers to basic research 
- “Development” refers to translating technical and scientific knowledge into products, processes, and 
services 
- “Engineering” refers to very practical aspects 
 
29) What is the strategy for developing “Research”, “Development”, and “Engineering” activities in your 
organisation (training, skills development, objectives, organisation in charge, management, control, 
incentives towards people, etc.) and what are the actions undertaken? How are these activities defined and 
how relevant are they to the needs of small satellite development? Who are the actors in charge of 
Research promotion, Development promotion, and Engineering development with regard to satellite 
technology? 
 
30) Considering your context, how important is each of these activities (i.e. Research, Development, and 
Engineering) for your organisation objectives? And what about human resources available in your 
organisation for each of these activities? What would be the proportions of these activities in your 
organisation? 
 
31) What are the actions undertaken for fostering the links Research-Development-Engineering and vice-
versa? How the R&D activities are commercialised? What are the achievements with regards to each 
activity (e.g. patents, commercialised products, etc.)? Do you have mechanisms that manage and combine 
the outputs to the satellites development needs? To what extend their outputs meet satellite development 
needs? 
 
32) With regard to the activities of Research, Development, and Engineering, indicate achievements that stem 
mainly from small satellite collaborative projects? In your view, where was the learning effort focused 
(Engineering, development, or Research)? How was the learning effectiveness assessed?   
 
33) Considering your context, how important is each of these activities (i.e. Research, Development, and 
Engineering) to your organisation objectives? And what human resources are available in your organisation 
for each of these activities? What would be the proportions of these activities in your organisation? 
 
34) In general, universities develop fundamental research whereas applied aspects are developed within 
specialised research and development centres as well as industry development centres? To what extend is 
this true for satellite technology in Algeria? Is industry involved in this research? Is there any strategy 
towards the development of clusters in satellite technology?   
 
35) What is the strategy for developing an indigenous Engineering sector able to provide the skills needed for 
satellite development and/or integration?  
 
36) With regard to satellite local development, what are the objectives and strategy in terms of core-
competencies to develop internally and elements to outsource (locally in Algeria)? In your view, which core 
competencies and functions could be developed within your organisation, which could be developed locally 
in Algeria but outside your organisation, and which could be imported from foreign firms?  What would be 
the role of the industrial sector and the private sector in each instance? Are these objectives explicit? Do 
you have an entity in charge of managing the organisational network and related interaction? 
 
37) With regard to research and development activities, does your organisation have an entity that carries out 
a technology watch (e.g. scientific and technological publications, seminars, patents analysis)?  
 
38) In your organisation, how is small satellite technology development managed? and particularly how are 
small satellite projects managed? Are there permanent entities (or teams) in charge of these activities? 
Describe the organisational structure of these activities. How does the organisation get feedback and 
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control the progress of small satellite technology development in general and small satellite collaborative 
projects in particular?  (Structural reviews, unstructured reviews, casual interactions, etc.). 
 
39) What is the organisational strategy or mechanism that fosters intra-organisation and inter-organisation 
communication?  
 
40) Does your organisation have a “formal” mechanism that identify, follow-up and manage experienced 
individuals and skilled individuals that stood out from the rest (e.g. they hold tacit knowledge, practical 
skills, theoretical skills, communication skills, etc.)? Does your organisation have a specific strategy in order 
to manage human resources that have been involved in successive collaborative projects (e.g. career plan, 
etc.)?  
 
41) How is training planned within your organisation (according to expressed needs, by anticipations, etc.) and 
how is it controlled and assessed? Describe the process for activities related to Research, Development and 
Engineering. 
-What about continuous training?  
-What about Managerial training?  
-What about communication skills development? 
 
42) Does your organisation face an imbalance between personnel demand or “desire” and the offer in terms of 
positions in activities of Research, Development, or Engineering? How is managed the imbalance between 
the personnel interest and organisation’s goals? 
 
43) How do you describe interactions between satellite project teams (intense, formal, informal, framed, etc.)? 
What is the organisation strategy or mechanism that fosters inter-team and intra-organisation 
communication and work (satellite project teams, entities within your organisation)? (Activities and 
projects that involve multiple teams, cooperation and exchange between teams, meetings, workshops, 
cross-functional objectives, etc.). Do you have any information system that enables group work, workflow, 
project management, scheduling, shared DB, etc.? Provide description with regard to Research activities, 
Development activities, and Engineering activities.  
 
44) With regard to EDTAS activities, how do you describe interactions between EDTAS’ researchers and ASAL’s 
personnel (intense, formal, informal, framed, etc.)? (Joint project, joint research, joint publication, etc.). 
Indicate whether researchers who participated in satellite projects (Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) 
are involved in these exchanges? 
 
45) How would you describe interactions between EDTAS’ researchers themselves, and between various 
universities involved (intense, formal, informal, framed, etc.)? (Joint project, joint research, joint 
publication, etc.) 
 
C. Capability-building management  
 
46) How appropriate are the equipment and facilities that have been built by your organisation (and its local 
partners) for conducting R&D activities in satellite technology?  
 
47) What is the number of employees in your organisation? Estimate the proportions of the workforce involved 
in: Management, Operations, R&D, and Engineering.  
 
48) How appropriate are the human resources of your organisation for conducting R&D activities in satellite 
technology? (Teams’ sizes, teams’ disciplines, team’s motivations, teams’ skills, etc.)  
 
49) How appropriate are the equipment and facilities that have been built for the following missions: Satellite 





50) How appropriate are the current human resources for the following missions: Satellite specification and 
design, components procurement, customisation and development, Assembly, test, operations? What are 
the human resources that are most needed to meet the organisation objectives?  
 
51) How appropriate are the current managerial and organisational capabilities of your organisation for the 
requirement of developing small satellites? (Management skills might include: project structure, system of 
monitoring of schedules and budget, supply management, quality management, etc.)? 
 
52) What is the number of employees in your organisation? Estimate the proportions of the workforce involved 
in: Management, Operations, R&D, and Engineering.  
 
53) How do you qualify the contribution of the successive collaborative satellite projects in building technical 
skills vs managerial skills of personnel? 
 
54) In parallel to the development of human resources through collaborative projects, what are the other 
actions undertaken in order to develop technical and managerial skills in manufacturing satellite 
components or integrate systems?  
 
55) In your organisation, how is small satellite technology development managed? and particularly how are 
small satellite projects managed? Are there permanent entities (or teams) in charge of managing satellite 
development projects? Describe the organisational structure of these activities. How does the organisation 
get feedback and control the progress of small satellite technology development in general and small 
satellite collaborative projects in particular?  (Structural reviews, unstructured reviews, casual interactions, 
etc.). 
-What about the adoption of management tools particularly those related to satellite development? (e.g. 
system of monitoring of schedules and budget, supply management, quality management, cost 
management, stock management, etc.).  
 
56) How appropriate you find your current organisation structure to the requirement of developing small 
satellites? 
 
57) How appropriate you find the procurement and supply procedure to the requirement of developing small 
satellites? 
 
58) Does your organisation deploy a quality assurance approach (e.g. Total quality management practices 
aiming to continuous improvement, etc.)? Do you have an entity in charge of quality management? 
 
59) The local environment is poor in terms of organisations and firms (suppliers, sub-contractors, R&D 
institutions) working on satellite technology, What are the objectives and strategies adopted for putting in 
place this environment and for encouraging actors to join you? What are the actions taken for this purpose 
(identifying them, surveying them, training them, transferring technology to them, helping them upgrading 
their facilities, incentives, etc.)? Do you have a dedicated entity or an organisation to oversee this process? 
 
60) Do you have an entity in charge of promoting and managing the organisational network (and related 
interactions) for the purpose of developing small satellite technologies at Research, Development, and 
Engineering level?  
 
D. Technology transfer management 
 
61) Collaborative projects are a mechanism that has been used for the last 15 years by your organisation to 
develop satellite technological capability? In your view, how is this mechanism evaluated, what are its 
strengths and weaknesses, and to what extent has it met Algerian needs and complied with Algerian 
objectives?  
 
62) Irrespective of small satellite collaborative projects, how do you qualify your international collaboration 
related to the development of small satellite technology? Do you make use of other international 
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mechanisms to develop this technology?  (collaborations on Research projects, Development projects, 
Engineering projects) (Use of unconventional mechanisms through offering incentives to foreign investors – 
Foreign Direct Investment, etc.)  
 
63) In general, diversifying partners at international level can increase opportunities for technology transfer 
and overcome certain setbacks. To what extent does this apply to small satellite development in Algeria? 
 
64) In your view, what is the strategy used to incentivise the foreign partners to be more effective in 
transferring technology? To what extent have the previous contracts been representative of this strategy 
(were the incentives in those contracts appropriate)?  
 
65) Based on your experience, which of the following statements matches your view most closely in terms of 
the risk the foreign company was taking when it provided training or transferred technology on the 
satellite? 
a-The foreign companies considered that the transferred technology has been exploited up to its limits and 
can be transferred without any risk (e.g. risk of fuelling future competition, security considerations). 
b- The foreign companies considered that transferred technology was advanced but the training provided 
was not deep enough to be risky for them (e.g. risk of fuelling future competition, security 
considerations).  
c-The foreign companies considered that technology was advanced, but they consider the Algerian’s 
capabilities are deemed to be not well enough advanced to make use of the advanced technology.  
 
66) ASAL used satellite collaborative projects with foreign companies as mechanism for transferring technology 
from abroad. Considering the level reached of local capabilities and limitations of collaborative projects 
mechanism to go further, does ASAL envisage adopting new mechanisms (e.g.  Licence production, 
relocation of foreign company activities, use of FDI-Foreign Direct Investment, etc.) for achieving higher 
levels of capabilities? 
 
67) What kind of relationship do you usually have with your foreign partners after the projects? Are these 
relations maintained through formal agreements? are they intense? How do they evolve?  
 
68) As technology transfer from abroad is an important way for developing satellite technology in Algeria, and 
in either technology transfer relationship or technology intensive industries, managing intellectual property 
issues (e.g. patents, etc.) is important for protecting foreign partners’ intellectual property and local 
innovation effort. How are these issues managed in your organisation? Does your organisation have an 
entity that manages intellectual property issues? 
 
69) How would you describe your current international experience in small satellite project negotiations, what 
about the negotiation balance and your bargaining power?  
 
70) Did local partners (universities, industry, EDTAS, etc.) benefit from the collaboration with ASAL in order to 
train their human resources for acquiring new skills, to update their equipment and facilities for Research, 
Development and Engineering, or to adapt their organisation for new requirements related to satellite 
development? Do you have a technology transfer programme or mechanism towards local partners? 
 
71) In your view, what is the strategy that ASAL should adopt to incentivise local partners to be effectively 
involved in ASAL’s satellite development activities? 
 
72) How would you describe the international collaboration of EDTAS with regard to R&D on satellite 
technology?  
 
E. Final suggestion 
 
73) How would you describe the needs of both local and international markets in terms of small satellite 
technology (components and systems market)? How would you describe the trend of small satellite 




74) According to your experience, do you have other market technological needs that can be met by using the 
satellite capabilities under development and the knowledge acquired? (e.g. automotive, aeronautic, 
medical technologies, etc.) Are you envisaging addressing these markets?   
 
75) Algeria’s policy throughout the last two decades has promoted an active sector of satellite image 
applications, what are the local trends in terms of growth and are/will needs be met? In your view, how 
would the market best be balanced between demand (of satellite images) and offer (satellite systems)? Do 
the planned/realised satellite systems meet the need? 
 
76) With regard to satellite images, what is (would be) the targeted market: local, regional, or international?    
 
77) With regard to small satellite components and systems, what is (would be) the targeted market, local, 
regional, or international?    
 
78) How would you describe the local effort to develop small satellites? Is there more emphasis on the market 
development (users of satellite images, etc.) or satellite system development? 
 
79) In your view, what is (would be) the guidance for Algerian efforts for developing small satellites: to develop 
(components and systems) for import substitution, or to develop for export to international market?  
 
80) In your view, for developing small satellites, what would be the core competencies and functions to 
develop within your organisation, to develop locally in Algeria but outside your organisation, and to import 
from foreign firms? 
 
81) With regard to small satellite projects, in your view, what would be the emphasis of your work and tasks: 
Design, Project management, Systems engineering, System integration, or Operations? 
 
82) Based on your experience on satellite technology and your knowledge of the local context, what would you 
suggest is most important in order to start developing satellites locally? 
a- to work with foreign firms on relatively old, less complex technology providing relatively modest or low 
system performances 
b- to work with foreign firms on relatively new, complex technology providing relatively high system 
performances 
c- to work more often on technology with higher risk of failure (non-completion or system failure) rather 
than working less often on technology with lesser risk of failure    
 
83) How confident do you feel about your organisation’s ability in order to develop small satellites locally?  
 
84) How would you describe the national policy in terms of Research, Development and Engineering promotion 
and its impact on satellite technology? How would you describe the intensity (e.g. investment, etc.) and 
outputs of these activities? Are they towards basic research, applied aspects, or more practical aspects?  
 
-How would you describe the national science and technology environment (science and technology policy, 
R&D policy, regulations, etc.) and its impact on satellite technology? How would you describe the 
intensity (e.g. investment, etc.) of activities in this environment and their relationships to satellite 
technology development? Within this environment, are actions promoted towards basic research, 
applied aspects, or more practical aspects?  
 
-How would you describe the national industrial environment (industrial policy, high technology industry 
policy, innovation policy, regulation, etc.) and its impact on satellite technology development? How 
would you describe the intensity (e.g. investment, etc.) of activities in this environment and their 
relationships to satellite technology?  
 
-How would you describe the national economic context (e.g. markets, regulations, protection measures, 




-How do you qualify the leadership evolution of the space sector at national level (from an entity under the 
PM (Prime Minister, formerly known as Chief of Government), then under MPTIC (Ministry of Post and 
Information and Communications Technologies), then again under PM)? To what extent did the changing 
in leadership affect the progress of this sector? 
 
85) The socio-economic objectives are part of the space programme objectives in Algeria, are nation 












Questions sur la mise en place de capacités de développement de 
petits satellites en Algérie  
 
adressées aux représentants des entités impliquées dans ce processus 
 
Objectifs de la recherche: Recueillir des données qui permettent de mieux comprendre le 
processus de transfert des technologies satellitaires pour le cas de l’Algérie. Cela permettra 
aux Algériens d'avoir une appréciation sur l'efficacité des mécanismes qu'ils utilisent pour 
mettre en place un potentiel de développement des technologies de petits satellites, et 
fournira des indications sur les processus les plus efficaces à adopter pour transférer les 
technologies satellitaires. 
 
Orientations pour répondre aux questions: 
- Le chercheur lui-même vous interviewera (face-à-face) lors d’une réunion, à convenir, 
pour s’assurer de la bonne compréhension des questions et de la bonne formulation des 
réponses. 
- Utilisez, à votre convenance, l'arabe, le français ou l'anglais au moment de répondre. 
- Vous pouvez faire, à votre convenance, des commentaires, oraux ou écrits, et joindre 
tout document que vous estimeriez pertinent. 
- Toutes les réponses seront traitées de manière confidentielle. Seul le chercheur aura 




A. Informations générales  
B. Effort d’apprentissage 
C. Management du développement des capacités   
D. Management du transfert des technologies 








A. Informations générales  
 
1) Quelle est votre poste/position actuel ?  et décrivez vos responsabilités et fonctions au sein de votre 
organisation? Combien de temps avez-vous passé dans ce poste/position? Combien de temps avez-vous 
passé dans cette organisation? 
 
2) Décrivez vos missions par rapport au développement des technologies des petits satellites? Est-ce que vous 
avez une politique/stratégie explicite (écrite) en matière de développement de petits satellites (ou le 
développement des petits satellites de télédétection)?  
 
3) L'un des buts déclarés du programme spatial algérien est de développer en phase et progressivement des 
capacités satellitaires. Les projets collaboratifs successifs avec des partenaires étrangers (ex. Alsat-1, Alsat-
2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) ont été utilisés comme mécanisme. Quelles sont ces phases progressives ciblées ? 
Est-ce que ces cibles sont formulées explicitement et est-ce que des calendriers leur sont définis?  
 
4) Selon vous, quelle a été (serait) la priorité lors de l’usage de projets collaboratifs de satellites successifs 
avec des partenaires étrangers (Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B): l'acquisition de systèmes satellitaires 
et leur déploiement pour répondre aux besoins nationaux en termes d'images satellitaires et 
d’applications, ou apprendre à développer des satellites (totalement ou partiellement)? 
 
5) Comment trouvez-vous ces objectifs en termes de clarté lorsqu’il s’agit de les mettre en œuvre (les traduire 
en actions)?   
 
6) Comment qualifiez-vous la flexibilité de ces objectifs en termes de spécifications (liberté d’ajuster les 
spécifications ou revoir complètement les objectifs) ? en termes de financement (liberté de demander plus 
d’argent) ? en termes de délais (liberté d’aller au-delà des délais) ? 
 
7) Comment qualifiez-vous le risque associé à ces objectifs?  
 
8) Comment qualifiez-vous l’ambition de ces objectifs?  
 
9) Selon vous, qu'est-ce qui motive le plus les gens à se joindre à votre organisation et à participer au 
développement des technologies satellitaires ?  
 
B. Effort d’apprentissage 
 
10) Pour chacun des projets de petits satellites, selon vous, sur lesquelles des aspects suivants l’accent a été 
mis : Conception, gestion de projet, l'ingénierie des systèmes, l'intégration du système, ou les opérations? 
quels sont les domaines de formation et développement ciblés par votre organisation? 
 
11) S’agissant des technologies satellitaires, quels sont les domaines de formation et de recherche ciblés par 
votre organisation (e.g. instrumentation spatiale, télécommunications spatiales, applications spatiales, etc.) 
 
12) Comment ces domaines de spécialisation ont été définis? Ont-ils été définis en fonction des besoins et des 
priorités de l’ASAL? Ont-ils été définis en fonction des capacités disponibles au niveau national? 
 
13) Quels sont les parts de chaque domaine de spécialisation dans l’effort de formation et de R&D? (le 
personnel affecté, le nombre d’étudiants en masters, doctorants, nombre de projets, parts de financement, 
etc.). Quel est la part des domaines orientés vers les technologies satellitaires comparé aux domaines 
orientés vers les applications spatiales ?   
 
14) Quels sont les mécanismes et les institutions utilisés pour mener les activités de formation et de 
recherche? (ex. EDTAS, centres internes -CTS, CDS-, les universités et les instituts locaux, coopération 
internationale, projets satellitaires collaboratifs Alsat-1, 2, etc.) ? Quelle serait la part de chaque 




15) Comment les expériences de gestion des projets satellitaires et les enseignements tirés sont stockés? 
Comment la documentation et les connaissances acquises à travers les projets collaboratifs ou produites en 
interne sont gérées (recueillies, enregistrées, stockées dans des bases de données, diffusé localement, mis 
à jour, système d'information assistée par ordinateur, etc.)? Décrivez la stratégie adoptée et les 
mécanismes mis en place? 
 
16) Comment les projets de recherche sont identifiés et définis, menées, financés, et gérées?  
 
17) Dans quelle mesure les individus impliqués dans ces projets de recherche sont tenus de travailler en 
continue sur des activités et des tâches similaires ou reliées? Décrivez si des mécanismes sont mis en 
place? Quel est le rôle de l’ASAL dans l’emploi de ces individus et dans l’utilisation des résultats de ces 
projets ?   
 
18) Quels sont les mécanismes utilisés pour assurer que les individus impliqués dans des projets collaboratifs 
de satellites (Alsat…etc.) soient impliqués dans des activités de formation et de recherche en Algérie afin 
qu’ils partagent leurs connaissances? 
 
19) Le développement des technologies de petits satellites implique plusieurs disciplines, quelles sont les 
disciplines à développer en première priorité et celles de priorités moindres? (ex. qu'en est-il de la 
mécanique des structures et de la mécanique spatiale, énergies, propulsion, management de la technologie 
et des projets satellitaires, ingénierie des systèmes, etc.) 
 
20) Selon vous, quelles ont été les principales contributions des projets successifs de satellites (Alsat-1, Alsat-
2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B)? 
 
21) Quelles sont les disciplines que vous ciblez dans les technologies des petits satellites à développer? 
Indiquez si les objectifs sont de développer des composants de systèmes de satellites; développer des 
capacités à intégrer de petits satellites à partir de composants développés ailleurs, ou un mélange? Si le 
mélange est ciblé, qu’est-ce qui serait le bon équilibre entre les connaissances à acquérir sur les 
composants et les connaissances à acquérir sur l'intégration (connaissances intégratives)? et quels 
composants seraient développés en priorité et pourquoi? 
 
22) Comment qualifiez-vous les interactions entre les équipes de projet (intense, formel, informel, encadré, 
etc.)? et comment l'interaction et la communication entre les équipes ou les entités de votre organisation 
sont encouragées? 
 
23) L'un des objectifs du programme spatial algérien est de développer les capacités d'intégration des 
satellites. Quel serait le rôle de la formation, R&D dans le développement des connaissances intégratives 
(Management de la technologie, l'ingénierie des systèmes, etc.) 
 
24) Selon vous, quelles ont été les principales contributions des projets successifs de satellites, des 
connaissances sur les composants, ou des connaissances sur l’intégration (connaissances intégratives)? 
 
25) Quelles sont les actions entreprises en vue de promouvoir et de développer les connaissances intégratives 
(formation, communication, structure de projet plate, les entités organisationnelles telles que les services 
d'ingénierie du système, etc.) 
 
26) Comment trouvez-vous le marché du travail en matière de recrutement de personnel à impliquer dans le 
développement des satellites? Comment identifiez-vous vos besoins? Comment le personnel est 
sélectionné? Est-ce que vous avez une stratégie d’anticipation en matière de besoins des projets (ex. pour 
la formation d'un réservoir et recruter en interne en cas de besoin, etc.)? Dans quelle mesure vous 
envisagez de recruter sur le marché international du travail (Algériens à l’étranger ou étrangers) ? 
 
27) Quel est l'impact de la participation aux projets collaboratifs (Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) sur les 
compétences du personnel impliqué (compétences en Engineering, R&D)? Selon vous, comment trouvez-
vous leurs compétences par rapport aux exigences de développement de satellites localement? Est-ce que 
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vous avec eu un feedback sur leurs compétences par rapport aux exigences d’emploi ou/et de 
développement de satellites? 
 
28) Dans quelle mesure des individus formés (ou ayant mené des activités de R&D) par le biais d’autres 
mécanismes (ex. EDTAS, universités, etc.) ont été impliqués dans des projets collaboratifs de satellites?   
 
 
Pour développer des capacités technologiques, trois activités sont souvent conjointement encouragées: la 
« Recherche », le « Développement » et « l’Ingénierie ou Engineering », où: 
- "Recherche" fait référence à la recherche fondamentale 
- "Développement" fait référence à la traduction de connaissances techniques et scientifiques en 
produits, procédés et services 
- " Ingénierie ou Engineering" fait référence à des aspects très pratiques 
 
29) Quelles sont les actions entreprises pour développer les activités de « Recherche », « développement », et 
« Engineering » dans votre organisation? (Formation, développement de compétences et d’habiletés, 
objectifs, organisation en charge, gestion, contrôle, incitations envers le personnel, etc.). Comment ces 
activités sont définies et comment sont-elles reliées aux besoins de développement de petits satellites? 
Quels sont les acteurs en charge de la promotion de la Recherche, du Développement, et de l’Engineering 
en matière de technologie des satellites? 
 
30) Compte tenu de votre contexte, quelle est l'importance de chacune de ces activités (« Recherche », 
« Développement », et « Engineering ») pour les objectifs de votre organisation? Et qu’en est-il des 
ressources humaines disponibles dans votre organisation pour chacune de ces activités? Quelles seraient 
les proportions de ces activités dans votre organisation? 
 
31) Quelles sont les actions entreprises pour favoriser les liens Recherche-Développement-Engineering et vice-
versa? Comment les activités de R&D sont valorisées (et commercialisées) ? Quelles sont les réalisations 
pour ces activités (ex. Brevets, produits commercialisables, etc.) ? Avez-vous des mécanismes qui gèrent et 
relient les outputs aux besoins de développement des satellites? Dans quelle mesure ces outputs 
répondent aux besoins de développement de satellite? 
 
32) S’agissant des activités de Recherche, Développement, et Engineering, indiquez les réalisations qui 
découlent principalement des projets collaboratifs de petits satellites? Selon vous, l’effort d'apprentissage 
fourni par votre organisation s’est concentré plutôt sur « l’Engineering », le « Développement », ou la 
« Recherche » ? Comment l'efficacité de cet apprentissage a été contrôlée? 
 
33) Compte tenu de votre contexte, quelle est l'importance de chacune de ces activités (« Recherche », 
« Développement », et « Engineering ») pour les objectifs de votre organisation? Et qu’en est-il des 
ressources humaines disponibles dans votre organisation pour chacune de ces activités? Quelles seraient 
les proportions de ces activités dans votre organisation? 
 
34) En général, les universités développent de la recherche fondamentale tandis que les aspects appliqués sont 
développés dans les centres de recherche et de développement spécialisés, ainsi qu’au niveau des centres 
de développement de l'industrie? Dans quelle mesure cela est vrai pour le cas de la technologie satellitaire 
en Algérie? Est-ce que l'industrie est impliquée dans la recherche? Y a-t-il une stratégie pour la mise en 
place de clusters (groupements) pour le développement de technologies satellitaires? 
 
35) Quelle est la stratégie pour le développement d’un secteur local de l’Engineering en mesure de fournir les 
compétences nécessaires pour le développement et / ou l'intégration des satellites? 
 
36) S’agissant du développement de satellites localement, quels sont les objectifs en termes de compétences 
clés (core-competencies) à développer en interne et les éléments à externaliser (localement en Algérie)? 
Quelles seraient les compétences clés et les fonctions de base à développer au sein de votre organisation, 
celles à développer localement en Algérie, mais en dehors de votre organisation, et celles à importer de 
l’étranger? Quel serait le rôle du secteur industriel et du secteur privé ? Est-ce-que ces objectifs sont 
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explicitement déclinés? Avez-vous une entité en charge de la gestion du réseau de l'organisation et des 
interactions? 
 
37) S’agissant des activités de Recherche et de Développement, est-ce que vous avez une entité qui réalise une 
veille technologique (ex. l'analyse des publications scientifiques et technologiques, des séminaires, des 
brevets)?  
 
38) Dans votre organisation, comment le développement des technologies de petits satellites est géré? et en 
particulier comment les projets de petits satellites sont gérés? Y at-il des entités permanentes (ou équipes) 
en charge de ces activités? Décrivez la structure organisationnelle de ces activités. Comment l'organisation 
obtient des feedback et contrôle la progression du développement des technologies des petits satellites et 
en particulier les projets collaboratifs de petits satellites? (revues structurelles ou planifiées, revues non 
structurelles et non planifiées, interactions informelles ou occasionnelles, etc.). 
 
39) Comment qualifiez-vous la stratégie et les mécanismes adoptés par votre organisation pour favoriser la 
communication intra-organisationnelle et inter-organisationnelle? 
 
40) Est-ce que votre organisation dispose d’un mécanisme «formel» qui identifie, suit et gère les personnels 
expérimentés et les individus qualifiés qui se démarquent du reste dans le développement des satellites 
(ex. ils détiennent des connaissances tacites, compétences pratiques, compétences théoriques, 
compétences de communication, etc.)? Est-ce que votre organisation a une stratégie spécifique pour gérer 
les ressources humaines qui ont été impliqués dans les projets collaboratifs successifs (ex. un plan de 
carrière, etc.)? 
 
41) Comment la formation est planifiée au sein de votre organisation? (en fonction des besoins exprimés, par 
anticipations, etc.) et comment est-elle contrôlée et évaluée? Décrivez le processus pour les activités liées 
à la « Recherche », au « Développement » et à « l'Engineering ». 
-Qu’en est-il de la formation continue? 
-Qu’en est-il de la formation managériale? 
-Qu’en est-il du développement des compétences en communication? 
 
42) Est-ce que votre organisation rencontre des asymétries entre la demande du personnel ou leur «désir» en 
termes d’emploi, et l'offre en termes de postes à pourvoir dans les activités de Recherche, de 
Développement, ou d’Engineering? Comment ce compromis entre l'intérêt personnel et les objectifs de 
l'organisation est managé? 
 
43) Comment qualifiez-vous les interactions et échanges entre les différentes équipes de projet (intense, 
formel, informel, encadré, etc.) ? Quelle est la stratégie (ou les mécanismes) de l'organisation pour 
favoriser la communication et le travail inter-équipe et intra-organisation (équipes de projet satellite, 
entité internes à votre organisation)? (Activités et projets qui impliquent plusieurs équipes, la coopération 
et les échanges entre les équipes, des réunions, des ateliers, des objectifs transversaux, etc.). Avez-vous un 
système d'information qui permet le travail de groupe, workflow, gestion de projet, planification, bases de 
données partagées, etc. ? Donnez des détails sur les activités de Recherche, de Développement, et 
d’Engineering. 
 
44) S’agissant des activités de l’EDTAS, comment qualifiez-vous les interactions et échanges entre les 
chercheurs de l’EDTAS et le personnel de l’ASAL (intense, formel, informel, encadré, etc.) ? (projets 
conjoints, recherches conjointes, publications conjointes, etc.). indiquez si des chercheurs qui ont participé 
aux projets satellitaires (Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) sont impliqués dans ces échanges. 
 
45) Comment qualifiez-vous les interactions et échanges entre les chercheurs de l’EDTAS, entre eux, et entre 
les différentes universités impliquées (intense, formel, informel, encadré, etc.) ? (projets conjoints, 






C. Management du développement des capacités   
 
46) Est-ce que les équipements et installations mis en place par votre organisation (et ces partenaires locaux) 
sont appropriés pour la conduite d’activités de R&D dans les technologies satellitaires ?  
 
47) Quel est le nombre d'employés dans votre organisation? Estimez la proportion de la main-d'œuvre 
impliquée dans: Management, Opérations, R & D et Engineering. 
 
48) Est-ce que les ressources humaines de votre organisation sont appropriées pour la conduite d’activités de 
R&D dans les technologies satellitaires ? (Tailles des équipes, disciplines des équipes, motivations des 
équipes, compétences des équipes, etc.) 
 
49) Est-ce que les équipements et installations mis en place par votre organisation (et ces partenaires locaux) 
sont appropriés aux missions suivantes : spécification et conception des satellites, achats de composants, 
personnalisation et développement, Assemblée, test, opérations?  
 
50) Est-ce que les ressources humaines de votre organisation sont appropriées pour les missions suivantes: 
spécification et conception des satellites, achats de composants, personnalisation et développement, 
Assemblée, test, opérations ? Quelles sont les ressources humaines les plus requises pour atteindre les 
objectifs de l'organisation? 
 
51) Est-ce que les capacités managériales et organisationnelles actuelles de votre organisation sont 
appropriées aux exigences de développement de petits satellites? (Les capacités managériales pourraient 
inclure: la structuration des projets, système de suivi des plannings et de budgétisation, gestion des 
approvisionnements, gestion de la qualité, etc.) 
 
52) Quel est le nombre d'employés dans votre organisation? Estimez la proportion de la main-d'œuvre 
impliquée dans: R & D, Engineering, Management, Opérations. 
 
53) Comment qualifiez-vous les contributions des projets successifs de satellites en matière de développement 
de compétences techniques vs compétences managériales du personnel? 
 
54) Parallèlement au développement des ressources humaines par le biais des projets collaboratifs de satellite, 
quelles sont les autres actions entreprises dans le but de développer des compétences techniques et de 
management dans le domaine spécifique de la fabrication des composants de satellite ou de l’intégration 
de systèmes? 
 
55) Dans votre organisation, comment est managé le développement des technologies de petits satellites? et 
en particulier comment sont managés les projets de petits satellites? Y a-t-il des entités permanentes (ou 
équipes) en charge de la gestion des projets de développement de satellites? Décrivez la structure 
organisationnelle de ces activités. Comment l'organisation est informée de l’évolution (feedback), et 
contrôle la progression, du développement des technologies de petits satellites en général, et les projets 
collaboratifs de petits satellites en particulier? (mécanismes et interactions formels, structurées, non 
structurées, plutôt informels, etc.).  
-Qu'en est-il de l'adoption d'outils de gestion en particulier ceux liés au développement de satellites? (ex. 
structuration de projet, système de planification, de suivi des calendriers et du budget, chaine logistique et 
gestion des approvisionnements, gestion de la qualité, gestion des coûts, gestion des stocks, etc.). 
 
56) Est-ce que vous trouvez que l’organisation actuelle de votre structure est appropriée aux exigences de 
développement de petits satellites? 
 
57) Est-ce que vous trouvez que les procédures d’achats et d’approvisionnements sont appropriées aux 




58) Est-ce que votre organisation déploie une approche d'assurance qualité (ex. pratiques de management de 
la Qualité Totale visant l'amélioration continue, etc.)? Avez-vous une entité en charge de la gestion de la 
qualité? 
 
59) L'environnement local est pauvre en termes d'organisations et d'entreprises (fournisseurs, sous-traitants, 
institutions de R & D) qui travaillent sur la technologie des satellites ; Quels sont les objectifs et les 
stratégies adoptées pour mettre en place cet environnement et pour encourager les acteurs à se joindre 
à vous? Quelles sont les mesures prises à cet effet (identifier les acteurs, les auditer, les former, 
transférer la technologie pour eux, les aider à mettre à niveau leurs installations, les mesures incitatives, 
etc.)? Avez-vous une entité ou organisation dédiée à cette mission? 
 
60) Avez-vous une entité en charge de la promotion et la gestion du réseau d'organisations (et des 
interactions) dans le but de développer des technologies de petits satellites et ce aux niveaux de la 
« Recherche », du « Développement », et de « l’Engineering »? 
 
D. Management du transfert des technologies 
 
61) Les projets collaboratifs ont été utilisés comme mécanisme de développement de capacités 
technologiques satellitaires les 15 dernières années par votre organisation, comment évaluez-vous ce 
mécanisme, quelles sont ses points forts et ses points faibles, et dans quelle mesure il a répondu aux 
besoins et objectifs algériens? 
 
62) Indépendamment des projets collaboratifs de petits satellites, comment qualifiez-vous votre 
collaboration internationale relative au développement des technologies des petits satellites? Utilisez-
vous d'autres mécanismes internationaux pour développer cette technologie, pour former et pour mener 
des activités de R&D? (Collaborations sur des projets de Recherche, des projets de Développement, des 
projets d'Engineering) (utilisation de mécanismes non-conventionnels en offrant des incitations aux 
investisseurs étrangers - Investissement Etrangers Direct, etc.) 
 
63) En général, la diversification des partenaires au niveau international peut accroître les possibilités de 
transfert de technologie et surmonter certains obstacles (dépendance), dans quelle mesure cela 
s’applique pour le développement des petits satellites en Algérie? 
 
64) Selon vous, quelle est la stratégie utilisée pour inciter les partenaires étrangers pour être plus efficace 
dans le transfert des technologies? Dans quelle mesure les contrats précédents étaient représentatifs de 
cette stratégie (Est-ce que les mesures incitatives dans ces contrats étaient appropriées)? 
 
65) Sur la base de votre expérience, laquelle des déclarations suivantes correspond le plus à votre point de 
vue sur le risque pris par la firme étrangère lorsqu’elle dispensait des formations ou transférait de la 
technologie sur les satellitaires ?  
a- Les Entreprises étrangères ont estimé que la technologie transférée a été exploitée jusqu'à ses limites 
et peut être transférée sans risque (ex. risque d’alimenter une concurrence future, considérations 
sécuritaires).  
b- Les sociétés étrangères ont estimé que la technologie transférée était avancée, mais la formation 
dispensée n’était pas assez profonde pour constituer un risque pour la société étrangère (ex. risque 
d'alimenter une concurrence future, considérations sécuritaires). 
c- Les Entreprises étrangères ont estimé que la technologie était avancée, mais elles considéraient que 
les capacités algériennes n’étaient pas assez avancées pour faire usage d’une technologie avancée. 
 
66) L’ASAL a utilisé les projets collaboratifs de satellites avec des entreprises étrangères comme mécanisme de 
transfert de technologie de l'étranger. Considérant le niveau atteint des capacités locales et des limitations  
des projets collaboratifs de satellites pour aller plus loin dans le transfert, est-ce que l’ASAL envisage 
l'adoption de nouveaux mécanismes (ex. Licence de production, délocalisation les activités d'entreprises 





67) Quel genre de relations avez-vous généralement avec vos fournisseurs de satellites après le projet? Est-ce 
que ces relations sont entretenues par des accords formels, sont-elles intenses, etc.? Comment évoluent-
elles? 
 
68) Compte tenu du fait que le transfert de technologies de l’étranger est crucial pour le développement de 
technologies satellitaire, et compte tenu du fait que dans les relations de transferts de technologies et 
dans les industries à forte intensité technologique, la gestion des questions de propriété intellectuelle 
(ex. les brevets, etc.) est importante pour protéger la propriété intellectuelle des partenaires étrangers 
ainsi que l’effort d’innovation local. Comment ces questions sont gérées dans votre organisation? Est-ce 
que vous avez une entité qui gère les questions de propriété intellectuelle? 
 
69) Comment qualifiez-vous votre expérience internationale actuelle dans la négociation des projets de petits 
satellites ? qu’en est-il de l’équilibre dans les négociations et qu’en est-il de votre pouvoir de négociation ?  
 
70) Est-ce que les partenaires locaux (universités, industrie, EDTAS, etc.) ont bénéficié de la collaboration avec 
l’ASAL pour former leur ressources humaines et acquérir de nouvelles compétences, pour mettre à jour 
leurs équipements et installations pour mener des activités de Recherche, Développement, et 
Engineering, ou adapter leurs organisations aux nouveaux besoins liés au développement de satellites? 
Est-ce que vous avez un programme ou mécanisme de transfert de technologies envers les partenaires 
locaux ?  
 
71) Selon vous, quelle est la stratégie que devrait adopter l’ASAL pour inciter les partenaires locaux à 
participer efficacement aux activités de l’ASAL en matière de développement de satellites? 
 
72) Comment qualifiez-vous la collaboration internationale de l’EDTAS en matière de R&D portant sur la 
technologie satellitaire ? 
 
E. Suggestions finales 
 
73) Comment qualifiez-vous les besoins des marchés, local et international, en termes de technologie de 
petits satellites (marché des composants et des systèmes)? Comment qualifiez-vous la tendance dans les 
marchés des petits satellites (évolution vers des marchés dominés par les fournisseurs, des marchés 
dominés par des acheteurs, etc.) ? 
 
74) Selon vous, avez-vous d'autres marchés dont les besoins technologiques peuvent être satisfaits en 
utilisant les capacités qui sont en cours de développement et les connaissances qui ont été acquises (ex. 
automobile, aéronautique, technologies médicales, etc.)? Est-ce que vous envisagez de vous adresser à 
ces marchés? 
 
75) La politique de l'Algérie au cours des deux dernières décennies a promu le secteur des applications de 
l’imagerie satellitaire, quelles sont les tendances locales en termes de croissance et est-ce que les besoins 
sont/seront satisfaits? Selon vous, comment serait l'équilibre du marché entre la demande (des images 
satellites) et l’offre (des systèmes satellites)? Est-ce que les systèmes de satellites prévus / réalisés 
répondront aux besoins? 
 
76) S’agissant du marché des images satellitaires, quel est (serait) le marché cible : local, régional, ou 
international ? 
 
77) S’agissant du marché des composants et systèmes satellitaires, quel est (serait) le marché cible, local, 
régional, ou international ? 
 
78) Comment qualifiez-vous l’effort national en matière de développement de petits satellites de 
télédétection, est-ce que cet effort a été plutôt tiré par le développement du marché (utilisateurs des 
images satellites, etc.) ou est-ce qu’il est plutôt poussé par le développement de systèmes satellitaires 




79) Selon vous, quel est (serait) la direction des efforts algériens dans le développement de petits satellites, 
est-ce vers le développement de composants et de systèmes favorisant le remplacement des 
importations, ou bien le développement de composants et de systèmes destinés à l'exportation vers le 
marché international? 
 
80) Selon vous, pour développer de petits satellites, quelles seraient les compétences et les fonctions de base 
à développer au sein de votre organisation, ceux pour développer localement en Algérie, mais en dehors 
de votre organisation, et ceux d'importer des entreprises étrangères? 
 
81) S’agissant des projets de petits satellites, selon vous, sur quoi l’accent devrait être mis dans vos travaux et 
taches: « la Conception », « la gestion de projet », « l'ingénierie des systèmes », « l'intégration du 
système », ou « les opérations »? 
 
82) Sur la base de votre expérience dans les technologies satellitaires et votre connaissance du contexte 
local, qu’est-ce que vous suggérez le plus afin de commencer à développer localement de petits 
satellites? 
a- de travailler avec des entreprises étrangères sur des technologies relativement anciennes, moins 
complexe, offrant des performances système relativement modestes ou faibles 
b- de travailler avec des entreprises étrangères sur des technologies relativement nouvelles, complexe, 
offrant des performances système relativement élevées 
c- de travailler plus souvent sur des technologies avec un risque d'échec plus élevé (non-achèvement de 
projet ou défaillance du système) plutôt que de travailler moins souvent sur des technologies avec un 
risque d'échec moindre 
 
83) Est-ce que vous êtes confiant des aptitudes de votre organisation pour développer des petits satellites 
localement? 
 
84) Comment qualifiez-vous la politique nationale en matière de Recherche, de Développement et 
d’Engineering et son impact sur la technologie des satellites? Comment qualifiez-vous l'intensité (ex. 
investissement, etc.) et les outputs (résultats, etc.) de ces activités? Sont-ils à orientés vers la Recherche 
fondamentale, recherche appliquée, ou vers les aspects les plus pratiques? 
 
-Comment qualifiez-vous l’environnement national des sciences et technologies (politique des sciences et 
technologies, politiques de la R&D, réglementation, etc.) et son impact sur le développement des 
technologies des satellites? Comment qualifiez-vous l'intensité (ex. investissement, etc.) des activités dans 
cet environnement et leurs relations aux technologies satellitaires? Est-ce-que les actions promues dans 
cet environnement sont orientées vers la Recherche fondamentale, recherche appliquée, ou vers les 
aspects les plus pratiques? 
 
-Comment qualifiez-vous l'environnement industriel national (politique industrielle, politique de l’industrie 
de haute technologie, politique d'innovation, réglementation, etc.) ? Comment qualifiez-vous l'intensité 
(ex. investissement, etc.) des activités dans cet environnement et leurs relations aux technologies 
satellitaires? 
 
-Comment qualifiez-vous le contexte économique national et son impact sur le développement des 
technologies de satellites? Comment qualifiez-vous l'intensité (ex. systèmes de financement, etc.) des 
activités dans cet environnement et leurs relations aux technologies satellitaires? 
 
-Comment qualifiez-vous l'évolution en termes de dépendance organisationnelle du secteur spatial au 
niveau national (d'une agence sous le Premier Ministère (ou Chefferie du Gouvernement), puis sous MPTIC 
(Ministère des Postes et de l'information et des communications Technologies), puis de nouveau sous 
Premier Ministère)? Dans quelle mesure ce changement a affecté le progrès de ce secteur? 
 
85) Les objectifs socio-économiques font partie des objectifs du programme spatial en Algérie, est-ce-que 











Questions on building small satellite capabilities in Algeria 
 
addressed to representatives of entities involved in the process  
(Doctoral School of Space Technology and Applications - EDTAS) 
 
Research aim: To collect data in order to gain better understanding of satellite technology 
transfer to Algeria. This will enable Algerians to gain an appreciation on the effectiveness of 
the mechanisms that they have used to build satellite technological capabilities, and will 
provide guidance regarding effective processes to transfer satellite technology.  
 
Guidance in responding to questions:  
- The researcher will be interviewing you by himself in a face-to-face meeting to ensure 
proper understanding of questions and responses.  
- Please feel free to use Arabic, French or English when responding.  
- Feel free to include any oral or written comments, or material deemed relevant or 
supportive to your responses.  
- All responses will be treated as confidential with only the researcher having access to 
them.  
 
Sections covered:  
A. General information 
B. Learning effort 
C. Capability-building management 
D. Technology transfer management 
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A. General information 
 
1) What is your current position and describe your responsibilities and duties with regard to the Doctoral 
School of Space Technology and Applications - EDTAS? How long have you been EDTAS’ coordinator?  
 
2) Describe the EDTAS’ missions in general and its operating mechanism? 
 
3) What kind of relationships EDTAS has with ASAL?  
 
4) One of the stated goals of the Algerian space programme is to progressively develop satellite capabilities. 
The successive collaborative projects with foreign partners (e.g. Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) have 
been used as a mechanism, how important is EDTAS contribution in the development of small satellite 
technology in Algeria? Does EDTAS have an explicit (written) policy and strategy with regard to small 
satellite development (or remote sensing small satellite development)?   
 
5) How clear you find the objectives defined by ASAL when it comes to implementing them by EDTAS?  
 
6) How flexible are these objectives in terms of: a) specification (freedom to adjust specifications or to 
completely review objectives); b) funding (freedom to ask more money); and c) time (freedom to go 
beyond the agreed timeline)?  
 
7) How risky do you find these objectives?  
 
8) How ambitious do you find these objectives?  
 
9) In your view, what motivates people the most to join the EDTAS and particularly partake in developing 
satellite technology?  
 
 
B. Learning effort 
 
10) With regard to the training provided within the EDTAS, what were the shares for each area of specialisation 
(Space instrumentation, Space telecommunications and computing, Image processing and GIS, optics and 
precision mechanics, Space telecommunications, etc.) since the creation of the EDTAS? (e.g. number of 
master and PhD students) 
 
11) How have these areas of specialisation (Space instrumentation, Space telecommunications and computing, 
Image processing and GIS, optics and precision mechanics, Space telecommunications, etc.) been defined? 
Were they defined according to ASAL’s needs? Were they defined according to EDTAS available 
capabilities?   
 
12) How are research projects in EDTAS identified or defined, conducted, funded, and managed? What is 
ASAL’s role in these projects?  
 
13) What are the disciplines you target as part of small satellite technology to be developed?  
 
14) In your view, what were the main contributions of the successive satellite projects (Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-
2B, Alsat-1B) for EDTAS activities and vice-versa?  
 
15) One of the goals of the Algerian space programme is to develop capabilities to integrate satellites. What 
would be the role of EDTAS in developing integrative knowledge (technology management, system 
engineering, etc.) 
 
16) How do you find the student prior level when it comes to involving them in satellite R&D? How do you 




17) Are/were these students involved, during or after their EDTAS training, in ASAL’s activities? Do you have 
any feedback on their skills with regard to work requirements or/and satellite development? 
 
 
For developing technological capabilities, three activities are often jointly fostered: Research, 
Development and Engineering, wherein:   
- “Research” refers to basic research 
- “Development” refers to translating technical and scientific knowledge into products, processes, and 
services 
- “Engineering” refers to very practical aspects 
 
18) How do you find the nature of the EDTAS activities in terms of “Research” and “Development”? are they 
research-centred or development-centred? What would be the proportions of these activities in EDTAS?  
 
19) What are the actions undertaken for translating these R&D activities into “Engineering” activities and vice-
versa? How are the R&D activities commercialised? What are the achievements with regard to each 
activity? (e.g. patents, commercialised products, etc.)  
 
20) Are these activities (i.e. Research, Development) conducted internally (within universities laboratories, etc.) 
or partly outsourced (conducted within industry environment)?  
 
21) In your view and based on your knowledge of the Algerian university context, what would be the core-
competences in satellite technology R&D to build locally and those to import?    
 
22) In addition to its academic training mission, does EDTAS conduct “on-demand” research outside the 
academic setting? What are the mechanisms in place to carry out such research? 
 
23) How would you describe interactions between EDTAS’ researchers and ASAL’s personnel (intense, formal, 
informal, framed, etc.)? (Joint project, joint research, joint publication, etc.). Indicate whether researchers 
who participated in satellite projects (Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) are involved in these exchanges? 
 
24) How would you describe interactions between EDTAS’ researchers themselves, and between various 
universities involved (intense, formal, informal, framed, etc.)? (Joint project, joint research, joint 
publication, etc.) 
 
C. Capability-building management  
 
25) How appropriate are the equipment and facilities of EDTAS for conducting R&D activities in satellite 
technology?  
 
26) How appropriate are the human resources of EDTAS for conducting R&D activities in satellite technology? 
(Teams’ sizes, teams’ disciplines, team’s motivations, teams’ skills, etc.)  
 
27) How appropriate are the current managerial and organisational capabilities of EDTAS with regard to its 
missions and objectives?  
 
 
D. Technology transfer management 
 
28) Did the EDTAS benefit from the collaboration with ASAL in order to train its human resources for acquiring 
new skills, to update its equipment and facilities, or to adapt its organisation for new requirements related 
to satellite development?  
 
29) In your view, what is the strategy that ASAL should adopt to incentivise EDTAS to be effectively involved in 




30) How would you describe the international collaboration of EDTAS with regard to R&D on satellite 
technology?  
 
31) In technology intensive industries such as satellite industry, managing intellectual property issues (e.g. 
patents, etc.) is important. How are these issues managed within EDTAS?  
 
E. Final suggestion 
 
32) Do you have other market needs that can be met by using EDTAS’s capabilities and the knowledge acquired 
(e.g. aeronautic, medical technologies, etc.)? Are you envisaging addressing these markets?   
 
33) How confident do you feel about EDTAS’s ability in order to support small satellites development locally?  
 















Questions sur la mise en place de capacités de développement de 
petits satellites en Algérie  
 
adressées aux représentants des entités impliquées dans ce processus 
(Ecole Doctorale des Technologies et Applications Spatiales – EDTAS) 
 
Objectifs de la recherche: Recueillir des données qui permettent de mieux comprendre le 
processus de transfert des technologies satellitaires pour le cas de l’Algérie. Cela permettra 
aux Algériens d'avoir une appréciation sur l'efficacité des mécanismes qu'ils utilisent pour 
mettre en place un potentiel de développement des technologies de petits satellites, et 
fournira des indications sur les processus les plus efficaces à adopter pour transférer les 
technologies satellitaires. 
 
Orientations pour répondre aux questions: 
- Le chercheur lui-même vous interviewera (face-à-face) lors d’une réunion, à convenir, 
pour s’assurer de la bonne compréhension des questions et de la bonne formulation des 
réponses. 
- Utilisez, à votre convenance, l'arabe, le français ou l'anglais au moment de répondre. 
- Vous pouvez faire, à votre convenance, des commentaires, oraux ou écrits, et joindre 
tout document que vous estimeriez pertinent. 
- Toutes les réponses seront traitées de manière confidentielle. Seul le chercheur aura 




A. Informations générales  
B. Effort d’apprentissage 
C. Management du développement des capacités   
D. Management du transfert des technologies 
E. Suggestions finales 
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A. Informations générales  
 
1) Quelle est votre poste/position actuel et décrivez vos responsabilités et fonctions par rapport à l’Ecole 
Doctorale des Technologies et Applications Spatiales? Combien de temps avez-vous passé en tant que 
Coordinateur de l’EDTAS ?  
 
2) Décrivez les missions de l’EDTAS en général et son mécanisme de fonctionnement ?  
 
3) Quel genre de relations l’EDTAS a avec l’ASAL ?  
 
4) L'un des buts déclarés du programme spatial algérien est de développer progressivement des capacités 
satellitaires. Les projets collaboratifs successifs avec des partenaires étrangers (ex. Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-
2B, Alsat-1B) ont été utilisés comme mécanisme. expliquez l'importance de sa contribution dans le 
développement des technologies des petits satellites en Algérie? Est-ce que l’EDTAS a une 
politique/stratégie explicite (écrite) en matière de développement de petits satellites (ou le 
développement des petits satellites de télédétection)?  
 
5) Comment trouvez-vous la clarté des objectifs définis par l’ASAL lorsqu’il s’agit de les mettre en œuvre en 
actions par l’EDTAS?   
 
6) Comment qualifiez-vous la flexibilité de ces objectifs en termes de spécifications (liberté d’ajuster les 
spécifications ou revoir complètement les objectifs) ? en termes de financement (liberté de demander plus 
d’argent) ? en termes de délais (liberté d’aller au-delà des délais) ? 
 
7) Comment qualifiez-vous le risque associé à ces objectifs?  
 
8) Comment qualifiez-vous l’ambition de ces objectifs?  
 
9) Selon vous, qu'est-ce qui motive le plus les gens à se joindre l’EDTAS et notamment participer au 
développement des technologies satellitaires ?  
 
 
B. Effort d’apprentissage 
 
10) S’agissant des formations dispensées au niveau de l’EDTAS, quels sont les parts de formations par spécialité 
(instrumentation spatiale, télécommunication et informatique spatiales, traitement d’images et SIG, 
Optique et mécanique de précision, télécommunications spatiales, etc.) et ce depuis la création de 
l’EDTAS ? (number of student in masters, doctorat)  
 
11) Comment ces domaines de spécialisation (instrumentation spatiale, télécommunication et informatique 
spatiales, traitement d’images et SIG, Optique et mécanique de précision, télécommunications spatiales, 
etc.) ont été définis? Ont-ils été définis en fonction des besoins de l’ASAL? Ont-ils été définis en fonction 
des capacités disponibles de l’EDTAS? 
 
12) Comment les projets de recherche dans l’EDTAS sont identifiés et définis, menées, financés, et gérées? 
Quel est le rôle de l’ASAL dans ces projets ? 
 
13) Quelles sont les disciplines que vous ciblez dans les technologies des petits satellites à développer?  
 
14) Selon vous, quelles ont été les principales contributions des projets successifs de satellites (Alsat-1, Alsat-
2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) aux activités de l’EDTAS and vice-versa? 
 
15) L'un des objectifs du programme spatial algérien est de développer les capacités d'intégration des 
satellites. Quel serait le rôle de l'EDTAS dans le développement des connaissances intégratives 




16) Comment trouvez-vous le niveau initial des étudiants impliqués dans la R&D satellitaire? Comment 
identifiez-vous les besoins? Comment les étudiants sont sélectionnés?  
 
17) Est-ce que ces étudiants ont été impliqués, au cours ou à l’issue de leur formation à l’EDTAS, aux activités 
de l’ASAL ?  Est-ce que vous avec eu un feedback sur leurs compétences par rapport aux exigences 
d’emploi ou/et de développement de satellites? 
 
 
Pour développer des capacités technologiques, trois activités sont souvent conjointement encouragées: la 
« Recherche », le « Développement » et « l’Ingénierie ou Engineering », où: 
- "Recherche" fait référence à la recherche fondamentale 
- "Développement" fait référence à la traduction de connaissances techniques et scientifiques en 
produits, procédés et services 
- " Ingénierie ou Engineering" fait référence à des aspects très pratiques 
 
18) Comment trouvez-vous la nature des activités de l’EDTAS en termes de «recherche» et «développement», 
sont-elles centrées sur la recherche ou sur le développement? Quelles seraient les proportions de ces 
activités dans l’EDTAS? 
 
19) Quelles sont les actions entreprises pour traduire ces activités de R&D en activités d’ «Engineering» et vice-
versa? Comment ces activités de R&D sont valorisées (et commercialisées) ? Quelles sont les réalisations 
pour ces activités? (ex. Brevets, produits commercialisables, etc.) 
 
20) Est-ce ces activités (« Recherche », « Développement ») sont menées en interne (dans des laboratoires 
d’universités) ou en partie externalisées (menées dans un environnement industriel)?  
 
21) Selon vous et sur la base de votre connaissance du contexte universitaire algérien, quelles seraient les 
compétences clés à développer localement en matière de R&D en technologies satellitaires et celles à 
importer ?  
 
22) En plus de sa mission de formation académique, est-ce que l’EDTAS peut effectuer des recherches à la 
demande et en dehors du cadre académique ? Quel sont les mécanismes mis en place pour mener de telles 
recherches ?  
 
23) Comment qualifiez-vous les interactions et échanges entre les chercheurs de l’EDTAS et le personnel de 
l’ASAL (intense, formel, informel, encadré, etc.) ? (projets conjoints, recherches conjointes, publications 
conjointes, etc.). indiquez si des chercheurs qui ont participé aux projets satellitaires (Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, 
Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) sont impliqués dans ces échanges. 
 
24) Comment qualifiez-vous les interactions et échanges entre les chercheurs de l’EDTAS, entre eux, et entre 
les différentes universités impliquées (intense, formel, informel, encadré, etc.) ? (projets conjoints, 
recherches conjointes, publications conjointes, etc.) 
 
C. Management du développement des capacités   
 
25) Est-ce que les équipements et installations de l’EDTAS sont appropriés pour la conduite d’activités de R&D 
dans les technologies satellitaires ?  
 
26) Est-ce que les ressources humaines de l’EDTAS sont appropriées pour la conduite d’activités de R&D dans 
les technologies satellitaires ? (Tailles des équipes, disciplines des équipes, motivations des équipes, 
compétences des équipes, etc.) 
 
27) Est-ce que les capacités managériales et organisationnelles actuelles de l’EDTAS sont appropriées à ses 





D. Management du transfert des technologies 
 
28) Est-ce que l’EDTAS a bénéficié de la collaboration avec l’ASAL pour former ses ressources humaines et 
acquérir de nouvelles compétences, pour mettre à jour ses équipements et installations, ou adapter son 
organisation aux nouveaux besoins liés au développement de satellites? 
 
29) Selon vous, quelle est la stratégie que devrait adopter l’ASAL pour inciter l’EDTAS à participer efficacement 
aux activités de l’ASAL en matière de développement de satellites? 
 
30) Comment qualifiez-vous la collaboration internationale de l’EDTAS en matière de R&D portant sur la 
technologie satellitaire ? 
 
31) Dans les industries à forte intensité technologique telles que l’industrie satellitaire, la gestion des questions 
de propriété intellectuelle (ex. les brevets, etc.) est importante. Comment ces questions sont gérées dans 
l’EDTAS?  
 
E. Suggestions finales 
 
32) Avez-vous d'autres marchés dont les besoins peuvent être satisfaits en utilisant les capacités qui sont en 
cours de développement et les connaissances qui ont été acquises? Est-ce que vous envisagez de vous 
adresser à ces marchés? 
 
33) Est-ce que vous êtes confiant des aptitudes de l’EDTAS pour apporter le support au développement de 
petits satellites localement? 
 
34) Dans quelle mesure trouvez-vous l'environnement national favorable pour le travail de l’EDTAS et le 















Questions on building small satellite capabilities in Algeria 
 
addressed to representatives of entities involved in the process 
(Aircraft construction company - ECA) 
 
Research aim: To collect data in order to gain better understanding of satellite technology 
transfer to Algeria. This will enable Algerians to gain an appreciation on the effectiveness of 
the mechanisms that they have used to build satellite technological capabilities, and will 
provide guidance regarding effective processes to transfer satellite technology.  
 
Guidance in responding to questions:  
- The researcher will be interviewing you by himself in a face-to-face meeting to ensure 
proper understanding of questions and responses.  
- Please feel free to use Arabic, French or English when responding.  
- Feel free to include any oral or written comments, or material deemed relevant or 
supportive to your responses.  
- All responses will be treated as confidential with only the researcher having access to 
them.  
 
Sections covered:  
A. General information 
B. Learning effort 
C. Capability-building management 
D. Technology transfer management 
E. Final suggestions 
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A. General information 
 
1) What is your current position and describe your responsibilities and duties within your organisation? How 
long have you been in this position? How long have you been in this organisation?  
 
2) Describe your organisation missions in general and explain how important is your participation in the 
development of small satellite technology in accomplishing these missions (economic importance, 
technological importance, company’s image, etc.)? Does your organisation have a policy and strategy with 
regard to the participation in small satellite development?   
 
3) One of the stated goals of the Algerian space programme is to develop locally and progressively satellite 
capabilities, how clear do you find this objective with regard to your organisation involvement? 
 
4) How risky do you find your involvement in this objective considering your own capabilities?  
 
5) How ambitious do you find your involvement in this objective considering your own capabilities?  
 
6) In your view, what motivates organisations/firms the most to join the Algerian Space Agency -ASAL and 
partake in developing satellite technology?  
 
B. Learning effort 
 
7) What did your organisation develop as part of satellite projects? Describe your successive participations.  
 
8) In your view, what was the learning benefit for each of your participation in satellite projects? Have you 
improved your capabilities of: Design and specification, Project management, Systems engineering, System 
integration, manufacturing and machining? 
 
9) How are the participation experiences and lessons learnt stored (e.g. routines, tests, procedures)? How is 
documentation and knowledge acquired throughout collaboration with ASAL or produced internally 
managed (gathered, recorded, stored in DB, diffused locally, updated, computer-aided information system 
etc.)? Describe the strategy adopted and the mechanisms that have been put in place?  
 
10) To what extent are individuals involved in these projects kept working on similar tasks and activities in 
Algeria? Describe whether mechanisms are put in place to ensure that this happens? (How do you manage 
the loss of qualified or experienced personnel due for instance to long interruptions in the work process, 
brain drain, etc.?) 
 
11) What are the mechanisms used to ensure that individuals involved in these projects mentor/supervise new 
individuals and share their knowledge? 
 
12) During your participation in these projects, what were the disciplines in which your organisation was 
involved? Precise whether these disciplines are usually covered by your organisation or they were 
developed for the purpose of this collaboration?  
 
13) After these experiences, what are the disciplines that you target in order to enlarge and deepen your 
participation in satellite projects? Precise whether you are going to develop these disciplines internally or 
to outsource them? 
 
14) As part of your usual activities, what are the activities that are carried out internally and those outsourced?  
 
15) How do you find the prior knowledge of your personnel with regard to their involvement in satellite 
development? In your view, how close is their knowledge to that required for developing satellites locally? 
 




For developing technological capabilities, three activities are often jointly fostered: Research, 
Development and Engineering, wherein:   
- “Research” refers to basic research 
- “Development” refers to translating technical and scientific knowledge into products, processes, and 
services 
- “Engineering” refers to very practical aspects 
 
17) How important is each of these activities (i.e. Research, Development, and Engineering) for your 
organisation objectives? And what about human resources available in your organisation for each of these 
activities?  
 
18) Are these activities (i.e. Research, Development, and Engineering) conducted internally or outsourced 
(developed outside the organisation)? What kinds of activities are conducted internally and what kinds are 
outsourced? 
 
19) What are the objectives in terms of core-competencies to develop internally and elements to outsource 
(locally in Algeria)? In your view, what would be the core competencies and functions to develop and that 
would be required by satellite industry?   
 
20) How would you describe interactions between your personnel and ASAL’s personnel throughout the 
projects (intense, formal, informal, framed, etc.)?  
 
C. Capability-building management  
 
21) Based on your experience and exchange with ASAL’s personnel and their partners, how appropriate are 
your equipment and facilities for satellite development requirements?  
 
22) Estimate the proportions of the workforce involved in satellite technology development with ASAL for the 
following categories: Management, Operations, R&D, and Engineering?  
 
D. Technology transfer management 
 
23) Did your organisation benefit from the collaboration with ASAL in order to train its personnel for acquiring 
new skills, to update its equipment and facilities, or to adapt its organisation for new requirements related 
to satellite development?  
 
24) In your view, what is the strategy that ASAL should adopt to incentivise your organisation to be more 
involved and to transfer effectively to your organisation the technology required for satellite development?  
 
25) What kind of relationship do you usually have with ASAL after the projects? Are these relations maintained 
through formal agreements, are they intense, etc.? How do they evolve?  
 
E. Final suggestion 
 
26) Do you have other market needs that can be met by using the capabilities that have been built and 
knowledge acquired during ASAL’s collaboration experience? Are you envisaging addressing these markets?   
 
27) How confident do you feel about your organisation’s ability in order to support small satellite development 
locally?  
 












Questions sur la mise en place de capacités de développement de 
petits satellites en Algérie  
 
adressées aux représentants des entités impliquées dans ce processus 
(Entreprise de Construction Aéronautique - ECA) 
 
Objectifs de la recherche: Recueillir des données qui permettent de mieux comprendre le 
processus de transfert des technologies satellitaires pour le cas de l’Algérie. Cela permettra 
aux Algériens d'avoir une appréciation sur l'efficacité des mécanismes qu'ils utilisent pour 
mettre en place un potentiel de développement des technologies de petits satellites, et 
fournira des indications sur les processus les plus efficaces à adopter pour transférer les 
technologies satellitaires. 
 
Orientations pour répondre aux questions: 
- Le chercheur lui-même vous interviewera (face-à-face) lors d’une réunion, à convenir, 
pour s’assurer de la bonne compréhension des questions et de la bonne formulation des 
réponses. 
- Utilisez, à votre convenance, l'arabe, le français ou l'anglais au moment de répondre. 
- Vous pouvez faire, à votre convenance, des commentaires, oraux ou écrits, et joindre 
tout document que vous estimeriez pertinent. 
- Toutes les réponses seront traitées de manière confidentielle. Seul le chercheur aura 
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A. Informations générales  
 
1) Quelle est votre poste/position actuel ?  et décrivez vos responsabilités et fonctions au sein de votre 
organisation? Combien de temps avez-vous passé dans ce poste/position? Combien de temps avez-vous 
passé dans cette organisation? 
 
2) Décrivez les missions de votre organisation en général et expliquez l'importance de votre participation dans 
le développement des technologies des petits satellites? (importance économique, importance 
technologique, l’image de l’entreprise, etc.) Est-ce que votre organisation a une politique/stratégie en 
matière de participation dans le développement de petits satellites?  
 
3) L'un des buts déclarés du programme spatial algérien est de développer localement et progressivement 
des capacités satellitaires, comment trouvez-vous cet objectif en termes de clarté lorsqu’il s’agit de 
l’implication de votre organisation?   
 
4) Comment qualifiez-vous le risque associé à votre implication en tenant compte de vos capacités ?  
 
5) Comment qualifiez-vous l’ambition associée à votre implication en tenant compte de vos capacités ? 
 
6) Selon vous, qu'est-ce qui motive le plus les organisations/firmes à se joindre à l’Agence Spatiale Algérienne 
-ASAL et à participer au développement des technologies satellitaires ?  
 
B. Effort d’apprentissage 
 
7) Qu'est-ce-que votre organisation a fait dans les projets satellitaires? Décrirez vos participations successives. 
 
8) Selon vous, en quoi cette participation a été bénéfique à votre entreprise en termes d’apprentissage ? 
avez-vous amélioré vos capacités de : Conception et les spécifications, gestion de projet, ingénierie des 
systèmes, intégration du système, fabrication et l’usinage? 
 
9) Comment les expériences et leçons apprises durant cette participation sont sauvegardées (ex. routines de 
tests, procédures)? Comment la documentation et les connaissances acquises tout au long de la 
participation collaboratifs, ou celles produites en interne sont gérées (recueillies, enregistrées, stockées 
dans des bases de données, diffusées localement, mises à jour, système d'information assistée par 
ordinateur, etc.)? Décrivez la stratégie adoptée et les mécanismes mis en place? 
 
10) Dans quelle mesure les individus impliqués dans des projets collaboratifs sont tenus de travailler sur des 
activités et des tâches similaires? Décrivez si des mécanismes sont mis en place? (Comment gérez-vous la 
perte de personnel qualifié ou expérimenté en raison, par exemple, de longues périodes d’interruptions 
dans le processus de travail, sortir de l’organisation, etc.?) 
 
11) Quels sont les mécanismes utilisés pour assurer que les personnes impliquées dans ses projets supervisent 
(ou assurent du mentoring) de nouveaux individus et partagent leurs connaissances? 
 
12) Durant votre participation dans ces projets, quelles ont été les disciplines impliquées au sein de votre 
organisation ? précisez si ces disciplines sont habituellement couvertes au sein dans votre organisation, ou 
elles ont été développées pour les besoins de cette collaboration?  
 
13) Après ces expériences, quelles sont les disciplines que vous ciblez dans le but d'élargir et d'approfondir 
votre participation à des projets de satellites? Précisez si vous allez développer ces disciplines en interne 
ou vous allez les sous-traiter? 
 





15) Comment trouvez-vous les connaissances préalables de votre personnel quant à leur implication dans le 
développement de satellite? Selon vous, comment trouvez-vous leurs compétences par rapport aux 
exigences de développement de satellites localement? 
 
16) Quel est l'impact de la participation dans ces projets sur les compétences du personnel impliqué?  
 
 
Pour développer des capacités technologiques, trois activités sont souvent conjointement encouragées: la 
« Recherche », le « Développement » et « l’Ingénierie ou Engineering », où: 
- "Recherche" fait référence à la recherche fondamentale 
- "Développement" fait référence à la traduction de connaissances techniques et scientifiques en 
produits, procédés et services 
- " Ingénierie ou Engineering" fait référence à des aspects très pratiques 
 
17) Quelle est l'importance de chacune de ces activités (« Recherche », « Développement », et « Engineering ») 
pour les objectifs de votre organisation? Et qu’en est-il des ressources humaines disponibles dans votre 
organisation pour chacune de ces activités? 
 
18) Est-ce ces activités (« Recherche », « Développement », et « Engineering ») sont menées en interne ou 
externaliser (développé en dehors de l'organisation)? Quels types d'activités sont effectués en interne et 
quels types sont externalisés? 
 
19) Quels sont les objectifs en termes de compétences clés (core-competencies) à développer en interne et les 
éléments à externaliser (localement en Algérie)? Selon vous, quelles seraient les compétences clés et les 
fonctions de base à développer et qui pourraient être requises par l’industrie des satellites ?  
 
20) Comment qualifiez-vous les interactions et échanges entre votre personnel et le personnel de l’ASAL 
durant ce projet (intense, formel, informel, encadré, etc.) ? 
 
C. Management du développement des capacités   
 
21) Sur la base de votre expérience ainsi que les échanges avec le personnel de l’ASAL et de ses partenaires, 
Est-ce que vos équipements et installations sont appropriés aux spécifications requises pour le 
développement de satellites? 
  
22) Estimez la proportion de la main-d'œuvre impliquée dans des taches de développement de satellites avec 
l’ASAL, pour les catégories suivantes : Management, Opérations, R & D et Engineering. 
 
D. Management du transfert des technologies 
 
23) Est-ce que votre organisation a bénéficié de la collaboration avec l’ASAL pour former son personnel et 
acquérir de nouvelles compétences, pour mettre à jour ses équipements et installations, ou adapter son 
organisation aux nouveaux besoins liés au développement de satellites? 
 
24) Selon vous, quelle est la stratégie que devrait adopter l’ASAL pour inciter votre organisation à participer 
davantage et de transférer efficacement à votre organisation la technologie requise pour le 
développement de satellites? 
 
25) Quel genre de relations avez-vous généralement avec l’ASAL après le projet? Est-ce que ces relations sont 
entretenues par des accords formels, sont-elles intenses, etc.? Comment évoluent-elles? 
 
E. Suggestions finales 
 
26) Avez-vous d'autres marchés dont les besoins peuvent être satisfaits en utilisant les capacités qui ont été 
développées et les connaissances qui ont été acquises au cours de l'expérience de collaboration avec 




27) Est-ce que vous êtes confiant des aptitudes de votre organisation pour apporter le support au 
développement de petits satellites localement? 
 
28) Dans quelle mesure trouvez-vous l'environnement national favorable pour le travail de votre organisation  












Questions on building small satellite capabilities in Algeria 
 
addressed to representatives of foreign companies involved in the process 
 
Research aim: Collection of data in order to gain better understanding of satellite 
technology transfer to Algeria. This will enable Algerians to gain an appreciation on the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms that they have used to build satellite technological 
capabilities, and will provide guidance regarding effective processes for transferring satellite 
technology.  
 
Guidance in responding to questions:  
- The researcher will be interviewing you by himself in a face-to-face meeting to ensure 
proper understanding of questions and responses.  
- Please feel free to use French or English when responding.  
- Feel free to include any oral or written comments, or material deemed relevant or 
supportive to your responses.  





Participant ID:  Date: 
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1) What is your current position and describe your responsibilities and duties within your organisation? 
 
2) Describe your responsibilities with regard to the satellite collaborative project with ASAL?  
 
3) In your view, how close do you find the prior knowledge of ASAL’s engineers to the requirements for 
partaking in the collaborative project? How did you find their selection process? 
 
4) What are the mechanisms used for the evaluation of learning which occurred during the project (e.g. 
metrics used, milestones, targets)? Was your view of learning shared with that of the Algerian part? (i.e. 
the same understanding of the boundaries and the targets/goals of learning)   
 
5) Work packages were used in order to define tasks and activities to be performed by ASAL’s engineers 
during the project. According to some of them, these work packages were sometimes not understood, very 
general and not enough detailed, or too narrowly oriented towards much specialised aspects, or not 
properly balanced (fostering either theoretical or practical aspects), or disregarding the prior knowledge of 
ASAL’s engineers, or even depending upon the mentor’s willingness or availability? In your view, how 
properly were the work packages formulated in accordance with ASAL’s needs?  
 
6) Interviews conducted with some ASAL’s engineers who participated in the collaborative project with your 
company reveal a dissatisfaction with regard to the documentation provided at the end of the project (e.g. 
not complete, not deep, etc.). In your view, what would be the reason of this dissatisfaction? 
 
7) According to ASAL’s representatives, one of the weakest aspects in the collaborative project with your 
company is the training (and skills development) on management of satellite projects. In your view, what 
would be the reason of this?  
 
8) ASAL’s engineers acquired academic and hands-on knowledge during the collaborative project with your 
company. According to them, little was acquired on satellite design. What would be the reason of this 
limitation (e.g. due to restrictions from your company, aspect not offered in the business model of your 
company, aspect not covered by the contract, etc.)?  
 
9) According to ASAL’s engineers, factors such as the working language(s) and idiosyncratic personality of 
engineers (from both sides) involved in the project have influenced significantly the mutual understanding 
between ASAL’s team and your team. To what extent do you agree with this statement?  
 
10) In your view, after the participation of ASAL’s engineers in the project, how close is their knowledge to the 
requirements of developing satellite locally in Algeria?  
 
11) In your view, what has been the priority of ASAL during the project: the acquisition of satellite system and 
its deployment for meeting its needs in terms of satellite images and applications, or learning how to 
develop satellites (completely or partially)? What is the aspect most fostered by the mechanism used for 
carrying out the project? 
 
12) In your view, for starting developing small satellites within ASAL’s facilities, what would be the core 
competencies and functions to develop?  
 
13) Based on your experience during the project, to what extent the formal project contract (between your 
company and ASAL) was representative of the real needs of ASAL? What would be the strategy to adopt 
in the future to avoid inadequacies between contracts and real needs?  
 
14) Based on your experience, how risk-averse do you find ASAL during the project?   
 
15) What kind of relationship do you usually have with your customers after the projects? Are these relations 
maintained through formal agreements, are they intense, etc.? How do they evolve?  
 
16) ASAL intends to build local capabilities for developing small satellites. For this purpose, ASAL should 
acquire from abroad a significant number of physical components and equipment. If some components 
and equipment are subject to restrictive regimes, how would you describe the openness of the 









Questions sur la mise en place de capacités de développement de 
petits satellites en Algérie  
 
adressées aux représentants des entités impliquées dans ce processus 
 
Objectifs de la recherche: Recueillir des données qui permettent de mieux comprendre le 
processus de transfert des technologies satellitaires pour le cas de l’Algérie. Cela permettra 
aux Algériens d'avoir une appréciation sur l'efficacité des mécanismes qu'ils utilisent pour 
mettre en place un potentiel de développement des technologies de petits satellites, et 
fournira des indications sur les processus les plus efficaces à adopter pour transférer les 
technologies satellitaires. 
 
Orientations pour répondre aux questions: 
- Le chercheur lui-même vous interviewera (face-à-face) lors d’une réunion, à convenir, 
pour s’assurer de la bonne compréhension des questions et de la bonne formulation des 
réponses. 
- Utilisez, à votre convenance, le français ou l'anglais au moment de répondre. 
- Vous pouvez faire, à votre convenance, des commentaires, oraux ou écrits, et joindre 
tout document que vous estimeriez pertinent. 
- Toutes les réponses seront traitées de manière confidentielle. Seul le chercheur aura 










1) Quelle est votre poste/position actuel et décrivez vos responsabilités et fonctions au sein de votre 
organisation?  
 
2) Décrivez vos responsabilités par rapport au projet collaboratif de satellite avec l’ASAL?  
 
3) Selon vous, comment trouvez-vous les connaissances préliminaires/antérieures des ingénieurs de l’ASAL 
par rapport aux exigences de participation dans le projet collaboratif ? Comment avez-vous trouvé the 
processus de leur sélection ? 
 
4) Quels sont les mécanismes utilisés pour l'évaluation de l'apprentissage survenant au cours du projet (ex. 
métriques utilisés, jalons, cibles) ? Est-ce que votre vision de l'apprentissage était partagée avec celle de la 
partie algérienne ? (C.-à-d. la même compréhension des limites et des cibles/buts de l'apprentissage) 
 
5)  Des « Work packages » ont été utilisés pour définir les tâches et les activités à réaliser par les ingénieurs de 
l’ASAL pendant le projet. Selon certains de ces ingénieurs, les « Work packages » étaient parfois mal 
compris, très généraux et peu détaillés, ou trop étroitement orientés vers des aspects très spécialisés, ou 
mal équilibrés (favorisant ou bien des aspects théoriques ou pratiques) ou négligeant les connaissances 
antérieures des ingénieurs de l’ASAL, ou même dépendant de la volonté ou de la disponibilité du mentor ? 
Selon vous, dans quelle mesure les « Work packages » ont été formulés en conformité avec les besoins de 
l’ASAL ? 
 
6) Les interviews menées avec certains ingénieurs de l’ASAL qui ont participé au projet de collaboration avec 
votre compagnie révèlent une insatisfaction par rapport à la documentation fournie à la fin du projet (ex. 
incomplète, non profonde, etc.). Selon vous, quelle serait la raison de cette insatisfaction ? 
 
7) Selon les représentants de l’ASAL, l'un des aspects les plus faibles du projet collaboratif avec votre 
compagnie est la formation (et le développement des compétences) dans le management des projets 
satellitaires. Selon vous, quelle serait la raison de cela ? 
 
8) Les ingénieurs de l’ASAL ont acquis des connaissances académiques et pratiques au cours du projet 
collaboratif avec votre compagnie. Selon eux, peu a été acquis sur la conception de satellites. Quelle serait 
la raison de cette limitation (ex. restrictions de votre compagnie, aspects non offerts dans le modèle 
d’affaire ‘Business model’ de votre compagnie, aspects non couverts par le contrat, etc.)? 
 
9) Selon les ingénieurs de l’ASAL, des facteurs tels que la(les) langue(s) de travail et la personnalité 
particulière des ingénieurs (des deux côtés) impliqués dans le projet ont influencé de manière significative 
la compréhension mutuelle entre l'équipe algérienne et votre équipe. Dans quelle mesure vous êtes 
d'accord avec cet avis ? 
 
10) Selon vous, après la participation des ingénieurs de l’ASAL dans le projet, comment trouvez-vous leurs 
compétences par rapport aux exigences de développement de satellites localement en Algérie ?  
 
11) Selon vous, quelle a été la priorité de l’ASAL durant le projet : l'acquisition d’un système satellitaire et son 
déploiement pour répondre à ses besoins en termes d'images satellitaires et d’applications, ou apprendre à 
développer des satellites (totalement ou partiellement) ? Quel est l'aspect le plus favorisé par le 
mécanisme utilisé pour la réalisation du projet ? 
 
12) Selon vous, pour commencer le développement de petits satellites en niveau de l’ASAL, quelles seraient 
les compétences et les fonctions de base à développer ?  
 
13) Sur la base de votre expérience durant le projet, dans quelle mesure le contrat formel du projet (entre 
votre compagnie et l’ASAL) était représentatif des besoins réels de l’ASAL ? Quelle serait la stratégie à 
adopter dans le futur pour éviter les inadéquations entre les contrats et les besoins réels ?  
 
14) Sur la base de votre expérience, comment qualifiez-vous l’aversion au risque de l’ASAL ?  
 
15) Quel genre de relations avez-vous généralement avec vos clients après les projets ? Est-ce que ces 
relations sont entretenues par des accords formels, sont-elles intenses, etc. ? Comment évoluent-elles ? 
 
16) L'ASAL entend construire des capacités locales pour le développement de petits satellites. A cet effet, 
l’ASAL devrait acquérir de l'étranger un nombre important de composants physiques et d'équipements. Si 
certains composants et équipements sont soumis à des régimes restrictifs, comment qualifiez-vous 
l'ouverture du marché international pour offrir d'autres alternatives ?  
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Questions on building small satellite capabilities in Algeria 
 
addressed to representatives of entities involved in the process 
 
Research aim: Collection of data in order to gain better understanding of satellite 
technology transfer to Algeria. This will enable Algerians to gain an appreciation on the 
effectiveness of the mechanisms that they have used to build satellite technological 
capabilities, and will provide guidance regarding effective processes for transferring satellite 
technology.  
 
Guidance in responding to questions:  
- The researcher will be interviewing you by himself in a face-to-face meeting to ensure 
proper understanding of questions and responses.  
- Please feel free to use Arabic, French or English when responding.  
- Feel free to include any oral or written comments, or material deemed relevant or 
supportive to your responses.  
- All responses will be treated as confidential with only the researcher having access to 
them.  
 
Sections covered:  
A. General information 
B. Learning effort 
C. Technology transfer management 








A. General information 
 
1) The socio-economic objectives are part of the space programme objectives in Algeria, are nation 
inspiration, nation pride and confidence building amongst people explicitly part of these objectives? 
 
2) One of the stated goals of the Algerian space programme is to progressively develop small satellite 
capabilities. The successive collaborative projects with foreign partners (e.g. Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, 
Alsat-1B) have been used as a mechanism, what are the targeted progressive phases? 
 
B. Learning effort 
 
3) As part of your strategy of small satellite technology development, indicate whether the objective is to 
develop components of satellite systems; develop capabilities to integrate small satellites from 
components developed elsewhere, or a mixture of the two?  If the mixture is targeted, which core 
competencies and functions could be developed within your organisation, which could be developed locally 
in Algeria but outside your organisation, and which could be imported from foreign firms?   
 
4) What are the strategies towards the development of local actors (public and private actors)? What are the 
actions taken for this purpose (e.g. identifying them, surveying them, training them, transferring 
technology to them, helping them upgrading their facilities, incentives, etc.)?  
 
 
For developing technological capabilities, three activities are often jointly fostered: Research, 
Development and Engineering, wherein:   
- “Research” refers to basic research 
- “Development” refers to translating technical and scientific knowledge into products, processes, and 
services 
- “Engineering” refers to very practical aspects 
 
5) How would you describe the national policies in terms of Research, Development and Engineering 
promotion and their impacts on satellite technology? How would you describe the intensity (e.g. 
investment, etc.) and outputs of actions stemming from these policies? Are they towards basic research, 
applied aspects, or more practical aspects (engineering)?  
 
6) What is the strategy and what are the actions undertaken for developing “Research”, “Development”, and 
“Engineering” activities in your organisation, notably those related to the needs of small satellite 
development? How important is each of these activities (i.e. Research, Development, and Engineering) for 
your organisation objectives? What are the actors in charge of Research promotion, Development 
promotion, and Engineering development with regard to satellite technology? 
 
7) What is the strategy towards developing indigenous Engineering sector able to provide skills needed for 
satellite development and/or integration?  
 
8) How would you describe the national labour market with regard to the development of satellite 
technology? Do you envisage recruiting from the international market (Algerian abroad or foreigners)?  
 
C. Technology transfer management 
 
9) Collaborative projects are a mechanism that has been used for the last 15 years by your organisation to 
develop satellite technological capability? In your view, how is this mechanism evaluated, what are its 
strengths and weaknesses, and to what extent has it met Algerian needs and complied with Algerian 
objectives? Considering the level reached of local capabilities and limitations of collaborative projects 
mechanism to go further, does ASAL envisage adopting new mechanisms (e.g.  Licence production, 
relocation of foreign company activities, use of FDI-Foreign Direct Investment, etc.) for achieving higher 




10) As technology transfer from abroad is an important way for developing satellite technology in Algeria, 
and in either technology transfer relationships or technology intensive industries, managing intellectual 
property issues (e.g. patents, etc.) is important for protecting foreign partners’ intellectual property and 
local innovation effort. How are these issues managed in your organisation?  
 
11) Sometimes, diversifying partners at international level can increase opportunities for technology transfer 
and overcome certain setbacks. To what extent does this apply to small satellite development in Algeria? 
 
D. Final suggestion 
 
12) How would you describe the needs of both local and international markets in terms of small satellite 
technology (components and systems market)? How would you describe the trend of small satellite 
markets (whether it evolves to suppliers markets, buyers markets, etc.)?    
 
13) In your view, do you have other market technological needs that can be met by using the satellite 
capabilities under development and the knowledge acquired? (e.g. aeronautic, medical technologies, 
etc.) Are you envisaging addressing these markets?   
 
14) How would you describe the local effort to develop small satellite? Is there more emphasis on the market 
development (users of satellite images, etc.) or satellite system development? 
 
15) In your view, what is (would be) the guidance for Algerian efforts in developing small satellites: to 













Questions sur la mise en place de capacités de développement de 
petits satellites en Algérie  
 
adressées aux représentants des entités impliquées dans ce processus 
 
Objectifs de la recherche: Recueillir des données qui permettent de mieux comprendre le 
processus de transfert des technologies satellitaires pour le cas de l’Algérie. Cela permettra 
aux Algériens d'avoir une appréciation sur l'efficacité des mécanismes qu'ils utilisent pour 
mettre en place un potentiel de développement des technologies de petits satellites, et 
fournira des indications sur les processus les plus efficaces à adopter pour transférer les 
technologies satellitaires. 
 
Orientations pour répondre aux questions: 
- Le chercheur lui-même vous interviewera (face-à-face) lors d’une réunion, à convenir, 
pour s’assurer de la bonne compréhension des questions et de la bonne formulation des 
réponses. 
- Utilisez, à votre convenance, l'arabe, le français ou l'anglais au moment de répondre. 
- Vous pouvez faire, à votre convenance, des commentaires, oraux ou écrits, et joindre 
tout document que vous estimeriez pertinent. 
- Toutes les réponses seront traitées de manière confidentielle. Seul le chercheur aura 




A. Informations générales  
B. Effort d’apprentissage 
C. Management du transfert des technologies 








A. Informations générales  
 
1) Les objectifs socio-économiques font partie des objectifs du programme spatial en Algérie, est-ce-que 
l'inspiration de la nation, la fierté de la nation, redonner confiance au peuple font explicitement partie de 
ces objectifs? 
 
2) L'un des buts déclarés du programme spatial algérien est de développer en phase et progressivement des 
capacités de développement de petits satellites. Les projets collaboratifs successifs avec des partenaires 
étrangers (ex. Alsat-1, Alsat-2A, Alsat-2B, Alsat-1B) ont été utilisés comme mécanisme. Quelles sont ces 
phases progressives ciblées ?  
 
B. Effort d’apprentissage 
 
3) Dans votre stratégie de développement de technologies de petits satellites, Est-ce que les objectifs sont de 
développer des composants de systèmes de satellites; développer des capacités à intégrer de petits 
satellites à partir de composants développés ailleurs, ou un mélange? Si le mélange est ciblé, quelles 
seraient les compétences clés et les fonctions de base à développer au sein de votre organisation, celles à 
développer localement en Algérie, mais en dehors de votre organisation, et celles à importer de l’étranger? 
 
4) Quelles sont les stratégies en faveur du développement des acteurs locaux, gouvernementaux ou privés? 
Quelles sont les mesures prises à cet effet (ex. identifier les acteurs, les auditer, les former, transférer la 
technologie pour eux, les aider à mettre à niveau leurs installations, les mesures incitatives, etc.)?  
 
 
Pour développer des capacités technologiques, trois activités sont souvent conjointement encouragées: la 
« Recherche », le « Développement » et « l’Ingénierie ou Engineering », où: 
- "Recherche" fait référence à la recherche fondamentale 
- "Développement" fait référence à la traduction de connaissances techniques et scientifiques en 
produits, procédés et services 
- " Ingénierie ou Engineering" fait référence à des aspects très pratiques 
 
5) Comment qualifiez-vous les politiques nationales en matière de Recherche, de Développement et 
d’Engineering et leurs impacts sur la technologie des satellites? Comment qualifiez-vous l'intensité (ex. 
investissement, etc.) des actions qui en découlent et leurs résultats? Sont-elles orientées vers la 
Recherche fondamentale, recherche appliquée, ou vers les aspects les plus pratiques? 
 
6) Quelles sont les actions entreprises pour développer les activités de « Recherche », « développement », et 
« Engineering » dans votre organisation notamment en relations avec les besoins de développement de 
petits satellites? quelle est l'importance de chacune de ces activités (« Recherche », « Développement », et 
« Engineering ») pour les objectifs de votre organisation? Quels sont les acteurs en charge de la promotion 
de la Recherche, du Développement, et de l’Engineering en matière de technologie des satellites? 
 
7) Quelle est la stratégie pour le développement d’un secteur local de l’Engineering en mesure de fournir les 
compétences nécessaires pour le développement et / ou l'intégration des satellites? 
 
8) Comment qualifiez-vous la marché national du travail par rapport au développement des technologies 
satellitaires? Envisagez-vous le recrutement du marché international (Algériens à l’étranger ou étrangers)? 
 
C. Management du transfert des technologies 
 
9) Les projets collaboratifs ont été utilisés comme mécanisme de développement de capacités 
technologiques satellitaires les 15 dernières années par votre organisation, comment évaluez-vous ce 
mécanisme, quelles sont ses points forts et ses points faibles, et dans quelle mesure il a répondu aux 
besoins et objectifs algériens? Considérant le niveau atteint des capacités locales et des limitations des 
projets collaboratifs de satellites comme mécanisme pour aller plus loin dans le transfert, est-ce que 
468 
 
l’ASAL envisage l'adoption de nouveaux mécanismes (ex. Licence de production, délocalisation des 
activités d'entreprises étrangères, Utilisation d’investissements directs étrangers IDE, etc.) pour des 
niveaux de réalisations plus élevés? 
 
10) Compte tenu du fait que le transfert de technologies de l’étranger est crucial pour le développement de 
technologies satellitaire, et compte tenu du fait que dans les relations de transferts de technologies et les 
industries à forte intensité technologique, la gestion des questions de propriété intellectuelle (ex. les 
brevets, etc.) est importante pour protéger la propriété intellectuelle des partenaires étrangers et l’effort 
d’innovation local. Comment ces questions sont gérées dans votre organisation?  
 
11) Parfois, la diversification des partenaires au niveau international peut accroître les possibilités de 
transfert de technologie et surmonter certains obstacles (dépendance), dans quelle mesure cela 
s’applique pour le développement des petits satellites en Algérie? 
 
D. Suggestions finales 
 
12) Comment qualifiez-vous les besoins des marchés, local et international, en termes de technologie de 
petits satellites (marché des composants et des systèmes)? Comment qualifiez-vous la tendance dans les 
marchés des petits satellites (évolution vers des marchés dominés par les fournisseurs, des marchés 
dominés par des acheteurs, etc.) ? 
 
13) Selon vous, avez-vous d'autres marchés dont les besoins technologiques peuvent être satisfaits en 
utilisant les capacités qui sont en cours de développement et les connaissances qui ont été acquises (ex. 
aéronautique, technologies médicales, etc.)? Est-ce que vous envisagez de vous adresser à ces marchés? 
 
14) Comment qualifiez-vous l’effort national en matière de développement de petits satellites de 
télédétection, est-ce que cet effort a été plutôt tiré par le développement du marché (utilisateurs des 
images satellites, etc.) ou est-ce qu’il est plutôt poussé par le développement de systèmes satellitaires 
(développement de composants et de systèmes satellites)? 
 
15) Selon vous, quel est (serait) la direction des efforts algériens dans le développement de petits satellites, 
est-ce vers le développement de composants et de systèmes favorisant le remplacement des 









Appendix 3-a: Access to data and ethical considerations- Support letter 
 
 
Date: 19 February 2016 
 
To whom it may concern 
 
PhD Research: An evaluation of satellite technology transfer to developing countries: A 
case study of Algeria.  
 
Technology transfer from developed to developing countries is seen as a catalyst for 
accelerating the technological capabilities of developing countries. Space technologies, 
traditionally the reserve of the major powers, were not so much concerned with this debate. 
However, a new international dynamic has emerged over the two last decades. It consists in 
the rise of new international mechanisms, so-called satellite collaborative projects, allowing 
countries, such as Algeria, within a relatively affordable budget, to access satellite 
technology from abroad and start building their own satellite capability.  
 
Mr. Ahmed AYAD is pursuing a PhD research on the evaluation of satellite technology 
transfer to developing countries, with an emphasis on the Algerian case. This research is 
funded by the Algerian Ministry of Defence.  
 
As part of his research, Mr. Ahmed AYAD will conduct a fieldwork in order to collect 
empirical data from a population that is located in Algeria, UK, and France. Sets of 
interviews and questionnaires will be addressed to this population which is composed of 
individuals involved in the Algerian satellite projects, at technical, middle and senior 
managerial levels along with representatives of foreign companies involved in this process.  
 
Beside the fact that this research allow better understanding of satellite technology transfer 
dynamics, it enables Algerians to gain appreciation on how effective are the mechanisms 
they used to build their satellite technological capabilities, and it provides guidance regarding 
effective processes to transfer satellite technology.  
 
For these reasons, it would therefore be appreciated if you provide appropriate assistance 





Professor Ron Matthews 
Researcher’s supervisor 









Appendix 3-b: Access to data and ethical considerations- Information sheet 
 
Information sheet for participants partaking in the research interviews 
 
Introduction: 
My name is Ahmed AYAD and this research forms part of my PhD study at the University of Cranfield 
- The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom. You are invited to take part in this study. Before you 
agree to do so, it is important that you understand the purpose and nature of the research and what 
your participation will involve, if you agree. 
Please read the following carefully along with the enclosed Consent Form. Please do not hesitate to 
ask clarification if anything is not clear or you wish to seek additional information. Contact details are 
provided at the end of this information sheet 
For your information, the Algerian Ministry of Defence is funding this PhD research. 
 
The purpose of this investigation: 
This investigation is part of a PhD study aiming to evaluate small satellite capability-building in 
Algeria. This PhD value is to understand better the phenomenon of building small satellite capability 
through collaborative projects, and the effectiveness of technology transfer from developed to 
developing countries with regard to small satellite technology.  
The investigation will provide empirical data that will be used in the PhD study. Sets of interviews will 
be employed to collect data from a population that is located in Algeria, in the UK and in France. This 
population is composed of individuals involved in the Algerian small satellite industry, at technical, 
middle and senior managerial levels along with representatives of foreign companies involved in this 
process.  For these reasons, your assistance will be crucial in providing insight to explore this issue. 
 
Do you have to take part? 
Your participation is entirely voluntary. If you do agree to take part, you will be asked to sign the 
enclosed Consent Form. After your signature, you can still withdraw at any time before or during the 
interview, without giving reason. If you withdraw, any data that you have given will not be used in the 
study. The withdrawal will not have any ill-effects on you. 
I will be interviewing you by myself. I will be the only person to hear you. However, you can allow any 
third person to be present during the meeting if you feel the need. 
 
What will you do in the project?  
If you agree to take part in the study and sign the Consent Form, you will be interviewed for about one 
and a half hours. The interview will take place in the location and at the time that are convenient to 
you. During the interview, I will be taking notes. Also, you will have the choice as to whether or not 
accept that the interview will be audio recorded.  
 
Will my participation be confidential? 
All interviews will be treated as confidential with only the researcher having access to the original 
data. Your identity will not be revealed and you will remain anonymous. For instance, you will be only 
identified as Participant A, B, C, etc.  
The result from data collection will be incorporated into my PhD thesis. No participants will be named 
in any publication associated to the research.    
In addition, upon your request, you can get a copy of the audio recorded interview or the interview 






Researcher contact details: 
Ahmed AYAD 





Tel: +44 (0) 7466333647 
+44 (0) 1793 785026 
 
Researcher’s supervisor contact details: 
Ron Matthews 



















Appendix 3-c: Access to data and ethical considerations- Consent Form 
(English Version) 
 
Interview Consent Form 
 
A research project undertaken by Ahmed AYAD 
PhD student in Technology Management, 
Cranfield Defence and Security, 
Cranfield University - The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 
October 2014 – Mars 2018 
 
Interview with ………………………………………………………………….. (Please insert name)  
 
 
 I confirm that I have received, read and understood the information for the above project and 
the researcher has answered any queries.  
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw from the project 
at any time, without having to give a reason and without any consequences.  
 I understand that I can withdraw my data from the study at any time.  
 I understand that any information recorded in the investigation will remain confidential and no 
information that identifies me will be made publicly available.  
 I understand that parts of what I say may end up being used in an anonymised form in future 
research publications  
 I consent to being a participant in the project  
 I consent to being audio recorded as part of the project : yes / no  
 
 










Appendix 3-d: Access to data and ethical considerations- Consent Form 
(French Version) 
 
Formulaire de consentement pour interview 
 
Un projet de recherche mené par Ahmed AYAD 
Etudiant PhD en Management de la Technologie, 
Cranfield Defence and Security, 
Cranfield University - The Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 
Octobre 2014 - Mars 2018 
 
 
Interview de .............................................................................................. .. (Veuillez insérer le nom) 
 
 Je confirme avoir reçu, lu et compris les informations relatives au projet ci-dessus mentionné 
et que le chercheur a répondu à toutes mes questions. 
 Je comprends que je peux retirer les réponses et données de l'étude à tout moment. 
 Je comprends que toutes les informations collectées dans l'étude resteront confidentielles et 
aucune information, par laquelle je pourrais être identifié, ne sera rendue publique. 
 Je comprends que certaines parties de ces informations peuvent être utilisées d’une manière 
anonyme dans des futures publications de recherche. 
 Je consens à participer à cette étude. 
 Je consens à être enregistré en audio dans le cadre de cette étude : oui / non. 
 
 
Veuillez signer ici: 
 
Date: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
